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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis seeks to place drama of the Caroline commercial theatre in its 
contemporary political and legal context; particularly, it addresses the ways in 
which the struggle for supremacy between the royal prerogative, common law and 
local custom is constructed and negotiated in plays of the period.  
 
It argues that as the reign of Charles I progresses, the divine right and absolute 
power of the monarchy on stage begins to lose its authority, as playwrights, 
particularly Massinger and Brome, present a decline from divinity into the 
presentation of an arbitrary man who seeks to impose and increase his authority by 
enforcing obedience to selfish and wilful actions and demands.  This decline from 
divinity, I argue, allows for the rise of a competing legitimate legal authority in the 
form of common law. 
 
Engaging with the contemporary discourse of custom, reason and law which 
pervades legal tracts of the period such as Coke’s Institutes and Reports and Davies’ 
‘Preface Dedicatory’ to Le Primer Report des Cases & Matters en Ley resolues & 
ii 
adiudges en les Courts del Roy en Ireland, drama by Brome, Jonson, Massinger and 
Shirley presents arbitrary absolutism as madness, and adherence to customary 
common law as reason which restores order. In this climate, the drama suggests, 
royal manipulation of the law for personal ends, of which Charles I was often 
accused, destabilises law and legal authority. 
 
This destabilisation of legal authority is examined in a broader context in plays set 
in areas outwith London, geographically distant from central authority.  The thesis 
places these plays in the context of Charles I’s attempts to centralise local law 
enforcement through such publications as the Book of Orders.  When maintaining 
order in the provinces came into conflict with central legislation, the local officials 
exercised what Keith Wrightson describes as ‘two concepts of order’, turning a 
blind eye to certain activities when strict enforcement of law would create rather 
than dissolve local tensions.  In both attempting to insist on unity between the centre 
and the provinces through tighter control of local officials, and dividing the centre 
from the provinces in the dissolution of Parliament, Charles’s government was, the 
plays suggest, in danger not only of destabilising and decentralising legal authority 
but of fragmenting it. 
 
This thesis argues that drama provides a medium whereby the politico-legal debates 
of the period may be presented to, and debated by, a wider audience than the more 
technical contemporary legal arguments, and, during Charles I’s personal rule, the 
theatre became a public forum for debate when Parliament was unavailable. 
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Introduction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Prerogative Royall, I take two wayes:  1. Either to be an act of meere will 
and pleasure, above, or beside Reason or Law: Or, an act of dispensation, 
beside, or against the letter of the Law. 
Assert. 1.  That which the Royalists call the Prerogative Royall of 
Princes, is the salt of Absolute Power; and it is a supreme and highest power 
of a King, as a King, to doe above, without, or contrary to a Law, or Reason: 
which is unreasonable. 
1. When Gods word speaketh of the power of Kings and Judges, 
Deut. 17.15, 16, 17. Deut. I. 15, 16, 17. and elsewhere, there is not any 
footstep, or ground for such a power: and therefore (if we speake according 
to conscience) there is no such thing in the world: And because Royalists 
cannot give us any warrant, it is to be rejected.  (Rutherford, 1644,192-93) 
 
 
The reign of Charles I saw significant changes in the ways that legal 
authority was perceived.  An increased acceptance of established law as a legitimate 
authority independent from the king was demonstrated in Charles’s trial in 1648, 
under a law to which some argued he could not be subject.  The relative positions of 
prerogative and law that had been under debate for some time were reassessed in 
heightened controversy as Charles ruled without Parliament during the 1630s and 
often in conflict with the spirit, if not the letter, of the law. Whilst legal and political 
historians have long noted the importance of the politics of law in the period, it has 
2 
been conspicuously neglected in studies of Caroline drama.  The aim of this thesis is 
to supply this omission, placing drama from 1625-1642 within the politico-legal 
context of its production, and in doing so not only emphasise the contemporary 
legal engagement of playwrights of the commercial theatre - particularly Massinger, 
Brome, Jonson, Shirley and Ford – but also suggest for the theatre a position of 
political importance in providing a forum for the public discussion of such issues.  
 
 
Life and Law 
 
Law defines relationships: person to person, person to property, individual to 
State, and as such overarches both the social and political world.  Indeed, historians 
have argued that ‘law was perhaps the most important framework for understanding 
seventeenth century politics and society’ (Hughes, 1991, 78).  Levels of litigation 
increased from the Elizabethan period onwards, and many people of all social strata 
came into contact with the law through local justices and assize courts, court 
mediation or litigation.  This, Michael Lane argues, ‘must have produced at the very 
least a veneer of legal knowledge’ (Lane, 1981, 275).
1
  There is evidence, he 
continues, that a more ‘substantive and substantial’ legal knowledge was part of the 
common culture: private libraries of people from a variety of backgrounds and 
professions contained a significant number of legal texts, from the rich and 
powerful to the middle and lower status merchants, shopkeepers and small yeoman 
farmers (Lane, 1981, 275). 
                                                
1
 For information on the increase in litigation see Baker, 1985, 41 and passim. Lane also notes that 
we should not assume ordinary people went to court only in connection with prosecutions: ‘Minor 
courts mediated in a variety of disputes, disagreements and simple uncertainties that we now regard 
as either inappropriate or too trivial to warrant seeking legal intervention’ (1981, 276). 
3 
 
The number of gentlemen entering the Inns of Court also increased during 
this period. Wilfred Prest notes that although numbers at the Inns had been rising 
from around 1530 and reached a peak during the reign of James VI and I, ‘there is a 
rally in the 1630s and very little weakening before the outbreak of the Civil War’ 
(Prest, 1972, 5-7).   Particularly important to the debates over common law and 
prerogative power in the period, and to the argument of this thesis, is the fact that 
the Inns, unlike the Universities that mostly taught only civil and canon law, 
educated their students in common law.
 2
   Lectures were given on subjects of law to 
the newer members (inner barristers) by the more senior members (readers or 
benchers), and the students participated in moots and debates on points of law.
3
  
Students at the Inns were, then, well prepared to debate ‘interpretations of the law 
by citing the maxims, precedents and principles which were the authorities of his 
craft’ (Prest, 1972, 116).  That a desire to attend an institution which provided an 
education in law should increase during a period of intense disagreement over 
legitimate legal authority exacerbated by Charles’s personal rule cannot be a 
coincidence, whether the education or the discontent with royal legal activities came 
first.
4
  Increased attendance at the Inns brought a broader spectrum of legally 
educated men, and many of these men took up positions at court or in the House of 
Commons.  Lane notes that in 1593, two out of five members of the House had 
                                                
2
 For John Davies, the Inns were ‘the most flourishing & honourable Academy of gentlemen, that 
ever was established in any nation, for the study & learning of the Municipall lawes thereof’ (1615, 
sig. *1v).   
3 Edward Coke commented that ‘Each of the Houses of Court [the Inns] consist of Readers above 
twentie: Of Utterbarristers above thrice so many: Of yong Gentlemen, about the number of eight or 
nine score, who there spend their time in Study of the Law, and in commendable exercises fit for 
Gentlemen’ (1635b, sig. D4v). For a fuller discussion of the educational activities of the Inns of 
Court see Prest, 1972, chapter VI.  J.H. Baker’s The Common Law Tradition: Lawyers, Books and 
the Law discusses in detail the development of learning at the Inns in ‘Part 1: Lawyers’ (2000, 
particularly chapters 1 and 3). 
4
 It was not the personal rule alone that caused discontent; James VI and I, Butler notes, ruled 
without Parliament for ten years (1984, 13).   
4 
received some legal education; by 1621 this increased to half, and by the 1640 Long 
Parliament, more than six in ten Commons members had received some legal 
education, although Lane does include a caveat that far fewer than this had actually 
been called as barristers (Lane, 1981, 277).      
 
Not all of those who studied at the Inns of Courts pursued law as a 
profession.  The Inns were not structured legal colleges as such; they more closely 
resembled clubs or societies where young gentlemen went to associate with others 
in London.  Whilst there were lectures on subjects of law, expected attendance was 
not enforced and many young men went to the Inns to round off their education. 
Indeed, the Inns provided not only the facilities to study law, but attendance was a 
route to high office at Court, as the Inns also provided the opportunity to take part in 
other events which gave training for the well-rounded gentleman and would-be 
courtier (Finkelpearl, 1969, 51-2). One of these was the performance of Christmas 
revels, which often included masques, and were sometimes performed at court.
 5
  
The interests of the members of the Inns in theatrical activity were not only in 
performance; they were also an important source of patronage for players and 
playwrights, ‘mak[ing] regular use of professional companies in their 
entertainments’ (Neill, 2007).  Several of the Caroline playwrights to be discussed 
here also had connections with the Inns.
 6
  Indeed, that the members of the Inns 
                                                
5
 See Wigfall Green (passim) and Finkelpearl (1969, Chapters 3 and 4), for detailed descriptions of 
some of the Inns’ revels, and their performance for the Court.   
6 As a member of the Middle Temple from 1602, John Ford should not, perhaps, be described as a 
layman.  James Shirley was admitted to Grey’s Inn in 1634, possibly because of his work on the 
masque The Triumph of Peace which the Inns of Court presented to the King and Queen that year 
(Leech, 1967, 278).  Philip Massinger, although not a member of the Inns himself, had friends there 
(Garrett, 2007) as he dedicated The Picture (1630) to ‘My Honored, and selected friends of the 
Noble society of the Inner Temple’ (The Picture, sig. A3r).  Jonson was a friend of such political 
thinkers as John Selden and Robert Cotton (Butler, 1992, 171), and as Brome was closely connected 
with Jonson it is likely that he mixed in similar circles, or at least had access to these political and 
legal ideas. 
5 
were avid supporters of the theatre and readers of drama is clear from Francis 
Lenton’s suggestion in The Young Gallant’s Whirligig (1629) that the Inns’ students 
preferred Jonson’s ‘book of playes’ to their law books (Gurr, 1996, 139), and from 
records which show that at the Inner Temple, Edward Heath purchased ten play-
books between 1629 and 1631, and John Greene paid numerous visits to the 
Blackfriars and the Cockpit whilst attending Lincoln’s Inn (Prest, 1972, 169).   
 
Gurr notes that under Charles I, ‘playgoing became socially more 
respectable than it had ever been’, and that ‘when the literate and the politically 
eminent began to pay serious attention to plays, it was inevitable that matters of 
both state and cultural policy should enter them more strongly’ (1996, 138 and 139).  
With increased attendance at the Inns, legal knowledge widespread in society, and 
the politics of law raging around the Caroline court, it is unsurprising that debates 
over law and legitimate legal authority should appear in drama of the period.  What 
is surprising, given this social and legal context, the ‘immediate proximity between 
the professional worlds of theatre and law in the cultural geography of London’ 
(Mukherji, 2006, 3), and the dramatic explorations of the politics of law including 
wide-ranging comment on particular laws and proclamations in Caroline plays, is 
the paucity of comment on these issues in literary criticism.
7
   
 
 
 
 
                                                
7
 For example, Brome’s The Court Beggar presents issues concerning Projectors, and Shirley’s The 
Lady of Pleasure deals with Charles I’s proclamation of 1632, ‘Commaunding the gentry to keep 
their Residence at the Mansions in the Country, and forbidding them to make their Habitations in 
London and places adjoining’. 
6 
Interpreting Caroline Drama 
 
 Martin Butler’s seminal monograph, Theatre and Crisis 1632-1642, rescued 
Caroline theatre from the traditional view which presented drama of the period as 
unconcerned by the political issues of its time, ‘withdrawing into a world of 
escapism, fantasy and romance, designed to divert its courtly auditors from the 
reality of their impending doom’.  Butler argues that, instead: 
 
Drama of the 1630s, perhaps more than any earlier drama, did persistently 
engage in debating the political issues of its day, and repeatedly articulated 
attitudes which can only be labelled ‘opposition’ or ‘puritan’.  (Butler, 1984, 
1-2) 
 
He makes a distinction between professional and courtly drama in the extent to 
which they engage with contemporary political issues, but maintains that criticism 
of court policies can be found in both arenas.  He is at pains to point out, however, 
that ‘“Cavalier” and “puritan”, “court” and “country”’, terms which have previously 
been used as polarised opposites in discussions of Caroline politics and plays, were 
‘not fixed norms of sensibility or behaviour to one or other of which every 
individual conformed’ (Butler, 1984, 5).  Thus far, I take no issue with his 
arguments; where I diverge from Butler is in terms of the drama’s presentation of 
monarchic authority.  Throughout the period 1632-1642 Butler maintains that drama 
did not question Charles’ power or authority, but insists, rather, that what he faced 
were problems of government (Butler, 1984, 13, 16).  This argument fails to take 
into account the many challenges, political and dramatic, to Charles’ authority in 
terms of law.  
 
 
7 
By this I do not wish to suggest that Caroline England, particularly its 
theatres, was overflowing with republicans; indeed, there is a notable but deliberate 
absence of republicans in my readings of the plays. The modern meaning of 
republic, as a state in which supreme power rests in the people and their elected 
representatives or officers, as opposed to one governed by a king or similar ruler, 
was current in the period, but, as Sanders argues, it was also used to refer to the 
community of the commonweal, and had an inflected meaning in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries which was more constitutional: ‘a republic implied a mixed 
form of government […] even a monarchy – a limited accountable monarchy – 
might be republican in its politics’ (Sanders, 1998, 2-3), so the slipperiness of the 
term makes its use problematic.
8
    I have, then, avoided republics and republicans 
in the chapters which follow, in part because of the ambiguousness of these terms, 
and in part to avoid temptation or accusations of reading with hindsight in the 
knowledge that the Civil War and Interregnum were to come. No one in 1629 knew 
how long Charles would rule without parliament; no one in the mid 1630s knew 
there would be Civil War within a decade; and no one in the 1630s anticipated an 
English republic.
9
  Revisionist and post-revisionist historians of the period, although 
they differ on ideas of overarching ideological differences, do agree that the Civil 
War, and the subsequent execution of the monarch, was in no way inevitable.   
 
                                                
8
 For a discussion of republicanism in a variety of meanings and interpretations in relation to Ben 
Jonson’s plays, see Julie Sanders’ Ben Jonson’s Theatrical Republics. 
9 There is evidence of thinking that a republic without a monarch was at least possible in the 
documents that were prepared by members of Elizabeth I’s Privy Council whilst there was concern 
for her safety from the supporters of Mary, Queen of Scots.   Usually when the monarch died, the 
Privy Council and Parliament disbanded and were recalled or reconstituted by the new monarch. 
Under the proposals put forward in a document which was never approved by the Queen or passed in 
Parliament, Burghley proposed that in the event of the Queen’s sudden death without named heir, the 
Privy Council or Parliament or both would not disband and, with judicial officials, would rule in a 
‘quasi-republican state of emergency’.  For a detailed discussion, see Collinson, 1987, passim, 
quotation on 418. 
8 
This is not to say that there was no republican thinking in the period. 
Markku Peltonen’s Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Political 
Thought 1570-1640 traces republican discourse as an alternative set of ideas to 
those concerning absolutism and the ancient constitution, arguing that: 
 
Although classical republicanism as a constitutional goal was not fully 
developed in early modern England, a theory of citizenship, public virtue 
and true nobility based essentially on the classical humanist and republican 
traditions, was taken up, studied and fully endorsed throughout the period. 
(Peltonen, 1995, 12) 
 
The only true nobility, humanist republican thought argued, is found in pursuing the 
vita activa, undertaking virtuous acts for the good of the commonwealth.
10
 Such a 
pursuit was not incompatible with support for a strong monarchy (Peltonen, 1995, 
165), and thus does not necessarily imply the advocation of rule without a monarch.  
Nevertheless, a strain of republican thought was evident in literature of the period, 
particularly in poetry.
 11
  Caroline drama, however, whatever it might suggest about 
tyrannous monarchs, legitimate legal actions, parliamentary activity or 
constitutional monarchy, does not advocate government without a King.  There is a 
possible exception to this in James Shirley’s The Traytor, in which Lorenzo, the 
Duke’s kinsman and favourite, uses republican ideas of nobility and active virtue set 
against the corruption and vice of the court to persuade Sciarrha to help him kill the 
Duke.  Sciarrha believes his promises for a virtuous government but it is clear to the 
audience that Lorenzo’s republican rallying is merely a ruse to gain support; his 
government would have been as corrupt as the Duke.  At the end of the play, with 
the Duke, Lorenzo and Sciarrha all dead, Cosimo, as ‘the next /Of blood’ (L1v) 
                                                
10 For a full discussion, see Peltonen, 1995, passim, especially Chapter 3.  The idea of the virtuous 
citizen leading the vita activa is set against the scholastic idea of the vita contemplativa which 
involved seclusion from public and political life (Peltonen, 1995, 144 and passim). 
11
 For a detailed discussion, see David Norbrook’s Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric 
and Politics 1627-1660. 
9 
becomes the ruler of Florence.  Although the idea of a republic is posited, the play is 
not able, finally, to institute this kind of government.  
 
Whilst arguments for the vita activa of classical humanism and 
republicanism were developed under James VI and I, Peltonen notes that the 
‘humanist tradition did not have as strong an ideological significance in the latter 
part of the 1620s’, suggesting that one of the reasons for this was that ‘the real 
issues at stake […] were such that a juristic vocabulary and more particularly one of 
the ancient constitution proved perhaps more efficacious in countering the king’s 
policy’ (1995, 286 and 288).  The challenges presented to Charles’ authority in law 
were not challenges to his position as monarch, but rather to his ability to act above, 
beyond or outwith the established laws of the country; it was a debate about the 
nature of kingship, not about whether there should be a king.  One of the aims of 
this thesis is to highlight the ways in which debates over the extent of legitimate 
monarchical legal authority were played out on the Caroline stage. 
 
Following from Butler’s work, Ira Clark’s Professional Playwrights: 
Massinger, Ford, Shirley and Brome proposes to enlarge ‘Butler’s focus on political 
issues such as absolutism and social mobility, so as to include more social concerns, 
mainly family and gender relations’ (Clark, 1992, 6).  Clark devotes a separate 
chapter to each of his chosen dramatists, and in line with his more social than 
political approach, he places the dramatists in their own social and theatrical 
context, first discussing their friendships and patrons, then giving a brief overview 
of the social and political issues raised in their works, before analysing one play 
from each dramatist which he sees as representative.  The focus holding these 
10 
individual discussions together is his analysis of characters, which examines the 
way that society constructs individuals’ social roles and how, conversely, these 
expected roles construct society.  Where my work touches on his is perhaps in my 
discussion of the construction of the legal role of the King, court, lawyers and 
Parliament in Caroline drama; his concern, however, is primarily with the 
representation of the socio-political issues of gender, gentility and social mobility, 
and although he does make reference to issues of absolutism and sovereignty such 
analysis is not sustained.  He does not allow for an alternative authority of law 
alongside parliament and monarch for which, I will argue, Caroline drama makes a 
case.  
 
 Julie Sanders’ brief but informative Caroline Drama: The Plays of 
Massinger, Ford, Shirley and Brome is the most recent survey of Caroline drama, 
and provides an introduction to themes, ideas, drama and dramatists of the period.  
Again, following Butler, Sanders suggests that these plays ‘rarely represent escapist 
indulgences and are more often than not direct engagements with social, political, 
and indeed theatrical realities in the moment in which they were produced’ 
(Sanders, 1999, 4).  This book succinctly combines Butler’s political and Clark’s 
social / socio-political approach in offering ways to read these plays in the context 
of courts and kingship, gender and theatre, town, country and community.
12
  The 
legal climate of Caroline England, however, is once again absent, although the 
chapter on ‘Court and Kingship’ does deal briefly with ideas of divine right, 
absolutism and paternalism, which I will explore in more detail in chapter two. 
                                                
12
 Matthew Steggle’s recent monograph Richard Brome: Place and Politics on the Caroline Stage 
continues the critical pattern of reading Caroline drama politically, but also pays particular attention 
to ideas of place, not in broad terms of town and country, but to the importance of particular 
locations in Brome’s plays. 
11 
 
 
Early Modern Culture, Law and Literature  
 
Although explorations of law are absent in the major critical works on 
Caroline drama, discussions of law in early modern literature and culture are 
flourishing.  Lorna Hutson and Victoria Kahn’s edited collection on Rhetoric and 
Law in Early Modern Europe contains essays discussing ideas as diverse as 
‘Classical rhetoric and the English law of evidence’, ‘Not the King’s Two Bodies: 
Reading the “Body Politic” in Shakespeare’s Henry IV, parts 1 and 2’, and 
‘Bribery, Buggery and the Fall of Lord Chancellor Bacon’. Looking at points of 
intersection between law and rhetoric, the point of the collection, Kahn and Hutson 
assert, is: 
 
less the recovery of the historical personality of the individual lawyer 
reading or writing rhetorical texts than the investigation of the relations 
between rhetorical or literary production and legal practice as these 
discursive fields conceptualized, or produced accounts of, human agency 
and subjectivity in the early modern period. (Kahn and Hutson, 2001, 2) 
 
This focus on human agency and subjectivity in relation to law is further explored in 
Luke Wilson’s monograph Theatres of Intention: Drama and the Law in Early 
Modern England, which is concerned with the representation of the developing 
understanding of intentional action and agency in law in the early modern period on 
the contemporary stage.  The connection between rhetoric, evidence and law 
highlighted by Hutson and Kahn’s collection is also discussed by Subha Mukherji in 
her recent Law and Representation in Early Modern Drama, in which her main 
concern is ‘to illuminate the nature and the extent of the engagement between the 
disciplines and cultural practices of the stage and the court in early modern 
12 
England’ (Mukherji, 2006, 2).
13
  Primarily discussing civil law cases, Mukherji 
examines the relationship between real and fictionalised trials in terms of how both 
relate to early modern thinking on probability and evidence, and discusses how 
drama may present a more rounded view of legal proceedings by giving a voice, 
albeit fictionalised, to those usually excluded from official court records (Mukherji, 
2006, 12-15).  Neither Mukherji’s work nor the essays in Hutson and Kahn’s 
collection deal in any detail with Caroline dramatic texts or with the wider political 
issues of law and legitimate legal authority with which my thesis is concerned.
14
      
 
 Politico-legal ideas are, however, discussed in the essays in Literature, 
Politics and Law in Renaissance England, edited by Erica Sheen and Lorna Hutson.  
Essays exploring treason, evidence, equity, libel and martyrdom take as their focus 
the connections between law, literature and politics in England between 1580-1660 
and, the editors argue, move away from the new historicist and cultural materialist 
tendency to ‘stick closely to a generalized Foucauldian model of the juridical and 
confessional subject’. By contrast, they ally themselves with work which ‘develops 
specific links between literary subjectivity and the languages and procedural 
structures of the English common law as it was concretely engaged in the political 
struggles of the early seventeenth century’ (Sheen and Hutson, 2004, 2-3).  These 
essays present concrete engagements with law and politics by examining the 
position of individuals, including the authors discussed, in relation to the law, and 
indeed particular legal cases (for example, Peter Goodrich’s essay concerns the Ship 
Money debates of the 1630s).  My work also moves away from Foucauldian 
discourses of power and subjectivity in placing Caroline drama within the specific 
                                                
13
 Here court refers to courts of law rather than the royal court. 
14
 Mukherji’s essay ‘False Trial in Shakespeare, Massinger and Ford’ does, however, deal more 
closely with two Caroline texts: Massinger’s The Picture, and Ford’s The Ladies Triall. 
13 
debates and discourse of law and legal authority of the period.  Whereas in several 
of the writers discussed in Sheen and Hutson’s collection there is what the editors 
call an assumption of ‘the rhetorical position of martyrs in representing themselves 
as oppressed by common law’ (Sheen and Hutson, 2005, 3), my argument contends 
that in drama of the commercial theatre under Charles I, common law was 
associated with rights, liberty and freedom from an oppressive and absolute, central 
law.     
 
 In terms of law and early modern culture, Paul Raffield’s monograph Images 
and Cultures of Law in Early Modern England: Justice and Political Power, 1558-
1660 examines the relationship between the law, the Inns of Court and theatrical 
entertainments. Raffield argues that the Inns of Court ‘acted out’ an ideal 
constitutional state in the structures and symbols of their own government, showing 
by example the benefits of such a state, and this was further illustrated in their 
presentations of appropriate use of law in their masques and revels through which 
they sought to influence the monarchy.  This influence, he argues, shifts to lawyers 
in parliament under Charles and to pamphleteering during the interregnum.  
Although Raffield often makes reference to ‘theatre’, his work does not refer to the 
commercial theatre or public performance, and despite the broader implications of 
his title, the study is only concerned with the images, symbols and cultures of law at 
or extending from the Inns of Court.  Where I touch on Raffield’s work is in his 
identification of ideas of reason and rationality in entertainments concerned with 
law and legal authority: Jacobean masques by the Inns, he argues, present the 
common lawyers allegorically as divine bodies, and as representing human reason 
(Raffield, 2004, 138-9).  My concern is not with these entertainments, but with the 
14 
connection between reason and law he raises which, I will argue, is fundamental to 
the common lawyers’ arguments for the supremacy of common law under Charles 
and is employed by Caroline playwrights, thus presenting contemporary legal 
discourses on the Caroline stage.  
 
That Raffield as a legal scholar should be interested in producing an 
interdisciplinary examination of issues of law (which includes cultural practices, 
architecture, law and theatrical entertainment), and that the body of critical work on 
law in early modern literature is growing, may in part be due to the expansion of the 
law and literature movement, although as Anthony Julius notes, this ‘movement is 
largely confined to law faculties and does not tend to figure in general accounts of 
modern literary theory’ (Julius, 1999, xvii).
15
  The reason for this can be found in 
the two main areas explored by the law and literature movement: ‘law as literature’ 
and ‘law in literature’.  The former ‘seeks to apply the techniques of literary 
criticism to legal texts’; the latter examines ‘the possible relevance of literary texts, 
particularly those which present themselves as telling a legal story, as texts 
appropriate for study by legal scholars’ (Ward, 1995, 3).
16
  What both areas have in 
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 This is, perhaps, exemplified in the fact that in Patrick Hanafin, Adam Gearey and Joseph 
Brooker’s Law and Literature collection, only two of the contributors are not members of law 
departments: one of these is Brooker and the other, Morris Kaplan, is a Philosophy Professor who 
had been a Visiting Fellow at Birkbeck’s Law School. 
16
 Julius suggests the movement has four, rather than two, main elements: law relating to literature 
(laws of literature); the literary properties of legal texts (law as literature); method of interpretation 
of legal and literary texts (legal and literary hermeneutics); and the representation of law and legal 
processes in literature (law in literature) (Julius, 1999, xiii), but the ‘law as’ and ‘law in’ literature 
division is more common.  Although censorship, which would fall into Julius’s ‘laws of literature’ 
category was to a greater or lesser extent an influence on playwrights throughout the period, it is not 
a primary concern of this thesis.  See Richard Dutton’s Mastering the Revels: the regulation and 
censorship of English Renaissance Drama for a discussion of licensing and censorship to 1626, and 
his Licensing, Censorship and Authorship in Early Modern England further examines censorship 
until the closure of the theatres in 1642 and how censorship impacted on the concept of authorship.  
For on overview of critical positions on the nature and extent of censorship, see Andrew Hadfield’s 
‘Introduction’ to Literature and censorship in Renaissance England. The essays in this volume 
examine the theatre and censorship, religious censorship and political censorship. Martin Butler 
(1992a) also discusses Jonson’s The Magnetic Lady in relation to ecclesiastical censorship. 
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common is, Lenora Ledwon suggests, ‘a keen interest in interpretation and 
narrative’ (Ledwon, 1996, ix) which makes them suitable for such interdisciplinary 
study.  Although Richard Posner asserts that ‘the study of law and literature seeks to 
use legal insights to enhance understanding of literature, not just literary insights to 
enhance understanding of law’ (Posner, 1988, 1), both of the described approaches 
favour the use of literature and literary critical practice for a better understanding of 
the law, rather than examining law as a means to a fuller understanding of a literary 
text.  However, literary scholars seem to be expanding the boundaries of ‘law and 
literature’ in a variety of ways: Mukherji states that she examines ‘law in literature’ 
in her approach to early modern drama, and Sheen and Hutson’s collection deals 
with law and literature if not necessarily in the main ways described above.  Ian 
Ward’s Law and Literature: Possibilities and Perspectives also suggests a tangent 
to law and literature in the use of literary texts to explore legal history (Ward, 1995, 
59), and it is here that my thesis touches on the law and literature movement. My 
approach is almost the reverse of Ward, who sees literature as an ‘educative 
supplement to the study of law’ (1995, 59). Not only does drama suggest how the 
playwrights understood politico-legal argument, but knowledge of contemporary 
legal debate allows a fuller understanding of the plays themselves, and their own 
position within this debate.
17
  Ward holds up Shakespeare as the richest source of 
literary engagement with legal history; I hope this study will show that Caroline 
drama is equally rich in its theatrical involvement with contemporary legal debates, 
perhaps more so in presenting a legitimate alternative to the legal authority of the 
monarch.  
                                                
17
 There is, of course, difficulty in stating with any certainty what the audiences understood from the 
plays.  Nevertheless, there would be little point in Caroline playwrights of the commercial theatre 
staging contemporary legal ideas or using legal terminology if these were not in some ways familiar 
to their audiences. 
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Staging Legal Authority 
 
Under Charles I, there was no debate over whether the country should be 
governed by rule of law; the conflict arose over whose law should take precedence: 
the law of the king or the common law.  Many lawyers believed that the king had no 
extra-legal powers, and the king’s prerogative was nothing more than those rights 
which he possessed under the law.  Absolutists, on the other hand, accepted no 
limitation to the royal prerogative.  This was not a new debate.  The extent of the 
royal prerogative and the relative position of prerogative and law had been under 
discussion for some time amongst absolutists and advocates of the supremacy of the 
common law:   
 
The idea that the royal prerogative was derived from and limited by law was 
orthodox among Tudor lawyers.  Moreover, the Tudor monarchs themselves 
accepted legal limitations upon their powers in practice, whatever high 
views of their authority they may have held in theory.  James and Charles, 
by contrast, proved far more willing to test their theoretical claims at law. 
(Sommerville, 1999, 99)
 18
 
 
James’s public professions of his commitment to customary ways and established 
legal methods, Roger Lockyer suggests, had the effect of preserving the image of 
the king as a constitutional ruler despite his recourse to unpopular prerogative 
measures such as Impositions (Lockyer, 1999, 240-1), and whatever his claims to 
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 Algernon Sidney’s Discourses concerning government (1698) argued that since the death of Henry 
V: 
Princes had almost continuously attempted ‘to advance their prerogative’ at the cost of the 
people’s liberty. The only exception had been Queen Elizabeth. Following Henry, she had 
not set ‘about to mangle acts of Parliament’ but had maintained the virtuous nature of the 
people and thereby the principles of ‘the mixed monarchies’. (Peltonen, 1995, 18)  
17 
absolute rule may have been elsewhere.
19
  Charles, on the other hand, made no 
attempt to cushion his claims to the prerogative in terms of the common law, and it 
was this, Glenn Burgess argues, which disrupted the Jacobean political consensus.  
Burgess argues that under James, discourses of common law and absolutism were 
not contradictory because they were used within particular parameters; thus James 
could claim a right to absolute monarchy in the theological discourse separating him 
from the Pope, and still claim supremacy for the common law without contradiction.  
Charles, however, either did not know or chose to ignore these conventions of 
political ‘languages’ that maintained a steady consensus under James, claiming an 
absolute prerogative not only in the theological discourses, but also in discourses of 
common law (Burgess, 1992, 179-181).
20
   
 
The terms Rutherford employs in the passage from Lex Rex with which I 
opened this introduction – prerogative, will, law and reason – were the key terms of 
legal debate in the Caroline period, and on the stage they become instrumental in 
establishing the common law as a legitimate legal authority higher than the king’s 
prerogative.
21
  I do not intend, here, to describe in detail the legal theories and 
arguments to which they belong; a fuller discussion of ideas of divine right and the 
ancient constitution will be given in the appropriate chapters where their importance 
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 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of absolutist arguments, especially pp. 74-85. 
20
 For a detailed examination of these political languages, see Burgess, 1992, chapter 5.  J. P. 
Sommerville disputes the existence of these languages, but does not suggest an alternative reason for 
a breakdown in legal and political relations in the Caroline period (Sommerville, 1996, 44-45). 
21
 Blair Worden argues that the rule of law rather than the rule of men was a significant part of 
republican thinking in the seventeenth century: 
 
Law was the embodiment of reason: men who ruled other than in the service of law became 
the slaves of will, lust, and passion, while those who served or supported them were guilty 
of idolatry, of the enslavement and debasement of the will. A commonwealth where law 
prevailed, whether or not it had a king, was a ‘free state’: its antithesis was tyranny. 
(Worden, 1991, 448) 
 
In this respect, the vocabulary of law, reason, passion and will with which this thesis is concerned 
overlap with the concerns of later republicanism. 
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in drama in bringing legal discourse on to the Caroline stage will be explored.  The 
argument of this thesis is structured around the decentralisation and fragmentation 
of legitimate legal authority as it was presented in drama of the commercial theatre.  
Beginning with the concrete expression of the crisis in legal relations between 
Parliament, the law(yers) and the king in the Petition of Right, the chapters then 
move in stages away from the dramatic presentation of divinely appointed absolute 
monarchy, through the establishment of an alternative legitimate legal authority in 
the common law, to the divorce of a benevolent local authority from an absolutist 
central authority and finally the destabilisation to the point of absence of a 
legitimate legal authority. 
 
Chapter One, ‘Rights, Prerogatives and Law: The Petition of Right’ takes as 
its focus the debates surrounding the Petition of Right in 1628.  The Petition makes 
reference to several important legal issues of the period which tested the relative 
positions of the king’s will and the common law, such as granting monopolies, 
military billeting, prerogative taxation and arbitrary imprisonment.  In doing so, it 
provides a useful introduction to the notions of right, privilege and law which form 
the background to the concepts debated in the subsequent chapters: the position of 
the king in relation to the law, and the foundations for arguments against an 
extensive royal prerogative in the ancient constitution and in Magna Charta.  The 
dramatic engagement with the Petition of Right in Jonson’s The New Inn and, less 
directly, Brome’s The Love-Sick Court demonstrates a theatrical involvement in 
specific legal and political debates, and, in the same way that the Petition itself 
points towards the main arguments in law, these texts are indicative of the ways in 
which contemporary debate over legitimate legal authority was presented on stage 
19 
throughout the period.  The New Inn nods towards a perceived wilfulness in the 
monarch which is explored in Chapter Two, and presents a mock-sovereign 
presiding over an imagined court leading towards the ideas of trial and judicial 
authority explored in Chapter Five.  Chapter Three develops the connection made 
between reason and law in The Love-sick Court, and this play’s presentation of a 
separate but centrally-connected authority in the countryside opens the possibilities 
of an alternative local legal authority which is the focus of Chapter Four. 
 
Arguments for and against unlimited royal prerogative in theories of divine 
right rule, patriarchalism and non-resistance are the subject of Chapter Two, 
‘Shaking the foundations of royal authority: from divine right to the king’s will’.  
This chapter argues, through a chronological discussion of three of Massinger’s 
Caroline plays, that during the period there was a change in the way that the 
monarch’s authority was presented on stage. Whilst Massinger’s The Roman Actor 
presents ideas of the irrefutable divine right and absolute power of kings, this claim 
to absolute authority through an intrinsic divinity is questioned in The Emperour of 
the East which presents the monarch as a fallible and wilful man.  Arguments of bad 
counsel which were common to defences of unpopular monarchical actions are also 
explored in this latter play.  The decline from divinity in the stage-monarch to the 
point at which the insistence on the unlimited prerogative comes to be seen as the 
enforcement of the arbitrary acts of a wilful, and entirely mortal, man rather than the 
wishes of a divinely protected and authorised king is examined through a reading of 
The Guardian.  
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This decline from divinity to wilfulness allows the possibility of an 
alternative legal authority which functions to moderate the king’s will.  Chapter 
Three, ‘Debating legal authorities: common law and prerogative’, puts forward the 
common law as such an alternative.  It begins by establishing the legitimacy of the 
common law as a legal authority through its connection with custom and the ancient 
constitution, explored in the theatre in Brome’s The Queenes Exchange.  Royal 
absolutism in this chapter is set against a rationality which contemporary legal 
discourse associates with custom and common law, and in this play and the others 
to be discussed here, The Antipodes and The Queen and Concubine, arbitrary 
absolutism comes to be represented as the opposite of reason: madness.  This 
madness, I argue, is not only self-destructive but also creates a kind of madness in 
the country as the plays suggest that an effect of royal disregard for established law 
is the destabilising of legal authority. When royal will competes with established 
common law, what exactly the law is, and where authority lies, is brought into 
doubt. 
 
Attempts to enforce prerogative law were compounded by an attempt to 
centralise systems of local government.  Chapter Four, ‘Decentralising legal 
authority: from the centre to the provinces’, is concerned with the idea and 
implementation of legal authority in the localities, and focuses on figures of local 
justice such as constables and Justices of the Peace.  It argues, through a reading of 
Brome’s The Weeding of Covent Garden and Jonson’s A Tale of a Tub, that Justices 
of the Peace represent royal absolutism, and that constables, in line with Keith 
Wrightson’s two concepts of order (Wrightson, 1980, passim), are more liminal 
figures, selective in their implementation of established law and keeping a balance 
21 
between the strict enforcement of law and local public relations. Like the 
destabilising of legal authority caused by wilful action discussed in Chapter Three, 
A Tale of a Tub suggests that the manipulation of law for their own ends by 
representatives of crown authority destabilises local order, and makes the local 
officers’ positions untenable.  In presenting the debates on arbitrary prerogative and 
reasonable law in a provincial context, I argue, plays such as Brome’s A Jovial 
Crew suggest that Charles I’s attempts to enforce central law more strictly in the 
provinces, and thus centralise legal authority, polarised legal positions, not only 
destabilising but potentially fragmenting legal authority. 
 
Chapter Five, ‘The theatre of the courtroom’, discusses dramatic trial scenes 
in the context of contemporary court procedures and the political and legal debates 
outlined in the chapters above. The focus of this chapter is the connection between 
the law court and the theatre, examining the interplay between court, theatre, law 
and legitimate legal authority.  The trial in Massinger’s The Roman Actor is 
essentially a trial of theatre, and reminds the audience of the precarious position 
censorship created for actors and dramatists.  However, this chapter will argue that 
the theatre also provides a courtroom in which to judge legal authorities and 
processes.  The Roman Actor acknowledges the emperor as absolute judge despite 
his absence from the trial, but this position of authority is questioned and 
undermined in later plays.  Ford’s The Ladies Triall places the ‘monarch as judge’ 
into a domestic sphere to question unnecessary royal trials of loyalty, and to 
reinforce the need for a monarch to obey his own laws as established by the plays 
discussed in Chapter Three. The acted trials (as forms of ‘plays within the plays’) in 
Shirley’s The Traitor and Brome’s The Antipodes examine the ways in which trials 
22 
were conducted, and find both the legal system and the judicial authorities wanting.  
More than this, though, the lack of a true figure of legal authority in these trials, this 
chapter will argue, is representative of the destabilising and fragmentation of legal 
authority caused by attempts to enforce the king’s will and circumvent established 
legal and local authorities. 
 
 
Inclusions and exclusions 
 
Finally, some words on the scope of this study: in terms of its literary 
coverage, my focus is chiefly on the works of Massinger, Brome, Jonson, Shirley 
and Ford as representative of the Caroline professional theatre.  Their Caroline plays 
were primarily staged at the private indoor theatres of the Blackfriars, 
Cockpit/Phoenix and Salisbury Court by the royally patronised King’s Men, 
Queen’s Men and the King and Queen’s Young Company (Beeston’s Boys).
22
  A 
comparison of the professional playwrights’ attitudes to legitimate legal authority 
with that of the courtly dramatists would be an interesting avenue to pursue with 
more time and space.
23
  The more expensive indoor venues suggest a wealthy, well 
educated audience; Blackfriars and the Cockpit were ‘the favourite resort[s] of the 
gentry’ (JCS, VI. 47), and the gentlemen of the Inns of Court ‘provided an 
influential segment of the play-going public’ at these theatres (Neill, 2007).  Thus 
the plays concerning the law and legitimate legal authority to be discussed here 
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 The King’s Men and the Queen’s Men were adult companies; the King and Queen’s Young 
Company was not a traditional boy’s acting group, but a combination of adult and child actors (JCS 
I, 324, note 1). 
23 Butler notes that the King’s Men incorporated courtier plays into their repertory (1984, 101). 
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were performed to an audience for whom they would be particularly resonant, in a 
place where this audience could interact less formally than at court: 
 
The theatres were neutral zones, independent of the court, where the gentry 
gathered casually, but also on a regular basis and with interests that were 
widely shared, and where ideas and attitudes were actively exchanged.  They 
were both public settings and areas of unrivalled personal interchange. 
(Butler, 1984, 110) 
 
The theatres thus created a venue for development of a public sphere, in which legal 
argument and political discussion could thrive.  Whilst it may seem that this only 
included the gentry, some of the plays were also performed at the Globe, as the 
King’s Men alternated by season between the Globe and Blackfriars (Gurr, 1996, 
150), suggesting a broader, more socially diverse audience for the same legal 
arguments.
24
   
 
In legal terms, my concern in this thesis is with the competing claims of 
custom, common law and royal prerogative made central to Caroline politico-legal 
debate by Charles’ insistence on the unlimited scope of his prerogative powers; the 
constraints of time and space prevent a discussion of civil, ecclesiastical and 
admiralty law.  Whilst I have read widely in the legal texts of the period, choices of 
what to include here were guided to some extent by the discussion of these issues in 
the work of legal and political historians, particularly J. G. A. Pocock’s The Ancient 
Constitution and the Feudal Law, Glenn Burgess’s The Politics of the Ancient 
Constitution:  An Introduction to English Political Thought, 1603-1642, and J. P. 
Sommerville’s Royalists and Patriots.  Politics and Ideology in England 1603-1640.  
                                                
24 Brome’s The Northern Lasse and Massinger’s The Emperour of the East are known to have been 
performed in both theatres.  Shirley’s The Doubtful Heir was written to be performed in Ireland. On 
return to England a performance was planned for Blackfriars but it was actually played at the Globe. 
Massinger’s The Guardian, Brome’s The Northern Lasse, Jonson’s A Tale of a Tub and Shirley’s 
The Dukes Mistris were also acted at court.  
24 
Except where English translations were necessary, wherever possible I have used 
for both legal tracts and dramatic texts editions that would have been available to 
contemporary readers and audiences, as the circulation of such texts in print 
provided further opportunities for the discussion of the legal ideas contained in 
them.
25
   
 
 
 The plays and playwrights to be discussed here were deeply concerned with 
issues of divine right, absolute monarchy, the ancient constitution, laws and 
liberties.  In the chapters which follow, this thesis will argue that Charles I’s 
attempts to gain greater and tighter control over the laws of the kingdom, asserting 
himself as the highest legal authority, led to an equal assertion of alternative 
legitimate legal authorities.  The plays of the foremost playwrights of the Caroline 
commercial stage, by employing the terms of contemporary legal discourse, present 
and juxtapose these authorities, allowing their audience to see and debate the 
potential consequences of adherence to royal will or rule according to common law 
or local practice.  In over-asserting kingly and central authority, the plays suggest, 
Charles’s policies raise the possibilities of destabilisation, fragmentation and 
disintegration of legitimate legal authority. 
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 Where Caroline editions of the plays were not available, I have used the first printed edition.  See 
David Zaret (1992, passim) for a discussion of the development of a public sphere through print. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Rights, Prerogatives and Law: 
The Petition of Right 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Soit droit fait come est desiré’ was the long awaited and sought after second 
response from King Charles I to the Petition of Right in 1628.  ‘Let right be done as 
is desired’ recognised that wrongs had been done to Charles’s subjects, and stated 
the king’s will that the same wrongs would not affect his subjects again.  In 
recognising the validity of the Petition in this particular way, Charles was seen to be 
acknowledging his subjects’ rights under the law and the limits to his own 
prerogative, and as such, this response was met with joy by those who had fought 
for the Petition’s acceptance; Francis Nethersole, member of the House of 
Commons, wrote to Princess Elizabeth that the bells of London were ringing and 
men were making bonfires at every door in celebration (Foster, 1974a, 22).
1
  That 
the king realised these implications was made clear in his decision to have the 
Petition reprinted after parliament’s authorised version, changing his printed 
response back to that of his first answer:  
                                                
1 E. R. Adair states that the second response to the petition was invented by those presenting it, in 
order that the reply directly suited the petition (1920, 102), but Elizabeth Read Foster describes this 
only as the usual response to private petitions which sought to give redress to subjects who had been 
mistreated by the king or under the law (1974a, 43).  L. J. Reeve suggests this is a combination of the 
forms of assent to a private petition of right and to a private bill (1986, 260).  
26 
 
The King willeth that right be done according to the laws and customs of the 
realm, and that the statutes be put in due execution, that the subject may 
have no just cause to complain of any wrong or oppressions contrary to their 
rights and just liberties, to the preservation whereof he holds himself in 
conscience as well obliged as of his prerogative. (cited in Russell, 1979, 
377) 
2
 
 
This first reply had been a royal attempt to respond to the petition without limiting 
Charles’s prerogative, admitting wrong action on the king’s part, or providing a 
written explication of the law. As such, it was not an appropriate answer to the 
Petition and was unacceptable to parliament which began, as in the dissolved 
session of 1626, to debate taking action against the Duke of Buckingham whose 
influence they blamed in part for the divide between the people and the King.  
Finally, in the House of Lords, Buckingham and Saye arranged to petition the King 
to change his response, and asked the Commons if they would join them.  This 
resulted in Charles’s second, and much more acceptable, response, with the added 
qualification that he meant no more by it than his first, and that the Parliament 
neither meant to, nor could, hurt his prerogative.
3
  The presentation on the Caroline 
stage of the relationship between rights, prerogatives and law highlighted in these 
different responses and encapsulated in the concerns voiced in and debates held 
over the Petition of Right is the focus of this chapter.  
                                                
2
 Parliament was still in session at the first printing of the Petition.  Foster notes that the second 
printing, including not only the earlier answer but also a ‘declaration concerning the true intent 
hereof’, would have circulated much more widely than the first, as it was printed with the public acts 
passed at the end of the Parliamentary session (1974b, 82).  Thus the unsatisfactory response which 
was less damaging to Charles’s prerogative was more widely known than the second answer. 
3
 Charles understood his prerogative to be divinely given and invulnerable, and this was the 
understanding of some in the House of Lords:  ‘the king had “a royal prerogative, intrinsical to his 
sovereignty and betrusted him withal from God for the common safety of the whole people and not 
for their destruction”’ (Russell, 1979, 353).  Factions in Parliament argued that they could not 
damage the King’s prerogative in their list of grievances in the Petition of Right because in those 
things he had no prerogative (Russell, 1979, 362). For the debates in both the Lords and the 
Commons see Russell, 1979, passim, especially 378-383.  ; Reeve, 1986, passim, Harrison, 1988, 
passim. Flemion, 1973, discusses the way in which the lords came to support the Commons in the 
Petition, and Flemion, 1991, deals with how the Lords understood the petition and discusses the 
attempts in the Lords to preserve the king’s prerogative.  Much of this section is based on these 
discussions. 
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 Performed in the aftermath of the parliament which passed the Petition of 
Right, and immediately before the meeting of the 1629 parliament, Ben Jonson’s 
The New Inn (1629), this chapter will argue, examines the use and abuse of 
prerogative through a background of common law rights based in Magna Charta, 
and addresses many of the Petition’s grievances in the immediate court and 
parliamentary context of 1628/9.  The theatrical engagement with the Petition of 
Right is continued in Richard Brome’s The Love-sick Court (1626 - 1640), which 
will be discussed in the final section of the chapter.
 4
  This play deals less 
specifically with the particular grievances and instead uses the Petition of Right and 
the idea of petitioning as a means to examine the structure of relationships between 
king, court and parliament, thus engaging not only in a discussion of earlier political 
structures and arguments, but also commenting on contemporary activity at court.  
The first section of this chapter will summarise the main points of contention 
between the king, parliament and the law which led to, and were highlighted in, the 
Petition of Right; the following sections will then discuss the dramatic explorations 
of these ideas in The New Inn and The Love-sick Court. 
 
 
Issues of Right; Problems of Law 
 
Petitioning was a common way to approach the monarch or Privy Council 
for assistance.  There were two main forms of petition: the petition of right, and the 
petition of grace.  Private petitions of right asked the king to provide justice to an 
                                                
4
 The dating of The Love-sick Court is particularly unclear.  Most critics now agree that the play was 
composed in the 1630s.  For a more detailed discussion of the dating of this play, see Appendix. 
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injured party, seeking redress for specific identified and investigated grievances, 
and those of grace sought mercy or exemption for a subject from an aspect of law.
5
   
What was unusual about the Petition of Right in 1628 was that it was presented 
collectively by both Houses of Parliament on behalf of the country to gain redress 
for grievances caused by the king’s manipulation of law regarding taxation and 
imprisonment.  Members of Parliament sought a royal explanation of those laws by 
which he claimed to act, or the institution of further laws to confirm the liberties of 
his subjects. Although Charles was prepared to confirm existing laws, including 
Magna Charta (which was usually appealed to in cases of dispute between the 
sovereign and subject over rights and liberties), he was not prepared to create new 
laws, or to provide a legally binding explicit elaboration of the meaning of such 
existing laws, which could potentially limit his scope for interpretation or 
prerogative action.  A further ratification of Magna Charta did not go far enough for 
many of those sitting in Parliament; it had been confirmed several times in the past 
by a variety of monarchs, and had not provided sufficient guarantee of the subjects’ 
liberties, depending as it did on the king’s interpretations and enactment of its 
provisions.  After some debate, the House of Commons decided to present the 
Petition of Right.  In using this form of petition, they were not merely presenting a 
complaint over unsubstantiated grievances; rather, a petition of right was a 
statement that wrong had been done, and that the monarch had to take action to 
rectify the issues stated.  Although the king had refused to clarify the law, the 
Petition also provided a bridge between complaint and legislation: gaining royal 
                                                
5
 See Foster for a discussion of the development of petitioning under Elizabeth and James VI and I 
(1974a, 27-35) and the distinction between petition of right and grace (1974a, 35-5). 
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assent to a petition of right was an archaic method of passing law.  Nevertheless, the 
extent to which the Petition could be seen as a statute was and is heavily debated.
 6
   
 
The Petition of Right does, however, provide a statement of the developing 
contemporary concern that the structure of legal authority was not sufficiently clear 
or defined.  It was, L. J. Reeve claims: 
 
an early and clear sign of the problems of Charles’s reign.  They included 
his own inclination to govern of arbitrary will, his losing the support of 
powerful individuals in the house of lords…  Perhaps the most critical 
problem of all was the widespread refusal to trust Charles, and the insistence 
by his subjects on legal guarantees, when fundamental interests or principles 
were at stake. (Reeve, 1986, 275)  
 
According to Conrad Russell, however, the problem that Parliament sought to 
resolve through the Petition was not merely a lack of trust in the King, but a lack of 
confidence in the law, particularly as a safe guarantee of liberty (1979, 350, 348).  It 
was because the law no longer seemed to provide the ‘legal guarantees’ Reeve 
describes that the Commons sought a clarification of the law from the King.  The 
Petition described the particular grievances for which it sought redress, and asked: 
 
[t]hat no man hereafter be compelled to make or yield any gift, loan,  
benevolence, tax or such like charge without common consent by act of 
parliament, and that none be called to make answer or take such oath or to 
give attendance or be confined or otherwise molested or disquieted 
concerning the same or for refusal thereof.  And that no freeman in any such 
manner as is before mentioned be imprisoned or detained.  And that your 
Majesty would be pleased to remove the said soldiers and mariners, and that 
your people may not be so burdened in time to come.  And that the aforesaid 
commissions for proceeding by martial law may be revoked and annulled.  
And that hereafter no commissions of like nature may issue forth to any 
                                                
6
 For more information on the legal status of the Petition of Right see Reeve, 1986, passim.   Reeve 
argues that using a Petition was a deliberately antiquarian attempt to revert to an older method of 
legislation (1986, 369).  In the 1628 Parliament, Coryton objected that legislation had not been made 
by petition and answer since the fifteenth century (Guy, 1982, 311). William Prynne discussed the 
Petition as a law at a reading at the Inns of Court in 1661 because, he argued, ‘it is a law originally 
framed, prosecuted and passed according to the ancientest and most usual parliamentary way; to wit 
not by bill, as of late times, but by petition’ (Forster, 1974a, 24).  
30 
person or persons whatsoever to be executed as aforesaid, lest by colour of 
them any of your Majesty’s subjects be destroyed or put to death contrary to 
the laws and franchises of the land. (Kenyon, 1986, 70)  
 
‘Franchise’, Coke clarified during the 1628 Commons debates, ‘is a French word, 
and in Latin it is liberty. In Magna Carta, nullus imprisonetur nor put out of his 
liberty or franchise’ (cited in Russell, 1979, 351). This connection with Magna 
Charta will be discussed below.   
 
In presenting a statement of his subjects’ rights, the Petition of Right also 
implicitly brought into question the rights to the prerogative powers that the king 
claimed.  One of the main crisis points between the asserted legal rights of his 
subjects and those of the king was the Five Knights’ Case of 1627.
7
   Sir Thomas 
Darnel, Sir John Heveningham, Sir Walter Erle, Sir John Corbet, and Sir Edmund 
Hampden, gaoled without cause shown for refusing to pay the Forced Loan of 1626, 
sought release through a writ of habeas corpus.
8
  Had the King’s Attorney returned 
that they were held for refusal to pay the Loan, their writ should have allowed the 
judges the opportunity to make a ruling on the legality of the Loan, as well as on the 
legality of the knights’ detention.  However, the answer returned was that they had 
been imprisoned, and continued to be so, ‘per speciale mandatum domini regis’ (‘by 
his majesty’s special command’).    J. A. Guy argues that this form of words was a 
direct response to the prisoners’ presumed strategy, and prevented a judicial review 
of the Loan’s legality; rather, it shifted the debate to the extent of the royal 
prerogative (1982, 291).  As no further defence could be made, the prisoners were 
refused bail and returned to gaol.   
                                                
7 For a detailed discussion of the Five Knights’ case, see Christianson, 1985, passim; see also 
Russell, 1979, 334-335 and Guy, 1982, passim.  Cust gives a more detailed discussion of the Five 
Knights’ Case in relation to the Forced Loan (1987, passim, especially 58-62). 
8
 This meant that the true reason for their imprisonment had to be made known to a court in order to 
determine the legality of their detention.  See ODL, ‘habeas corpus’. 
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Was imprisonment at the king’s command without further cause stated 
acceptable under the law?  Magna Charta, the Petition of Right reminded the King, 
stated that no man could be ‘imprisoned… outlawed or exiled or in any manner 
destroyed, but by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land’ 
(Kenyon, 1986, 69); however, this left the problem of what exactly the law of the 
land (lex terrae) was.  Coke argued that ‘If I have any law, lex terrae is the common 
law’ (quoted in Reeve, 1986, 265), which meant that prerogative imprisonment was 
against the stipulations of Magna Charta.  The king and privy councillors, however, 
argued that the king had the right to detain potential felons for reasons of state 
without giving more specific cause.  There were precedents for incarceration 
without cause shown: Guy Fawkes, for example, had been held for reasons of state 
without complaints of infringement of liberties or applications of habeas corpus 
(Russell, 1979, 347), and in 1592 the Elizabethan judges had explained the 
propriety of prerogative imprisonment: 
 
If any person be committed by her Majesty’s commandment from her 
person, or by order from the Council Board, or if any one or two of her 
Council commit one for high treason, such persons so in the case before 
committed may not be delivered by any of her courts without due trial by the 
law, and judgement of acquittal had. (quoted in Guy, 1982, 293-4) 
 
Guy notes, however, that although this allowed the monarch or the Privy Council to 
imprison without bail, it also points towards an intended trial (for which the cause 
of imprisonment would have to be given); it is not licence for indefinite arbitrary 
imprisonment.  That Charles had returned an answer of ‘per speciale mandatum 
domini regis’ to the knights’ writ of habeas corpus meant that they would be 
detained indefinitely, as no defence could be mounted without substantive charges 
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to answer.
 9
  Reeve argues that ‘the practice by which Charles had had the knights 
remanded constituted not the manipulation but rather the prevention of due process’ 
(1986, 267).  It was in this prevention of due process of law that Charles 
contravened the stipulations of Magna Charta’s lex terrae clause (Christianson, 
1985, 68).  The further difference was that in this case the prisoners were not held 
on suspicion of plotting treason, but for refusal to pay the Forced Loan; Charles had 
clearly abused his right to prerogative imprisonment for reasons of state as a 
political tool to punish those who displeased him and to prevent judicial review of 
the Forced Loan (Reeve, 1986, 263). 
 
 It was not only arbitrary imprisonment and the Forced Loan which led to the 
Petition of Right, however. Russell argues that the presence of so many soldiers 
billeted in civilians’ homes, however ‘unpaid and mutinous’ and ‘unfit to stand 
against a continental enemy’ they might have been, carried the implicit threat of 
military force to impose the king’s will (1979, 335-336).  Billeting was, in fact, one 
of the specified grievances of the Petition: 
 
[O]f late great companies of soldiers and mariners have been dispersed into 
divers counties of the realm, and the inhabitants against their wills have been 
compelled to receive them into their houses, and there to suffer them to 
sojourn against the laws and customs of this realm, and to the great 
grievance and vexation of the people. (Kenyon, 1986, 69) 
 
                                                
9
 Guy points out that:  
 
there was little point in seeking further writs of alias habeas in political actions at this time, 
because a rule of King’s Bench would not be changed unless new factual grounds were 
produced to show that bail could be granted, which could never happen until the returns to 
writs of alias habeas were amended by the Crown to reveal the ‘cause of the cause’ of 
detention. (Guy, 1982, 293) 
 
Until the king gave the reason behind their imprisonment for reasons of state, they were unable to 
mount a further defence or ask the judges of Kings Bench to overturn the refusal of bail. 
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Not only was billeting a great expense to those upon whom it was forced without 
adequate financial redress, it also brought military practices into a domestic 
sphere.
10
  Thus, closely related to billeting, the Petition also addressed the exercise 
of martial law.  Although it was accepted that martial law was a suitable way of 
maintaining order amongst troops in war time, the concern was that such systems of 
law and justice were being, or would be, imposed upon the king’s non-military 
subjects.
11
  Again, as with prerogative imprisonment, an arbitrary, summary law 
threatened to override the rule and due process of established statute and customary 
law which supposedly guaranteed the liberties of the subject.  It is with the 
negotiation between prerogative, liberties, parliament and law in The New Inn and 
The Love-sick Court that the rest of this chapter is concerned. 
 
 
 
Assuming Authority: The New Inn 
 
 The main plot of Ben Jonson’s The New Inn explores the appropriate extent 
of the royal prerogative and parliamentary advice through the establishment of a 
mock court (potentially royal, legal and parliamentary), presided over by the servant 
Pru as Queen for the day.  This pretended court organised by women, the 
disputations of love and valour which it hears, and the backdrop of the Barnet Inn 
called ‘The Light Heart’ have led Julie Sanders to read the play in terms of the 
                                                
10 Russell states that ‘Not merely was [billeting] one of the most expensive of all the war demands: it 
also, in the most literal sense, brought the war home to the people’ (1979, 336). 
11
 In May 1625, a commission of martial law was sent to the mayor of Plymouth against soldiers or 
‘other dissolute persons joining with them’ (Boynton, 1964, 260).  Russell argues that the real 
concern over martial law was that it ‘created a real possibility that soldiers would be used to interfere 
with the most cherished of all English liberties: the autonomy of county government’, and was 
brought about by Charles’s government’s attempts to centralise administration to fund and organize 
the war (1979, 359).  For a discussion of attempted centralisation, the relation between local and 
central authority, and its presentation on the Caroline stage, see Chapter 4. 
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politics of female acting, the socially inclusive environment of the inn, sumptuary 
laws, and the saloniste brand of neo-Platonism espoused by the Countess of 
Carlisle.
12
  The play’s relationship with the politics and parliamentary activities of 
1628 and 1629 has been noted by Martin Butler, although he chooses rather to read 
the play as a comment on a possible rapprochement of king and parliament on the 
death of Buckingham rather than an exploration of the political ideas of the Petition.  
Indeed, he reads the direct reference to the Petition of Right in Act II as a 
‘disparaging echo of the most important legislative enactment of the 1628 
Parliament’ (1992b, 172-176, quotation at 173).  I will argue that The New Inn’s 
engagement with the Petition of Right is more detailed and more positive than 
Butler allows, suggesting that the play advocates the balance of subjects’ rights 
against a moderated, if not curtailed, royal prerogative.  As the main plot focuses on 
the position of the prerogative, the sub plot addresses specific grievances of the 
Petition of Right such as billeting and martial law. 
 
From very early in the play, it is clear that The New Inn participates in the 
discourses of rights, liberties and the appropriate use of prerogative that the Petition 
of Right raised.  Goodstocke, the Host of The Light Heart Inn, declares to Lovel, his 
melancholy guest, in Act I, scene ii:  ‘It is against my free-hold, my inheritance, /  
My Magna charta, Cor laetificat, / To drinke such balder dash, or bonny clabbee!’ 
(New Inn, sigs. B2r-B2v).  Although the Host is here ostensibly doing nothing more 
than commenting on the quality of particular drinks, his terms of reference are 
political, and particularly relevant to subjects’ freedom from arbitrary imprisonment 
and to their right to hold their own property inviolate to the prerogative claims of 
                                                
12 See Sanders, 1996, passim; 1998, 144-163; 2002b, passim; and 2000a, passim. 
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forced loans and extra parliamentary taxation.
13
  His appropriation of these terms, 
however, is not allowed to pass without comment: 
 
Lov[el]:  Humerous Host. 
 
Host: I care not if I be. 
 
Lov:   But airy also. 
 Not to defraud you of your rights, or trench 
Upo’ your priviledges, or great charter, 
(For those are every hostlers language now) 
Say, you were borne beneath those smiling starres, 
Have made you Lord, and owner of the Heart, 
Of the Light Heart in Barnet; suffer us 
Who are more Saturnine, t’enjoy the shade  
Of your round roofe yet. (New Inn, sig. B2v) 
 
Although the discussion is framed in light-hearted terms surrounding the humours 
of the host and his guests, thus connecting this play with Jonson’s earlier drama and 
drawing attention to the play as a theatrical event, Lovel’s comments that ‘rights’, 
‘priviledges’ and the ‘great charter’ ‘are every hostlers language now’ suggest a 
public familiarity with these terms and their meaning.  Inns and taverns were 
potentially places of political discussion in the seventeenth century; that the host of 
an inn should be familiar with these terms is not unlikely.
14
  Butler’s assertion that 
                                                
13
 Russell makes the connection between liberties and inherited property explicit in his description of 
the Petition of Right:  
 
A liberty based on the common law will be a series of franchises, particular liberties, and 
immunities granted or adjudged on particular occasions. Such an approach to liberty leads 
easily to the identification of liberty with property, and of liberties with inheritances. As the 
Petition of Right itself said, it was designed to confirm the liberties the subjects had 
inherited. Liberties, like title-deeds, were traced back to an original grant, in this case 
mainly to Magna Carta. (Russell, 1979, 351) 
 
Some common lawyers were doubtful about attributing these rights to Magna Charta as this would 
provide an origin for them, and arguments for the authority of common law hinged on the idea that it 
was customary and immemorial (see Chapter 3).  If the rights that the common law protected were 
rooted in Magna Charta, which had been granted and confirmed by Kings, then the law was not 
independent of the king. 
14
 Adam Smyth notes that inns became increasingly important as locations for meetings between 
town merchants, county justices, and landowners (2004, xx), and Michelle O’Callaghan discusses 
taverns (slightly different spaces in terms of the social hierarchy of drinking establishments but 
similar in providing a space for lawyers and gentlemen to meet socially) as the location to foster 
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this ‘sadly acknowledges that every innkeeper with a grudge against the great has 
started to pick up such loose constitutional terms’ (1992b, 173) assumes an irritation 
in Lovel’s response which is not merited by the rest of their conversation: 
Goodstocke is the Host of the Inn, this is a good-natured conversation and Lovel 
remains polite even in his melancholy.  There is no reason that his comment should 
not be a reply to the Host in his own terms. That Goodstocke is, as is later revealed, 
actually the missing Lord Frampul, and is therefore, as his name suggests, of the 
‘good stock’ of aristocratic descent, may also contribute to his concern with 
inheritance and familiarity with these terms.
15
   
 
 It is against this discourse of Magna Charta, and backdrop of rights, 
inheritance, and liberties that Pru and Lady Frampul set up their mock court where 
Pru is queen for the day and in which, with Goodstocke’s permission, all at the 
Light Heart become subject to her rule.  The inclusion of all the play’s characters in 
this performance is emphasised in the ladies’ disappointment that Stuff, the tailor, 
has not delivered Pru’s monarchical gown: ‘If he had but broke with me, I had not 
car’d, /But with the company, the body politique’ (New Inn, sig. C2v).  Stuff has 
failed to play his part in the illusion, breaking faith with the newly constituted State 
under Pru, and with the ‘company’, both social and dramatic (acting company).  
This dramatic metaphor is continued in their conversation over the dress Lady 
Frampul lends to Pru instead: 
                                                                                                                                    
‘new forms of sociability among an urban elite’ (2004, 37) providing a space for educated men to 
meet for literary and political discussion.  Particularly interesting in terms of the political 
significance of tavern societies, she notes a coincidence in the early seventeenth century in the 
members of a particular tavern fraternity supporting each other’s activities in parliament (2004, 49). 
15
 Inheritance and heraldry are significant themes in this play.  See Sheila Walsh (1999, passim) for a 
discussion of the ways in which the play advocates inheritance by daughters, and explores 
contemporary English colonial activity in Ireland through Shelee-nien who is also the missing Lady 
Frampul. 
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 Lad:  ’Twill fit the Players yet, 
  When thou hast done with it, and yield thee somewhat. 
 
 Pru:   That were illiberal, madam, and mere sordid 
  In me, to let a sute of yours come there. 
 
 Lad:  Tut all are Players, and but serve the Scene. (New Inn, sig. C3r)
16
 
 
In terms of the acting of this play, most of the main characters are, at some point, 
acting a role: Lord Frampul as Goodstock, the Host; Laetitia Frampul as Frank 
(Goodstocke’s son) as Laetitia (a relative and companion of Lady Frampul); Pru as 
the Sovereign; Pinnacia Stuff as a Lady, and Stuff as her footman.
 17
   The 
deliberate, self-conscious recognition that ‘all are Players’, that everyone in the play 
is acting a part (both as actors on the stage, and as disguised or costumed characters) 
also draws attention to the idea that all of the characters serve a purpose, they ‘but 
serve the scene’.  Michael Hattaway also draws attention to the significance of the 
setting of the play in terms of its self-conscious theatricality: 
 
We know that actors imitate real people, but setting the action in a place of 
resort or revelry reminds us that imitation or acting is characteristic of life as 
well as of art, that men and women as actors perform and play games, 
maintain illusions, ape and reflect one another’s roles. (Hattaway, 1984, 17) 
 
This suggests a licence for social experiment and inversion at the Inn which is 
elaborated on at the mock court with its servant-sovereign, described as the ‘dayes 
sports devised i’the Inne’ (New Inn, sig. B8r).  Whilst ‘sport’ suggests that this will 
be the day’s entertainment, it also hints towards the amorous encounters to be had at 
this court, and once again is an indication of the theatricality of the occasion: these 
                                                
16 Julie Sanders argues that throughout the play the conversations that Lady Frampul and Pru hold 
about Pru’s dress emphasise Lady Frampul’s superiority both in beauty and power over Pru, despite 
the apparent overturning of authority during the ‘dayes sports’  (Sanders, 2002b, passim).  In the 
same article, Sanders notes that Pru’s concerns over selling expensive clothes to acting companies 
would have been familiar to early modern audiences as part of anti-theatrical tracts, and concerns 
over appropriate clothing during the period (Sanders, 2002b, paragraph 10).  
17
 Anne Barton suggests that it is through role-playing in The New Inn that the characters come to 
truly know themselves and each other. Thus Pru’s acting as a Lady reveals her ‘inherent excellence’ 
whilst Pinnacia’s acting as a Lady demonstrates her ‘unalterable vulgarity’ (1984, 271). 
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proceedings are all, supposedly at least, in jest.
18
  The inversion of the usual order in 
the servant-sovereign and mock court has elements of carnival, and all will be put in 
its correct order – including the reunion of Lord and Lady Frampul in their proper 
roles – at the end of the play.
19
  
 
Set in the discourse of rights and prerogatives which pervades the play, the 
inversions of the ‘dayes sports’, along with the extensive role playing throughout, 
provide a framework in which to explore the roles which Parliament and monarch 
should play in relation to subjects’ rights and liberties.  Indeed, the contemporary 
political relevance of the play is asserted when Goodstocke comments, again in 
dramatic terms, on how he sees activities at The Light Heart: 
 
 If I be honest, and that all the cheat 
 Be, of my selfe, in keeping this Light Heart, 
Where, I imagine all the world’s a Play; 
The state, and mens affaires, all passages 
Of life, to spring new, scenes come in, goe out 
And shift, and vanish, and if I have got 
A seat, to sit at ease here, i’mine Inne, 
To see the Comedy; and laugh, and chuck 
At the variety, and throng of humors, 
And dispositions, that come justling in, 
And out still, as they one drove hence another. (New Inn, sig. B5r) 
 
This, as earlier, aligns The New Inn with Jonson’s humours plays, but is also an 
explicit iteration of the theatrum mundi topos (Hattaway, 1984, 19, 17).  Not only 
are the audience reminded that the actors are actors in this play, but also that the 
Light Heart Inn, and by extension the theatre in which it is played, is representative 
of the world outside the theatre. 
                                                
18 OED, ‘sport’ n. 1a, 1b, 2a. 
19
 Cf. Sanders, 1996, 550.  In the elements of carnival and the mock court, the ‘dayes sports’ are 
reminiscent of some of the revels held by the Inns of Court.  For a discussion of these revels, see 
Wigfall Green, 1931, passim, and Finkelpearl, 1969, Chapters III and IV, for detailed descriptions of 
some of these revels, and their performance for the Court. 
39 
 
 As sovereign of the day’s sports, Pru presides over a court which hears both 
a petition and a bill of complaint.  Lovel’s complaint that he has received ‘a dis-
respect’ (New Inn, sig. D3r) from Lady Frampul results in two sessions of a Court 
of Love in which he speaks first of love and then of valour.
20
  His discourse on 
valour which ‘springs out of reason’, ‘the scope’ of which is ‘alwayes honour, and 
the publique good’ (New Inn, sig. F4r) appeals for a revival of the gentlemanly 
sensibilities which led him earlier to make the (subsequently denied) request that the 
Host give his son to him as a page.  His discourse of love follows the arguments of 
neo-Platonism which were increasingly popular at court, and take the form of the 
arguments of Platonic symposia.
21
  Although Julie Sanders argues that the ‘neo-
Platonic strains in the text have been concentrated upon to the detriment of more 
politicized and potentially parliamentary strains’ (1996, 559), she does not pursue 
this point in terms of the political implications of Pru’s court.  When it first 
convenes, Queen Pru is approached by Colonel Tipto: 
 
Hos[t]:    Ask what you can S
r.
 
 So’t be i’the house. 
 
Tip[to]: I ask my rights and priviledges, 
  And though for forme I please to cal’t a suit, 
  I have not beene accustomed to repulse. 
 
 Pru: No sweet Sir Glorious, you may still command – 
 
 Hos: And go without. 
 
                                                
20 For a discussion of the tradition of the court of love, see Hattaway (1984, 30-31).  
21
 See Hattaway (1984, 32) and Sanders (1996, 559) for a discussion of the traditions on which 
Lovel’s speeches rely.  Whilst Hattaway notes it is unlikely that Platonism was as fashionable as it 
would be in the mid-1630s (1984, 32), Sanders argues that the neo-Platonism exhibited in The New 
Inn, with Frances Frampul at its centre, follows that of the salonistes, which would have been easily 
recognisable in London in the late 1620s, and that Lady Frampul can be seen as a partial and satiric 
portrait of the Countess of Carlisle with whom this movement was associated (2000a, 458, 456). 
Karen Britland, however, argues that a clear cut distinction between Henrietta Maria’s brand of 
Platonism and that of the Countess of Carlisle is problematic (2006, 9-11). 
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 Pru:    But yet Sir being the first, 
  And call’d a suit, you’ll looke it shall be such 
  As we may grant. 
 
 Lad[y Frampul]:  It else denies it selfe. 
 
 Pru: You heare the opinion of the Court. 
 
 Tip:      I mind 
 
  No Court opinions. 
 
 Pru:    ’Tis my Ladies, though. 
 
 Tip:  My Lady is a Spinster, at the Law, 
  And my petition is of right. 
 
 Pru:     What is it? 
 
 Tip: It is for this poore learned bird. (New Inn, sig. D1v) 
 
This interchange between the mock sovereign and petitioner draws attention 
explicitly to the Petition of Right, and Tipto’s comment on Lady Frampul’s lack of 
legal rights as a spinster emphasises his assertion of what he perceives as his own 
rights.  What he asks for, however, is not a redress of grievances, but the 
(unmerited) advancement of his man, Fly, at Pru’s court.  As such, his reference to 
the Petition is actually an abuse of the discourse of rights prevalent in the 1628 
parliament, serving to highlight the impropriety of undeserving court favourites and 
by inference, the propriety of the real Petition of Right. The political significance of 
the comment on undeserving court favourites in a play written after the 
assassination of Buckingham and just before the meeting of the new 1629 
parliament should not be underestimated.   
 
For their abuse of the rhetoric of rights and privileges Tipto and Fly are, and 
deserve to be, ejected from Pru’s sensible court.  Nevertheless, although this 
passage presents the Petition of Right in a favourable light, it does also set limits to 
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appropriate petitioning.  Whilst Pru indicates that Tipto may ‘command’ of her, 
Goodstocke’s comment that in doing so he will ‘go without’ suggests that making 
demands of the monarch will result in a poor reception; Tipto’s ‘sute’ must truly be 
a suit.
22
  Moreover, it must be a suit which is ‘i’the house’ to answer, and ‘such / As 
[Pru] may grant’.  Any such petition, the play suggests, must be reasonable, through 
proper channels, and something that the monarch is able to grant, or it ‘denies it 
selfe’ even before it is asked.  Pru’s deference to the members of her court here 
suggests something of the importance of advisers giving – and monarchs receiving – 
advice, and her reference to the ‘opinion of the court’ invites a comparison between 
Pru’s and the Caroline court, suggesting that there too, any unreasonable demands 
will be denied / deny themselves.   
 
Tipto’s refusal to accept the court’s opinion leads Pru to invoke her mistress 
as an authority seemingly higher than that of the court, insisting ‘’Tis my Ladies 
[opinion], though’.  This places Lady Frampul in an ambiguous position regarding 
the court and laws of the day’s sports; she becomes both a spinster under the law, 
and of the law in making the rules of the game.  But it is not Lady Frampul who is 
supposed to be queen of this court, but Pru, and her subsequent assertion of her 
authority over Lady Frampul leads to a discussion of the extent of what Pru can 
legitimately command: 
 
 Pru:    Goe and kisse him, 
  I doe command it. 
 
 Lad[y Frampul]:   Th’art not wilde, wench! 
 
                                                
22
 Charles I later commented on the inappropriateness of couching demands in the form of a petition: 
discussing the 19 Propositions sent to the king he argued that ‘Certainly, to exclude all power of 
denial, seemes an arrogancy, least of all becomming those who pretend to make their address in an 
humble and loyall way of petitioning’ (Charles I, 1648, sig. F7r). 
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 Pru: Tame, and exceeding tame, but still your Sov’raigne. 
 
 Lad: Hath too much bravery made thee mad? 
 
 Pru:      Nor proud. 
  Doe, what I doe enjoyne you. No disputing 
  Of my prerogative, with a front, or frowne; 
  Doe not detrect: you know th’authority 
  Is mine, and I will exercise it swiftly,  
  If you provoke me. (New Inn, sig. D2v) 
 
Whilst Lady Frampul is concerned that Pru has taken her authority too far – after 
all, her power and her ‘bravery’ are only loaned to her for ‘the dayes sports’ (New 
Inn, sig. B8r) – Pru is absolutely assured of her sovereign power and authority in 
this matter, and there is no question for the audience that Pru is far from mad 
(‘wilde’).  Nor is this an abuse of her ‘prerogative’; the on and off stage audiences 
sympathise with Lovel and with Pru’s rules, not with her Lady’s objections.  Lady 
Frampul’s choice of words here is, however, significant; in later Caroline plays 
madness becomes associated with tyranny and arbitrary, absolute monarchy.
23
  That 
this play anticipates, if not participates in, this discourse is clear in the terms Lady 
Frampul uses in continuing to question Pru’s command:  
 
 Pru: The royall assent is past, and cannot alter. 
 
 Lad: You’l turne a Tyran.  
 
Pru:     Be not you a Rebell, 
It is a name alike odious. (New Inn, sig. D3r) 
 
In equating tyranny and rebellion, this interchange seeks to present a harmonious, 
middle way, advocating co-operation between monarch and subjects and, perhaps, 
appealing to the Caroline audience for a peaceful session of the upcoming 
parliament.  It cannot be insignificant in the play’s parliamentary context that this 
                                                
23 See Chapter 3, passim. 
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rejection of both tyranny and rebellion comes so close to the play’s delineation of 
appropriate petitioning and royal response. 
 
Despite Lady Frampul’s protestations of tyranny, Pru’s refusal to hear her 
complaint is not presented as the tyrannous act of an arbitrary monarch, but rather 
couched once again in the terms of contemporary legal argument: 
 
 Would you make lawes, and be the first that break ’hem? 
 The example is pernicious in a subject, 
 And of your quality, most. (New Inn, sig. D3r) 
 
Lady Frampul has assumed that, because under other circumstances she holds 
authority over Pru, she is able to circumvent the ‘laws’ of the game she has set up.  
It is clear that this is not so, and Pru’s argument echoes Caroline concerns, evident 
in several plays, that in his manipulations of the law, Charles I broke his own (in 
being the laws of his kingdom) laws.
24
  The resulting confusion over what should be 
held as the highest authority, the king’s will or the law, is perhaps echoed in the 
difficulty of deciphering who has authority at this point in the play: Lady Frampul’s 
concern that she has ‘woven a net / To snare [her] selfe in!’ (New Inn, sig. D2v), 
suggests that as the instigator of the ‘dayes sports’, she holds ultimate authority, but 
Pru’s position as sovereign of these sports gives her the power to enforce her own 
commands.  Latimer’s and the Host’s interjections of ‘Just Queene!’, ‘Brave 
Sovraigne!’, ‘A She-Trajan!’(New Inn, sig. D3r) emphasise not only Pru’s position 
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 For other examples, see James Shirley’s The Doubtful Heir, in which Ferdinand deliberately sets 
Queen Olivia up to break one of her own laws regarding marital fidelity.  One of her courtiers asks 
her ‘where shall we expect / The life of that good act, when you begin / A breach of chastitie by so 
black example’ (Doubtful Heir, sig. E3r).  Soon after, Ferdinand himself faces charges for plotting to 
use the law maliciously against the Queen - a law which he himself has broken in his marriage to 
Olivia, being already married to Rosania. This layering of deliberate misuse and breaking of law by 
rulers (Ferdinand is the rightful king, Olivia is the current queen) illustrates the confusion created 
when the monarch chooses to disregard established law.  See my discussion of Brome’s The Queen 
and Concubine in Chapter 3 (pp. 183-187) and Ford’s The Ladies Triall in Chapter 5 (pp.259-60) for 
a more detailed exploration of this idea. 
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of authority, but also the justice of her comments, highlighting the need for 
obedience to laws from all levels of society.
25
  Although Lady Frampul attempts to 
attribute the popularity of Pru’s decision to the fact that ‘Prince Power will never 
want her Parasites’, the play does not endorse this judgement of the mock-
sovereign’s supporters. Indeed, Pru’s statement that justice is the primary concern 
of her reign (‘We that doe love our justice, above all / Our other Attributes’ (New 
Inn, sig. D3r)) is no mere posturing; she does attempt to uphold the justice attributed 
to her. 
 
 Although it is clear that it is with Pru that the moral authority lies, the 
confusion over who holds ultimate legal authority is continued throughout the play.  
Lady Frampul’s concern that Pru will overstep her carnival authority is, after 
Lovel’s two hours and two kisses in the Court of Love, reversed in a complaint that 
Pru does not use her authority to make him stay: 
 
 Lad[y Frampul]: Why would you let him goe thus? 
 
 Pru:       In whose power  
Was it to stay him, prop’rer then my Ladies! 
 
 Lad: Why in her Ladies? Are not you the Soveraigne? 
 
 … 
 
 Lad: But had not you the authority, absolute?  (New Inn, sig. F8r) 
 
Lady Frampul again wishes to change the terms of the ‘dayes sports’ to suit her own 
wishes.  However, whilst she insists it was Pru’s prerogative through her absolute 
sovereignty (which she had earlier denied her) to make Lovel stay, Pru 
acknowledges the limits to this authority: particularly in matters of love, sovereigns 
                                                
25
 Trajan was known as the best of emperors and renowned for his justice and care for the well-being 
of his subjects (Benario, 2003). 
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have no authority.
26
   She can, as sovereign for the day, command a kiss for Lovel 
from her Lady, but it would have been an overstepping of her temporary authority 
to go beyond this.   
 
In her peevishness, Lady Frampul soon highlights to Pru how temporary her 
powers are, calling her an ‘idiot Chambermayd!’ (New Inn, sig. F8v).  In defence of 
her actions, Pru reminds Lady Frampul of her previous ‘frowardnesse’ regarding 
Lovel: 
 
Pru: And were not you i’rebellion, Lady Frampal, 
  From the beginning?  
 
Lad:    I was somewhat froward, 
I must confesse, but frowardnesse sometime 
Becomes a beauty, being but a visor 
Put on. You’l let a Lady weare her masque, Pru.  
 
Pru: But how do I know, when her Ladiship is pleas’d 
To leave it off, except she tell me so? (New Inn, sig. F8r) 
 
That Lovel, like Pru, also leaves the mock court not understanding Lady Frampul’s 
true feelings, which is to her disadvantage as well as his, suggests the importance of 
clarity in relationships between sovereigns and their ‘servants’ (New Inn, sig. B7r). 
The ‘frowardnesse’ Lady Frampul admits indicates a deliberate perverseness in her 
actions towards Lovel, and perhaps also towards Pru’s authority, indicating a 
wilfulness that is here associated with beautiful women.
27
  Lady Frampul responds 
                                                
26
 Love is often used in drama of the period as a means to show the limits to royal or patriarchal 
authority.  In Lodowick Carlell’s The Deserving Favourite (printed 1629) the Duke reminds the King 
that while he can control the behaviour of the object of the Duke’s affections, he can have no control 
over her heart (sig. B3r). Duchess Rosaura in Shirley’s The Cardinal makes it clear that ‘the 
King…hath no power nor art / To steer a Lovers Soul’ (sig. B3r) despite his control over whom she 
marries, and the king himself admits that he ‘did exceed the office of a King / To exercise dominion 
over hearts’ (D1v).  It is Ithocles’s attempts to control his sister’s heart in marrying her to Bassanes 
rather than to Orgilus to whom she is already promised and whom she loves that leads to the 
devastation of John Ford’s The Broken Heart. 
27
 This association of woman and wilfulness is raised on several occasions throughout the thesis. See, 
for example, Chapter 2, p.121; Chapter 3, pp.163-65.  Sanders argues that the ‘association of the 
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that Pru would have understood had she been attentive or observant.  But the 
problem Pru has with understanding when and where her authority applies feeds 
into a wider problem in The New Inn regarding what is meant by what is said, and 
what could not or should not be misunderstood, which James Loxley describes as a 
‘problem of seriousness’.  He suggests that Lady Frampul’s response asserts: 
 
that this is a distinction that an utterance makes for the attentive reader, 
despite the circumstances which have called forth such an assertion. 
Language, they claim, ultimately reveals the intentions it embodies – only 
contingent factors such as ignorance, weakness or deliberate fault can in the 
last analysis impede such communication. (Loxley, 2002, 96) 
 
In a play concerned with the Petition of Right and the powers of the monarch, this 
problem of transparency is not insignificant; this same emphasis on clarity could be 
marshalled to support either the king’s or parliament’s arguments over the law in 
the Petition of Right.  Whilst Charles refused an explanation, maintaining that the 
law and his prerogative needed no further clarification, parliamentary calls for 
explanation and clarification of Charles’s understanding of the law in the Petition of 
Right (to avoid such contingent factors as Loxley mentions with regard to authority 
in the play) could just as well be represented by Pru’s question ‘but how do I 
know…?’ (New Inn, sig. F8r).
28
   
 
These questions of interpretations and authority are punctuated throughout 
the play by the activities of the inn’s staff and lower class inhabitants.   Sir Glorious 
Tipto’s pro-Spanish attitude leads Butler to argue that he is ‘some sort of reflection 
on the world according to Buckingham…a flashy, hispanophile courtier’, who, with 
Pinnacia Stuff and her pretences at gentility, present antitypes which prove the 
                                                                                                                                    
aristocratic female protagonist with masquing and performance may also have served to make a 
Countess of Carlisle analogy obvious to contemporary Caroline audiences’ (2000a, 458). 
28
 Loxley understands Pru’s question in a broader sense too, saying that it ‘prefigures much of the 
critical puzzlement and exasperation that the play as a whole has occasioned’ (Loxley, 2002, 96). 
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validity of Lovel’s ethical treatises during the Court of Love on love and valour 
(1992b, 175).  However, along with Fly, Tipto also serves to draw attention to 
military matters. Although Tipto’s military connections are obvious from his title of 
Colonel, Fly too is associated with military activity: 
 
Lat[imer]: What calling has’ he? 
 
Hos[t]:     Only to call in, still. 
 Enflame the reckoning, bold to charge a bill, 
 Bring up the shot i’the reare, as his owne word is, 
 
Bea[ufort]: And do’s it in the discipline of the house? 
 As Corporall o’ the field, Maestro del Campo, 
 
Hos:  And visiter generall, of all the roome, 
 He has’ form’d a fine militia for the Inne too.  
Bea: And meanes to publish it? 
Hos:     With all his titles. 
 Some call him Deacon Fly, some Doctor Fly. 
 Some Captaine, some Leiutenant, But my folks 
 Doe call him Quarter-master, Fly, which he is. (New Inn, sig. C6r) 
 
As well as being a presentation of the dishonest inn-worker who inflates the 
customers’ bills, Fly’s position as corporal, lieutenant and Quartermaster (in 
military terms, usually a lieutenant responsible for finding quarters for the soldiers) 
raises the issue of billeting in this play already concerned with rights, prerogatives 
and petitioning.  Named as the person responsible for billeting, his home at an Inn 
presents proper billeting practices: according to Coke and Phelips, ‘no one could be 
compelled to take soldiers but inns, and they were to be paid for them’ (Russell, 
1979, 336).   
 
Fly’s militia is highlighted as a specifically Caroline enterprise when Tipto 
describes it as ‘an exact Militia’. His comment that it is ‘a fine Militia, and well 
order’d’ (New Inn, sigs. D6r, D5v), reflect Charles’s concerns early in his reign to 
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improve England’s military preparation and build an exact militia, which he later 
could barely afford to maintain. Indeed, the inn is also an appropriate place for the 
establishment of a militia as much recruiting for Charles’s new militia was done at 
drinking establishments (Sanders, 1996, 555).  The Host’s description of Fly’s 
activities at the inn is a series of military puns and the reference to his militia and 
his enforcement of discipline recalls the imposition of martial law to keep unruly 
(and unpaid) troops in order.
29
  The concern over martial law also presented in the 
Petition of Right was closely related to billeting, so it is unsurprising that quarter-
master Fly is also used to explore military law.  Indeed, Fly and his militia are 
called upon to carry out the punishments decided on for Pinnacia and Nick Stuff: 
‘Let him be blanketted. Call up the Quarter-master / Deliver him ore, to Flie’.
30
  
That the sensible, just and ‘Mercifull queene Pru’ to whom Stuff appeals tells him ‘I 
cannot help you’ (New Inn, F2v-F3r) suggests that requests to established judicial 
authorities outside martial law are or have been ineffective. It is, in this respect, 
relevant that the punishments decided on for Pinnacia and Stuff are put forward, not 
by Pru, but by the Host and Lady Frampul (whose desire to exercise her authority, 
as we have seen, is only for her own ends).   
 
Nick and Pinnacia Stuff are, ostensibly, punished for delaying the delivery 
of Pru’s gown whilst they enact Stuff’s sexual fantasies (Pinnacia dresses as a 
                                                
29
 For an explanation of the military puns, see Hattaway’s gloss to II.v.25-8 (1984, 102-3). There was 
some debate over whether the army were subject to civil jurisdiction. Lindsay Boynton notes that 
officers frequently claimed an exemption from this for the army in disputes with country magistrates, 
and that ‘By doing so they afforded yet another cogent argument to those who maintained that 
martial, or military law was essential to govern an army, and against those who venerated the 
common law as a panacea’ (1964, 258). 
30 Blanketing involved being repeatedly thrown in the air and caught in a blanket.  Although this was 
a rough punishment, in comparison with the punishments Lady Frampul and Pru were inventing for 
Stuff before Pru’s court was in session at the beginning of Act II – ‘crop’d /With his owne Scizzers’ 
or ‘stretch’d on his owne yard / He shold be alittle, ha’ the strappado’  (New Inn, sigs. C2v-C3r) – it 
is relatively mild. 
49 
countess and Stuff as her footman).  However, it is clear that they are punished for 
more serious matters than this delay: 
 
Lat[imer]: This gown was then bespoken, for the Soveraigne? 
 
Bea[ufort]: I marry was it. 
 
Lad[y Frampul]:  And a maine offence, 
 Committed ’gainst the soveraignty: being not brought 
 Home i’the time.  Beside, the prophanation, 
 Which may call on the censure of the Court. (New Inn, sig. F2v) 
 
Pru has already forgiven Stuff for the missing gown since she put on her mistress’s 
dress (New Inn, sig. C3r); more important is the ‘prophanation’ their fantasy brings 
with it.  Unlike Pru, Pinnacia has no authority to dress above her station, and her 
punishment is that of a common prostitute – ‘send her home, / Divested to her 
flanell, in a cart’ (New Inn, sig. F3r) – reflecting both her low status and the Stuffs’ 
intended use of the gown.  Latimer adds to this, ‘And let her Footman beat the 
bason afore her’ which continues the reference to the punishment of prostitutes, but 
may also be a reference also to the charivari, an unofficial, community-imposed 
punishment for unpopular marriages or married couples who do not fulfil their 
appropriate roles.  Nick and Pinnacia Stuff are punished at all levels of authority 
and society for acting outside their proper sphere.    
 
That the main concern over the behaviour of the tailor and his wife is their 
unfounded and unlicensed claim to authority and high position is made clear in the 
direct comparison made between Pru and Pinnacia Stuff: 
 
 Lad:    Well! go thy wayes, 
  Were not the Tailors wife, to be demolish’d, 
  Ruin’d uncas’d, thou shouldst be she, I vow.  
… 
Pru: I will not buy this play-boyes bravery, 
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 At such a price, to be upbraided for it, 
 Thus, every minute. (New Inn, sig. F8v) 
 
This is once again self-consciously theatrical (the actor playing Pru playing the 
sovereign is indeed a ‘play-boy’ in the Caroline theatre), and it recalls Pru and Lady 
Frampul’s earlier conversation about giving the dress Pru has borrowed from Lady 
Frampul to an acting company.  At that point, Lady Frampul was unconcerned 
about who might later be wearing her dress, thus emphasising that Pinnacia’s crime 
was to act the Lady, assume a certain authority, without permission.  In this respect, 
it is significant that this interchange arises from Lady Frampul’s anger that Pru had 
not used her sovereign authority as she wanted her to use it.   
 
The assumption of unusual levels of authority is acceptable under particular 
circumstances, The New Inn argues, but not all. The rewards granted to Pru at the 
end of the play (her marriage to Latimer and a substantial dowry from Lord 
Frampul) are for her good sense, and acting appropriately with the power she was 
given. When all characters stop ‘acting’ at the end of the day’s sports and all return 
to their appropriate social roles, Pru is no longer a servant but Latimer’s equal.  And 
whilst Lovel’s speeches, the ridiculousness of Colonel Tipto and the cautionary 
punishments of Stuff and his wife do, as Butler argues, suggest an attempt to 
‘reconstruct an aristocratic ideology after the removal of Buckingham’ from 
Charles’s court (1992b, 175), the play’s concerns are politically broader than the 
construction of the Caroline court.  I would argue that through the discourse of 
rights, prerogatives and parliaments established from the beginning of the play, The 
New Inn suggests that parliaments too may assert their authority for the good of the 
‘body politique’ (New Inn, sig, C2v), questioning higher authorities with 
parliamentary authority when monarchs break their own laws. Whilst upholding the 
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authority of the true monarch, the play also suggests the need for parliamentary 
advice:  
 
Pru: Your Ladyship will pardon me, my fault, 
 If I have over-shot, I’le shoote no more. 
 
Lad: Yes shoot againe, good Pru, Ile ha’ thee shoot, 
 And aime, and hit: I know ’tis love in thee, 
 And so I doe interpret it. (New Inn, sig. C3v) 
 
If presented appropriately, with the right intentions (not for personal advancement 
like Tipto and Fly) and proper acknowledgement of position, parliamentary advice 
should be given and heeded.  
 
 
Petitioning the King: The Love-sick Court. 
 
While Jonson’s play uses the Petition of Right to examine the relationship 
between subjects and sovereigns, and the appropriate assumption, use and abuse of 
position and authority, Brome’s play The Love-sick Court, or The Ambitious 
Politique uses the Petition as an example of good government to advocate co-
operation between parliament and monarch, and emphasise the common good over 
individual concerns for power and privilege.  Readings of The Love-sick Court have 
tended to focus on the courtly activities of the play, discussing the possible 
husbands for Princess Eudyna, whose marriage is thought to be, for most of the 
play, the only way to secure the succession and therefore the stability of the State.  
The Love-sick Court’s emphasis on love and friendship led Harbage to argue that it 
was a poor imitation of contemporary courtly plays of neo-Platonic love (Harbage 
cited in Steggle, 2004, 138), but R. J. Kaufmann argues that rather than an imitation 
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of the plays popular at court in the 1630s, The Love-sick Court is a parody or 
burlesque of this dramatic genre (1981, 126-7).
31
   Butler, following Kaufmann, 
then interprets the play as a comment upon the seriousness with which Caroline 
courtiers approached political issues. If courtly drama is representative of courtly 
thought on politics, then: 
 
Court life, as seen through the drama the court prefers, is a ludicrous farrago 
of extravagant, conflicting intrigues, remote sensibilities and impossible 
fastidiousness.  In this court, making love has become more important than 
matters of state. (Butler, 1984, 267) 
 
Courtly, neo-Platonic love, this suggests, has indeed made the court (dramatic and 
Caroline) politically ‘sick’.  I will argue that between its representation of the two 
(unsatisfactory) alternatives of its title – ‘the love-sick court’, and ‘the ambitious 
politique’ – the play posits a third, parliamentary, way of governing in its references 
to the Petition of Right and representation of the country swains, whose importance 
to an understanding of the political engagement of the play has been much 
underestimated.  
 
The Love-sick Court opens with a comment on the king’s health, which is 
indicative not only of the state of the court but of the state of the commonwealth: 
when the head of the body politic is sick, so is its body.  Indeed, Disanius’s 
suspicions as to the cause of the king’s sickness suggest disorder in the country:   
 
  I that have not seen him 
Since he was sick, can guess, then at the cause  
Of his distemper. He is sick o’ th’ subject; 
Th’unquiet Commons fill his head and breast 
With their impertinent discontents and strife. 
The peace that his good care has kept’hem in 
                                                
31
 Kaufmann discusses in great detail the ways in which Brome’s treatment of love and friendship, 
courtly language, the sub-plot and the idealising of women to the point of idolatry positions this play 
as a parody rather than a poor imitation (1981, 109-130). 
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For many years, still feeding them with plenty, 
Hath, like ore pampered steeds that throw their Masters, 
Set them at war with him. (Love-sick Court, sig. F8r) 
 
At the beginning of the play, Disanius sets up a conflict between the king and his 
people, and his sickness ‘o’th’subject’ can be read as weariness with a particular 
subject (the marriage of his daughter) or as caused by his subjects.  More than this, 
however, the reference to the Commons raises the issue of parliament, suggesting 
that it is the House of Commons which is ‘unquiet’.
32
  To Disanius, the Commons’ 
discontents are ‘impertinent’, suggesting both that he believes they overstep their 
authority in what they ask and that their opinions are irrelevant to him, if not to the 
king.  Although his criticism is directed primarily towards the Commons in their 
complaints despite living in years of peace and plenty that the king has provided, 
Disanius’s horse-riding analogy is not uncritical of the king, both in that he believes 
that he has ‘oer pampered’ his subjects, and in the suggestion that the king is no 
longer in control.
33
  It was a particularly appropriate image for a Caroline 
audience.
34
 
 
Whilst Disanius emphasises conflict, and suggests the way to restore the 
king to health is to execute the ‘leading heads’ of the Commons (Love-sick Court, 
                                                
32
 Whilst it is possible that here Commons means ‘the common people, the commonality; the lower 
order, as distinguished from those of noble or knightly or gentle rank’ (OED ‘commons’ 1a), that the 
‘swain heads of Thessaly’ (Love-sick Court, sig. K3r) are representatives of the commoners suggests 
that Commons should also be taken to mean the House of Commons (OED. ‘commons’,  2c).  Of 
course, in the 1630s, the House of Commons would have been very quiet. 
33
 An analogy was made between accomplished horse riding and keeping control of both a man’s 
own passions and those over whom he governed: ‘Taming a great beast was a taming of nature’s 
wildness and so, like the Caroline masques and paintings in which disordered nature is calmed, 
represented an act of government’ (Sharpe, 2000, 100).  
34
 In the 1630s two paintings by Van Dyck and a statue by Hubert Le Sueur presented Charles I on 
horseback.  For a discussion of the paintings in relation to Caroline court and political activities, see 
Strong, 1972. 
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sig. F8v), the king himself is much more aware of the need to listen to their 
concerns and appease them: 
 
  To determine 
Of you Eudyna, is by heaven committed 
In present unto me. On you depends 
The future glory and prosperity, 
Both of my house and Kingdom. Tis besides, 
Exacted of me by my near Allies, 
And by my Subjects (whom I must secure) 
To constitute a Successor: And no longer 
Will I expect your answer, then five dayes. 
By then you must declare who is your husband; 
Or else expect one from my self; the man 
Whose name I am as loth to mention 
As you to hear, even Stratocles. (Love-sick Court, sig. H5v) 
 
The centrality of Eudyna’s marriage for the future stability and prosperity to the 
state is clear, and it is the king’s prerogative, here a divinely given right, both as 
monarch and father to determine her future. However, he does allow her a choice, 
providing that this choice is made sufficiently quickly to calm the fears of his allies 
and his people.  The unpopular action he threatens, using his power to impose a 
husband upon her who might be distasteful to them both, is defended in terms of 
political necessity; he ‘must’ secure his allies and his subjects.
35
  That he is willing 
to put his subjects’ wishes and his allies’ concerns before his own desires in 
pressing for a marriage to Stratocles which he and she find personally distasteful 
emphasises the king’s concern for his people and his country. 
 
                                                
35 This might be related to the arguments of ‘necessity’ Charles advanced for the exercise of his 
prerogative powers. Although this particular instance is an admirable use of necessity, many thought 
that Charles’s use of such arguments allowed him too much freedom to act outwith the law.   There 
were those in the Parliament of 1628 who believed that Charles resorted to the Forced Loan out of 
necessity to fund the war and that voting sufficient parliamentary supply would relieve the necessity 
and therefore Charles would return to parliamentary taxation for funding.  Lord Keeper Coventry 
noted in his speech to open the 1628 Parliament, that ‘just and good kings finding the love of their 
people and the readiness of their supplies may the better forbear the use of their prerogatives and 
moderate the rigour of their laws towards their subjects’ (quoted in Russell, 1979, 339). 
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The king’s availability to his people and his willingness to hear their 
grievances is emphasised in his reception of the Commons: 
 
 Dis[anius]: O here they come. These be the principals 
  The heads, the heads, forsooth they call themselves. 
  Head-carpenter, head-smith, head-plowman, & head-shepherd. 
 
 Kin[g]: Nay, pray approach; & seem no more abash’d 
  Here then amongst your giddy-headed rowts, 
  Where every man’s a King, and wage your powers 
  Gainst mine in foul defiance. Freely speak 
  Your grievance, and your full demand.  
 
1 Rus: Tis humbly all exprest in this petition. (Love-sick Court, sig. G2r)  
 
Disanius’s dismissal of them as self-titled ‘heads’ followed by a list of their 
occupations emphasises the lowliness of their status in his opinion, particularly in 
comparison with the king, who is the ‘head’ of the body politic.  The king too 
criticises their actions away from court, suggesting that there, ‘amongst [their] 
giddy headed rowts’, they act as if they are kings, and pit their power against his as 
if they were equal.  The reference to ‘foul defiance’ has political connotations 
regarding the Petition of Right, as Parliament refused to pass the requested subsidy 
bill until Charles assented to the Petition confirming subjects’ rights and limiting the 
use of his prerogative in particular areas.  Despite Brome’s king’s accusation of the 
‘heads’ overstepping their authority amongst their peers, he is prepared to give them 
fair and free hearing when they present themselves to him in the proper manner as 
representatives of his subjects.  The combination of demands and grievances the 
king expects from the country swains is particularly resonant of the Petition of 
Right; ‘grievance’ was a heavily loaded word in the context of the 1628 parliament.  
The Petition was a means to force the king to address the grievances of the people, 
and Coke had named the Duke of Buckingham as the ‘grievance of grievances’ 
(quoted in Foster, 1974a, 23).  In recognising that these men have a grievance, the 
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king, like Charles in his second response to the Petition of Right, acknowledges 
they have legitimate grounds for complaint.  Indeed, that they choose to present 
these grievances to the king in the form of a petition is made more striking in the 
Caroline political context, particularly as it follows soon after the king’s offer to 
explain one of Thessaly’s laws to the assembled courtiers: 
  
 My lords, altho’our Lawes of Thessaly 
 To you, as well as to our self, are known, 
 And all our customs, yet for orders sake 
 I shall lay open one to you. (Love-sick Court, sig. G1v) 
 
The Caroline Commons’ requests that Charles explain what was meant by certain 
laws, rights, and prerogatives, and the perceived need for this kind of laying open 
the law, was in part what led to the Petition of Right.  The king’s comment that the 
laws are as well known to these ‘heads’ as to himself may reflect Charles’s refusal 
to give an explanation, but Thessaly’s king, in a demonstration of good kingship, 
and ‘to keep order’, agrees to an explanation. 
36
 
 
 Disanius’s proposal to execute the ringleaders is one of the first suggestions 
in this play that it is courtiers who prevent a peaceful accommodation between the 
king and the Commons, and reflects a similar attitude current in the Caroline period.  
During the 1620s, the courtier in question was the Duke of Buckingham.
37
   In this 
play Stratocles, ‘the ambitious politique’ of the subtitle, is explicitly noted as the 
cause of trouble.  His disruptive presence is emphasised by his first appearance: 
 
 Jus:   You are too sharp Disanius.  There’s a means, 
  As milde as other of the Kings clear Acts, 
                                                
36 In relation to parliamentary activity regarding Charles’s first reply to the Petition of Right, it is 
interesting to note that the Commons later re-petition the king through Placilla to adjust his initial 
response to their petition (Love-sick Court, sig. L2v). 
37
Kaufmann suggests that Stratocles might relate to the ‘potent figure of Strafford’ at the Caroline 
court of the 1630s (Kaufmann, 1981, 111, footnote 6). 
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  In agitation now, shall reconcile 
  All to a common peace, no doubt. 
 
  Dis:  What’s that Justinius? 
 
 Jus: Stay: here comes Stratocles.    Ent. Strat. 
 
 Dis: I fear, in that  
  Ambitious pate lies the combustable stuff 
  Of all this late commotion (Love-sick Court, sig. F8v). 
 
Stratocles is indeed ‘combustible’ in being prone to passions, as demonstrated in his 
later attempts to abduct and rape the Princess.  Disanius’s suspicions that he is to 
blame for the disorder in the country are confirmed by the fact that Stratocles’s 
entrance quite literally interrupts the explanation of a way to restore peace between 
the King and Commons.  Impeaching Buckingham was not the intention of the 1628 
Parliament, but their attempts to do so previously had contributed to Charles 
dissolving the Parliament of 1626.  At the 1628 session, the Commons chose not to 
antagonise the king in renewing their attempts to bring down Buckingham, but to 
focus on recent grievances and the maintenance of subjects’ rights and liberties.
38
  
However, after Charles’s first unsatisfactory answer to the Petition of Right in 
which the king willed that ‘right be done according to the laws and customs of the 
realm’ but did not acknowledge that wrongs had been done to his subjects or give 
an indication that he would not abuse his prerogative power in the future, the 
Commons once again considered impeaching Buckingham, only prevented by 
Buckingham’s own engineering of a further request to the King to give an 
alternative answer to the Petition.  In making Stratocles ambitious and the cause of 
trouble but also distasteful to the king and courtiers, Brome both allows and 
disallows the association of Buckingham and Stratocles and suggests a more 
                                                
38
 Russell notes how unusual it was for Parliament to concentrate so exclusively on one issue for so 
long: ‘A House of Common which would, for three months, neglect religion, trade, and legislation in 
order to stick to one issue was showing a purposefulness which had not been seen for a long time’ 
(Russell, 1979, 344). 
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appropriate royal scepticism towards overly ambitious courtiers than Charles had 
shown in the 1620s.  
 
Stratocles’s ambition is based in theories of kingship which ascribe divinity 
to kings: 
  
 Why is man 
 Prescrib’d on earth to imitate the Gods, 
 But to come nearest them in power and action? 
 That is to be a King! That onely thought 
 Fills this capricious breast. A King or nothing! (Love-sick Court, sig. F8v) 
 
It is this claim for the god-like powers of kings which immediately follows 
Disanius’s suggestion that Stratocles is the cause of the ‘commotion’; a desire for 
personal power, apparently unbounded by law and subject to whim, causes the 
disruption to the commonwealth in Thessaly.
39
  It is significant that the aspiration to 
capricious absolutism is stated by the courtier to whom the king would not want to 
marry his daughter; this is not, the play suggests, an appropriate way to think about 
governing.  In this way, Stratocles makes a striking contrast with the current king, 
who seems to place his country’s good above his own.  Indeed, almost immediately 
before Stratocles declares that all of his power and position ‘is as none’ without 
‘majesty’ which to him is ‘The supream / Estate on earth, and next unto the Gods’, 
the king expresses his disappointment that the Oracle has not helped him to give 
‘My countrey satisfaction, and my self’ (Love-sick Court, sig. I1v, I1r). That he 
expects the same solution to satisfy the people and himself simultaneously, suggests 
that the second wish is closely bound to, if not accomplished by the first.  In 
demonstrating his own understanding of his authority, the king only makes 
                                                
39
 OED, ‘caprice’, 2 and 3.  Ideas of the divinity and divine right of kings and its treatment in 
Caroline drama will be developed in Chapter 2. 
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reference to his divinely given rights in relation to deciding Eudyna’s future. 
Although he is aware of his power – shown particularly in his conversation with the 
rustics discussed above and in an interchange with Thymele in which he refuses, 
albeit with her interests at heart, to explain himself (‘My will has been above your 
question. Pray / Let me request you go’ (Love-sick Court, sig. L2v)) – he uses this 
power for the good of his country, not to raise his own position to a god-like 
divinity. 
 
 The Commons too are aware of the king’s power.  The ‘heads’ who present 
their petition at court are representative of all of the king’s subjects, as indicated in 
their comments when they approach the king: 
 
2 Rus:  By all means have a care that, to any question, we give the King  
good words to his face; He is another manner of man here then we 
took him for at home. 
 
3 Rus: I sweat for’t. I am sure I have scarce a dry thread in my leather  
lynings. 
 
4 Rus: They made us heads i’ the countrey: But if our head-ships now, with  
all our countrey care should be hang’d up at court for displeasing of 
this good King, for the next Kings good our necks will not be set 
right again in the next Kings raign I take it.  
(Love-sick Court, sig. G2r) 
 
The reference to the rustics being ‘made heads i’ the country’ suggests election, or 
at least nomination, and tightens the connection between these rustics and 
parliament suggested by their petition of grievances. Nevertheless, although they 
had been made ‘heads i’ the country’, here they are obviously subject to a higher 
authority, whose power they had much underestimated; he is ‘another manner of 
man here’.  Although described as ‘good’, he does have the power to hang men who 
displease him, but this power is couched in terms of political legacy, making them 
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an example so that the next king will not have to deal with similar disobedience.  
Kings, they themselves suggest, must be approached in the proper way, and this is 
through petitioning and with deference (‘good words’).  In this way, the play echoes 
the importance of appropriate petitioning and approaches to the monarch suggested 
in The New Inn.  When considered in a parliamentary context, this also adds a 
further dimension to their concern to give the king ‘good words’ in that as a 
governmental body, they must be careful to give the king morally sound advice. The 
use of the word ‘countrey’ here too requires further exploration.  The earlier (albeit 
disparaging) references to their occupations and their title as ‘rustics’ associate them 
with the countryside, and Martin Butler understands the rustic ‘Swain heads of 
Thessaly’ (Love-sick Court, sig. K3r) in relation to other plays of the period such as 
Brome’s  The Queen and Concubine and The Queenes Exchange, positioning them 
in a framework which contrasts court and country (county) ideologies, making the 
country morally superior to the court (Butler, 1984, 267-8).
40
   In the more specific 
parliamentary context I have established for these men, however, not only are they 
from the country(side)/counties, but they are representatives of the whole country 
(England).  Thus their ‘countrey care’ is not rustic innocence or limited to their 
county; their concern is for the country as a whole.
41
  The idea that these ‘rustics’ 
could be hanged for their concern for their country is discomfiting in the context of 
the royal and parliamentary activities of Charles’s reign. 
 
                                                
40
 See Chapter 3 for my discussion of The Queen and Concubine (pp. 177-191) and The Queenes 
Exchange (pp. 147-165). 
41
 Richard Cust and Peter Lake argue that although it has ‘become a commonplace of modern 
scholarship that when a seventeenth-century Englishman spoke of his “country” he was referring to 
his county’, for Richard Grosvenor, (MP and local governor) country meant both county and the 
country as a whole (Cust and Lake, 1981, 48-9). 
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 The ‘country care’ of the Thessalian rustics is contrasted throughout the play 
with an apparent lack of concern for the country by the courtiers.  The opening 
scenes of political seriousness at court develop into a romantic drama revolving 
around the princess’s choice of husband between two princes, Philargus and 
Philocles, and Stratocles’s attempts to engineer his own marriage to Eudyna.  The 
princes are sworn brothers, and each attempts to uphold the other’s claim to the 
princess to his own cost.  The way they behave towards each other, and their 
courting of Eudyna as an ideal, divine woman (‘Can I look on her and ask a 
Reason? / O the divinity of woman’ (Love-sick Court, sig. H3r)) rather than an 
object of desire, is reminiscent of the cult of neo-Platonic love surrounding 
Henrietta Maria at Charles’s court in the 1630s.
42
  The alternatives the play seems to 
present for Eudyna’s possible husband, then, are representatives of grasping 
capricious absolutism in Stratocles or of ineffective neo-Platonism in Philocles and 
Philargus.  Neither are presented as particularly viable options. 
 
The demands that love and friendship make on the brothers bring them to 
forget about the point of the marriage: to secure the succession and the stability of 
Thessaly.  Only once, whilst trying to defer to his brother’s happiness does 
Philargus remember the State: ‘But how can you forgo that equal interest / You 
have with me in Thessaly and Eudina’ (Love-sick Court, sig. K7v).  The collocation 
of Eudyna and Thessaly here implies a representation of the one in the other which 
occurs throughout the play.  However, Philargus’s concern is still for the sacrifices 
Philocles is offering to make, not for the state or the princess themselves, 
emphasised in the fact that this conversation occurs whilst the brothers delay 
                                                
42
 See Kaufmann, 1981, 127-9, Lynch, 1967, chapters III and IV, and Britland, passim, especially 6-
13 for a fuller explanation of neo-Platonic love at court.  Lesel Dawson gives a brief over-view of the 
doctrine of Platonic love (2002, paragraphs 1-10). 
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answering the king’s summons to court to determine the marriage and succession, 
instead arguing over which of them will abandon his claim in favour of the other.  
Disanius attempts to be the voice of reason, and encourages them to return to the 
court: 
 
 I could even swadle’em both for a brace of Babyes. 
 Your folly makes me mad: will you return 
 Yet to the presence, both of you? (Love-sick Court, sig. K7r)  
 
In commenting on the childishness and folly of this behaviour, Disanius also passes 
comment on the frivolity or silliness of any court’s absorption in this kind of 
activity.  He is aware of what is at stake, and tries to press this upon his nephews: 
 
 Nephew, come, be wise: 
 It is a crown that Courts you; and the name 
 Of friend, or Brother ought to stand aloof, 
 And know a distance, where such dignity 
 Is tendred. Take your opportunity. (Love-sick Court, sig. K7r) 
 
Disanius undermines the posturing of their courtly friendship by bringing their 
inflated arguments down to a practical reality: what they ‘ought to do’.
43
  If, as in 
Butler’s argument, the neo-Platonic plays of the court reflect a courtly over-concern 
with ‘love’ and lack of concern with politics, this sharp reminder of what ought to 
take precedence at the Thessalian court is also a rebuke to the Caroline court for its 
preoccupation with such ideas of neo-Platonism and courtly love.  The potential 
play on ‘Courts’ as both ‘courting’ and ‘becoming the centre of a royal court’ 
reminds the audience, if not the princes, of the purpose of their dispute.  Making the 
                                                
43
 Kaufmann argues that the subplot also serves to undermine this courtly behaviour. In this subplot 
there are also three potential husbands for Doris, the waiting woman, who are specifically paralleled 
with the princes and Stratocles.  Placing the courtly behaviour amongst the servants illustrates how 
ridiculous it is.  Doris agrees to marry whichever of them is servant to the prince who marries the 
princess, or to marry Geron if Stratocles is successful in gaining her hand.  Disanius’s interventions 
though, question this courtly posturing from within the main plot too (Kaufmann, 1961, 122).  That 
their servants neglect their duty to the princes whilst they court Doris can be likened to the 
princes’failure to serve the king/ state whilst they court Eudyna. 
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princes the ones who are courted rather than courting feminises them and their 
indecision.   
 
The princes’ lack of manliness is also associated with a lack of reason.  It is 
not that the twins do not love Eudyna, but that their approach to her is inappropriate, 
both in their inaction and the terms in which they describe it.  Philocles places his 
love for her above reason and virtue: 
 
Fond reason I disclaim thee, 
Love is a strain beyond thee, and approaches 
The Gods estate: Friendship’s a moral vertue 
Fitter fr [sic.] disputation, then observance. 
Eudina. O Eudina! In what price 
Art thou with me, for whom I cast away 
The Souls whole treasury Reason and Vertue? (Love-sick Court, sig. H2r) 
 
Philocles’s contrasting of moral virtue with how love should be treated implies that 
action should be taken where love is concerned, something belied by the brothers’ 
failure to act on their professed love for Eudyna.  More important, however, is that 
Philocles here claims he will voluntarily give up reason and virtue to pursue 
Eudyna.   Philargus too couches his love in these terms: 
 
 But, where [love] rules and is predominant, 
It tiranizeth; Reason is imprison’d; 
The will confined; and the memory 
(The treasury of notions) clean exhausted; 
And all the sences slavishly chain’d up 
To act th’injunctions of insulting love, 
Pearch’d on the beauty of a woman. (Lovesick Court, sig. H2v) 
 
Although Philocles and Philargus do not abandon reason for passion/desire as could 
be inferred from these speeches, they do in their foolish deference to each other.
44
   
                                                
44
 The abandonment of reason is not, however, consistent with neo-Platonic thought. In his 
discussion of court masques, Kevin Sharpe argues that: 
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Thus this court’s attention to Platonic love is also shown as a movement away from 
reason, and the political parody implies the same for the Caroline court, despite its 
self-representation as the haven of reason and beauty in masques such as Tempe 
Restord.
45
  The ‘tyranny’ Philargus ascribes to love associates irrational desire with 
arbitrary authority, a trope which is returned to repeatedly in Caroline drama. 
 
Whilst the princes’ idolising of Eudyna is criticised as politically ineffective, 
Stratocles’s attempt to abduct and rape the princess provides a concrete connection 
between sexual desire and political ambition in the play (Steggle, 2004, 141).  This 
connection between uncontrolled / uncontrollable desire for a woman and desire for 
power is explored in several plays of the period, particularly regarding absolute, 
arbitrary rule, and in these terms it is important to remember that Stratocles’s 
visions of majesty involve absolute divine power.
46
     In contrast with Stratocles, 
whilst Philocles and Philargus profess to love Eudyna, they do not seem to desire 
her.  Steggle suggests that they do not love her in ‘any meaningful sense’ because 
‘neither brother seems properly aware of the power of heterosexual desire or of the 
will to power’ (Steggle, 2004, 140, 141).
47
  However, too much of this is dangerous; 
if it were not, then Stratocles’s actions would not be so strongly condemned in the 
play, in other courtiers’ condemnation of him, in the distaste for his potential 
                                                                                                                                    
The love we read of in the masques is Platonic love.  In the masques, as in Neo-Platonic 
theory, beauty, that quality which expresses the virtues, perforce attracts them to itself, and 
so draws those attracted to the love of the good which raises them above the plane of sense 
and appetite (the antimasque) to the sphere of reason, the soul (Sharpe, 1987, 203). 
 
Whilst Philocles and Philargus have clearly raised themselves above the physical, they have not 
moved towards, but rather away from reason. 
45
 This criticism of Caroline government in terms of rationality also feeds into a discourse of reason 
and law, passion and absolutism current throughout the period, which I will discuss in detail in 
Chapter 3. 
46
 The connection between desire and absolutism will be explored in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3. 
47
 This apparent lack of desire is consistent with the play’s neo-Platonism. In conventional platonic 
terms, ‘such love transcends physical attractions, it is the noble attitudes of what is best’ (Parry, 
1981, 185). 
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marriage to Eudyna, and in his ultimate repentance.   Indeed, his uncontrolled desire 
costs him the support of the Thessalian rustics: 
 
   Those are enough 
To hang the man [Matho], and turn his Lord out of 
Our Countrey favour:  If we find he has 
 That plot upon the body of the Princess 
 Of Rape and Murder.  He can be no King 
 For us: for, sirrah, we have wives and daughters. (Love-sick Court, sig. K3r) 
 
Again, their ‘countrey favour’ suggests local and national concerns; an ambition for 
too much power would put courtiers (and kings) out of favour with the country.  
While Steggle suggests that the swains’ concern over Stratocles from this point on 
is not so much in relation to his ruthlessness per se, but his sexual untrustworthiness 
(Steggle, 2004, 141), the connection between sexual desire and political power in 
this play makes it difficult to suggest that their political concerns are not equally 
prevalent.  Greedy courtiers (or kings with aspirations to god-like absolutism) 
cannot be allowed to take what rightfully belongs to others, be this their wives, 
daughters or material property.  In preventing a power-hungry courtier from seizing 
what is not rightfully his, the Swains’ actions may also be related to their earlier 
association with the Petition of Right, which prevented the improper seizure of 
persons and property at the King’s will. 
 
 The Princes’ irrationality and consequent failure to respond to the king’s 
summons through their courtly attempts to defer to each other’s happiness almost 
allows Stratocles into power: 
 
 King:  No answer, no return? Must I intreat, 
  Yet have my undeserved favours slighted? 
 […] 
 
 King: … So, call in Stratocles. (Love-sick Court, sig. L1v) 
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The play suggests that it is the courtiers’ playing at neo-Platonic love which 
potentially allows arbitrary, grasping absolutism to thrive at court.  It is only 
Stratocles’ refusal to marry the princess that delays the King’s decision long enough 
for the truth to be revealed that Philocles is actually Eudyna’s brother, so the 
succession falls to him; Philargus then is free to marry the Princess without 
abandoning the principles of friendship expounded throughout the play.  ‘[A]s Juno 
to her Jupiter, / Sister and wife’ (Love-sick Court, sig. L6v), Placilla can marry 
Philocles, whom she has loved apparently incestuously throughout the play, and 
Stratocles, now repentant for his former ambition, fades from the action after 
refusing the princess in marriage.
48
   The removal from the action of those who 
assert absolute authority in the happy resolution of the drama is indicative of the 
need to temper absolutism in order to restore order and harmony in the country.
49
 
 
This idealised conclusion, in which the court is returned to order, almost 
obscures the potential for disaster caused by the Princes’ neglect of duty explored in 
earlier scenes.   Their concern for each other’s future makes them completely 
unaware of Stratocles’s scheming to undermine both of them and take power and 
Eudyna for himself.  He arranges that the brothers meet each other in the North Vale 
Of Tempe to duel.  The note his servant Matho composes for each of them is 
significant in criticising the brothers’ courtly behaviour: ‘Brother Philocles, we are 
                                                
48
 Steggle argues that Placilla’s incestuous feelings for her ‘brother’ suggests self-parody on Brome’s 
part in relation to Offa’s lust for his sister Mildred in The Queenes Exchange (Steggle, 2004, 139).  
However, the extent of the surrender to the unnatural desires of incest are also indicative of the state 
of the commonwealth with regard to law: despite the brothers’ lack of concern for the State and 
Stratolces attempts, the laws of Thessaly are not broken: Placilla never acts on her incestuous desires 
and is rewarded with lawful marriage to her beloved at the end of the play.  In contrast. Offa’s 
pursuit of his sister illustrates the potential chaos which could ensue if the law is disregarded (see 
Chapter 3, pp.159-61), and the consequences of Giovanni and Annabella’s incest in John Ford’s ’Tis 
Pitty Shee’s a Whore demonstrates the fatal results of a complete surrender to will over the rule of 
any kind of law. 
49 See my discussion of The Queen and Concubine in Chapter 3 (pp.177-191, especially pp. 188-9). 
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the laughing stock of the Nation; and injurious both to the King, our Countrey, the 
divine Eudina, and our selves, by our childish love’ (Love-sick Court, sig. I5v).  
Kaufmann argues that the note reminds the audience of the comic appearance and 
childishness of their conduct (Kaufmann, 1981, 119), something emphasised by the 
comedy of their duel: ‘They espie one another draw, and pass at each other, 
instantly both spread their arms to receive the wound’.  When this ploy fails, 
‘[Philocles] offers to kill himself, Philargus closes with him. They strugle, and both 
fall down, still striving to hold each others sword. &c.’ (Love-sick Court, sigs. K1r, 
K1v).  More important in the challenge to a duel, however, is the threatened injury 
to the king, country and princess which their courtly inaction causes.  Their folly 
will cause damage to the king (of Thessaly and, by analogy, of England) in terms of 
reputation and in answering the petition of the Commons, and their disregard for the 
country will, of course, damage the state.  Whilst the brothers fight over which one 
will kill himself so the other can marry Eudyna, Stratocles abducts the princess, 
planning to rape her, so their delay is indeed potentially injurious to the court and 
the Princess.   ‘The main critique’, as Matthew Steggle argues, ‘that the play makes 
of the cult of courtly romance is that it makes effective civic government 
impossible’ (Steggle, 2004, 139).    
 
Kaufmann argues that there is no more significant action after the delivery 
of the duel challenges until the beginning of the final act (Kaufmann, 1981, 120).  
However, this neglects the way in which the crisis of Eudyna’s rape is averted:  
 
We are the heads of Tempe; and the chief 
Swain heads of Thessaly (the King has known us) 
And here we came to lay our heads together 
For good of common wealth.  Here at the verge 
Of this adjoyning Thicket is our Bower 
68 
Of consultation; and from thence (regardful 
Ever with eye and ear for common good) 
We saw a beard pull’d off; and heard that mouth, 
(Which is now dumb) open a plot, unlike 
The pittiful complaint he made to us. (Love-sick Court, sig. K3r) 
 
In the context of the ‘swain heads’ as parliamentary figures, this gathering at Tempe 
can be understood as a parliamentary session.  Although it has not been called by 
the King, the need for it is clearly evident, as the swains then have the necessary 
information to help the princes rescue the princess.  That this practical rescue is 
closely related to helping the country as a whole is emphasised in the repetition of 
the idea that they meet ‘for good of common wealth’ with their eyes open for the 
‘common good’.  The reference to Tempe here may be an allusion to Aurelian 
Townshend’s masque Tempe Restord, performed at court in 1632, in which the 
valley of Tempe which has been under the control of Circe (uncontrolled desire) is 
returned to reason by Charles and his Queen in the forms of Heroic Virtue and 
Divine Beauty.  In this way, the play not only parodies neo-Platonic courtly drama, 
but questions the ideologies presented in the court masque.  In turning the masque’s 
reason of Tempe over to parliament, (where these courtiers only visit occasionally 
either to indulge in foolish duels or commit acts of sexual violence), Brome 
appropriates royal discourses of reasoned behaviour for parliament, and associates 
neo-Platonic love (with its cult of divine beauty) with ineffective government and 
lack of concern for the state.  It is not enough to present a theatrical discourse of 
reasonable behaviour; the court must also behave reasonably, and to do so, the king 
must call a parliament. 
 
 Although it meets without royal permission, the self-constituted parliament 
is wholly loyal to the king and the princess. Having captured Matho and Stratocles 
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in their attempts to kill the princes and rape the princess, they debate what to do 
with them: 
 
 Now it remains, that we advise our selves, 
 Brethren of Tempe, that since these delinquents 
 Are fallen into our hands, that we discharge 
 Our Countrey loyalty with discretion, 
 And not release him from our power, but by 
 The power above us. (that’s the kings) wee’l wait 
 On you to court. (Love-sick Court, sig. K4r) 
 
They clearly acknowledge the king’s authority to be higher than theirs, although it 
should be noted that they are aware that they too have power, from which Stratocles 
will not be released until theirs is superseded at court.  Whereas previously their 
‘countrey care’ required that they petition the king, it seems here that discharging 
their ‘countrey loyalty’ involves not only apprehending the criminals, but taking 
them to the appropriate place and person for judgement.
50
 This parliamentary 
gathering, although they have previously questioned the king, can still be loyal in 
carrying out their duties under him. The Caroline parliament, by extension, can 
remain loyal to the king despite their Petition in 1628, and could be both loyal and 
useful if called in the 1630s.   
 
When caught by the country swains, Stratocles realises that he is out 
numbered – ‘You have ods o’ me’ (Love-sick Court, sig. K3v) – and this too is 
Matho’s excuse for revealing their plot:  
 
 Str. Coward, slave, 
  Thy faintness hath betray’d me. 
 
                                                
50 The difficulty of ascertaining the appropriate authority in the crisis of legal authority brought about 
by the conflict between the personal rule and rule by common law will be expanded upon throughout 
the thesis.  See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the confusion which arises in law through the 
competing authority of prerogative and common law and Chapter 5 for a discussion of the absence of 
proper authority. 
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 Math:  No, ’twas ods, 
  Such as men meet that fight against the Gods.  
(Love-sick Court, sig.K3v) 
 
While his reference to the gods may be related to the Delphian oracle which stated 
that Philocles and Philargus would both win the prize of crown and princess, there 
is an interesting transference of the god-like power from those with a claim to 
absolute rule (here represented by Stratocles) to the parliamentary swains.  The 
greater number of them, as with Stratocles’ arrest, is significant; only with a 
parliament can the court take care of the State, embodied here in Eudyna.   The 
usefulness of the Swain-parliament both in their earlier petition and in their 
immediate action for the Princess is highlighted when the king draws attention to 
the uselessness of the courtiers regarding Eudyna’s disappearance:   
 
 Bereft of all my joyes and hopes at once! 
 Is there no comfort, nor no counsel left me? 
 Why stand you gazing thus with sealed lips? 
 Where is your counsell now, which you were wont 
 In trifling matters to pour out in plenty? 
 Now, in the peril of my life and state 
 I cannot get a word. (Love-sick Court, sig. K4r) 
 
In the context of the 1630s, when neo-Platonism held sway at court and Charles 
ruled without a parliament, the play’s emphasis on the usefulness of parliaments 
‘for good of common wealth’ and for the protection of the king, his subjects, and 
the State must be seen as a pointed political statement.   Steggle, Butler and 
Kaufmann, concentrating on the potential for political commentary in the parody of 
courtly drama, do not take the political implications of petitioning or parliaments 
raised by the country swains sufficiently into account.  Steggle’s commentary 
describes the Swain heads as ‘good-hearted though stupid’ and ‘unsophisticated but 
sincere’ rustics, but does acknowledge that the play suggests the future of good 
government in Thessaly remains in their hands and with Disanius (2004, 141); 
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Butler, however, notes only the contrast of good country counsel and courtly royal 
favourites (Butler, 1984, 267-8).  To do this is to miss the centrality of the swains’ 
parliamentary discourse, action and concern for the commonwealth to the 
movement and political impact of the play. 
 
The Love-sick Court’s emphasis on parliamentary effectiveness 
notwithstanding, it should be noted that the play’s king himself is not often 
criticised.  He deals fairly with the country swains despite their ‘foul defiance’; he 
tries to act on their petition, and uphold his vow to secure the succession; and 
heagrees, mercifully, to Eudyna’s request to pardon Stratocles for his offences.  It is 
clear that it is his court and courtiers, not the king, who are presented as hindering 
the good of the commonwealth in The Love-sick Court.  Brome’s king is an 
example of good monarchical rule, but this rule is not effective without the co-
operation of, and his collaboration with, the country swains.  Performed in the 
1630s, the play comments on the need to call a parliament, which has already 
demonstrated its care for the country, and which can do so again with loyalty to the 
crown.  The alternatives – the absolute rule of ambitious, rapacious men or the 
ineffectiveness of neo-Platonic courtiers – do not provide a satisfactory or secure 
method of government.  The king’s rule in consultation with the country swains 
provides a reasonable middle way between absolutism and inaction. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In 1628, the Petition of Right brought the relationship between the royal 
prerogative, the common law and the rights of Charles’s subjects into sharp focus, 
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and highlighted Parliament’s role in defending the rights and liberties of English 
people.  Whilst Jonson’s The New Inn picks up on this immediate political context, 
debating its potential adjustment of powers, privileges and appropriate roles, 
including a close engagement with the terms and grievances presented in the 
Petition, Brome’s The Love-sick Court takes a broader perspective, using a dramatic 
presentation of the Petition to illustrate good kingship and to advocate, through the 
‘countrey care’ of the Swains and the ineffective neo-Platonic actions of the 
courtiers, parliamentary participation in government for the good of the 
commonwealth.  Both plays emphasise the need for co-operation between the king 
and parliament, The New Inn warning subjects not to assume more authority than 
they should but praising their appropriate use of authority and influence, and The 
Love-sick Court presenting the dangers to the king, the state and the people when 
there is no parliament, and illustrating parliamentary effectiveness, particularly in 
safeguarding liberty and property.  Almost at the border between Charles’s 
parliamentary rule of the 1620s and personal rule of the 1630s, the Petition of Right, 
and these plays which depend on it for their political impact, provide a valuable 
summary of the political and legal concerns of the Caroline period; the issues raised 
in this chapter regarding the divine right of monarchy, the relative positions of 
prerogative and law, and the appropriate use of authority will be expanded upon in 
the chapters which follow.
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Chapter 2 
 
Shaking the foundations of royal authority:  
From divine right to the king’s will 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ‘The King is above the Law, as both the author, and giver of strength 
thereto’, argues James VI and I in The True Lawe of Free Monarchies (1603, D1v).  
For Henry of Bracton, writing much earlier in c1235, but often cited as a legal 
authority in the early Stuart period:
1
   
 
The King must not be under man but under God and under the law, because 
the law makes the king [Let him therefore bestow upon the law what the law 
bestows upon him, namely, rule and power] for there is no rex where will 
rules rather than lex. (Bracton, 1968-77, 33) 
 
Theories of the foundations of royal authority such as rule by divine right, 
patriarchalism, contract and designation led to different arguments over the relative 
positions of the king, the people and the law.  Having first laid out the claims these 
theories make for the basis and extent of the authority of the king, this chapter will 
explore the changes in the representation of the foundations of monarchical 
authority on the Caroline stage in Massinger’s The Roman Actor (1626), The 
Emperour of the East (1631) and The Guardian (1633), and the effect these changes 
have on an understanding of the relationship presented between the king and the 
                                                
1 For example, Edward Coke quotes this passage of Bracton in Reports 4 (1635c, sig. B5r).  
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law.  It will argue that from presenting a stage-monarch whose word is law, and 
who justifies all his actions by his quasi-divine status in The Roman Actor’s 
Domitian, Massinger’s rulers gradually come to be seen as powerful, wilful and, 
significantly, merely mortal men, whose authority and motives for their actions can 
be questioned.     
 
 
The Foundations of Authority 
 
 Arguments regarding royal sovereignty, how it is gained and whether it can 
be revoked, play a fundamental part in the understanding of legitimate legal 
authority, and the relationship between the king and the law.  There were several 
theories which asserted or contested the absolute, unquestionable, irrevocable 
authority of the monarch.  This section will lay out the understood foundations of 
royal authority in theories of divine right, including patriarchalism and designation, 
which held that the king was accountable only to God, and was thus above the law. 
Then, it will briefly sketch out some of the ways in which this assertion was 
contested, before examining the main points of argument concerning the relative 
positions of the king and the law. 
 
The doctrine of divine right rule argued that the king received his authority 
directly from God, and was answerable only to God:
2
 
 
                                                
2 Authority through divine right was not limited only to monarchy.  The doctrine stated that once and 
however it was established, any government was upheld and authorised by God. This applies to any 
form of government, monarchy, aristocracy, democracy or a mixed constitution, and the manner of 
institution of this government (hereditary monarchy, election, conquest) is irrelevant to the 
unquestionable and irreversible nature of this power. 
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There are two speciall grounds, or foundations of true Soveraignty in our 
gratious Lord the King.  The one that receiving his Authority only from God, hee 
hath no superiour to punish or chastice him but God alone.  The other, that the 
bond of his subjects in obedience unto his sacred Majesty is inviolable, and 
cannot bee dissolved. (Mocket, 1615, sig. C8r)  
 
According to this argument, the king cannot be subject to earthly law, as this would 
place an authority which was below God above the monarch.  Such arguments for 
the foundation of royal authority meant that even if a king acted tyrannously, there 
was no redress for his subjects.  James VI and I, in his commentary on I Samuel 
8:1-22 in which the Israelites ask for a king to rule them, points out that the people 
were warned that a monarch might rule tyrannically: 
 
18  And yee shall cry out at that day, because of your King, whom yee have 
chosen you: and the Lord God will not heare you at that day. 
19  But the people would not heare the voice of Samuel, but did say:  Nay, 
but there shalbe a King over us. (James VI and I, 1603, sig. B6r) 
 
Having been thus warned, the people have no grounds for complaint if their king is 
tyrannous, nor can they depose or remove him themselves, because sovereignty is 
given and maintained by God:  
 
For as yee could not have obteined [a king] without the permission and ordinance 
of God: so may yee no more, fro he be once set over you, shake him off without 
the same warrant.  And therefore in time arme your selves with patience and 
humility, since he, that hath the only power to make him, hath the only power to 
unmake him; and yee only to obey, bearing with these straits that I now fore-
shewe you, as with the finger of God, which lyeth not in you to take off. (James 
VI and I, 1603, sigs. B7v-B8r) 
 
Only if a king acts against the laws of God can people disobey him, but even in this, 
they may only fly from his fury, ‘without resistance, but by sobes and teares to 
GOD’ (James VI and I, 1603, sig. C5v).  
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The most commonly asserted Biblical evidence for the divine status, 
absolute power and irresistibility of kings, however, was St Paul’s command in 
Romans 13: 
 
Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers.  For there is no power but 
of God: the powers that be, are ordained of God.  Whosoever therefore 
resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall 
receive to themselves damnation. (Romans 13:1-2) 
 
The importance of this text to John Maxwell’s argument for the authority of kings in 
his Sacro-sancta Regum Majestas is indicated in the decision to reproduce it on the 
title page.
3
  More specifically, however, Maxwell relates this passage to the idea of 
monarchy founded in paternal sovereignty as, he argues, God created it in Adam 
(1644, sigs. M2v-M3r): 
 
we may be led on to consider how Monarchia fundatior in paterno jure. 
How Monarchie is founded in paternall Soveraignty; and the best way to 
finde out jura Majestatis, the Soveraign’s prerogative, is to consider well 
what in Scripture, what in nature, we finde to be the true and naturall right of 
a father; onely probably, because of mans corruption and untowardnesse by 
reason of sinne, it is like that God hath allowed more to Soveraigne power to 
enable and secure it. (Maxwell, 1644, 85) 
 
Biblical precedent authorised fatherly power, and the Fifth Commandment was 
made to serve political purposes: 
 
Somewhat I heard this evening Praier from our Pastor in his Catechisticall 
Expositions upon the fifth Commaundement, Honour thy Father and thy 
Mother:  who taught, that under these pious and reverend appellations of 
Father and Mother, are comprised not onely our naturall Parents, but 
likewise all higher powers; and especially such as have Soveraigne 
authoritie, as the Kings and Princes of the earth[…] And the evidence of 
reason teacheth, that there is a stronger and higher bond of duetie betweene 
children and the Father of their Countrie, then the Fathers of private 
families.  These procure the good only of a few, and not without the 
assistance and protection of the other, who are the common foster-fathers of 
                                                
3
 William Dickinson also argues from this text in his sermon to assize judges of Reading, ‘that we 
may therfore at length learne to range our selves every one in his due place and calling, without 
derogation from God himselfe, and that power which he has set over us’ (1619, sigs. B1r-B2v). 
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thousands of families, of whole Nations and Kingdomes, that they may live 
under them an honest and peaceable life. (Mocket, 1615, sigs. B1v-B2r)  
 
Thus the respect due to fathers was extended and increased to the king, the ‘father’ 
of the country.  This kind of catechistical argument was widespread and taught from 
an early age, although Mocket’s reasoning from the Commandment gives a more 
logical expression to the analogy than other tracts.
 4
    
 
Sir Robert Filmer rationalised and codified this analogy between fathers and 
kings in his Patriarcha (1628-1642).
5
    Filmer argued a ‘genetic’ history of 
patriarchal politics, in which the political authority of the King developed from the 
social authority of fathers in times when the father literally was the ruler of his 
(extended) family.
6
  This paternal power, Filmer argued throughout Patriarcha, was 
inherited from Adam, to whom it was given by God, was re-affirmed in Noah and 
descended down to Filmer’s time of writing.
7
  Therefore kingly power was given by 
God and, because of this, unlimited except by God’s laws (Filmer, 1680, sig. F7v). 
                                                
4
 See, for example, The A B C with the catechism that is to saie, the instruction…to be learned of 
everie childe (1601, sigs. A6r-A6v) which details all those figures of authority who should be 
considered under this Commandment.  Mocket’s text was authorised by King James as a textbook for 
the instruction of the young in their political duties (Sommerville, 1999, 13; see also A Proclamation 
for the confirmation of all authorised orders, 1615). 
5
 There is some debate over the date of composition of Patriarcha because it first appeared in 
manuscript and was meant only for circulation amongst a group of Filmer’s friends and 
acquaintances.  It is believed that the Chicago manuscript was written before 1631, and the 
Cambridge manuscript between 1635 and 1642. What is noteworthy, however, is that all of the 
possible dates for composition fall within Charles I’s rule. Patriarcha was printed posthumously in 
1680. 
6 I have taken the term ‘genetic history’ from Gordon Schochet (1975, passim).  According to genetic 
history, the essence of a state is explained by the manner of its origin; there can be no change or 
development (Daly, 1979, 57).  Thus, the authority of the king is thought to descend directly from 
the authority of the original fathers of families beginning with Adam which, through joining 
together, evolved into a society governed by the father of the now ‘extended’ family.  Although 
society may have lost track of the genetic lineage between the king and the original fathers, that does 
not, according to Patriarcha, mean there is no connection (Filmer, 1680, C2v-C3r).  Compare 
Maxwell, 1644, 80-88). 
7 Samuel Rutherford denies this genetic argument in Lex Rex, although he does not deny a rule by 
fathers before rule by Kings: ‘It is a lie, that people were necessitated, at the beginning, to commit 
themselves to a King: for we read of no King, while Nimrod arose: Fathers of families (who were not 
Kings) and others, did governe till then’ (Rutherford, 1644, 221).  Bodin also argues there were no 
kings before Nimrod (1606, 200). 
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Patriarchalism did, however, imply a responsibility on the king’s part to govern in 
the best interests of his subjects: 
 
By the lawe of Nature the King becomes a naturall Father to all his Leiges at 
his Coronation. And as the Father of his fatherly dutie is bound to care for 
the nourishing, education, and vertuous government of his children: even so 
is the King bound to care for all his subjects.  
        (James VI and I, 1603, sig. B4v) 
 
He is not, however, bound by anything other than his conscience to do so.  Samuel 
Rutherford disputes such claims, arguing that the king must be responsible to his 
people as well as to God, because he cannot fail in his obligation to God to care for 
his people, unless he fails in his obligation to his people to care for them 
(Rutherford, 1644, 107).   
 
There were, however, other objections to patriarchalist arguments; although 
they were strong in appealing to contemporary social assumptions, they were not 
irrefutable.
8
   Filmer himself acknowledged the objection that ‘It may seem absurd 
to maintain that Kings now are the Fathers of their People, since Experience shews 
the contrary’.  Whilst he attempts to overcome this objection by arguing that kings 
‘all either are, or are to be reputed the next Heirs to those first Progenitors, who 
were at first the Natural Parents of the whole people’ (1680, sig. C2r), Maxwell 
offers an alternative.  He argues that when nations are disordered and without a 
patriarchal ruler, ‘they condescend that one shall have Soveraigne power over all, 
and so by consent shall be surrogated in the place of the common father’ (1644, sig. 
M3v).  This argument, however, leaves open the possibility that authority is given to 
                                                
8
 Sommerville argues that the strength of patriarchalism lay in its appeal to contemporary social 
assumptions and structures of the patriarchal early modern society (1999, 29). 
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the king by a sovereign people, and thus can be revoked.  Maxwell denies this 
possibility, arguing that in choosing a ruler: 
 
all their part is onely to designe or declare the man, which is onely potestas 
designativa, potestas deputativa, but the power is onely from Almighty God, 
the potestas collativa, the Authority, the Soveraignty, is of God, from God, 
Gods. (Maxwell, 1644, 86) 
 
This is the argument of designation theory.  Although the people may designate the 
man who is to be their ruler, the authority with which he rules comes not from them, 
but from God, in another form of the divine right doctrine.  Maxwell’s emphatic 
repetition of ‘God’ leaves his reader in no doubt of the origin of the king’s power; it 
is not only given by God, but it is God’s own power.  There can be no return of 
sovereignty to the people because they were never sovereign. 
   
 However, there were those who claimed that the people collectively were 
sovereign and had decided to confer this power onto a single ruler.  In what is a kind 
of ‘designation theory in reverse’ Samuel Rutherford argues, with Biblical 
precedents to match those of the absolutists, that rather than the people choosing a 
king and God granting him the authority to rule, God instead designates a man in 
guiding the people in their choice, and then it is the people who confer authority 
upon him: 
 
no man can be formally a lawfull King, without the suffrages of the people: 
for Saul, after Samuel from the Lord anointed him, remained a private man, 
and no King, till the people made him King and elected him.  And David, 
anointed by that same divine authoritie, remained formally a Subject, and 
not a King, till all Israel made him King at Hebron.  And Saloman, though 
by God designed and ordained to be King, yet was never King, till the people 
made him King; […] ergo, there floweth something from the power of the 
people, by which he who is no King, now becommeth a King, formally, and 
by Gods lawfull call; whereas before the man was no King, but as touching 
all royall power a mere private man.  (Rutherford, 1644, sig. C4r) 
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Unlike Maxwell’s uncompromising assertion that the authority is ‘of God, from 
God, Gods’, here the authority is conferred entirely by the people with the guidance 
of God.  In this way, Rutherford maintains a careful balance between the ‘just 
prerogative of the king and people’ of the extended title of his Lex Rex. 
 
 When conferring authority upon the king, contract theorists argued, the 
people were able to set the conditions of its tenure. In his De Jure Regni Apud 
Scotos Dialogus (1579), George Buchanan argues that if a king breaks the terms of 
the contract by which he rules, the people can revoke his power (Buchanan, 2004, 
125).
9
  His argument, based on an assumption of innate reason in a people, states, ‘it 
is incredible that, in return for bestowing such a great privilege on their kings, the 
people should allow themselves to have less favourable rights than they had before’ 
(Buchanan, 2004, 101).  Rutherford takes his argument further, stating that not only 
is it incredible that the people would do this, but they do not have the power to do 
so: 
 
It is false that the people doth, or can by the Law of nature resigne their 
whole liberty in the hand of a King, 1. they cannot resigne to others that 
which they have not in themselves, Nemo potest dare quod non habet, but 
the people hath not an absolute power in themselves to destroy themselves. 
[…] for neither God, nor Natures Law hath given any such power. 
(Rutherford, 1644, 147) 
 
His reference to Natural Law raises the idea of a natural instinct for self 
preservation, which political theorists argued first led people to form communities 
and governments.
 10
  Such a law of self preservation would not allow a naturally 
sovereign people to subject themselves irreversibly to rule by a tyrannous man.
 11
        
                                                
9
 Buchanan’s text is a discussion on the difference between monarchy and tyranny, and attempts to 
justify the enforced abdication of Mary Queen of Scots in 1567.   
10
 This is based on arguments concerning the original institution of governments through a natural 
law or instinct which led individual people to gather together in societies for protection, safety and 
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 Like Buchanan, Rutherford, too, argues that it is against reason that a 
sovereign people would allow a tyrant the absolute right to rule: 
 
The people either maketh the man their Prince conditionally, that he rule 
according to Law; or absolutely, so that he rule according to will or lust: 
[…]  He is not Deut. 17.15, 16. made absolutely a King to rule according to 
his will and lust; for, [Reigne thou over us] should have this meaning; Come 
thou and play the Tyrant over us, and let thy lust and will be a law to us: 
which is against naturall sense. (Rutherford, 1644, 105-6) 
 
In suggesting that to allow a monarch the opportunity to tyrannise over a people, 
they invite him to make his will law, Rutherford implicitly denies that the king’s 
will should be law. More than this, if a king does not act in accordance with 
established law, he breaks one of the conditions of his kingship, and can then be 
challenged or removed.  The terms of his argument are particularly interesting in 
relation to the exploration of absolute authority on the Caroline stage; the 
uncontrolled desire or lust of the king is often a marker of a stage king’s submission 
to will alone and a descent into tyranny.
12
  That law is set up in opposition to this 
lust in Rutherford’s argument suggests the moderating power of law over a 
potentially wilful man, an idea also developed in Caroline drama. 
 
Law, Kingship and Tyranny 
 
 The relationship between the king and the law as to which held the highest 
authority was closely connected to these arguments over the foundation of royal 
                                                                                                                                    
better government. To Aristotle, political society was natural.  For a detailed explanation, see 
Sommerville (1999, 14, 18-23). 
11
 Rutherford’s Lex, Rex was written in answer to John Maxwell’s Sacro-sancta Regum Majestas: 
The Sacred and Royal Prerogative of Christian Kings, to assert the prerogative of a sovereign people 
in comparison with that of the King.  John D. Ford (1994, passim) provides a detailed discussion of 
the ways in which Rutherford’s text responds to Maxwell’s. 
12 See my discussion of Massinger’s plays below, and Chapter 3. 
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authority. For James VI and I, the King is this point of origin for the law: ‘Kings 
were the authors and makers of the lawes, and not the lawes of the Kings’ (1603, 
sig. C7r).
13
  Even when acting in accordance with law, the king remains absolute:  
 
For althogh a just Prince will not take the life of any of his subjects without 
a cleare law: Yet the same lawes, whereby he taketh them, are made by 
himselfe, or his predecessors.  And so the power flowes allwayes from 
himselfe. (James VI and I, 1603, sig. D1r) 
 
If this is the case, a King cannot act against the law, as he is the point of its 
authority.  However, for Rutherford who places the origin of the King’s sovereignty 
in the people, the origin of law is also in the people: 
 
Obj.  The King is the fountaine of the law, and Subjects cannot make Lawes 
to themselves, more than they can punish themselves.  He is only the 
Supreme. 
 
Answ: The people being the fountaine of the King, must rather be the 
fountaine of the Lawes…. 
 The civil Law is cleare, that the laws of the Emperor have force only 
from this fountaine, because the People have transferred their power to the 
King.  (Rutherford, 1644, 208) 
 
The point of administration of the law (that is, the King) remains the same in this 
argument, as the King exercises legal justice through the law-making powers vested 
in him by the people; for Rutherford, however, it is the people who maintain the 
ultimate legal authority. 
 
Whilst he argues that the king is the origin of law, James VI and I does 
concede that he should rule, wherever possible in conjunction with the law: 
 
[T]he King is above the Law, as both the author, and giver of strength 
thereto: yet a good King will, not onely delight to rule his subjectes by the 
Law; but even will conforme himselfe in his owne actions there unto, 
                                                
13
 Although he makes this argument specifically in relation to Scottish kings, The True Law also 
speaks about kings more generally, and in fact a reference to the absolute power of English kings 
through conquest appears almost immediately after this argument. 
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alwayes keeping that ground, that the health of the common-wealth be his 
chiefe law.  And where he sees the law doubt-some or rigorous, he may 
interpret or mitigate the same. (James VI and I, 1603, sig. D1v) 
   
James states that the good of the commonwealth should override any concern for 
maintaining established law, and the use of prerogative power to act outwith the law 
allows him then to rule equitably.  Bodin too maintains that a good king should 
uphold established law in so far as it is equitable: 
 
And yet neverthelesse the maxime of right still standeth in force, That the 
soveraigne prince may derogat unto the lawes that hee hath promised and 
sworne to keepe, if the equitie thereof ceased, and that of himself without 
consent of his subjects:[… ] But if there bee no probable cause of abrogating 
the law he hath promised to keepe, he shall do against the dutie of a good 
prince, if he shall go about to abrogat such a law: and yet for al that is he not 
bound vnto the covenants and oathes of his predecessours, further than 
standeth with his profit, except he be their heire. (Bodin, 1606, 93) 
14
 
 
Both of these arguments set forward the notion maintained by absolutists that the 
King’s ability to abrogate laws which were no longer equitable was a necessary part 
of his role as the fountain of Justice.  However, it is also made clear that a King is 
under no obligation to obey established law.
15
     
 
Rutherford agrees that the King’s prerogative should allow him to use 
discretion in interpreting the law for the sake of equity; this he calls a ‘prerogative 
by way of dispensation of justice’, and it is a legitimate exercise of royal power 
outwith the law.
16
  He does, however, reject entirely the idea of an absolute 
                                                
14
 James I also maintains the independence of the King from the law:  ‘a good King will frame all his 
actions to be according to the law: yet he is not bound thereto but of his good wil, and for good 
example-giving to his Subjectes’ (James VI and I, 1603, sig. D1v). 
15
 Indeed, Bodin goes so far as to argue that a King who is obliged to maintain and obey the laws of 
his predecessors cannot be sovereign; all earthly laws, in fact, according to Bodin, depend upon 
nothing but [the sovereign’s] ‘meere and franke good will’ and the right and ability to make law 
without his subjects’ consent is the ‘principall point of soveraigne majestie, and absolute power’, and 
‘unto Maiestie, or Soveraigntie belongeth an absolute power, not subject to any law’ (Bodin, 1606, 
93, 92, 98, 88). 
16
 There are two other dispensations: of power and of grace.  The one of power is not, according to 
Rutherford, a legitimate use of royal power because it would excuse an action which would be ‘sin’ 
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prerogative for a King to act entirely outwith the law at his own will and pleasure. 
According to Lex Rex:  ‘A Prerogative Royall must be a power of doing good to the 
people, and grounded upon some reason or law: but this is but a branch of an 
ordinarie limited power, and no prerogative above or beside law’ (Rutherford, 1644, 
192-194, quotation at 193). Whilst this may seem similar to King James’ argument 
above, for James there is no doubt that the king is not compelled to obey the law by 
anything other than his own wishes; for Rutherford, the king has no dispensation to 
act outwith the law.   
 
Indeed, the way in which a king acts in relation to the law is that which 
becomes a marker of the difference between tyrants and kings.  This is suggested 
somewhat tentatively by King James:  
 
The one acknowlegeth himself ordeined for his people, having received 
from God a burthen of governement whereof he must be countable:  The 
other thinketh his people ordeyned for him, a praye to his appetites[…]  A 
good King (thinking his highest honour to consist in the due discharge of his 
calling) employeth all his studie and paines, to procure and mainteine (by 
the making and execution of good lawes) the well-fare and peace of his 
people, and (as their naturall father and kindly maister) thinketh his greatest 
contentment standeth in their prosperitie[…] An usurping Tyrant[…] will 
then (by inverting all good lawes to serve onely for his unrulie private 
affectiones) frame the common-weale ever to advance his particular: 
buylding his suretie upon his peoples miserie.   
(James VI and I, 1599, sigs, E2v-E3v) 
 
The duties of a king suggested, however, are not enforceable; rebellion is ‘ever 
unlawful’ (James VI and I, 1599, sig. E4r) and performance or otherwise of these 
duties is to be left to the King’s conscience.  It is noteworthy here that the ‘good 
                                                                                                                                    
without the royal will to deny this.  The dispensation of grace is similar to the dispensation of justice; 
it allows the king to lift the ‘custome’ for a poor man who cannot afford to pay (Rutherford, 1644, 
194). 
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king’s’ position in relation to earthly laws remains ambiguous.
17
  Whilst he argues 
that a king should make and execute good laws, James does not state whether the 
laws to be upheld are statute laws, the common law, or those made by the King’s 
prerogative decree, nor does he state how to decide which laws are good.  It is 
emphasised only that a good king will rule in the interest of his people, and is 
accountable to God for his actions.  Other writers, however, make the connection 
between rule without law and tyranny much more starkly.  Rutherford notes that a 
tyrant is a man who ‘habitually sinneth against the Catholike good of the Subjects 
and State, and subverteth the Law’ (Rutherford, 1644, 217), and Bodin, too, marks 
the difference between kings and tyrants in this way: ‘the one measureth his 
manners, according unto his lawes; the other measureth his lawes, according to his 
owne disposition and pleasure’ (Bodin, 1606, 212).
18
  But whereas for Rutherford, 
tyranny removes the authority of the king’s office because a king acting outside the 
law acts outside his office and is therefore no longer King (Rutherford, 1644, 186, 
243), for Bodin, a tyrant cannot be resisted as long as he is sovereign: 
 
I cannot use a better example, than of the dutie of a sonne towards his 
father…Now if the father shall be a theefe, a murtherer, a traytor to his 
countrey, […] or what you will else; I confesse that all the punishments that 
can be devised are not sufficient to punish him: yet I say, it is not for the 
sonne to put his hand thereunto[…]  I say therfore that the subject is never to 
be suffered to attempt anything against his soveraign prince, how naughty & 
cruel soever he be: lawful it is, not to obey him in things contrarie to the 
laws of God and nature: to flie and hide our selves from him; but yet to 
suffer stripes, yea and death also rather than to attempt anything against his 
life or honour.  (Bodin, 1606, 225) 
 
 
                                                
17
 As we have seen above, elsewhere James leaves no room for doubt, arguing that a king is not 
bound to act according to established laws, although he may do so ‘of his good wil, and for good 
example-giving to his Subjectes’ (James VI and I, 1603, sig. D1v). 
18
 It should be noted that Bodin places a greater emphasis on the tyrant’s habit of breaking God’s 
laws and the law of nature rather than earthly laws (1606, 210-212), but nevertheless, earthly law is 
not overlooked.  
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Divine Status and Absolute Power: The Roman Actor  
 
 The Roman Actor is, perhaps, the best known of the plays to be discussed in 
this chapter. It is often read as a theatrical response to contemporary anti-theatrical 
tracts, and criticism of the play tends to focus on the plays-within-the-play and their 
interpretation.
19
  In what follows, I will discuss a different aspect of Massinger’s 
play which is often overlooked, arguing that The Roman Actor is deeply concerned 
with issues of the foundation and exercise of monarchical authority, engaging with 
the ideas of the divinity of kings, the relationship between the ruler and the law, and 
resistance to the king which I have set out above. 
 
 The Roman Emperor, Domitian, rules by divine right, claiming protection 
from the goddess Minerva (Roman Actor, sig. H4v).  More than this, however, 
Domitian behaves and speaks as if he were a god: 
 
 In the Vitellian warre he rais’d a Temple, 
 To Jupiter, and proudly plac’d his figure 
 In the bosome of the God.  And in his edicts  
 He does not blush, or start to stile himselfe 
 (As if the name of Emperour were base) 
 Great Lord, and God Domitian.  (Roman Actor, sig. B2v) 
 
Already in Act I, Domitian is shown to be over ambitious, being discontent with his 
high position as emperor, and preferring to be a god.  In describing himself as God 
in his edicts, Domitian also gives these (the direct commands of the emperor, not 
                                                
19
 For example, David Reinheimer (1998) and Andrew Hartley (2001) read the play in relation to 
censorship; Jonathan Goldberg discusses the way that the senate courtroom becomes a theatre, the 
plays within the play, and finally Domitian’s ‘theatre of conscience’ (1989, 203-209).  Butler is a 
notable exception to this trend in reading the play politically, and in relation to other plays with a 
classical setting (1985, passim; 150-162 focus on The Roman Actor).  I will discuss The Roman 
Actor’s trial scene and relationship with anti-theatrical tracts in Chapter 5.   
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the established laws of Rome) the unquestionable authority of divine law. The 
attribution of a divine status to a monarch is not unusual; James VI and I made 
similar claims for kingship.
20
  What is unusual is the extent to which the emperor 
insists on, and Massinger emphasises, Domitian’s divinity throughout the play.  Not 
content with being a ‘little God’ (James IV, 1599, sig. B2v, my emphasis), 
Domitian sees himself as equal to, and in the heart of, the king of the gods, placing 
himself in the centre of Jupiter’s statue. He also claims Jupiter’s prerogative of 
thunder as his own, offering some of his subjects the opportunity to ‘receive the 
honour / To kisse the hand, which rear’d up thus, holds thunder / To you ’tis an 
assurance of calme’ (Roman Actor, sig. C4r).
21
  
 
That Domitian’s emphasis on his divinity was a significant aspect of the play 
to contemporary audiences is evident from Thomas Jay’s commendatory poem:
 22
 
 
 Each line thou hast taught CEASAR is, as high 
  As Hee could speake, when grovelling Flatterie, 
 And His owne pride (forgetting Heavens rod) 
  By His Edicts stil’d himselfe great Lord and God. 
 By thee againe the Lawrell crownes His Head; 
  And thus reviv’d, who can affirm him dead? 
 Such power lyes in this loftie straine as can 
  Give Swords, and legions to DOMITIAN. (Roman Actor, sig. A3r) 
 
                                                
20
 ‘[L]earne to know and love that God, whomto ye have a double obligation; first, for that he made 
you a man; and next, for that he made you a little God to sit on his Throne, & rule over other men’ 
(James VI and I, 1599, B2v). 
21 ‘Prerogative’ is the term used by Edwards and Gibson here (Plays and Poems, V.185). In claiming 
this they apply particularly appropriate contemporary political terminology.  In being a prerogative, 
it is a right reserved only to the ruler, and this suggests that Domitian is over-stepping his authority 
in claiming a power reserved for Jupiter. 
22 Thomas Jay was one of the play’s dedicatees.  He was one of Massinger’s close associates and 
attended Lincoln’s Inn. He was knighted in 1625.  He also:  
 
sat in Parliament, was a Middlesex magistrate, and went with Buckingham to the Isle de 
Rhé in 1627. As keeper of the King's armoury at Greenwich and the Tower, he was in 
trouble about the sale of unwanted arms and armour in 1628, and in 1641 he was put out of 
the Commission of the Peace after being accused of extortion as a Justice of the Peace. He 
had pretensions to verse, and contributed commendatory poems to The Roman Actor, The 
Picture, and A New Way to Pay Old Debts.  (Plays and Poems, V.180; quotation at I. xxxvi) 
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Jay’s poem commends the effectiveness of Massinger’s choice in Domitian’s 
language, through which he claims the playwright (and the actor) make Domitian 
live again.  However, in praising the liveliness of Massinger’s words, there is also a 
hint of the power of the word of the emperor in the ambiguity over whose ‘loftie 
straine’ Jay refers to.  Massinger’s poetry brings Caesar and his acts to life, but 
perhaps it is the power of Domitian’s words that gives him ‘Swords, and legions’, 
his personal power and resort to physical force give him authority.  
 
It is not only in direct references that Domitian becomes identified as a god.  
Domitia’s response to Domitian’s advances ironically echoes Mary’s song of praise 
at the annunciation: ‘And my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour.  For he hath 
regarded the low estate of his handmaiden’ (Luke 1:48):
23
 
 
   I am transported, 
 And hardly dare beleeve what is assur’d here. 
 The meanes, my good Parthenius, that wrought Caesar 
 (Our God on earth) to cast an eye of favour  
Upon his humble handmaide! (Roman Actor, sig. B3r) 
 
This adoption of Biblical register and phrasing is maintained throughout the scene, 
emphasising Domitian’s position as ‘God on earth’.  There is, for example, a credic 
resonance to Parthenius’ statement of Domitian’s widespread political power, ‘The 
world confesses one Rome, and one Caesar’ (Roman Actor, sig. B3v).  The 
disjunction between the religious echoes and the use Domitian makes of his power – 
here it is to enforce a divorce between Domitia and her husband Lamia so that she is 
free to become his wife – also serves to highlight Domitian’s abuse of his position 
as ruler, and his usurpation of heavenly privileges.  These religious allusions shift 
                                                
23 Cf. Plays and Poems, V. 183, note to I.ii.19-21. 
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the frame of reference of the play from classical, pagan Rome to Christian 
construction of society, facilitating a comparison between the Roman emperor and 
the English king which is suggested in Paris’ earlier emphatic reference to Domitian 
as ‘Caesar, in whose great name / All Kings are comprehended’ (Roman Actor, sig. 
C1v).  Both James VI and I and Charles I employed Roman imperial iconography at 
court, and whilst it would be pushing the political engagement of the play much too 
far to suggest that Massinger represents either of these monarchs in Domitian, the 
play does suggest an alternative, much less positive interpretation of ancient Rome 
than James had done or Charles was to do.
24
  The step from glorious imperial Rome 
to tyrannous emperor is not a large one.  
 
Parthenius’ persuasions to seduce Domitia from her husband also make 
claims for Domitian’s relationship with the law: 
 
 Domit[ia]:  You know I have a husband, for my honour 
  I would not be his strumpet, and how lawe 
  Can bee dispenc’d with to become his wife. 
  To mee’s a riddle. 
 
 Parth[enius]:    I can soone resolve it. 
  When power puts in his Plea the lawes are silenc’d. 
The world confesses one Rome, and one Caesar, 
  And as his rules is infinite, his pleasures 
  Are unconfin’d; this sillable his will, 
  Stands for a thousand reasons. (Roman Actor, sig. B3v) 
 
The personification of power here (‘his Plea’) implies that infinite power and the 
emperor are indivisible, which is emphasised in claims for the extent of his power 
across the world.  The language of the law courts in ‘Plea’ suggests an official legal 
                                                
24 In a similar vein, Butler argues that ‘Massinger’s mirror for tyranny stands in radical opposition to 
the contemporary court culture both aesthetically and politically’ (1985, 152).  For a discussion of 
James VI and I’s employment of imperial iconography, see Kewes, 2002, passim.  In 1633 Van Dyck 
painted Charles riding through a triumphal arch, and in 1632, Charles danced in the masque Albion’s 
Triumph. 
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negotiation, and this maintains a pretence of acting within the law whilst denying its 
power.   In fact, such is the authority that the emperor exercises, that merely a 
syllable from him holds more power than the law.   What becomes clear is that 
Domitian rules only in accordance with his own will, and is not bound to give any 
explanation, morally or legally, for his actions.  
 
 Parthenius’s assertions of the emperor’s power in this respect are set 
alongside Lamia’s objections to Domitian’s seduction of Domitia: 
 
 This is rare. 
 Cannot a man be master of his wife 
 Because she’s young, and faire, without a pattent. 
 I in mine owne house am an Emperour, 
 And will defend whats mine. (Roman Actor, sig. B4r) 
 
In the same way that the analogies of patriarchalism argued that the king gains his 
power as the father of the kingdom, Lamia, as head of his household, is a king in the 
domestic sphere.  His reference to needing a ‘pattent’ from the emperor to keep his 
wife reflects concerns over monopolies in James I’s reign which would become 
increasingly contentious under Charles.
25
  In maintaining his rights to hold his 
property absolutely, Lamia sets the subjects’ rights in direct opposition to the rights 
the emperor claims, and in doing so prefigures the claims made later in Charles’s 
reign over individuals’ rights to hold property inviolate to prerogative demands.
26
  
When this appeal to his supposedly inalienable rights as a husband fails, he resorts 
to what should be the safeguard of these rights in the law, asking, ‘Is this legall?’.  
                                                
25
 Monopolies were made illegal in by Statute in 1624.  However, the Statute did allow some 
exceptions, and monopolies held by corporations, and for limited periods, inventions were legal 
(Butler, 1987, 130).  See Chapter 3, footnote 50.  Butler argues that in The Roman Actor, ‘the crucial 
principle at stake is that [Domitian’s] conception of his power exhibits exactly that challenge to the 
fundamental freedoms of the subject which was feared from Stuart government’, and notes that the 
Caroline concern with the forced loan, arbitrary imprisonment, and unimpeachable liberties of the 
subject are encapsulated in the Lamia episode (1985, 154). 
26 See Chapter 1, pp.34-5, p.65 
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Parthenius’ response, ‘Monarchs that dare not doe unlawfull things, / Yet bare them 
out are Constables, not Kings’ (Roman Actor, sig. B4r) , asserts not only that 
Domitian does not have to act according to the law, but also that if he were to act 
only according to the law, he would not be a king.  This is a sharp contrast with 
Rutherford’s arguments that only in obeying the law can monarchs be true kings, 
not tyrants.
27
 
 
 Domitian himself makes a direct statement concerning his position in regard 
to the law:   
 
Shall we be circumscrib’d? let such as cannot 
 By force make good their actions, though wicked, 
 Conceale, excuse or qualifie their crimes: 
 What our desires grant leave, and priviledge to 
 Though contradicting all divine decrees, 
 Or lawes confirm’d by Romulus, and Numa, 
 Shall be held sacred.  (Roman Actor, sig. D3r) 
 
For Domitian, his power allows him to do anything, without explanation or excuse. 
Whilst there was debate in the period over the position of the king in relation to 
positive law, there was no debate over the primacy of God’s laws.  James VI and I 
maintained throughout his political tracts that Kings must remain answerable to God 
for their deeds, and must therefore uphold His laws.
28
  Domitian’s denial of their 
precedence, then, is an arresting comment, and following the Renaissance tragic 
tradition of the overreacher, Domitian has sealed his fate.  The emperor’s opinion of 
other earthly power too is unusual.  Domitian’s reference to Romulus and Numa 
cites the earliest precedent for Roman kingly authority, those in whom his position 
                                                
27
 See above p. 85. 
28
 See for example, the first book of Basilikon Doron: ‘Anent a King’s Dutie towards God’.  See also 
Bodin, ‘as for the lawes of God and nature, all princes and people of the world are unto them subject’ 
(Bodin, 1606, 92).  
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of authority originates, and then denies any lasting power to their laws.
29
  Instead he 
claims that it is his desires which give him ‘leave, and priviledge’ and should be 
held ‘sacred’, presenting his will as the highest authority.  This collocation of desire 
and privilege is implicitly critical of the royal prerogative, suggesting that the 
prerogative is not a royal right, but a more acceptable name for royal wilfulness, an 
idea which is developed in James Shirley’s The Lady of Pleasure.
30
   
 
 Whilst it is in his divorce of Lamia and Domitia that Domitian is seen to 
exercise his power above all laws, it is, ironically, in his relationship with Domitia 
that he is shown to be most weak.  Having discovered her attempt to seduce Paris, 
he orders her torture and death, but quickly changes his mind: 
 
 O impudence! take her hence. 
 And let her make her entrance into hell. 
 By leaving life with all the tortures that 
 Flesh can be sensible of. Yet stay. What power 
 Her beautie still holds o’re my soule that wrongs 
 Of this unpardonable nature cannot teach me 
 To right myselfe and hate her? – Kill her. – Hold. (Roman Actor, sig. H3r) 
 
                                                
29 This contrasts starkly with most political argument of the period which bases its truth and force on 
precedent.  Nevertheless, Bodin argues that a sovereign is not bound to uphold laws made by his 
predecessors, or those he has made himself (Bodin, 1606, 92-3).  The figure of Numa particularly is 
associated with justice and kingly legal power, and is one of two ancient figures to appear in the 
painted arch of James Shirley’s Triumph of Peace (sig. A4r), which negotiates between the royal 
prerogative and the established law. 
30
 James Shirley emphasises this use of ‘privilege’ to hide wilfulness in Aretina in The Lady of 
Pleasure. Butler argues similarly (1984, 167-8).  Early in the play Aretina upbraids her husband for 
trying to limit her behaviour by reminding him of her ancestry and the privileges they and she have 
held, and tells him ‘You ought not to oppose’ (Lady of Pleasure, sigs.B1v-B3r, quotation B3r).   She 
bases her claims to be allowed whatever liberties she chooses upon ideas of ‘privilege’, previous 
examples of women who behave in the same way, and on her kinsmen at court, associating her 
closely through her language and position with royalty of the period.  Her husband, however, 
describes her extravagant activities as ‘Not a Pastime but a tyrannie’ (Lady of Pleasure, sig. B2v), 
and as the play progresses it becomes increasingly clear that Aretina’s acts of privilege are 
unreasonable and extravagant acts of will, and she is finally brought to understand this and submits 
to her husband’s more reasonable rule.  The play suggests then that ‘privilege’ should be subject to 
some limitations.  It is also an example of the way in which royal wilfulness became associated with 
less than manly behaviour in making the advocate of privilege and prerogative a wilful woman.  This 
association of wilfulness with unmanliness becomes increasingly evident in plays throughout the 
Caroline period (see Chapter 3 p.164).  
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This indecision is not characteristic of Domitian, and provides a stark contrast with 
his earlier command for the public torture of Rusticus and Sura; even in response to 
Parthenius’s reasonable and deferential cautions, Domitian is resolute in his 
decision, confirming this in the decisive statement, ‘Caesar hath said it’ (Roman 
Actor, sig. F2r).  His desire for Domitia has undermined his authority to the extent 
that Stephanos describes his doting on her as ‘the impotence of his affection’ 
(Roman Actor, sig. I2v, my emphasis).  Domitia herself knows she has power over 
him, and in a scene which is reminiscent of Domitian’s gloating to Lamia having 
taken his wife, she taunts him over his weakness:  
 
  Though thy flatterers 
 Perswade thee, that thy murthers, lusts, and rapes 
 Are vertues in thee, and what pleases Caesar 
 Though never so unjust is right, and lawfull; 
 Or worke in thee a false beliefe that thou 
 Art more then mortall, yet I to they teeth 
 (When circl’d with thy Guards, thy rods, thy axes, 
 And all the ensignes of thy boasted power) 
 Will say Domitian, nay adde to it Caesar 
 Is a weake feeble man, a bondman to  
 His violent passions, and in that my slave. 
 Nay more my slave, then my affections made me 
 To my lov’d Paris. (Roman Actor, sig. I3r) 
 
In submitting to his desire for her he has shown himself to be not only less than a 
god, but less than a free man.  The comparison between his passion for her and hers 
for Paris emphasises this in suggesting that his desire makes him weaker than a 
woman.  She undermines both his claims to divinity and his power to make his will 
into law by dismissing these ideas as those ‘false beliefe[s]’ with which sycophants 
flatter him, and stresses his vices by naming his actions as what they really are: 
murder, lust and rape.  For her, to whom he is subject, he is unable to ‘By force 
make good [his] actions, though wicked’ (Roman Actor, sig. D3r).   
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 At the end of the play, Domitian’s ‘murthers, lusts and rapes’ return to haunt 
him, literally in the ghosts of Rusticus and Sura (Roman Actor, sig. K1r), and 
metaphorically in his assassination.  Until this point, there has been an emphasis on 
the impossibility of active resistance to the emperor: in an extended version of 
Julia’s comment ‘What we cannot helpe, / We may deplore with silence’ (Roman 
Actor, sig. F1v), Lamia states:  
 
And since we cannot  
With safetie use the active, lets make use of  
The passive fortitude, with this assurance 
That the state sicke in him, the gods to friend, 
Though at the worst will now begin to mend. (Roman Actor, sig. B3r). 
 
This simultaneously suggests and denies the possibility of resistance.  He cannot 
actively resist the emperor in plotting or with physical strength for fear of his life, 
but instead can wait with patience (‘passive fortitude’) for Providence to rescue the 
State. Rusticus and Sura, to whom he makes this comment, exercise a different kind 
of passive resistance at their execution, during which they ‘grinne’, and assert that 
‘beyond our bodies / Thou hast no power’ (Roman Actor, sig. F2v).  In their 
transcendence of the physical, they defeat the tyrannous emperor who can only 
exercise his power over them in shows and actions of cruelty.  Their reply to 
Domitian’s question, ‘Are they not dead?’ emphasises their superiority to him:  
 
 Sur[a]: No, wee live 
 
 Rust[icus]: Live to deride thee, our calme patience treading 
 Upon the necke of tyrannie. (Roman Actor, sig. F3r) 
 
In actions they cannot defeat him, but in patience he is conquered.  Indeed, their 
calm and orderly speech, even under torture, provides a stark contrast with 
Domitian’s outbursts to the hangman:  
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Againe, againe. You trifle. Not a groane,   
Is my rage lost? What cursed charmes defend ’em! 
Search deeper villaines. Who lookes pale? Or thinkes 
That I am cruel? (Roman Actor, sig. F2v) 
 
The short sentences, repetitions, questions and exclamations all indicate that the 
emperor, unlike his victims, has lost control. 
 
 It is clear in The Roman Actor that kinds of resistance to the emperor are 
possible: Rusticus and Sura’s acceptance of their punishment, their simultaneous 
(non-active) resistance to his power, and their threats to haunt Domitian cause him a 
moment’s pause (‘By my shaking, / I am the guiltie man, and not the Judge’, 
(Roman Actor, sig. F3v)), and later the conspirators do succeed in killing the 
emperor.  However, the legitimacy of these acts of resistance is yet to be 
determined.  Lamia’s advice to trust in Providence to alleviate the sickness of the 
state is seconded throughout the play in the absolutist notion that a king, however 
evil, cannot be deposed by his people because of his divine status:
 31
 
 
 The [im]mortall powers 
 Protect a Prince though sould to impious acts, 
 And seeme to slumber till his roaring crimes 
 Awake their justice: but then looking downe 
 And with impartiall eyes, on his contempt 
 Of all religion, and morrall goodnesse, 
 They in their secrets j[u]dgements doe determine 
 To leave him to his wickednesse, which sinckes him 
 When he is most secure. (Roman Actor, sig. E4v).
32
 
 
                                                
31 The people cannot act against a king because of their low position in relation to him: ‘the person 
and power of the King is alwaies sacred and inviolable.  It is not for those whom God hath appointed 
to obey, to examine titles & pedigrees’ (Dickinson, 1619, C2r).  Rutherford, however, argues that the 
people are greater than the king in that there are more of them in number, and therefore in 
importance (Rutherford, 1644, sig. T2r).   
32
 In the 1629 edition, the first line of this quotation reads ‘The mortall powers’, but in context both 
of this quotation and the wider scene, Edwards and Gibson’s change to ‘immortall’ based on the 
manuscript makes more sense (Plays and Poems, III, 52).  If read as ‘mortall powers’, the statement 
is much more radical, claiming an almost divine power for the emperor’s subjects.   
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The description of Domitian’s crimes as ‘roaring’ highlights their immensity, and 
suggests that his speech as well as his actions have been out of place.  In claiming to 
be above the gods, and in acting tyrannously against the law of the gods, Domitian 
has committed crimes of action and of words.   The reference here to the divine 
protection of princes is not, as Douglas Howard suggests, a mere exercise in 
political expedience on Massinger’s part (1985, 126); rather, the emphasis 
throughout the play on Domitian’s relationship with the gods makes this idea an 
integral part of the play.  Some political theorists of the period who argued against 
resisting tyrannous monarchs maintained that kings were divinely protected: 
 
if there bee any offence committed by him forasmuch as there is no breve to 
enforce, or constraine him, there may be supplication made that he would 
correct, and mend his fault: which if he shall not doe: it is abundantly 
sufficient punishment for him that he is to expect God a revenger: for no 
man may presume judicially to examine his doings, much lesse oppose them 
by force and violence.  And this is no other kingly Soveraignety than God 
himselfe has given unto his Maiestie. (Mocket, 1615, sigs. D3r-D3v) 
33
 
 
However, there were those who argued that resisting tyrants was a legitimate, 
indeed praiseworthy activity.  George Buchanan, for example, argues that those who 
are unwilling to live by laws which maintain the stability and prosperity of the 
community, that is, those who do not behave with reason, are no better than wild 
animals and it is praiseworthy to rid a community of this kind of danger (Buchanan, 
2004 p. 89).
34
 
 
                                                
33
 See also the anonymous The Divine right and Irresistibility of Kings, and supreme Magistrates, 
1649, passim and True Lawe (1603 especially sig. C3v-C4r) where James argues that using singular 
biblical precedents for the deposition of a king is the same as arguing that murder and robbery can 
also be excused in all cases because these also have scriptural precedent.  
34
 In an otherwise comprehensive argument, Buchanan is notably reticent on the idea of the divine 
right of kings.  He deals only with contract theories and the position of elected or hereditary 
monarchy, which give kings power from the people, not from God. 
97 
 Rusticus and Sura’s passive resistance is vindicated in their peaceful 
transcendence of the earthly, and in their troubling appearance in Domitian’s dream.  
The assassination of the emperor, however, is more complicated.  In his 
presentation of the conspirators’ murder of Domitian, Massinger differs from his 
sources.
35
  In Suetonius, Stephanos’ part in the action is brought on by fears for his 
own life; he was ‘in trouble for intercepting certaine monies’ (Suetonius, 1606, sig. 
2A3r).  In Massinger’s play, however, each of the conspirators is given a more 
noble reason for their actions: 
 
 Parth[enius]:  This for my Fathers death. 
  
Domit[ia]:  This for my Paris, 
  
Julia: This for thy Incest 
  
Domitilla:  This for thy abuse of Domitilla. (Roman Actor, sig. K4r) 
  
In giving Domitian’s crimes as reasons for the conspirators’ actions, Howard 
argues, Massinger makes it clear that Domitian dies because of his crimes (1985, 
125).
36
  However, while the conspirators themselves draw attention to Domitian’s 
tyranny as their reasons for participating in his assassination, the play emphasises 
that Domitian’s fall is brought about not only by this, but by the offence he causes 
to the gods: 
 
 Let proud mortalitie but looke on Caesar 
 Compass’d of late with armies, in his eyes 
 Carrying both life, and death, and in his armes 
 Fadoming the earth; that would be stilde a God, 
 And is for that presumption cast beneath 
 The low condition of a common man, 
 Sincking with mine owne waight.  (Roman Actor, sig. K2v) 
 
                                                
35
 Howard (1985, 125) argues similarly. 
36
 It should be remembered that fear for their own lives is not entirely absent from the conspirators’ 
motivation (Roman Actor, sigs. K2v-K3r), but significantly it is not emphasised at the time of the 
assassination. 
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Domitian recognises he has overstepped the bounds of his position, acknowledging 
his ‘presumption’.
37
  Until the final act, he has considered himself secure while 
Minerva is his patroness (Roman Actor, sig. I4v), but her desertion of him leaves 
him unprotected.  Her reasons for this desertion are particularly significant: 
 
And me thought 
 Minerva ravish’d hence whisper’d that she 
 Was for my blasphemies disarm’d by Jove 
 And could no more protect me.  Yes twas so, 
 His thunder does confirme it, against which   thunder and  
 Howe’re it spare the lawrell, this proud wreath  lightning. 
 Is no assurance. (Roman Actor, sig. K1v) 
 
Domitian here realises that he is only the ‘weake feeble man’ Domitia describes him 
to be (Roman Actor, sig. I3r), and his position as Caesar does not protect him from 
the anger of the gods.  In light of this acceptance of his mortality, the Tribune’s 
comment which follows Domitian’s speech in which he claims that he would not 
‘lift an arme’ against Domitian’s ‘sacred head’ (sig. K1v, my emphasis) is ironic. 
The disarming of Minerva and the emphasis, both in Domitian’s speech and through 
the stage directions, on thunder bring to mind Domitian’s usurpation of Jove’s 
weapon of thunder; his previous claim to be ‘Guarded with our own thunder’ 
against fate (Roman Actor, sig. G4r) is, here, shown to have been the empty bluster 
of a powerful but mortal man.  The intertextual reference to revenge tragedy in the 
thunder to indicate God’s anger and impending justice suggests that Domitian’s 
downfall is imminent.
38
  
                                                
37
 Rutherford gives Domitian as an example of a ‘monstrous Tyrant’ who was pursued by God ‘in 
wrath’ (1644, 217). 
38
 For example, Castabella in Cyril Tourner’s The Atheists Tragedie exclaims, ‘O patient Heav’n! 
Why doest thou not expresse thy wrath in thunderbolts; to teare the frame of man in pieces?’ (sig. 
I1v) and thunder resonates throughout the play. Vindice in The Revengers Tragaedie also anticipates 
the thunder of God’s wrath: 
 
 O thou almighty patience, tis my wonder, 
 That such a fellow, impudent and wicked, 
 Should not be cloven as he stood: 
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 Whilst it is clearly his divine ambitions that are emphasised as the cause of 
his downfall, it remains that human agents bring about Domitian’s death.  The 
punishment of the conspirators anticipated at the end of the play denies the 
possibility of the legitimate killing of a monarch, even if he is a tyrant: 
 
1 Trib[une]:  What have you done. 
 
Parth[enius]: What Rome shall give us thanks for. 
 
Steph[anos]:  Despatch’d a Monster. 
 
1 Tribune:   Yet he was our Prince 
 How ever wicked, a[n]d in you this murther 
  Which whosoe’re succeeds him will revenge. 
  Nor will we that serv’d under his command  
  Consent that such a monster as thy selfe 
  (For in thy wickednesse, Augusta’s title 
  Hath quite forsooke thee) thou that wert the ground 
  Of all these mischiefes, shall goe hence unpunished. 
  Lay hands on her. And drag her to sentence, 
  We will referre the hearing to the Senate 
  Who may at their best leisure censure you.  
(Roman Actor, sigs. K4r-K4v) 
 
In Stephanos’s claim, there is something of the contract theorists’ ideas of praise for 
those who remove tyrants.
39
  Indeed Parthenius’ confident ‘shall give us thanks’ 
(not ‘should’, for example), suggests that he anticipates no retribution for the act.   
The Tribunes, however, do not condone his action, and re-affirm the sovereign-
subject positions of the assassinated emperor and his killers: ‘he was our Prince/ 
                                                                                                                                    
 Or with a secret winde burst open! 
Is there no thunder left, or ist kept up 
In stock for heavier vengeance, there it goes! (Revengers Tragaedie, sig. H1r) 
39 Buchanan, for example, argues that it is not only legitimate but praiseworthy to kill a tyrant, and 
describes such men as animals or monsters: 
If I were allowed to pass a law, I would order, as the Romans used to do in seeking 
expiation for monsters, that men like that [those who did not wish to live according to law 
for the good of the commonwealth] should be banished into desert lands or drowned in the 
sea far from the sight of land, lest even the contagion of their dead bodies infect living men; 
and that those who killed them would have rewards decreed to them, not only by the people 
as a whole but by individuals, as commonly happens in the case of those who have killed 
wolves or bears or have caught their cubs. (Buchanan, 2004, 89) 
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How ever wicked’.
40
  It is interesting that this inalienable princely authority which 
Domitian retains whatever his actions does not apply to his wife, who loses her title 
of Augusta for her wickedness, confirming that the murder of an emperor is a crime 
above all others.  Although the Tribune states that the hearing will be left to the 
senate, it is clear that it is not the senate but Domitian’s successor as emperor who 
will exact punishment.  The inability of the Senate to act without the emperor has 
already been illustrated at the beginning of the play in the abandoned trial of Paris, 
and here the Tribune’s first comment that ‘whosoe’re succeeds [Domitian] will 
revenge’ his murder emphasises the primary position of the emperor.
41
  Thus the 
emperor, however wicked, remains independently sovereign, set apart from and 
above the Senate. 
 
 The Roman Actor does not deny the divine right of kings, nor does it 
condone active resistance; instead it presents a ruler who oversteps the bounds of 
his prerogative, attempting to position himself as equal to, if not above, the gods.  
The emperor’s extra-legal prerogative, in fact, is not denied in this play; although, 
for example, his divorce of Lamia and Domitia is objectionable, his power to do so 
is not in question, and it is, conspicuously, not presented as a reason for his death.  
It is important to note that at the end of the play, it is not Domitian’s illegal actions 
which are brought to the fore, but his cruelties: 
 
Take up his body.  He in death hath payd 
For all his cruelties.  Heere’s the difference 
 Good Kings are mourn’d for after life, but ill 
 And such as govern’d onely by their will 
 And not their reason. Unlamented fall 
No Goodmans teare shed at their Funerall. (Roman Actor, sig. K4v) 
                                                
40
 ‘The wickednes therefore of the King can never make them, that are ordayned to be judged by 
him, to become his Judges’ (James VI and I, 1603, sig. D5v). 
41 See Chapter 5 pp. 248-254 for a discussion of Paris’s trial. 
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In placing an emphasis on reason here, Massinger also suggests a need for 
moderation in absolute power and this will be explored further in my discussion of 
The Emperour of the East below.  Here, however, it is interesting to note in the 
Tribune’s words an echo of a passage in James VI and I’s Basilikon Doron in which 
he states the difference between a good king and a tyrant: 
 
For a good Kinge (after a happie and famous reigne) dyeth in peace, 
lamented by his subjectes, and admyred by his Neighbours… Where by the 
contrarie, a Tyrantes miserable and in-famous life, armeth in his owne 
subjectes to become his burreaux:  And although that rebellion bee ever 
unlawful on their parte, yet is the worlde so wearied of him, that his fall is 
little meaned by the reste of his subjectes, and but smyled at by his 
neighboures.  (James VI and I, 1599, sigs. E3v-E4r) 
 
Whilst it is possible that this is could be a commonplace saying, it is not 
unreasonable to suggest a link between these passages.
42
  An echo of the former 
king’s (absolutist) advice to his son for government in a play which deals with 
divine right and the dangers of resistance if a monarch is tyrannous, and is 
performed at the beginning of a new reign, allows the commercial theatre to speak 
to and of the new king, whilst paying tribute to the former ruler.  
 
 
Decline from Divinity: The Emperour of the East  
 
 Whilst The Roman Actor presents the assassination of the emperor, the play 
maintains the irresistibility of the monarch, demonstrating that it is his displeasing 
of the gods which really condemns Domitian.  However, the desertion by Minerva 
                                                
42
 Bodin, for example, makes a similar statement regarding the difference between kings and tyrants: 
‘the one is praised and honoured of all men whilest he liveth, and much missed after his death; 
whereas the other is defamed yet living, and most shamefully reviled both by word and writing when 
he is dead’ (1606, 213). 
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and Domitian’s submission to his passion in his desire for Domitia illustrate that 
Domitian is a mortal man, however powerful and divinely appointed.   As the 
Caroline period progresses, this decline from divinity becomes increasingly 
apparent in stage monarchs.  This section will discuss the ways in which the 
monarch comes to be seen more clearly as a fallible, mortal man rather than a divine 
figure of authority in The Emperour of the East.   In this play, Massinger presents 
two monarchs: Theodosius (the emperor) and his sister Pulcheria, who has ruled 
Constantinople during his minority.  The juxtaposition of their methods of 
government dramatises a discussion on stage of the proper use of authority whilst 
maintaining the absolute power of the monarch; the reasons for Theodosius’s fall 
from moderate absolutism to arbitrary rule suggest both his own fallibility and the 
importance of sensible counsel. 
  
Theodosius has been educated in the arts of rule by his sister Pulcheria, who 
was appointed his protector with ‘the disposure / Of his so many Kingdomes’ (The 
Emperour of the East, sig. B1v) until he reached maturity.
43
  It is clear that she has 
performed both duties very well, and is admired by her subjects at home and by 
foreign princes: 
 
Paulinus:  Her soule is so immense, 
  And her strong faculties so apprehensive, 
  To search into the depth of deepe designes, 
  And of all natures, that the burthen which 
  To many men were insupportable, 
  To her is but a gentle exercise, 
 Made by the frequent use familiar to her. 
 
Cleon:  With your good favour let me interrupt you. 
 Being as she is in every part so perfect, 
Me thinkes that all kings of our Easterne world 
                                                
43 In subsequent references, The Emperour of the East will be abbreviated to Emperour.  
103 
Should become rivalls for her. 
 
 Paulinus:  So they have, 
  But to no purpose.  She that knows her strength  
To rule, and governe monarchs, scornes to weare 
 On her free necke the servile yoke of marriage. 
 […] 
 Shee’s so impartiall when she sits upon  
 The high tribunall, neither swayd with piety, 
 Nor awd by feare beyond her equall scale, 
 That ’tis not superstition to beleeve 
 Astrea once more lives upon the earth, 
 Pulcheriaes brest her temple.  (Emperour, sig. B1v-B2r) 
 
These references to the justice of Astraea, Pulcheria’s refusal to marry, and 
references to her as a Phoenix and ‘the moon’ (Emperour, sigs. B1r, D2r) make 
clear allusion to Elizabeth I and situate the play in the growing trend 
 of nostalgia for the chaste, just reign of Elizabeth in drama after her death.
44 
 The 
reference to a ‘servile yoke’ of marriage also serves to emphasise the sovereign 
independence of Elizabeth from the influence of foreign rulers.  This nostalgia, 
which became manifest early in James’ reign, took a variety of forms, from an 
image of chastity, to a politic prince maintaining an ‘even keel in domestic and 
foreign affairs’ to a ‘Protestant Valkyrie’ (Woolf, 1985, 172).  There is, in 
Pulcheria, a combination of these images.  In his description of her, Paulinus 
establishes her skill in domestic rule, and her private lodgings are described as ‘a 
chaste Nunnery’ (Emperour, sig. B1v).  Whilst she is not quite the warlike 
Protestant Queen defending her people from the Catholic threat, she is careful to 
maintain a distinction between religions, encouraging Athenais’ conversion to her 
country’s religion, and insisting on her baptism before Theodosius marries her 
(Emperour, sig. E4r).  It is possible that contemporaries would have recognised in 
this a critical comment on Charles’ marriage to Henrietta-Maria, a Catholic 
                                                
44
 Anne Barton argues similarly, 1981, 717-719.   Diana, goddess of the moon and of chastity, and 
the phoenix formed parts of Elizabeth’s iconography and contributed to the distancing of the Queen 
from any human fallibility.  See Barton, 1981, passim.   
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princess; the marriage raised fears of Catholic influence in Charles’ court, and with 
it developing ideas of absolutist prerogative rule which were associated with 
Catholicism.  Athenais’ growing insistence on the privileges of her position as 
empress, and Theodosius’ increased arbitrariness after marriage support this 
reading.
45
  Pulcheria’s capabilities as governor are made clear in the ease with 
which she carries her responsibilities, emphasised in the comparison which suggests 
that many men would find the burden unsupportable which she, as a woman, bears 
with ease.  It is important to note, however, that Pulcheria’s good government, 
fairness and justice do not preclude her from being an absolute monarch. It is clear 
that she alone manages her court and governs the empire.
 46
 
 
Despite the Elizabethan note, the problems at Pulcheria’s court are 
noticeably Stuart.  Those courtiers she condemns – the informer, the projector, the 
suburbs mignon and the master of the habit – embody some of the more 
controversial figures of both the Jacobean and Caroline Courts.  However, her most 
scathing condemnation is reserved for the Projector: 
  
Projector, I treat first 
 Of you and your disciples; you roare out, 
 All is the Kings, his will above his lawes: 
 And that fit tributes are too gentle yokes 
 For his poore subiects; whispering in his eare, 
 If he would have them feare, no man should dare 
 To bring a sallad from his country garden, 
 Without paying gubell; kill a hen,  
 Without excise: and that if he desire 
 To have his children, or his servants weare 
 Their heads upon their shoulders, you affirme, 
                                                
45
 Doris Adler argues similarly: ‘With the hindsight of history, Theodosius and Athenais […] seem 
dramatized types of Charles and Henrietta Maria, and the warnings to the young emperor and 
empress within the play seem very much the warnings that much of the nation would have their own 
king and queen heed’ (1987, 89). 
46
 This is not inconsistent with the reading of Pulcheria as an Elizabeth figure, as James VI and I 
respected James for upholding the royal prerogative (Woolf, 1985, 172). 
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 In policy, tis fit the owner should  
 Pay for ’em by the pole; or if the Prince want  
 A present summe, he may command a city 
 Impossibilities, and for non-performance 
 Compell it to submit to any fine 
 His Officers shall impose: is this the way 
 To make our Emperor happy? Can the groanes 
 Of his subjects yeeld him musick? Must his thresholds 
 Be wash’d with widdowes and wrong’d orphans teares, 
 Or his power grow contemptible? (Emperour, sig. C3v) 
 
Projectors were particularly contentious figures in Caroline politics.  That the 
projector should be associated with the advocation of the king’s will as superior to 
the law is suggestive of the legal controversy over monopolies, which many 
common lawyers argued were an illegal way for Charles I to gain extra-
parliamentary revenue.
47
  Pulcheria’s condemnation of this attitude suggests she 
rules in accordance with established law, as does her reference to the law when 
sentencing the wrong-doers to banishment from court (Emperour, sig. C4r).  
However, it is clear that this is a criticism of more than monopolies, and it is, in 
fact, a condemnation of arbitrary absolutism, extra-parliamentary finance and 
favouritism.  The reference to the Prince commanding a sum of money from cities 
ties this criticism closely to Charles’ financial activities, referring to forced loans 
and the penalties imposed for those who did not or could not pay.
48
  Describing such 
sums as ‘impossibilities’ here implies an unreasonableness in Charles’ demand.  
The references to different ways of wresting taxes from the people (‘gubell’ and 
‘excise’) too provide a comment upon Caroline fiscal activities.
49
  Indeed, in using 
                                                
47
See Chapter 3, p.171, footnote 49 for more information on projects and monopolies, and their 
appearance in drama of the period. 
48
 See Richard Cust’s The Forced Loan and English Politics 1626-1628. 
49
 Here, excise may refer to a general tax, not the more specific excise duty, which was not adopted 
in England until 1643. These were, however, exacted in Holland at Massinger’s time of writing.  
(OED, ‘excise’ 1, 2a).  Although I have not been able to find an exact definition of ‘gubell’, there 
was a salt tax imposed in France before the revolution called a ‘gabelle’.  Sharpe notes that there was 
a project proposing to make salt from seawater, and the salt works at Newcastle on Tyne were 
supposed to bring £30, 000 per year (1992, 121).  As this reference is made in the complaint against 
the projector, it may also be a comment on the monopoly for making saltpetre granted by James VI 
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words such as ‘poore’, ‘feare’, ‘groanes’ and ‘teares’ Pulcheria casts these financial 
activities in a particularly negative light, and her question of whether this can make 
the emperor happy encourages her audience (both on and off stage) to consider their 
effects.  However, her final question, ‘Must […] his power grow contemptible’, 
addresses a monarch’s sense of self-preservation, and provides a warning of the 
potential results of this behaviour.
 50
  Anne Barton wonders how such a tirade 
against Charles’ activities passed the censorship of the Master of the Revels (1981, 
719), but as no comment from this process remains alongside the record of its 
licensing, it would seem that the play was not read, at least by the Master of the 
Revels, as constituting any severe criticism of the king.   
 
 Pulcheria’s rejection of the activities which would oppress her people is 
representative of her benevolence which is emphasised throughout the play.  She is 
respected for her justice both at home and abroad:  Athenais is drawn to her court 
for help because of this, and she is always willing to hear the petitions of her 
subjects, instructing her servants to take ‘especiall care too / That free accesse be 
granted unto all / Petitioners’ (Emperour, sig. B2v).  That Pulcheria’s criticism is of 
those who maintain that ‘All is the Kings, his will above his lawes’ for their own 
benefit hints towards the idea of bad counsel which the play explores through the 
influence of Theodosius’s courtiers.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
and I, and the proclamation confirming this issued by Charles I in 1627. Saltpetre was a controversial 
issue in the 1630s (Sanders, 1997, 461-2). 
50 Although when it was published, The Emperour of the East included a Prologue at Court, there is 
no evidence that this play was ever acted at court and no record of what Charles thought about the 
politics of the play. (JCS, IV. 778-9)  The Court Prologue, however, suggests that the play was not 
received particularly well in the theatre and appeals to the ‘justice’ of the King as ‘supreme judge’ to 
set the play above the envy of those who condemn it (Emperour, sig. A4v).  
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Philanax, Timantus, Chrysapius and Gratianus lament that Theodius has not 
yet taken over government from his sister.  Chrysapius’s reasons for this 
demonstrate his ambition: 
 
 Wee that by 
 The neerenesse of our service to his person, 
 Should raise this man, or pull downe that, without 
 Her licence hardly dare prefer a suit, 
 Or if wee doe, ’tis cross’d. (Emperour, sig. D1v) 
 
The powers he believes they should have are those which should be the province of 
the king, not his courtiers, suggesting an overstepping of appropriate bounds in 
Chrysapius’s desires, and that this power and influence is denied to them at 
Pulcheria’s just court suggests their impropriety.  Philanax, pointing out the selfish 
concerns of Chrysapius’s statement, claims that his interest is in raising the emperor 
to his rightful position, not in elevating his own: 
 
  You are troubled for 
 Your proper ends, my aimes are high and honest. 
 The wrong that’s done to Majesty I repine at: 
 I love the Emperor, and ’tis my ambition 
 To have him know himselfe, and to that purpose 
 Ile run the hazard of a check. (Emperour, sig. D1v) 
 
This seems a little hollow following from Chrysapius’s statement, and his mention 
of his ‘ambition’, whatever that may be, ties his desires to Chrysapius’s.   Philanax, 
of course, hopes that in knowing himself, Theodosius will also come to know what 
Philanax sees as the correct gifts and powers for his courtiers.  
 
 In their attempts to bring him to know ‘himselfe’ the courtiers argue that his 
current actions are not fit for a monarch: 
 
Timant[us]: You have not yet 
 Bene Master of one houre of your whole life, 
108 
 
Chrys[apius]: Your will and faculties kept in more awe, 
 Then shee can doe her owne 
 
Philanax: And as a bondman 
 O let my zeale finde grace, and pardon from you, 
 That I descende so low, you are designed 
 To this or that imployment, suiting well 
 A private man I grant, but not a Prince, 
 To bee a perfit horseman, or to know 
 The words of the chace, or a faire man of armes, 
 Or to bee able to pierce to the depth, 
 Or write a comment on th’ obscurest Poets, 
 I grant are ornaments, but your maine scope 
 Should bee to governe men to guarde your owne, 
 If not enlarge your empire. (Emperour, sig. D2v) 
  
The activities for which they criticise him, and in which Pulcheria has made sure he 
has been educated, are those which were the marks of cultivated, reasonable 
manliness: mastery of horses and hunting were markers of mastery of the passions, 
and only when a man can be master of his own passions is he able to be ruler of 
others.
51
  Their suggestion that Pulcheria is more in control of Theodosius’s will 
than she is of her own is not borne out by her actions in the play, and the lie 
suggests something of their pique at their lack of advancement.  In their own 
ambitions and in pressing Theodosius to abandon these activities and do more to 
show his power – Timantus laments that the emperor has staged ‘No pompe, / Or 
glorious showes of royaltie, rendring it / Both lov’d and terrible’ (Emperour, sig. 
D3r) –  the play illustrates the bad influence that such ambitious courtiers can wield, 
and suggests that not only do they have a false idea of what is becoming of their 
                                                
51
 For example: 
As Hee can not bee thought worthie to rule & command others, that cannot rule and dantone 
his owne proper affections & unreasonable appetites; so can he not be thought worthy to 
governe a Christian people, knowing & fearing God, that in his own person and hart feareth 
not, and loveth not the Divine Majestie. (James VI and I, 1599, sig. B2r) 
See Sharpe (2000, 99-100) for a discussion of the analogy between mastering one’s will and 
horsemanship.  
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own position (indicated in Chrysapius’s wish to press suits), but also what is 
becoming of the emperor’s. 
 
 Theodosius’ response, however, suggests the influence of Pulcheria’s 
temperate government: 
 
  will you not know 
 The Lyon is a Lyon, though he show not 
 His rending pawes? Or fill th’affrighted ayre 
 With the thunder of this rorings? you bless’d Saints, 
 How am I trenched on?  Is that temperance  
 So famous in your cited Alexander, 
 Or Roman Scipio a crime in mee? 
 Cannot I bee an Emperour, unlesse 
 Your wives, and daughters bow to my proud lusts? 
 And cause I ravish not their fairest buildings 
 And fruitfull vineyards, or what is dearest, 
 From such as are my vassals, must you conclude 
 I doe not know the awfull power, and strength  
 Of my prerogative?  (Emperour, sigs. D3v-D4r)  
 
Absolute authority, Theodosius states, does not necessarily involve distressing his 
subjects merely to prove his power; rather, he places an emphasis on temperance, 
claiming heritage in earlier temperate and successful rulers.
52
  There is, however, 
despite this condemnation of cruel and arbitrary acts, a much more worrying 
underlying absolutist claim here: should Theodosius wish to act in the way that he 
describes, it is within his prerogative as absolute monarch to do so.   
 
In advocating benevolent rule, Theodosius stresses the good of the 
commonwealth over that of individual courtiers: 
 
   am I close handed 
 Because I scatter not among you that 
                                                
52
 Scipio and Alexander (in his earlier years) were recognised for their temperance (Plays and 
Poems, V. 220, note to II.i.136-7).  
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 I must not call mine owne.  Know you court leeches, 
 A Prince is never so magnificent, 
 As when hee’s sparing to inrich a few 
 With th’iniuries of many; could your hopes 
 So grossely flatter you, as to beleeve 
 I was born and traind up as an Emperour, only 
 In my indulgence to give sanctuarie, 
 In their unjust proceedings to the rapine 
 And avarice of my groomes?  (Emperour, sig. D4r) 
 
Thus whilst it is clear that Theodosius is aware of his power and prerogative to take 
property from his subjects, he is also prepared to acknowledge the limits of what he 
can call his own property.  This emphasis on the property rights of his subjects, like 
Pulcheria’s criticism of extra taxes, strikes a contemporary chord with the 
arguments made against Charles’ use of the prerogative taxation.
53
  Emphasising in 
Theodosius’ rebuke to the courtiers and through Pulcheria’s actions that a ruler can 
be secure in the mere knowledge of an absolute prerogative, the play suggests that 
the royal prerogative need not be exercised unreasonably to be maintained.  
Pulcheria is no less absolute for her reasoned rule, and a ‘Lyon is a Lyon, though he 
show not / His rending pawes’ (Emperour, sig. D3v). 
 
 Despite his rejections of the courtiers’ arguments, however, it is clear their 
comments have some impact, as Theodosius takes control over his empire almost 
immediately, saying to Pulcheria: 
 
 Will you have mee 
 Your pupill ever? The downe on my chinne 
 Confirmes I am a man, a man of men, 
 The Emperour, that knowes his strength (Emperour, sig. E1r) 
 
                                                
53 The rights of the king to levy extra parliamentary taxes were under debate throughout the personal 
rule.  That tyranny was associated with the illegal command of subjects’ property is evident in 
Bodin’s argument that there are three types of monarchy: lordly, kingly and tyrannical, where: ‘The 
tyrannicall Monarchie, is where the prince contemning the lawes of nature and nations, imperiously 
abuseth the persons of his free borne subjects, and their goods as his owne’ (Bodin, 1606, 200). 
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Whilst his repetition of man / men is an assertion of his maturity, and thus an 
indication that he no longer needs his sister to rule on his behalf, it also emphasises 
that he is indeed a man, not a god, despite Philanax’s Biblical reference to the 
inscrutability of kings (Emperour, sig. D3v).  This mortal fallibility soon becomes 
evident in his actions as Emperour, granting petitions arbitrarily so that he can ‘send 
petitioners [away from him] with pleas’d lookes’.  Indeed, when he attempts to 
excuse this folly he once again claims that he is a man, but this time, it is as an 
acknowledgement of his weaknesses, not a statement of his strength: ‘I am a man, 
like other Monarchs, / I have defects and frayleties’ (Emperour, sig. G4v).   All 
monarchs, not only theatrical ones, are merely powerful men. 
 
As in many plays of the Caroline period, the monarch’s turn to arbitrary 
government and a rule of passion rather than reason, is closely related to his 
relationship with a woman, in this play, Athenais / Eudoxia.
54
  Early in 
Theodosius’s reign, it is not that Athenais exerts a deliberately corrupting influence 
over the emperor, as the courtiers attempted; rather, she does not try to influence his 
behaviour at all, claiming she has ‘no will, but what is deriv’d from [his]’ 
(Emperour, sig. F2).  Pulcheria tries to convince Athenais to use her potential 
influence for good, to moderate Theodosius’ behaviour: 
 
Pulcheria:  You know, nor do I envy it, you have 
 Acquir’d that power, which, not long since was mine, 
 In governing the Emperor, and must use 
 The strength you hold in the heart of his affections, 
 For his private, as the publique preservation, 
 To which there is no greater enemy, 
 Then his exorbitant prodigality, 
                                                
54
  See, for example, the influence of Honoria on Ladislaus in Massinger’s The Picture (1629) and 
Alinda on Gonzago in Richard Brome’s The Queen and Concubine (1635-6).  This is a development 
from the association between passion and will in The Roman Actor, as Domitian asserted the power 
of his will over the laws before beginning his relationship with Domitia. 
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 How ere his sycophants, and flatterers call it 
 Royal magnificence. 
 […] 
  Therefore, Madam, 
 Since ’tis your duty, as you are his wife, 
 To give him saving counsells, and in being 
 Almost his idoll, may command him to 
 Take any shape you please, with a powerfull hand, 
 To stop him in his precipice to ruine. 
 
 […] 
 
Athenais:  Do you think 
 Such arrogance, or usurpation, rather, 
 Of what is proper, and peculiar 
 To every private husband, and much more 
 To him an Emperor, can ranck with th’obedience 
 And duty of a wife? are we appointed 
 In our creation (let me reason with you) 
 To rule, or to obey? Or ’cause he loves me 
 With a kinde impotence, must I tyrannize 
 Over his weaknesse?  (Emperour, sigs. F3r-F3v) 
 
In Theodosius’s ‘kinde impotence’ there is an echo of Domitian’s impotence 
concerning Domitia; submission to passion weakens an otherwise powerful ruler.  
Athenais’ refusal to use her influence to help Theodosius govern reasonably is set 
alongside the frivolous and sycophantic courtiers’ encouragement of his irrational 
actions, suggesting that unquestioning obedience is as harmful for the ruler and his 
country as giving bad advice.
55
  Indeed, Pulcheria argues that it is the duty of those 
capable of giving sound advice to do so.  Although Athenais and the corrupt 
courtiers view Pulcheria’s comments here as a means to regain control over the 
empire and emperor through his wife, there is very little reason in any of Pulcheria’s 
words or actions up to this point to doubt her stated motives. Later, however, she 
does view Athenais as a rival for her greatness (Emperour, sig. K2v).   The political 
comment made here is complicated in this play by the mixing of domestic and 
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 Horatio in Richard Brome’s The Queen and Concubine, who is ‘the onely man / That does the 
King that service, just to love / Or hate as the King does’ (sig. B5v), illustrates both the 
ridiculousness and the dangers of complete unquestioning obedience to the monarch’s will.  
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political spheres.  Wifely obedience is proper, and Athenais extends this in the well-
known analogy between the domestic and political spheres to include unquestioning 
obedience to the Emperor.  Ira Clark argues that the danger to the empire and 
emperor caused by Athenais’ submissiveness suggests that Massinger advocates 
strong women and their rights (1992, 40), but Massinger already presents a more 
than able female monarch in this play; rather, what is at stake here is the importance 
of appropriate political counsel.  In petitioning for and receiving Athenais as a slave 
through Theodosius’s careless and arbitrary granting of petitions, Pulcheria teaches 
Theodosius, Athenais and the theatre audience, that such political obedience is not 
always appropriate.  There may also be, in this petition, a warning to courtiers 
regarding encouraging kings to act irrationally, as Theodosius’ ambitious courtiers 
acknowledge the folly of encouraging his arbitrary gifts, worrying that Pulcheria’s 
petition could have been to have them executed (Emperour, sig. G1r).   
 
 Although Theodosius accepts his sister’s guidance after Athenais is restored 
to him, his passion for her continues to affect his reasonable judgement.  He 
irrationally (and wrongly) assumes that when Paulinus sends to him an apple which 
he had earlier given to his wife, Paulinus sends it in scorn because he is weary of an 
affair with Athenais.   In his anger, he orders Athenais’s exile and sentences 
Paulinus to death.  Although his subjects protest that Paulinus should be given the 
benefit of the due process of law, questioning the sentence whilst ‘His cause [is] 
unheard’, Theodosius sees this as a proper use of his absolute authority insisting, ‘Is 
what I command, / To be disputed?’   To the theatre audience, however, who know 
that Paulinus and Athenais are innocent of adultery, his action is, as the just and 
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wise Pulcheria warns, mere ‘rashnesse’ (Emperour, sig. K2v); it is the wilful action 
of a powerful man.   
 
When he believes the sentences have been carried out, Theodosius begins to 
doubt his actions: 
 
 I play the foole, and am 
 Unequall to my selfe, delinquents are 
 To suffer, not the innocent. I have done 
 Nothing, which will not hold waight in the scale 
 Of my impartiall justice: neither feele 
 The worme of conscience, upbraiding mee 
 For one blacke deed of tyranny; whereof then 
 Should I torment my selfe? 
 
The audience, however, know that his judgement was not impartial, and that 
Theodosius recognises this too is indicated, despite his denials, in his reference to 
his conscience and to tyranny.  That his conscience does not allow him to be equal 
to ‘[him] selfe’ suggests that he has now accepted as true the definition of his 
authority as entirely arbitrary that the ambitious courtiers propounded as ‘knowing 
himself’, and is unable to maintain this image.   His assertions of his authority in the 
rest of this long speech (which is almost soliloquy, suggesting he wrangles with his 
own conscience and not with his subjects’ judgements) serve to remind him of the 
power which was earlier claimed for him: 
 
  shall I to whose power the law’s a servant, 
 That stand accomptable to none, for what 
 My will calls an offence, being compell’d, 
 And on such grounds to raise an Altar to 
 My anger, though I grant ’tis cemented 
 With a loose strumpets and adulterers gore, 
 Repent the justice of my furie?  (Emperour, sig. L2r) 
 
Now it is not only the ambitious courtiers and projectors, but the emperor who 
believes his will is above the law, and the possibility that it is this ‘will’ and not the 
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law that decrees what should be considered an offence raises the spectre of a 
completely unrestrained arbitrary monarchy.  The extent to which Theodosius has 
lost any moderation in reason is indicated in the deification of his anger, and the 
conflation of ‘furie’ (which has connotations of impetuosity and madness) and 
‘justice’ is a disturbing indication of the potential excesses and injustice of such 
arbitrary rule.
56
   
 
This assertion of monarchical power is, however, juxtaposed with an 
assertion of monarchical responsibility: 
 
 Arc[adia]: As you are our Soveraigne, by the tyes of nature 
  You are bound to bee a Father in your care 
  To us poore Orphans. (Emperour, sig. L2r) 
 
This is an echo of arguments of patriarchalism which asserted the responsibilities as 
well as the authorities for the king.
57
  This, and their kneeling to him, seems to 
remind Theodosius that he has not ruled in the best interests of his subjects, and he 
reflects upon his arbitrary acts: 
 
 Wherefore pay you 
 This adoration to a sinfull creature? 
 I am flesh, and blood as you are, sensible 
 Of heat, and cold, as much a slave unto 
 The tyrannie of my passions, as the meanest 
 Of my poore subjects the proud attributes 
 (By oil’d tongu’d flatterie impos’d upon us) 
 As sacred, glorious high, invincible, 
 The deputies of heaven, and in that 
 Omnipotent, with all false titles els 
 Coind to abuse our frailetie, though compounded 
 And by the breath of Sycophants appli’d 
 Cure not the least fit of an ague in us. 
 Wee may give poore men riches; confer honors 
 On undeservers, raise, or ruine such 
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 OED, ‘furie’, 1 and 2. 
57 See above, p. 78. 
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 As are beneath us, and with this puff’d up, 
 Ambition would perswade us to forget 
 That wee are men.  (Emperour, sig. L2v) 
 
Most importantly here, Theodosius rejects the notion that an emperor is one of the 
‘deputies of heaven’ along with other ‘false titles’, instead acknowledging his 
weaknesses as a mortal man.  In describing himself as a ‘sinfull creature’, he 
recognises his own fallibility, and thus emphasises that he is a man, not a god.
58
  
Theodosius places emphasis on those things which may make a king feel more than 
mortal:  power and, more significantly, the comments of those advisers who speak 
as if he were divine.
59
  This decline of and from divinity is accompanied by a 
recognition of the role played by passion, not reason, in the emperor’s arbitrary 
actions; indeed, passion is here directly associated with tyranny: in describing 
‘tyrannie of [his] passions’, Theodosius implies both that his passions have control 
over him, and that they cause him to act tyrannously.  Again, the uselessness of 
flattery is brought to the fore in this play: those who obey unquestioningly, or refuse 
to offer good counsel cannot cure a sickness, either of wilfulness in the king 
himself, or an illness in the body politic.   At the end of the play, Theodius, having 
discovered the truth (that Paulinus is a eunuch and could not have had an affair with 
Athenais), is reunited with his wife and released from the guilt of Paulinus’s death 
by the revelation that Philanax did not carry out the execution. Thus it is the 
disobedience to arbitrary acts without due process of law which brings about a 
happy resolution to the play.   
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 One of Rutherford’s arguments against the idea of a king’s will being law in accordance with the 
notion that God’s will is law, is that a king may will something unreasonable because he does not 
have the infinite wisdom and perfect will of God which mean that God can will only good 
(Rutherford, 1644, 192-3). 
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 ‘There is nothing which power equal to the gods dare not believe about itself when it is praised’ 
(Buchanan, 2004, 95). 
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 In contrast with The Roman Actor which emphasises the divine right of 
Kings, even whilst questioning royal ambition, The Emperour of the East places 
increased emphasis on the impact of external influences on the monarch to moderate 
and guide his (or her) actions.  In Theodosius, Massinger presents a movement 
away from a divine power and authority of a sovereign towards rule by a mortal and 
fallible man subject to passion.  As Theodosius comes to recognise his weaknesses 
as a man, the need for good counsel and moderating reason is brought to the fore, 
and The Emperour of the East begins to hint at the possibility of established law 
being such a moderating influence over the monarch through the contrasting views 
Pulcheria and Theodosius give of the king’s relation to the law.
60
    This developing 
relationship between the monarch and the law, passion and reason in Caroline 
drama will be explored in more detail in Chapter 3; the final section of this chapter 
will examine the ways in which this shift in the foundation of monarchical authority 
from divinity to will is explored in The Guardian. 
 
 
Subject to will: personal authority in The Guardian 
 
 The decline from divinity of the theatrical rulers calls into question one of 
the legitimising foundations of royal authority.  Although kings should rule 
according to reason, as suggested in The Emperour of the East, this is not always 
the case, and the intertwining discourses of will and prerogative in drama of the 
period, reflecting contemporary political debates as Charles continued his personal 
rule, begin to represent personal power as a point of authority for the king’s rule.  
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 The idea that laws were established as a form of reasoned moderation because kings are men, and 
thus subject to passions, is one of the arguments Buchanan gives for limiting monarchical authority 
through law (Buchanan, 2004, 35). See also Rutherford, 1644, 184. 
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This section will examine the legitimacy of this position of authority as it is 
presented in The Guardian.  In this play, as with the differing approaches to 
government of Pulcheria and Theodosius, Massinger uses a comparison of different 
rulers and governors to explore alternative methods of rule and foundations of 
authority.   
 
 The play opens with a discussion over the best way for the guardian of the 
title, Durazzo, to govern his ward.  He has allowed Caldoro to be extravagant with 
his money, and the freedom to see whom and do what he pleases.  His guardianship 
of Caldoro is benevolent, and as the play progresses it becomes clear that he does 
have his nephew’s interests at heart, first offering him country pursuits to take his 
mind off his beloved, and then helping him to an engagement with Caliste.    
However, the Neapolitan gentlemen’s warning that his ‘too much indulgence’ 
(Guardian, sig. G7v) will ruin his nephew, and Durazzo’s own argument, indicate 
that this is a form of irrational arbitrary rule, despite his benevolence.  His refusal to 
have his nephew master any means to support himself is clearly irresponsible, 
particularly as he encourages his thriftless spending: ‘He wears rich clothes, I do so; 
he keeps horses, games, and wenches; / ’Tis not amiss, so it be done with decorum’ 
(Guardian, sig. G8r).   The reference to decorum does not necessarily imply that he 
expects his nephew to behave in an orderly or seemly way that pleases Neapolitan 
society – it is clear from the gentlemen’s warnings that this is not the case – rather, 
he expects him to behave in accordance with his position and wealth.
 61
 What this 
entails, however, is not entirely clear, and a shadow of much less benevolent 
absolutism clouds Durazzo’s joviality when he describes the pastimes he and 
                                                
61 OED, ‘Decorum’, 1a, b, 2b, 3. 
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Caldoro will enjoy in the country.  He describes days of hunting, followed by 
evenings when he will:   
 
   give [Caldoro] a Ticket, 
 In which my name, Durazzo’s name subscrib’d, 
 My Tenants Nutbrown daughters, wholsom Girls, 
 At midnight shall contend to do thee service.  
 I have bred them up to’t; should their Fathers murmure, 
 Their Leases are void; for that is the main point 
 In my Indentures: And when we make our progress 
There is no entertainment perfect, if  
This last dish be not offer’d. (Guardian, sig. H5r) 
 
Whilst, for the most part, the full description of the country pursuits does present the 
idealised life of country gentry (Clark, 1993, 264), the liveliness and light-
heartedness of the description and the emphasis on the positive aspects of the 
countryside (the girls are ‘wholsom’, for example) tend to obscure a more serious 
aspect of his plan: although some of the girls may go to his bed willingly, the threat 
of eviction if they refuse hangs over Durazzi’s tenants.  The possibility of a 
monarch taking other men’s wives and daughters arbitrarily is once again raised in 
Caroline drama, the monarchical analogy being confirmed in Durazzo’s reference to 
their visits as royal progresses.
62
  Despite this, as Philip Edwards argues, the 
‘amorality of the licentious old guardian is never rejected’ in the play (1963, 350).
63
 
  
 Durazzo’s benevolent governance of his nephew is juxtaposed with Iolante’s 
strict guardianship of her daughter Caliste.  Hearing that Caliste’s ‘fame and 
favours’ have been the reason for a public quarrel between ‘noted Libertines’ 
(Guardian, H5r), she threatens: 
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 There is also a certain amount of hypocrisy in this analogy: Durazzo has previously commented on 
the expense royal progresses place on those who are visited (Guardian, sig.G8r). 
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 In their discussions of Durazzo’s description of his country pursuits, neither Clark nor Edwards 
acknowledge the uncomfortable coercive aspect of Durazzi’s otherwise idealised description. 
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 Do not provoke me. 
 If from this minute, thou ere stir abroad, 
 Write Letter or receive one, or presume 
 To look upon a man, though from a Window, 
 I’ll chain thee like a slave in some dark corner, 
 Proscribe thy daily labor: Which omitted, 
 Expect the usage of a Fury from me, 
 Not an indulgent Mothers. (Guardian, sig. H6v) 
 
The use of ‘indulgent’ draws a deliberate comparison with Durazzo’s liberal 
governance, highlighting Iolante’s severity. The extent of her demands – Caliste is 
not so much as to look at a man – and the harshness of her threatened punishments 
lead Mirtilla to claim that this is ‘Flat tyranny, insupportable tyranny’ (Guardian, 
sig. H6v), and ultimately leads to her daughter’s rebellion and elopement with 
Caldoro (whom she thinks is Adorio).  Indeed, the relationship between Iolante and 
her daughter is used in this play to explore possibilities of resistance to tyrannous 
monarchs.  To Caliste’s questioning ‘She is my Mother, & how I should decline 
it?’, Mirtilla responds: 
 
   I will not perswade you 
 To disobedience: Yet my Confessor told me 
 (And he you know is held a learned Clerk) 
 When Parents do enjoyn unnatural things, 
 Wise Children may evade ’em. (Guardian, H7r) 
 
This echoes the comment made in The True Lawe, that when kings act against 
God’s laws, then subjects may disobey them, and raises the possibility of legitimate 
disobedience in running away from a monarch who issues such commands.
64
  The 
legitimacy of the argument, which Mirtilla attempts to confirm by citing her 
confessor as its source, is somewhat undermined by the appropriation of a moral 
and religious justification for refusal to obey sinful commands in order to follow 
their own desires and disobey Iolante’s unreasonable, but not immoral edict.   
                                                
64 See above, p.75 
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 That Iolante is representative of arbitrary absolutism in the play is confirmed 
through the now familiar theatrical equation of this kind of rule with complete 
surrender to desire:   
 
 I am full of perplexed thoughts: Imperious Blood, 
Thou only art a tyrant; Judgement, Reason, 
To whatsoever thy Edicts proclaim, 
With vassal fear subscribe against themselves. (Guardian, sig. K6v) 
 
The association of untempered passion with tyranny is made explicit here, as Iolante 
acknowledges that in her desire for Laval, her good judgement and reason have 
become subject to her passion.  The unmanliness of such submission to passion and 
abandonment of reason which has been suggested in the analysis of The Roman 
Actor and The Emperour of the East above is emphasised here in the fact that a 
woman, the only female authority figure in this play, makes this statement.   
 
 Durazzo and Iolante’s rights to absolute authority over their respective 
children is never questioned; their paternal / maternal position grants them a natural 
authority.  It is, rather, their exercise of this authority which is brought under 
scrutiny.   The Guardian does, however, also examine the foundation of legitimate 
kingly authority in its two figures of political authority, Alphonso and Severino.  
The play focuses particular attention on issues of law by presenting a forest 
kingdom of banditti with its own laws and sovereign in juxtaposition with the 
kingdom of Naples.  This comparison allows a more detailed consideration of ideas 
of legitimate rule, personal power, law and prerogative, as Severino (king of the 
banditti), unlike Alphonso (King of Naples), has no theoretical right to rule.  Whilst 
Butler and Adler have read Severino’s forest kingdom as an ideal alternative to the 
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corrupt Neapolitan kingdom (Butler, 1984, 256-7; Adler, 1987, 103), I will argue 
that, in a greater demonstration of political engagement than their reading allows, 
Massinger’s forest kingdom presents not an alternative to, but a critique of, 
absolute, arbitrary authority. 
 
 There is no direct assertion of the foundation of Alphonso’s authority, but 
that he is ‘anointed’ as king suggests that he is given his authority by God; what is 
made explicit in the way that Alphonso describes his power, however, is that his 
position brings him certain responsibilities. When he apprehends Severino as king 
of the banditti at the end of the play, he states: 
 
  Thy carriage in this unlawful course appears so noble, 
 Especially in this last tryal, which 
 I put upon you, that I wish the mercy 
 You kneel in vain for, might fall gently on you. 
 But when the holy Oyl was pour’d upon 
 My head, and I anointed King, I swore 
 Never to pardon murther; I could wink at  
 Your robberies, though our Laws call ’em death; 
 But to dispense with Monteclaro’s blood 
 Would ill become a King; in him I lost 
 A worthy subject, and must take from you 
 A strict accompt of’t. (Guardian, sig. N2r-v) 
 
Alphonso recognises that in accepting the privileges of a King, he also must accept 
the duties to an authority higher than his own (to uphold heavenly law) which come 
with these prerogatives.
65
  The king’s accountability to God is emphasised in 
Alphonso’s earlier comment on being asked to pardon Severino for the supposed 
murder of Monteclaro that he ‘dare not pardon murther’ (Guardian, sig. H8v, my 
emphasis).  Nevertheless, it is also clear that Alphonso is not bound to act within the 
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 James Shirley’s The Cardinal (1641) also draws attention to the responsibilities of divinely 
authorised rulers, but here the weight of responsibility is increased to include being an adequate 
representative of God on earth, with the threat that if a king is unjust, people will also doubt God’s 
justice (The Cardinal, sigs. C8v and D3r).  
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strict bounds of earthly law, and that he uses his prerogative power for pardons and 
punishment (he says that he would pardon the robberies ‘though our Lawes call ’em 
death’).
66
   On more than one occasion, Alphonso pardons an offence in the hope 
that the perpetrator will behave better thereafter and deserve his forgiveness.   He is 
not, though, an unduly lenient king, threatening that if they do not mend their ways 
they will ‘deeply smart for’t’ (Guardian, sig. M1r).  Importantly, whenever 
Alphonso acts outwith the established law, it is to mitigate its harshness, not to 
further his own ends. 
 
 Unlike Alphonso, whose anointment gives him legitimate authority, 
Severino has no external authority for his power, and imposes the rule of his will 
upon the forest band.  Although he recognised his responsibility to make sure his 
followers are fed and clothed (Guardian, sig. M8r), there is no suggestion that this 
duty is imposed upon him by a higher authority, and this is to his credit. Since 
fleeing Naples and Alphonso’s sentence for the supposed murder of his brother-in-
law Monteclaro, Severino has become king of the banditti and given them laws by 
which to live: 
 
3.  We lay our lives at your Highness feet. 
 
4.   And will confess no King, 
         Nor Laws, but what come from your mouth; and those 
We gladly will subscribe to.  (Guardian, sig. I6r) 
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 This aligns him with the good King of James VI and I’s Basilikon Doron, who will use justice with 
moderation (1599, sig. O3v). This use of prerogative is also the ‘prerogative by way of dispensation 
of justice’ that Rutherford allows as legitimate for the king (1644, 194).  Alphonso’s obedience to 
heavenly laws, of course, does not diminish his absolutism. 
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This statement clearly identifies Severino as the origin of law, and denies authority 
to any alternative source.
67
   If the royal word is the site of legal authority, then the 
king’s will is law.  It is also clear that this rule of will is maintained through 
demonstrations of personal power:  Claudio states that Severino can command his 
subjects ‘with a look’ (Guardian, sig. I6r) and later the bandit king threatens not to 
leave any of his rebellious subjects alive when they refuse to give up their money to 
a just cause at the end of the play (Guardian, sig. N2r).   
 
Severino’s complete authority is later confirmed when he invites Iolante to 
share his sovereignty in the forest, and the bandits present their loyalty to her:  
 
 From you our Swords take edge, our Hearts grow bold. 
 From you in Fee, their lives your Liegemen hold. 
 These Groves your Kingdom, and our Law your will; 
 Smile, and we spare; but if you frown, we kill. (Guardian, sig. N4v)
68
  
 
This, as has been the case with Domitian and Theodosius before, clearly identifies 
the sovereign’s will with the law, but the phrasing of the statement ‘our Law your 
will’ allows two interpretations: first, that whatever the sovereign wills is law, but 
second, that the sovereign wills that there is law, or that law is obeyed. The feudal 
register of this passage in the ‘Entertainment of the Forests Queen’ suggests an 
element of chivalric courtly love in pledging allegiance to a lady, and perhaps 
makes reference to the cult of chaste, courtly love developing around Queen 
Henrietta-Maria.  The emphasis placed on chastity throughout the play supports this 
reading. 
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 See Rutherford (Rutherford, 1644, 208, quoted above, p82) on the idea that the people hold the 
sovereign authority to make law.  Buchanan argued that as law was created to restrain the king 
because he was a man subject to passion and therefore not always able to rule dispassionately, then a 
king must be subject to law (Buchanan, 2004, 129-131). 
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 The entertainment appears as ‘II Song’ at the end of the play in the 1655 edition.  Edwards and 
Gibson insert it at the beginning of Act 5, scene 1. 
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More importantly, the feudal language connects the forest kingdom with the 
feudal structures of society imposed upon the Anglo-Saxons at the time of the 
Norman invasion, and this has significant implications for ideas of law.  Common 
lawyers opposed to the extra-legal use of royal prerogative, such as Edward Coke, 
argued that there was a continuity in English common law from the Saxons (whose 
laws were made by consent of the people) through to the present, and for this 
reason, the king was not above the law, nor was he its origin.
69
  However, others, 
including James VI and I, argued that after the Norman invasion William the 
Conqueror imposed his laws upon the (free) Saxons and thereafter his descendants 
ruled according to their own laws, not those made previously by the people: 
 
And although divers changes have bene in on-ther countries of the bloud 
Royall, and kingly house, the kingdome being rest by conquest from one to 
an other, as in our neighbour country in England, (which was never in ours,) 
yet the same ground of the Kings right over all the lande, and subjects 
thereof, remaineth alike in all other free Monarchies, as well as in this.  For 
when the Bastard of Normandie came into England, & made himselfe King, 
was it not by force, and with a mighty army? Where he gave the law, & 
tooke none, changed the lawes, inverted the order of governement[…] 
And for conclusion of this poyn[t] that the king is over-lord over the whole 
landes, it is likewise daylie proved by the Lawe of our hoordes, […] want of 
Haires, and of Bastardies.  (James VI and I, 1603, sigs. C8r-C8v).
 70
 
 
Thus, whilst Norman associations give added emphasis to Severino’s absolutism, if 
they are read from a common law perspective, they allow for criticism of this 
absolutism in the loss of Saxon liberties. 
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 See Burgess, 1992, chapter 2 and Hill, 1958, chapter 3.  The ancient and customary nature of 
common law is discussed below in Chapter 3, pp.134-146. 
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 ‘Hoordes’, ‘haires’ and bastardies’ are all aspects of the royal prerogative.  A more general 
argument for the absolute power of kings through conquest can be found in writing throughout the 
period.  See Sommerville (1999, 65-68).  Bodin argues that a monarch who takes power through 
conquest can legitimately treat his subjects’ person and property as his own property (1606, 201).  
Rutherford specifically denies Maxwell’s argument that conquest gives a ruler absolute power above 
the law (1644, 82-89). 
126 
 Martin Butler and Doris Adler read Severino’s kingdom as an ideal 
alternative to the corrupt Neapolitan kingdom (Butler, 1984, 256-7; Adler, 1987, 
103), placing the play in the dramatic tradition in which the exiled courtier and the 
values of the country present an honest, honourable contrast with the corrupt court.  
The substance of Severino’s laws contributes to this impression by enforcing a kind 
of social justice in preventing attacks upon the poor but allowing theft from the rich 
and greedy.  Those who hoard grain or enclose commons, greedy usurers, ‘builders 
of Iron Mills, that grub up Forests, With Timber Trees for shipping’, dishonest 
shopkeepers and vintners are all fair targets for the outlaws (Guardian, sig. I6v); 
those who are not to be attacked include lawyers, scholars, soldiers, poor farmers, 
labourers and those who carry goods for others.  However, Severino’s laws place 
most emphasis on the protection of women: 
 
 But above all, let none presume to offer 
 Violence to women, for our King hath sworn, 
 Who that way’s a Delinquent; without mercy 
 Hangs for’t by Marshal law. (Guardian, sig. I7r) 
 
The reference to martial law, even in the middle of these commands to uphold social 
justice, suggests the potentially arbitrary nature of Severino’s power, and is 
reminiscent of the fears of Charles I’s subjects in the late 1620s.
71
  The exclusion of 
lawyers from the list of those the banditti can rob because they ‘may / To soon have 
a gripe at us’ and are ‘angry Hornets, / Not to be jested with’ (Guardian, sig. I6v) 
suggests that it is only lawyers (with the common law) who provide a sustainable 
challenge to Severino’s supremacy.  However, the overtones of the Robin Hood 
legend evident in this strategy of robbing only the rich and greedy, emphasised by 
Alphonso’s comments on the justice of Severino’s distribution of his spoils and a 
                                                
71 See Chapter 1, pp.33, 47- 48. 
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reference to the outlaws as ‘imitating / The courteous English Theeves’ (Guardian, 
sig. M6r), suggests injustice in Neapolitan society against which Severino’s band of 
men stands, and would support Butler and Adler’s readings.  These allusions to 
Robin Hood would not have been lost on the Caroline audience, particularly as the 
popularity of Robin Hood ballads and plays had increased in the preceding decades 
(Hill, 1997, 71).   
 
However, the presentation of Severino, his forest kingdom and his laws is 
more complicated than this court / country binary allows.  I have already established 
that Alphonso is a just monarch, ruling according to heavenly laws, and exercising 
his prerogative only to ensure the equity of the law.   Severino’s laws must, then, 
have a different purpose.  In this respect the forest setting of Severino’s kingdom, 
along with the personal power that authorises his law, is significant; not only does 
the play comment on abstract notions of the right to rule and the foundation of 
legitimate authority, but through Severnino’s kingdom Massinger also comments 
extensively upon specific contemporary political issues.   
 
 Charles I’s revival of the forest laws and extension of forest boundaries was 
very unpopular among his wealthier subjects as they saw this as an unscrupulous 
means of raising extra-parliamentary revenue through the royal prerogative.  Forests 
became sites of noble resistance to monarchy, and Severino’s law, which is in 
competition with Alphonso’s, and his position as outlaw, suggest that the forests 
held an oppositional status.  However, forests were also, George Keeton argues: 
 
particularly subject to the will of the sovereign, and the laws which 
controlled them were regarded as a special body of law, distinct from the 
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Common Law of the King’s ordinary courts, and beyond the control of  the 
ordinary justices of Curia Regis. (Keeton, 1966, 180) 
 
There is, then, only prerogative law in the forest, identifying Charles more closely 
with Severino than with Alphonso.   The association of law and will in Severino’s 
kingdom discussed above also suggests an allusion to Charles’ prerogative rule.  It 
should be remembered in this respect that Severino’s laws are not customary laws 
as those protecting common land were in Caroline England, but written laws, 
imposed by the king, which are read, re-read and noted in table books by Severino’s 
forest subjects.  In presenting these ‘forest laws’ as a means to protect the poor by 
penalising the greedy, the play gives a positive light to Charles’ prerogative 
activities.  Indeed, Kevin Sharpe notes that in many areas the forest laws actually 
protected the peasant population from the threat of enclosure by private individuals 
(Sharpe, 1992, 245), ‘the grand Incloser of the Commons’ and the ‘Builders of Iron 
Mills, that grub up Forests, / With Timber Trees for shipping’ condemned by 
Severino’s laws (Guardian, sig. I6v).  This last reference also emphasises the need 
to maintain forests to build ships to strengthen the navy, an idea highlighted at the 
end of the play by Alphonso’s story of his sons taken captive by Turkish pirates.  
This story would have a deep resonance for the play’s Caroline audience because in 
1631, not long before the play was licensed, there was an assault by pirates on 
Baltimore in Cork during which one hundred and fifty inhabitants were captured.  
Severino’s donation of all of the banditti’s wealth to the disguised King to ransom 
his sons and their companions from the pirates is a topical reference.
72
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 The play was written too early for this to be understood in context of Charles’ later contentious 
prerogative demands for ship money.  Bodin argues that usually a king does not have the right to 
levy extraordinary taxes outside those granted by agreement with the people though parliament, but 
‘neverthlesse if the necessitie of the Commonweale be such as cannot stay for the calling of a 
parliament, in that case the prince ought not to expect the assemblie of the states, neither the consent 
of the people’ (Bodin, 1606, 97). 
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There are, however, problems in reading Severino’s Kingdom as a positive 
representation of personal rule, not in Severino’s laws, but with his own actions.  
Severino breaks his own laws. On venturing back to Naples to visit his wife, 
Iolante, he finds her prepared to receive a lover.  In rage he threatens to torture her 
until she reveals her lover’s identity, ties her to a chair, and leaves her in the dark.  
Iolante’s comments draw attention to the fact that in his swift judgement, without 
due process of law, Severino is not acting as a just ruler but rather as a passionate 
man: 
 
Good sir, hold: 
For, my defence unheard, you wrong your justice, 
 If you proceed to execution, 
 And will too late repent it. (Guardian, sig. K7r) 
 
The association between passion and tyranny evident in the earlier plays is once 
again highlighted in the relationship between a man and the object of his (romantic) 
desire.  Her warning echoes Philanax’s concern in The Emperour of the East over 
the execution of Paulinus, ‘his cause unheard’ (Emperour, sig. K2v), but the 
emphasis here is placed on the effect such summary condemnation has on the image 
of the monarch’s justice.  Monarchs acting and judging rashly, the play warns, 
damage their own reputation for justice.  Reluctantly, Severino hears her story but 
his sentence for her is unchanged.   Iolante’s maid, Calypso, returns and swaps 
places with her mistress so that Iolante can meet Laval (the gentleman she tried to 
seduce, but who is actually her brother Monteclaro in disguise), believing that 
Severino will never really harm his wife. This is a reasonable assumption in the 
context of Massinger’s plays dealing with the combination of passion and tyranny; 
Domitian, for example, claims to be powerless to punish Domitia (Roman Actor, 
sig. H3r).  However, when Severino returns, thinking Calypso is Iolante, he stabs 
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both her arms and slits her nose.   This action breaks the most important of 
Severino’s own laws: ‘But above all, let none presume to offer / Violence to 
women’ (Guardian, sig. I7r).  Yet, Severino suffers no consequences for the 
action.
73
  Having complained of her injuries to Laval (Monteclaro), whose concern 
turns to the safety of his sister Iolante and her daughter, Calypso leaves the stage 
and does not return. Iolanthe and Severino are reconciled, and when Laval reveals 
his true identity as Monteclaro, Severino is accepted back into Neapolitan society 
under Alphonso’s rule.  The implication of this is that a monarch can break their 
own laws with impunity (the same is, of course, true of Iolante, who breaking her 
own decrees of chastity escapes punishment through a trick and is forgiven).  This is 
an assertion with complex political implications for Charles’ personal rule, 
particularly in respect of the debate surrounding the legal position of the royal 
prerogative, and the dubious legal manoeuvrings Charles and his advisers carried 
out.   
 
 Severino’s violence to women jars awkwardly in a play which otherwise 
emphasises the need to uphold law both in Alphonso’s refusal to pardon murder, 
and the re-iteration of Severino’s laws.   Finally, Severino must ask the pardon of 
the more moderate King for his offences against Alphonso’s laws, and submit 
himself to Alphonso’s sovereignty.  Whilst this can be read as a suggestion that 
Charles may need to curb his absolutism to a more moderate level, the unresolved 
                                                
73
 It is possible to read this law as a comment on sexual violence: the emphasis on chastity 
throughout the play would support this reading, and if this were the case, Severino commits no 
crime.  However, there are no threats to female chastity in this play, except those posed by the 
women’s passions themselves; rather the threats are of physical violence.  Adorio threatens to torture 
Mirtilla (Guardian, L7r), and when Claudio’s appearance prevents Adorio’s second threatened attack 
on Mirtilla it is not a sexual attack, despite his exclamation ‘Forbear, libidinous Monsters’, but a 
threat to ‘rip [her] entrail’ to recover a jewel he believes she has swallowed (Guardian, sig. M5v).   
Severino’s violence then, must be against his own law.  
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issue of Calypso’s wounds leaves a worrying shadow over issues of sovereignty.  It 
seems to emphasise that if a king does not choose to live by a rule of law – 
whoever’s law this may be (God’s, established law, his own edicts) – there is no 
redress for the injured subject. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Massinger’s plays never deny the ultimate sovereignty of the king.  There is 
no suggestion that the people may revoke sovereignty or punish a tyrannous king, 
and the exercise of established law is entirely at the monarch’s discretion; even 
Mirtilla’s argument about disobedience advocates only running away, not 
revolution.  What does change in the period covered by these plays, however, is the 
emphasised foundation for kingly authority.  At the beginning of the Caroline 
period, the plays’ grounds for royal absolutism are the theoretical claims of divine 
right kingship, but as the period progresses, authority comes increasingly to be seen 
as resting on the personal power of one wilful man.  Because of this, emphasis is 
placed upon the need to moderate the behaviour of a powerful man subject to his 
passions, through the intervention of good counsel, reasoned argument and law.  
The intertwining of the abstract ideas of sovereignty and governance with specific 
aspects of Caroline political and legal policy, such as prerogative taxation, 
projectors and forest laws, suggests an increased public awareness of and debate 
over the employment of and foundation for royal authority.  The decline from 
divinity provides an opportunity to question the ultimate legal authority of the 
monarch: a wilful man can be debated with, a demi-god cannot.  The demonstrated 
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need for a moderating force on the royal will allows the possibility of a legal 
authority independent from the monarch, and the advocation of the common law of 
England as such an authority, as presented on the Caroline stage, is the focus of the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Debating Legal Authorities:  
Common Law and Prerogative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This chapter will explore the ways in which Caroline debates over common 
law and prerogative were presented on the commercial stage. The movement away 
from a divinely authorised monarch to a king who acts only according to his own 
will is developed here in plays which contrast the untempered will of the monarch 
with the rationality of law.  Setting arbitrary absolutism against custom and 
established law, Richard Brome’s The Queenes Exchange (c.1631-34), The 
Antipodes (1638) and The Queen and Concubine (c.1635-39) participate in 
contemporary arguments over the position of common law and prerogative using 
the ideas and vocabulary of Caroline legal debate, and suggest that the common law 
came to be seen as an alternative, legitimate legal authority to that of the king.
 1
  The 
                                                
1
 There is no certain dating for The Queenes Exchange, but critics agree it cannot have been written 
later than 1634 because, according to the title page, it was acted by ‘His Majesties servants at 
Blackfriars’.  Brome was associated with this company in the early 1630s but was writing for the 
Red Bull’s company in 1634, and had moved to the Salisbury Court theatre by 1635 (see Shaw, 
1980, 25-6).   Shaw suggests that this is one of Brome’s early enterprises independent from Jonson, 
and dates it as 1631-2 (Shaw, 1980, 93, 25), Butler, however places the play towards the middle of 
the 1630s, alongside The Queen and Concubine (Butler, 1984, 268). A date of the early 1630s for the 
play would make its engagement with ancient rights and liberties particularly topical in the wake of 
the impact of the Petition of Right in 1628.  There is greater consensus on the dating of The Queen 
and Concubine than The Queenes Exchange. Cook says it is evidently a King’s Revels play, and 
must therefore be dated prior to 1637 (Cook, 1947, 286). Butler suggests a date of 1636 for this play, 
arguing that it closely matches the outlook of the queen’s courtiers in 1635-6 (Butler, 1984, 35, 42) 
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first section of this chapter will provide the legal context in which these plays will 
be discussed, summarising the legal arguments for and against the superiority of 
common law and absolutism, and establishing the legal vocabulary which the plays 
employ to further this debate.  The Queenes Exchange, I will argue, debates the 
contemporary arguments for the supremacy of the ancient constitution and the 
common law; The Antipodes contrasts the ‘reason’ of law with arbitrary action, and 
finally, The Queen and Concubine explores the destabilising consequences of 
favouring arbitrary action over established law. 
 
 
 
Discourses of Common Law 
 
 
[A]lbeit the books and records (which are & vetustatis & veritatis vestigia 
[traces of antiquity and truth]) cited by me in the prefaces to the third and 
sixt parts of my Commentaries, are of that authority that they need not the 
aide of any Historian: yet will I with a light touch set downe out of the 
consent of Storie some proofes of the Antiquitie, and from the censure of 
those persons who in respect of their profession (for they were Monkes and 
Clergie men) may rather fall into a Jealousie of reservednes then flatterie, 
somewhat of the equitie and excellencie of out Lawes; And that it doth 
appeare most plaine in successive authoritie in storie what I have positively 
affirmed out of record, That the grounds of our common laws at this day 
were beyond the memorie or register of any beginning, & the same which 
the Norman conqueror then found within this realm of England.  The laws 
that Wil. Conqueror sware to observe, were bonae & approbatae antiquae 
regni leges, that is, the lawes of this kingdome were in the beginning of the 
Conquerours raigne good, approved, and auncient. (Coke, 1611, 2pi4r-2pi4v) 
 
 The common law of England is, according to Coke, equitable, excellent and 
ancient.  The existing system of common law had been in place since time 
                                                                                                                                    
and Shaw suggests 1635, because the play was, she suggests, one of two presented to the Kings 
Revels company the Salisbury Court theatre 1635-6  (Shaw, 1980, 29).  There is no reason to dispute 
this approximate dating. 
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immemorial, emphatically before the Norman Conquest.
2
  This ancient law formed 
the basis of the ancient constitution which maintained the liberties of the subject 
over the imposition of the will of a monarch.
3
  As this form of law was ancient and 
without specific originator, the ancient constitution denied any possible claims that 
the law was imposed by a single monarchical figure, and therefore a contemporary 
king could not claim absolute prerogative and authority over the law as a 
descendant, literal or metaphorical, of the original lawgiver: 
 
Neither could any one man ever vaunt, that, like Minos, Solon, or Lycurgus, 
he was the first Lawgiver to our Nation: for neither did the King make his 
owne prerogative, nor the Judges make the Rules or Maximes of the lawe, 
nor the common subject prescribe and limitt the liberties which he enioyeth 
by the lawe […].  Long experience, & many trialles of what was best for the 
common good, did make the Common lawe. (Davies, 1615, sig. *3r) 
4
  
 
Even those such as Francis Bacon who stated that there was a ‘principal Law-giver 
of our nation’ (1630, sig. A3r) claim that this was Edward I and so the institution of 
the law pre-dates the Norman Conquest, denying the possibility for a king to claim 
absolute monarchy through descent from the Conqueror.
5
 
 
                                                
2
 Conquest theories allowed absolute authority to the invading king, to institute new or deny any 
existing laws.  See Chapter 2, p.125.  
3 The ‘ancient constitution’ is a term used by most political historians of the early Stuart period but 
very few of them attempt to describe what this is.  J. G. A. Pocock gives the following summary of 
his arguments concerning the ancient constitution.  It was: 
an ‘immemorial’ constitution, and … belief in it was built up in the following way.  The 
relations of government and governed in England were assumed to be regulated by law; the 
law in force in England was assumed to be the common law; all common law was assumed 
to be custom, elaborated, summarized and enforced by statute; and all custom was assumed 
to be immemorial, in the sense that any declaration or even change if custom – uttered by a 
judge from his bench, recorded by a court in a precedent, or registered by king-in-
parliament as a statute – presupposed a custom already ancient and not necessarily recorded 
at the time of writing. (Pocock, 1987, 261) 
In this chapter I will be discussing some of the claims made here in relation to the legal and political 
writings, and the dramatic texts of the period. 
4
 Davies’ ‘Preface Dedicatory’ was reprinted in 1628. 
5
 Coke acknowledges the role of Edward I in codifying the common law, but argues that the law was 
already ancient before the time of the conqueror and before Edward’s codification (1635, passim  
and 1611, passim).   
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In order for the common law to be seen as an independent, potentially 
competing, authority alongside the king, however, its legitimacy as such first had to 
be established. The authority of the king, which had the legitimising sources of 
precedent both historically and biblically, could only be successfully matched by an 
alternative of significant historical authority.
6
  This was in part the reasoning 
behind, and in part the conclusion taken from, the claims for common law’s ancient 
and customary usage.  The circularity of this argument reflects much of the 
contemporary thinking about the common law and the ancient constitution; custom 
feeds into law, and reason feeds into both custom and law and all three contribute to 
the nature of common law’s legal authority, which is then compared in its 
fittingness as a form of government for England with the royal prerogative, an 
essentially personal, and potentially changeable and irrational ‘law’ as discussed in 
Chapter 2.   This section will give an overview of the key terms of common law 
thought in the period, custom and reason, and their deployment in legal argument. 
 
Custom 
The common law was distinguished clearly from statute, civil and canon law 
by being lex non scripta, unwritten law.  It was, in fact, a law based on customs 
                                                
6 Cf. Hill, 1958, 69.  This may, in part, account for the dissolution of the Society of Antiquaries. The 
Society researched issues of historical, antiquarian interest.  Kevin Sharpe notes that no satisfactory 
reason has been set forward for the sudden termination of the Society’s activities in 1607, but argues 
that their meetings and papers had become increasingly concerned with political issues, suggesting 
that ‘Perhaps [James VI and I] did not entirely approve of the antiquaries’ involvement in the world 
of politics’ (Sharpe, 1979, 28-32, quotation 32).  In this respect, it is interesting to note that at least 
two of the lawyers and political thinkers to be discussed here, John Doddridge and John Davies were 
members of the Society.  John Selden was also a friend of Robert Cotton, a founder member of the 
Society, and had frequent access to Cotton’s library.  In 1629, Charles I ordered the closure of 
Cotton’s library on what Sharpe calls the ‘pretext’ of Cotton’s circulation of a seditious paper (1979, 
80), and Stuart Handley suggests the real reason for the closure was that Cotton had allowed his 
library to be used for ‘the production of arguments and precedents deemed detrimental to royal 
interests’ (Handley, 2004).  
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which are of benefit to all in the community.   Not all customs, however, could be 
treated as law: 
  
In respect of their forme, they are either generall throughout all the 
Realme, and so doe they constitute that part of the Common Law which is 
grounded upon the generall Custome of the Realme. 
 Or else they are particular Customes to certaine places.  
(Doddridge, 1631, 101) 
 
In order to be considered law, a custom had to be effective throughout the whole 
country; local customs were, to an extent, exceptions to the law in the area in which 
they applied.
 7
  Even countrywide application was not in itself sufficient to merit 
custom being understood as law, however; the custom also had to have been in 
constant usage since time immemorial: 
 
And note that no custome is to bee allowed, but such custome as hath bin 
vsed by title of prescription, that is to say, from time out of minde.  But 
divers opinions have beene of time out of mind, &c. and of title of 
prescription, which is all one in the Law.  For some have said, that time of 
mind should bee said from time of limitation in a Writ of right, that is to say, 
from the time of King Richard the first after the Conquest, as is given by the 
statute of Westminster[…] But they have sayd that there is also another title 
of prescription that was at the Common law, before any estatute of limitation 
of writs, &c. And that it was where a custome or usage, or other thing hath 
beene used, for time whereof mind of man runneth not to the contrary.  And 
they have said that this is proved by the pleading[…] that is as much to say, 
when such a matter is pleaded, that no man then alive hath heard any proofe 
of the contrary, nor hath no knowledge to the contrary.  (Coke, 1629, 113a-
114a)
8
 
 
                                                
7
 William Noy argues in a similar vein to Dodderidge, suggesting that customs in general use are 
maxims in the law:  
CUSTOMES 
Consuetudo est altera lex.   
Customes are of two sorts; Generall Customes in use throughout the whole Realme, called 
Maximes, and particular Customes used in some certaine County, Citie, Towne, or 
Lordship, whereof some have beene specified before, and some follow here, and where 
occasion is offered.  (William Noy, 1642, 19) 
8
 Cf. Henry Finch: ‘The Common law of England is a Law used time out of mind, or by prescription 
throughout the Realme’ (Finch, 1627, 77). 
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Coke’s argument encompasses two notions of ‘time immemorial’, but it is the latter 
– literally ‘time out of mind’ – which he most clearly emphasises to justify the 
treatment of custom as law.
9
   
 
Long usage also contributes to the superiority of the common law as a form 
of government: ‘such prescription, or any prescription used, if it be against reason, 
this ought not, nor will not bee allowed before Judges, Quia malus vsus abolendus 
est’ [because evil will be destroyed by experience/usage/custom] (Coke, 1629, 141).  
This statement is key to understanding the arguments and vocabularies of common 
law: Coke’s insistence on reason in customs will be examined in more detail 
shortly; the importance of the notion that ‘evil will be destroyed by experience’ 
emphasises the appropriateness of the common law for English government.  A 
custom which is not beneficial will be discontinued, and because of this: 
 
[T]his Custumary lawe is the most perfect, & most excellent, and without 
comparison the best, to make & preserve a commonwealth, for the written 
lawes which are made either by the edicts of Princes, or by Counselles of 
estate, are imposed uppon the subject before any Triall or Probation made, 
whether the same bee fitt & agreeable to the nature & disposition of the 
people, or whether they will breed any inconvenience or no.  But a Custome 
doth never become a lawe to binde the people, untill it hath bin tried & 
approved time out of minde, during all which time there did thereby arise no 
inconvenience, for if it had beene found inconvenient at any time, it had 
beene used no longer, but had beene interrupted, & consequently it had lost 
the vertue & force of a lawe. (Davies, 1615, *2r)
 
 
 
This reason for preferring the common law (that it has been approved by long 
usage) also holds true as a reason for not introducing new laws, or changing those 
already in place, unless, of course, they have been proved contrary to reason, in 
which case, the custom loses its force as law: 
                                                
9
 For more information on both forms of ‘time immemorial’ see Weston, 1991, 376 and Tubbs, 1998, 
365-9, especially 367. 
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For any fundamentall point of the ancient Common lawes and customes of 
the Realme, it is a Maxime in policie, and a triall by experience, that the 
alteration of any of them is most daungerous; For that which hath been 
refined & perfected by all the wisest men in former succession of ages, and 
proved by continuall experience to be good and profitable for the common 
wealth, cannot without great hazzard and daunger be altered or changed. 
(Coke, 1635c, sig. B2v)  
 
In his epistles to the reader of the books of Reports Coke often repeats that to 
change the common law is dangerous or will lead to inconvenience.
10
  The idea is 
not specific to Coke, and can be found in Bodin’s Six Bookes of a Common-weale:  
‘to make the matter short, there is nothing more difficult to handle, nor more 
doubtful in event, nor more dangerous to mannage, than to bring in new decrees or 
lawes’ (1606, 470).
 11
  The idea itself can be traced back to Aristotle, but it becomes 
particularly significant in Coke’s attempts to assert the legitimate authority of the 
common law over the royal prerogative: the imposition of a new royal law, or, royal 
abrogation of established law is, according to this argument, a dangerous practice.
12
 
 
 Coke bases his argument for the ancient nature of common law on the 
arguments of Sir John Fortescue, Chief Justice of England under Henry VI, 
particularly Chapter XVII of his De Laudibus Legum Angliae (written between 
1468 and 1471, first printed 1545-6):
 
 
 
                                                
10 The idea appears in Reports 3 (1635b, sig. D4r) and is emphasised and repeated at several points in 
Reports 4 (1635c, ‘To the reader’ passim).  See also John Davies:  
 
when our Parliaments have altered or changed any fundamentall pointes of the Common 
lawe, those alterations have beene found by experience to bee so inconvenient for the 
commonwealth, as that the common lawe hath in effect beene restored againe, in the same 
points, by other Actes of Parliament, in succeeding ages. (Davies, ‘Preface dedicatory’, 
1615, *2r) 
11 J. P. Sommerville uses the appearance of such arguments in Bodin as evidence that the English 
respect for custom was not as separate from the thinking of continental theorists as Pocock and 
Burgess would like to claim (Sommerville, 1996, 47-8). 
12
 Burgess argues that there was almost universal agreement on the danger of changing or 
introducing new laws from Aristotle, Aquinas, Machiavelli and Bodin to Coke (1992, 23-24). 
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The customs of England are very ancient, and have been used and accepted 
by five nations successively  
‘The kingdom of England was first inhabited by Britons; then ruled by 
Romans, again by Britons, then possessed by Saxons, who changed its name 
from Britain to England.  Then for a short time the kingdom was conquered 
by Danes, and again by Saxons, but finally by Normans, whose posterity 
hold the realm at the present time.  And throughout the period of these 
nations and their kings, the realm has been continuously ruled by the same 
customs as it is now, customs which, if they had not been the best, some of 
those kings would have changed for the sake of justice or by the impulse of 
caprice, and totally abolished them, especially the Romans, who judged 
almost the whole of the rest of the world by their laws.  Similarly, others of 
these aforesaid kings, who possessed the kingdom of England only by the 
sword, could, by that power, have destroyed its laws.  Indeed, neither the 
civil laws of the Romans, so deeply rooted by the usage of so many ages, 
nor the laws of the Venetians, which are renowned above others for their 
antiquity – though their island was uninhabited, and Rome unbuilt at the 
time of the origin of the Britons – nor the laws of any Christian kingdom, are 
so rooted in antiquity. Hence there is no gainsaying nor legitimate doubt but 
that the customs of the English are not only good but the best’. (Fortescue, 
trans. S. B. Chrimes, 1942, 39-41)
13
 
 
The long continuance of customary common law, then, confirmed its status as both 
legitimate legal authority and perfect for governing England.  If the customary law 
was not the best method of government, various conquerors could and would have 
changed the law.  This acknowledgement of the possibility of a conqueror imposing 
his will as law did allow the prospect of absolute government after the Norman 
Conquest.  This would have disrupted the ancient constitution which upheld the 
rights and liberties of the subject independently of the King, and entitled Charles, as 
a descendant of William, to absolute authority through conquest.
14
  Importantly for 
                                                
13 Fortescue’s original Latin when describing the reasons an invading king might change the laws 
reads: ‘aliqui regum illorum iusticia racione vel affecione concitati eas mutassent’ [some of those 
kings would have changed them, moved by justice, reason, or caprice (my emphasis)]. Coke’s 
translation, more accurate than Chrimes’s, states that ‘some of these Kings, mooved either with 
Justice, or with reason, or affection, would have changed them’ (1636, sig. pi3v). Coke acknowledges 
Fortescue as one of his authorities for maintaining the ancient establishment of the common law in 
the letter ‘To the reader’ of Reports 6 (passim).  In his address ‘to the learned reader’ in the second 
book of Reports, Coke argues similarly to Fortescue that, ‘If the ancient Lawes of this noble Island 
had not excelled all others, it could not be but some of the severall Conquerors, and Governors 
thereof […] would (as every of them might) have altered or changed the same’ (Coke, 1635a, sig. 
pi4v). 
14
 See Hill, 1958, 63.  Coke emphasises that the ancient laws continued throughout the reign of 
William the Conqueror and were restored by Henry I after William Rufus had attempted to impose 
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the specific legal debates over ship money and non-parliamentary taxes of the 
period, this would also have given Charles absolute control over all land and 
property, and therefore the unquestionable right to impose prerogative taxation.  
 
The perfect nature of the common law for ruling England was also asserted 
by James VI and I in The Kings Maiesties Speach to the Lords and Common of this 
present Parliament at Whitehall on Wednesday the xxj of March, Anno Dom. 1609: 
 
I am so farre from disallowing the Common Law, as I protest, that if it were 
in my hand to chuse a new Law for this kingdome, I would not onely 
preferre it before any other Nationall Law, but even before the very Judiciall 
Law of Moyses: and yet I speake no blasphemy in preferring it for 
conveniencie to this kingdome, and at this time, to the very Law of God: For 
God governed his selected people by these three Lawes, Ceremoniall, 
Morall, and Judiciall: The Judiciall, being onely fit for a certaine people, 
and a certaine time, which could not serve for the general of all other people 
and times. (James VI and I, 1609, sigs. C2r-v).   
 
In this speech James was attempting to defend himself from accusations that he 
intended to dispense with the common law of England and rule by Civil law, which 
allowed absolute rule by the monarch.
15
  Earlier in this speech James does assert his 
right to exercise the royal prerogative and claims that this is upheld, not limited, by 
                                                                                                                                    
his oppressive will on the people (1611, sigs. 2pi4v-2pi5r), thus neutralising the Conquest by 
absorbing it into the narrative of the ancient constitution. See also ‘To the learned reader’ of Reports 
2. Davies affirms that:  
the Norman Conqueror found the auncient lawes of England so honourable, & profitable, 
both for the Prince & people, as that he thought it not fitt to make any alteration in the 
fundamentall pointes or substance thereof: the change that was made was but in formulis 
iuris.’ (Davies, 1615, sig. *3r).   
John Hare, however, in St Edwards Ghost: or Anti-Normanisme, laments the changes made to the 
law and government at the Conquest and demands a return to the ancient laws and liberties enjoyed 
by the Saxons (1647, passim). There is some debate over the extent to which it was argued that the 
conquest had made a significant difference to the systems of law and government in England.  For a 
detailed discussion see Hill, (1958, passim), Skinner (1965, passim) and Sommerville (1986, 
passim).  Hill and Skinner give broader historiographical discussions of the Norman Conquest and its 
interpretation, whereas Sommerville focuses more closely on the early Stuart period.     
15
 Absolutism became associated with the civil law, through the doctrine quod principi placuit: 
(Kelley, 1974, 38): that which pleases the king (i.e. the king’s will) is law. Francis Bacon and John 
Doddridge note some similarities between the civil law and the laws of England (Bacon, 1630, B2v-
B3r; Doddridge, 1631, 158-9).  The attitude of English common lawyers, antiquaries and scholars 
towards the civil law is debated in a series of articles in Past and Present by Donald Kelley, and 
Christopher Brooks and Kevin Sharpe.  See Kelley, 1974; Brooks and Sharpe, 1976; and Kelley, 
1976.   
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the law (1609, sig. C1r) and it is clear James would not place the authority of the 
common law above his own judgement.
16
  Nevertheless the emphasis throughout is 
placed on the status of the Common Law as the most suitable means to govern the 
country.
17
   
 
The idea that the common law and ancient constitution had remained 
completely unchanged, as advocated by Fortescue followed by Coke, however, was 
not entirely satisfactory to some of his contemporaries, such as John Selden and 
Henry Spelman, who argued that this is essentially non-historical, and does not 
allow for the developments in society.  Selden questioned the argument for 
immutable customary law in his notes on Fortescue in the 1616 edition of De 
Laudibus Legum Angliae, instead arguing for an evolutionary development of 
common law, claiming contrary to Fortescue, ‘But questionlesse the Saxons made a 
mixture of the British customes with their own; the Danes with old British, the 
Saxon and their own; and the Normans the like’ (Selden, 1616, 7).  The comments 
Selden makes on this particular chapter of Fortescue’s work are much longer than 
his commentary on any other chapter, suggesting the importance he places on this 
issue.  His argument for the historical and evolutionary nature of law continues, 
responding to questions of the origin of common law: 
 
`Tis their triviall demand, When and how began your common laws? 
Questionlesse its fittest answerd by affirming, when and in like kind as the 
laws of all other States, that is, When there was first a State in that land, 
                                                
16
 Davies maintains both of these arguments – that the common law is the best law to rule this 
English nation, and that it upholds the king’s prerogative – in his praise of the common law. 
However, he makes the point more strongly, stating that the common law ‘is so framed and fitted to 
the nature & disposition of this people, as wee may properly say, it is connaturall to the Nation, so as 
it cannot possibly bee ruled by any other lawe’ (1615, ‘Preface Dedicatory’, *2v).   
17
 Roger Lockyer suggest that it was James’s public professions of his commitment to customary 
ways and established legal methods which preserved the image of the King as a constitutional ruler 
despite his recourse to unpopular prerogative measures such as Impositions (1999, 240-1). 
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which the common law now governs:  then were naturall laws limited for the 
conveniencie of civill societie here, and those limitations have been from 
thence, increased, altered, interpreted, and brought to what now they are; 
although perhaps (saving the merely immutable part of nature) now, in 
regard of their first being, they are not otherwise then the ship, that by often 
mending had no piece of the first materialls, or as the house that’s so often 
repaired, ut nihil ex pristine materia superfit [so that nothing is made of the 
original material], which yet (by the Civill law) is to be accounted the same 
still. (Selden, 1616, 19) 
 
Although this need not entirely contradict the idea of law as customary, nor deny 
that the origin of law is immemorial, it does discredit the notion that common law 
has remained unchanged.
 18
  Selden’s argument that the common law of England 
began at the same time as the laws that govern other nations also strikes against 
Fortescue’s assertions, above, that the English laws are of greater antiquity than 
other laws, and for this reason are the best.  Instead, Selden argues, the common law 
is the best law by which to govern England because it has evolved with the people 
and communities it governs: ‘Those which best fit the state wherein they are, cleerly 
deserve the name of the best law’ (Selden, 1616, sig. C2v). 
 
Reason 
The legitimacy and superiority of the common law of England was not only 
based on its long usage, however; it was also considered to be a law constituted of 
reason, which derived in part from its customary nature, and in part from its basis in 
natural law.  Selden’s commentary on Fortescue, aside from describing and 
emphasising the common law’s fittingness to govern the nation, also draws attention 
                                                
18
 In ‘Of the Ancient Government of England’, first written in 1614, Henry Spelman also argues for a 
slow evolutionary process of legal development:  
 
To tell the Government of England under the old Saxon Laws, seemeth an Utopia to us 
present; strange and uncouth: yet can there be no period assign’d, wherein either the frame 
of those Laws was abolished, or this of ours entertained; but as day and night creep 
insensibly one upon the other, so also hath this alteration grown upon us unsensibly, every 
age altering something, and no age seeing more than what themselves are actors in, nor 
thinking it to have been otherwise than as themselves discover it by the present. (Spelman, 
1698, 49)   
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to the idea that all law (at least all customary law) is based upon natural law.
 19
  The 
law of nature was thought to be the natural reason with which men governed 
themselves and was often equated with God’s moral law.
20
  For Davies, common 
law’s similarity to the natural law contributed to its authority and its perfection: 
 
Therefore as the lawe of nature, which the schoolmen call Ius commune, & 
which is also Ius non scriptum, being written onely in the hart of man, is 
better then all the written lawes in the worlde to make men honest & happy 
in this life, if they would observe the rules thereof: So the custumary lawe of 
England, which wee doe likewise call Ius commune, as comming neerest to 
the lawe of Nature, which is the roote and touchstone of all good lawes, & 
which is also Ius non scriptum, & written onely in the memory of man (for 
every custome though it tooke beginning beyond the memory of any living 
man, yet it is continued & preserved in the memory of men living) doth farre 
excell our written lawes. (Davies, 1615, 2) 
 
However, natural law was also a law of reason. Natural law was the natural reason 
which every man possessed, and by which he should govern his own actions: ‘The 
law of Nature is that soveraigne reason fixed in mans nature, which ministreth 
common principles of good and evill’ (Finch, 1627, 3-4). The use of the word 
‘soveraigne’ is significant: if reason should be sovereign in ruling a man’s actions, it 
should also be sovereign over will in determining law. ‘All men must agree,’ Finch 
states, ‘that lawes in deed repugnant to the law of reason, are aswell[sic] void, as 
those that crosse the law of nature’ (1627, 76). 
 
Indeed, Finch asserts that the common law is ‘nothing els but common 
reason’.  However, it is not merely the common reason, ‘which everie one doth 
                                                
19 The idea that all law derives from natural law is not specific to Selden (see, for example, 
Doddridge, 1631, 153, 158-9) nor new to the period, having its origins in the thinking of Thomas 
Aquinas (Burgess, 1992, 33).  Selden goes on to explain that the reason laws are different in different 
countries and States, despite having a common origin in Natural law, is that they have developed 
according to the needs of that particular community in the same way that makes English common 
law perfect for governing England (Selden, 1616, 17-18). 
20
 Natural law, Aristotle believed, was also that which made men form political societies for 
government.  For a detailed discussion of ideas of natural law, and its relationship with common law, 
see Sommerville, 1999, 13-18. 
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frame unto himselfe’, he argues, ‘but refined reason’ (Finch, 1627, 75).  Coke’s The 
first part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England gives a more detailed 
explanation: 
21
 
 
And this is another strong argument in Law, Nihil quod est contra rationem 
est licitum [nothing which is against reason is lawful].  For the reason is the 
life of the Law, nay the common Law it selfe is nothing else but reason, 
which is to be understood of an artificiall perfection of reason, gotten by 
long study, observation, and experience, and not of every mans naturall 
reason, for, Nemo nascitur artifex [No one is born an expert].  This legall 
reason, est summa ratio [is the highest reason].  And therefore if all the 
reason that is dispersed into so many severall heads were united into one, yet 
could he not make such a law as the Law of England is, because many 
succession of ages it hath beene fi[n]ed and refined by an infinite number of 
grave and learned men, and by long experience growne to such a perfection, 
for the government of this Realme, as the old rule may be justly verified of it 
Neminem oportet esse sapientiorem legibus: No man (out of his owne 
private reason) ought to be wiser than the Law, which is the perfection of 
reason. (Coke, 1629, 97b) 
 
Coke presents here dense and sophisticated arguments for the rationality of law. The 
common law is the highest form of reason because it is not the wisdom of one man 
in one time, but of many men through several ages, and their cumulative wisdom 
must be greater than that of one man.  Not only does Coke argue for the rationality 
of common law here, but also for its superiority over a law imposed by any one 
person. Included in his argument is the assertion that a man’s personal, natural, 
reason is not enough to be able to understand the complexities of law; rather, it can 
only be understood through long study and experience, an ‘artificial reason’ which 
only experienced lawyers and the judiciary possessed. They and only they are 
capable of correctly interpreting and manipulating the law.  If this is the case, the 
                                                
21 Hereafter Institutes I. 
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king cannot hold authority over the law, either as law-giver or as primary 
interpreter.
 22
 
 
In a variety of ways, then, the common law was viewed as a legitimate legal 
authority, independent of the king.  It has no single originating source (be that 
indigenous king or conqueror), making it subject to the will of no single ruler; 
instead it claims legitimate authority in its antiquity, its rationality or its perfect 
fittingness to govern England. The common law had in its favour two different 
assertions of its rationality: its derivation from the law of Nature, and its basis in 
custom.
23
  Both of these arguments, by virtue of their emphasis on reason and 
testing, favour common law over any rule imposed by a single lawgiver, and 
provide an alternative, rational law in contrast with that imposed by the potentially 
capricious will of the monarch.   
 
In the sections which follow, this chapter will examine the ways in which 
the understood history and vocabularies of common law are employed and 
translated on the Caroline stage.  The Queenes Exchange engages with the ancient 
constitution and the customary nature of common law; The Antipodes, by 
illustrating the absurdity of irrational judgement, emphasises the need to temper 
desire and act according to law and The Queen and Concubine examines the 
rationality of law and the consequences of disregarding this in favour of arbitrary 
                                                
22
 This led to a direct confrontation between Coke and James VI, common law and the monarch.  
Although James had natural reason, Coke argued, he did not have the ‘artificial reason’ of the 
judiciary.  James objected that this would mean that he was under the law, and Coke quoted 
Bracton’s argument that Kings were under God and the Law (Bracton, 1968-77, 33).  See Barnes 
(2004, 12-13) and Usher (1903, passim).      
23 That the customary nature of law allows common law to be a law of reason through the trying and 
testing of rules before they become law is indicated in Coke’s argument, above, ‘if it be against 
reason, this ought not, nor will not bee allowed before Judges: Quia malus abolendus est’ (Coke, 
1629, 141).  Burgess argues that custom was what allowed the common law to be both mutable and a 
law of reason and thus immutable (Burgess, 1992, 29).  
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absolutism.  These plays, however, do not merely employ the vocabulary of 
common law to present the ideas of contemporary legal argument; they also present 
the potentially destabilising effect of competing legal authorities in the common law 
and royal prerogative.  Although the motif of marriage is used both as a method of 
legal (re-)stabilisation and as an index of legal stability, it becomes clear that in 
order to maintain justice and stability in the kingdom, the common law must take 
priority over royal will. 
 
 
The Ancient Constitution: The Queenes Exchange 
 
The Queenes Exchange centres on the marriage options of Bertha, Queen of 
the Saxons.  The Saxon setting is unusual, and no source for the play has been 
identified, suggesting a deliberate association of the play with the idealised Saxon 
past employed by advocates of the common law.
24
  In the course of the play, Bertha 
marries Anthynus, the son of one of her courtiers, believing he is the man to whom 
she is betrothed, King Osriik of Northumberland (the men are almost identical); the 
Queen’s ‘exchange’ of the title is her exchange of one husband for another.  More 
significant, however, are the legal authorities these possible husbands represent: 
Osriik embodies arbitrary absolute rule and Anthynus, rule by the customary 
common law. Bertha, in changing her husband, also changes the kind of legal 
authority she espouses.   
                                                
24
 Butler (1984, 265) and Weston (1991, passim) note that the Saxons were the society to whom the 
Stuarts looked for customary rights and liberties, and it is indeed the Saxons to whom Coke (Reports 
8, ‘To the reader’), Hare (1647, passim, esp. 6) and Spelman (1698, passim), amongst others, refer 
their readers for the ancient nature of the law and the liberties of parliaments.  Andrews states he has 
examined the chronicles of ‘Hall, Holinshed, Fabyan etc’ in vain for the source, but the names of the 
characters, however, can be found in Holinshed’s chronicles referring to Saxons (Andrews, 1981, 79-
80). 
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At the beginning of the play, consistent with the Saxon setting, Queen 
Bertha has called a meeting of her Lords to ask their opinion on her proposed 
marriage to Osriik.
25
  Bertha’s first speech sets out clearly her claims to authority: 
 
Since it hath pleasd the highest Power to place me 
 His substitute in Regal Soveraignty, 
 Over this Kingdom, by the generall vote 
 Of you my loyall Lords, and loving Subjects, 
 Though grounded on my right of due Succession; 
 Being immediate heir, and only child 
 Of your late much deplored King my Father. 
 I am in most reverend duty bound 
 Unto that Power above me, and a wel- 
 Befitting care towards you my faithfull people, 
 To rule and govern so (at least so neere 
 As by all possibility I may) 
 That I may shun Heavens anger, and your grief.  
(Queenes Exchange, sig. B1r) 
 
As the opening speech, Bertha’s dwelling on the foundations of her authority sets 
the scene for the ideas of legitimate authority in law to be contested throughout the 
play.  This speech encompasses a variety of political theories on the nature and 
origin of royal power: she is the representative of God on earth, thus ruling by 
divine right, but she has also been elected through the Lords’ vote and as such has 
the support of the council too.  Her right to rule as the legitimate heir to the previous 
monarch is emphasised by her description of her father as ‘late’ and ‘much 
deplored’ (his death has been much lamented).
26
  Her claims to authority encompass 
divine right and contract theories of government, and the deliberate conflation of 
                                                
25
 Saxon kings ruled in association with a counsel of Lords which later became the basis for rule by 
Parliament.  This provided a long, continuous (and pre-conquest) history for the notion of King-in-
parliament, and added to claims that the King could not overrule parliament by virtue of their 
existing only after instigation by a previous king.  See William Lambarde’s Archeion, cited in 
Burgess, 1992, 62.  This contrasts starkly with Robert Filmer’s argument that ‘all those liberties that 
are claimed in parliaments are the liberties of grace from the king, and not the liberties of nature to 
the people’ (Filmer, 1680, I5v). 
26 OED, ‘deplored’, 1. 
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these theories in the potential origins of Bertha’s authority means she is 
undoubtedly sovereign in her kingdom: there is no position from which her 
authority can be questioned.
 27
  What is at stake is the way in which she exercises 
her authority to govern.  She is, at this point in the play, far from arbitrary 
absolutism; she acknowledges that her position comes with a duty, both to God and 
to her people to rule justly.
 28
  
 
 Although most of the Lords express their approval of her marriage, Segebert 
does not.  The reasons for his objection associate him closely with advocates of the 
common law: 
 
  I beseech you my Lords, 
To weigh with your known wisdom the great danger 
This match may bring unto the Crown and Country. 
Tis true, the King Osriik as wel in person 
As in his dignity, may be thought fit 
To be endow’d with all you seem to yeild him. 
But what becomes of all the wholsome Laws, 
 Customs, and all the nerves of Government 
 Your no less prudent than Majestick Father 
 With power & policy enricht this Land with; 
 And made the Saxons happy, and your self 
 A Queen of so great eminence. (Queenes Exchange, sigs. B1r-v) 
 
Segebert’s use of the discourse of custom of contemporary legal argument, and his 
reference to Saxons, connects the laws that he seeks to preserve with the ancient 
constitution.  These laws are not only good for the wellbeing of the country – they 
are ‘wholsome’, suggesting health in the body politic – but they have also enriched 
it, and it is this legal wealth that gives Bertha her superiority over other monarchs.  
                                                
27
 See Chapter 2, pp.74-81 for a discussion of these theories. 
28 James VI and I’s asserted that a King should behave ‘as a loving Father, and carefull watchman, 
caring for [his subjects] more then for himselfe, knowing himselfe to be ordained for them, and they 
not for him; and therefore countable to that great God, who placed him as his lieutenant over them, 
upon the perill of his soule to procure that weale of both soules & bodies, as farre as in him lieth, of 
all them that are committed to his charge’ (1603, sig. B4r). 
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As part of the debate over the position of common law and prerogative, it is 
significant that here the customary law maintains the Queen’s position, the Queen 
does not give power to the law, thus conforming to contemporary arguments that the 
king’s prerogative was part of, or indeed granted by, the established law rather than 
the law being subject to the king’s will.  The ‘great danger’ Segebert fears for the 
country is that these laws will be lost and Bertha’s happy, prospering and orderly 
realm will ‘Be now subjected to a strangers foot; / And trod into disorder’ (Queenes 
Exchange, sig. B1v) by subjection to Osriik’s rule. 
 
 Segebert does not want to deprive his queen of the authority she currently 
wields or the privileges already ascribed to her; he wishes only to maintain the 
status quo: 
 
 I know, and you, if you knew any thing,  
 Might know the difference twixt the Northumbrian lawes 
 And ours: And sooner will their King pervert 
 Your Priviledges and your Government, 
 Then reduce his to yours. (Queenes Exchange, sig. B2r) 
 
The audacity of this argument (‘if you knew anything’) suggests the extent of 
Segebert’s concern for the maintenance of the common law. The government of the 
Saxons and indeed Bertha’s privilege are, he argues, currently on the right course 
(that of moderate monarchical rule by common law), but this will be perverted in 
marriage to Osriik.
29
  The assertion that Osriik would not reduce his government to 
hers could suggest that he has greater power than Bertha which he will not diminish 
or bring under her control. However, ‘reduce’ had other meanings current in the 
                                                
29 Burgess argues that one of the ways English ancient constitutionalism differed from other 
countries’ was that it began as a means to defend the status quo, not, as in Spain and France, to 
advocate a return to a golden age (Burgess, 1992, 15-18).  Ancient constitutionalism, Burgess 
suggests, is not merely a glorification of the past in late 16
th
 and early 17
th
 century England, but a 
glorification of the present (1992, 17). 
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seventeenth century including ‘to lead or bring back from error on action, conduct, 
or belief, especially in matters of morality or religion’ or ‘to bring (a thing, 
institution, etc.) back to a former state’.
30
  Segebert’s concern is that Osriik will 
pervert the Saxon laws rather than turning his seemingly erroneous methods of 
government to those prudent and wholesome methods prevalent in Bertha’s Saxon 
kingdom.
31
 
 
 The late King charged Segebert with the duty of protecting the law in 
Bertha’s marriage. Concerned for his people, the King commanded: 
 
 That rather then by marriage you should bring 
 Your Subjects to such thraldome, and that if 
 No Prince whose lawes coher’d with yours did seek you 
 (As some there are, and nearer then the Northumbrian) 
 That he would have you from some noble Stock 
 To take a Subject in your owne Dominion. (Queenes Exchange, sig. B2r) 
 
The customary laws of the ancient constitution safeguarded the liberties of the 
subject; that Osriik’s government would bring the Saxons into ‘thraldome’ is the 
first clear indication of his absolutism.  Segebert offers an alternative to this in 
suggesting marriage to one of her subjects, whose idea of law would necessarily 
coincide with her own.
32
  Segebert never suggests that he is the man she should 
                                                
30
 OED, ‘reduce’, 8a and 9b.  See also definition 2.  The first of these also lends weight to the notion 
that the play might include some reference to the catholic influence of the Queen at court (see 
footnote 33).   
31 Matthew Steggle reads the play as a comment on the concerns of nationhood and Britishness 
related to the union of England and Scotland, arguing that the play ‘does not offer practicable 
solutions to anxieties about the nature of the union between England and Scotland , but the play 
certainly articulates such anxieties’. As the union of Bertha’s court with Osriik’s does not actually 
happen, Steggle suggests that this is a separatist play (2004, 54-57, quotation at 56). 
32
 The legal import of Segebert’s argument here is emphasised if his reasons for the Queen’s 
marriage to a subject are compared with those given by Cleonarda in Lodowick Carlell’s The 
Deserving Favourite (1629): 
 
  Who would not 
     Marry with a Subject that is a King of Vertues, 
     Rather then with a King that’s govern’d 
     By his Vices? (Deserving Favourite, sig. N2v) 
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marry and, despite the other Lords’ pointed question, ‘whom in your great wisdom / 
Would you allot the Queen?’, he is cleared of any ambitious motive by his obvious 
concern for the law and the state, and in his condemnation of the other courtiers for 
their sycophantic acquiescence to Bertha’s wishes ‘though all / The Kingdom perish 
for’t’ (Queenes Exchange, sig. B1v).  His care for the country is confirmed when he 
states that he does not grieve at his banishment (imposed for speaking out against 
the Queen’s wishes) so much for himself as for what will become of his country 
(Queenes Exchange, sig. B4v).    
 
The fear for the liberties of the people and the safety of the law Segebert 
invokes is intensified by the imagery Bertha chooses, in the same scene, to give her 
assent to the marriage to Osriik: 
 
 A King sent forth a General to besiege  
 A never conquered City.  The siege was long, 
 And no report came back unto the King; 
 How well or ill his Expedition thriv’d; 
 Until his doubtful thoughts had given lost, 
 His hope oth’ City, and his Army both 
 When he being full of this despair, ariv’d 
 Oth’ suddam his brave General with Victory; 
 Which made his thanks, as was his conquest double. 
(Queenes Exchange, sig. B2v) 
 
There is nothing unusual about the analogy between a love won and a conquest but, 
in the context of Segebert’s Saxon objections, the passage must have political 
resonance. If, as some absolutists claimed, the Norman Conquest introduced 
absolute kingship and disrupted the ancient constitution, Bertha’s willing 
acquiescence to Osriik’s conquest implies a submission to the will and whim of the 
                                                                                                                                    
Segebert and Cleonarda’s argument make essentially the same point: it is better to marry a subject 
who has appropriate values than marry a king who does not.  However, Cleonarda’s concern with 
virtues rather than laws emphasises the concern for common law expressed in Brome’s play, and 
potentially suggests a divergence of priorities between courtier and commercial playwrights which, 
although outside the scope of this thesis, merits further investigation.   
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conqueror and the abolition of the customary Saxon law. Her reference to a double 
conquest is a little ambiguous:  whilst it is clear that in terms of the siege, ‘double’ 
refers to the greatness of the King’s joy and victory, in Bertha’s analogy the 
meaning is less clear, and to a politically alert audience could potentially link the 
conquest of Bertha’s heart with the subordination of her laws and realm.  The 
political and legal implications of the Queen’s conquest analogy are confirmed in a 
sycophantic courtier’s comment: 
 
 I can but think what old Segebert said 
 Concerning Laws, Customes and Priviledges, 
 And how this match will change the Government. 
 I fear, how e’er the Laws may go, our Customes will 
 Be lost; for he [Northumbrian ambassador] me thinks out-flatters us already. 
     (Queenes Exchange, sig. B2v-B3r) 
  
Although his second use of ‘custom’ quite clearly refers to court ‘customs’ of 
flattery, the emphasis is placed on the change in laws and customs and how this 
‘will change the Government’.
 33
  Coming so soon after Bertha’s conquest analogy 
and in the same scene as Segebert’s objections to the marriage based on concern for 
law and liberty, this cannot but emphasise the play’s engagement with 
contemporary legal argument. 
 
The emphasis Segebert places on custom and law contrasts sharply with the 
terms he uses to criticise Bertha’s marriage: 
 
  All your wealth 
 Your state, your laws, your subjects, and the hope 
 Of flourishing future fortunes, which your Father 
 By his continual care, and teadious study 
 Gave as a Legacy unto this Kingdom: 
 Must all be altered, or quite subverted, 
                                                
33
 In these concerns over the effects of Bertha’s marriage it is possible to see a fear of the influence 
the French, Catholic Queen Henrietta-Maria may have had at court, especially because Catholicism 
was associated with absolutism. 
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 And all by a wilful gift unto a stranger. (Queenes Exchange, sig. B1v) 
 
In describing Bertha’s decision to marry Osriik as a ‘wilful gift’ Segebert 
undermines the Queen’s prerogative, bringing it to the level of mere wilfulness, 
recalling contemporary anti-absolutist discourses of will which were established in 
Chapter 2.  The royal prerogative has become mere will, not the reasoned 
government which, at least in Segebert’s eyes can be found in the legacy of 
customary law Bertha inherited.  This legacy implies not only the long continuance 
of the law, but also a responsibility to preserve it to pass it on again at the Queen’s 
death.  Significantly, hope for the future for subjects, state and wealth are connected 
to the law, not to Bertha’s will; indeed, indulging Bertha’s will would overthrow or 
ruin (subvert) these hopes. 
 
This questioning of the royal will causes the Queen to reassert her authority: 
 
 Peace: stop his mouth.  Unreaverend old man, 
 How darst thou thus oppose thy Soveraignes will, 
 So well approvd by all thy fellow Peers; 
 Of which the meanest equals thee in judgement?  
(Queenes Exchange, sig. B1v) 
 
Bertha tries to recover the authority of her ‘Soveraignes will’ from the imputations 
of whim both by reinforcing her authority in asking how he dares to oppose her, and 
by the approbation of the other Councillors.  Segebert does not, however, accept the 
will of the Queen and the approval of his sycophantic peers as a sound method of 
judgement: 
 
Do you approve their judgements, Madam, which 
 Are grounded on your will?  I may not do’t.  
Only I pray, that you may understand, 
(But not unto your loss) the difference 
Betwixt smooth flattery, and honest judgements.  
(Queenes Exchange, sig. B1v) 
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The repetition of the word ‘will’ in this interchange (‘wilful gift’, ‘Soveraignes 
will’, ‘your will’) emphasises that this action is on the whim of the Queen rather 
than a reasoned decision. The need for advisers’ true judgement rather than the 
flattery of sycophants that Segebert highlights is not specific to drama of the 
Caroline period, but here, however, the flattery of Bertha’s courtiers not only 
encourages absolute, even arbitrary, rule but it is also explicitly connected with 
undermining the stability of her state, laws and subjects, and the ‘hope / Of 
flourishing future fortunes’ left as her legacy by her father.  
 
Already, even before his appearance on stage, Osriik has tempted Bertha 
towards arbitrary rule. This can be seen most clearly in her banishment of Segebert 
for his advice; indeed, Anthynus later describes her as the ‘Tyrannesse’ who 
banished his father (Queenes Exchange, sig. D4v).  Nevertheless, she does not yet 
rule with cruelty; she refuses to execute Segebert or confiscate his land because of 
his insolence, dismissing her courtiers’ suggestions with ‘ Away, you’l be too cruel’ 
(Queenes Exchange, sig. B2r).  In Osriik himself, however, the traits of an arbitrary 
ruler can be found.  He rules in conjunction with a court favourite, a controversial 
figure in early Stuart politics, particularly the Duke of Buckingham, and a stock 
figure of Jacobean and Caroline drama.
34
  Osriik acts only according to his own will 
and his rule is clearly one of personal authority augmented with threats of severe 
punishment: 
 
 And if my power be not a spell sufficient 
 To worke your secresie, I’l take your heads 
                                                
34
 For example, Ben Jonson’s eponymous Sejanus, Massinger’s Sanazarro in The Great Duke of 
Florence, and Brome’s Flavello in The Queen and Concubine. 
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 To mine own custody. (Queenes Exchange, sig, E1v) 
 
This is not reasoned absolutism; rather it is the arbitrary threat of a wilful man, 
emphasising his power and ability to punish.  There is no reason to believe he will 
not carry out his threats.   
 
Osriik’s complete surrender to will is illustrated in his uncontrollable 
passion for Mildred, Segebert’s daughter.  When Osriik first submits to his passion 
for Mildred, he describes it as an illness: ‘I am not well, what kind of Changeling 
am I?’ (Queenes Exchange, sig. C2r).  His reference to being a ‘Changeling’ may 
refer to his sudden change of heart from Bertha to Mildred, but it could also refer to 
the danger to his friendship with his favourite Theodrick if he pursues Mildred as 
she has already been wooed by him.
35
  In a dramatic parallel with Bertha’s actions, 
Osriik too banishes the courtier who obstructs his union with the desired partner, 
ordering Theodrick’s house arrest.  The king and his courtiers repeat throughout the 
following scenes at Osriik’s court that the king is ‘not well’ or ‘sick’ (Queenes 
Exchange, sig. C2r, D2v) , providing a stark contrast between the sickness caused 
by unrestrained will at Oriik’s court and the ‘wholsome Laws’ (Queenes Exchange, 
sig. B1r) which Segebert claims for Bertha’s kingdom.  Indeed, Osriik’s sickness 
does not only affect him, but those around him: 
 
Although I cannot properly call it 
A sickness:  I am sure ’tis a disease 
Both to himself and all that come about him. 
I fear he’s brain-crack’d, lunatick and Frantic, mad; 
And all the Doctors almost as mad as he, 
Because they cannot find the cause. (Queenes Exchange, sig. D2v). 
 
                                                
35
 That the desire that represents absolutism should also be concerned with taking what rightfully 
belongs to one of his subjects may also be a comment on the abuse of royal power and infraction of 
subjects’ liberties in Charles’s forced loans and prerogative taxation. 
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All is not well in the Northumbrian body politic.  The possibility that Osriik’s desire 
for Mildred has sent him mad also draws a comparison with Segebert’s concern for 
the laws of Bertha’s kingdom.  Whilst he reprimands Bertha for acting wilfully, and 
her Lords for their sycophancy, they comment that he has lost his senses: 
 
 [Lord?]: Take hence the mad man. 
 
 Colr.: We are sorry for you. 
 
 Elk.: And wish the troublesome spirit were out of you 
  That so distracts your reason. (Queenes Exchange, sig. B1v)
36
 
 
It is clear, however, from his concern for his country and through comparison with 
Osriik’s illness, that Segebert’s reason is not distracted, although Osriik’s, in his 
overwhelming desire, is.  The claims for the reason of the common law are 
translated here into a madness of absolutism on the Caroline stage.
37
  The courtiers 
explicitly associate this madness with his court favourites who, in having ‘the rule 
here over [their] Ruler’, have, they say, made the king mad (Queenes Exchange, sig. 
E4v).  This is a subtle representation of the evil counsel argument, in which any 
unpopular or inappropriate actions taken by the king are the result of poor advice.  
However, it also associates the king’s madness with the instruments of his absolute 
rule – his favourites.  The connection between madness and absolutism is further 
confirmed in the audience’s knowledge that Osriik’s madness is really caused by his 
arbitrary will in his uncontrollable passion for Mildred. Although it seems, at least 
initially, that he wrestles with this passion, his arbitrary unconcern for his people is 
illustrated in his continued pursuit of Mildred despite acknowledging that his 
treatment of Theodrick is ‘unjust’ (Queenes Exchange, sig. D3v). 
                                                
36 The 1657 edition of the text attributes the first of these lines to Segebert, but as he has just finished 
speaking, and the sentiment in it coincides with the other Lords rather than Segebert it seems to have 
been misattributed. 
37
 This a particularly key idea to Brome, and appears again in The Queen and Concubine and The 
Antipodes which will be discussed below. 
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Despite Osriik’s sickness, no harm comes to his country.  However, in the 
linked sub-plot centred on Segebert’s family, Brome illustrates the potential dangers 
for law and order in the total submission to will.
 38
   As Segebert prepares to go into 
exile he asks his children for an expression of their gratitude.
 
The echoes of King 
Lear in this scene are obvious, and contribute to the tragic atmosphere of Segebert’s 
exile, invoking a potential political instability. They also suggest something of 
Bertha and Segebert’s folly in wanting to hear their own praise, as well as preparing 
the audience for Offa’s treachery, which endorses Segebert’s warnings to the Queen 
about heeding flattery.
39
  Mildred answers as becomes an obedient daughter, that 
she cannot speak his goodness to her; Offa replies with great flattery, and Anthynus 
reserves his praise, saying he will give his father no more and no less than his due 
respect because: 
 
 I have observ’d, but specially at Court, 
 Where flattery is too frequent, the great scorn 
 You have ever cast upon it, and do fear 
 To come within such danger of reproof. 
 Knowing your reason may as well detest it 
 In your own house, as in Kings Pallaces.  (Queenes Exchange, sig. B4r). 
 
Once again, Segebert is associated here with reason.  This speech maintains the 
distance already established between Segebert’s attitude and that of the other 
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 ‘The space of the family is used as a means for exploring the wider problems of the monarch-
father’s relationship with his children-subjects in the body politic of the wider commonwealth’ 
(Sanders, 1999a, 68).  The comparison between a father and a king occurs frequently in political 
tracts of the period.  See for example, Patriarcha and James VI and I’s True Lawe of Free 
Monarchies (passim). 
39
 For a more detailed examination of the King Lear resonances, see Shaw, 1980, 94; Andrews, 1981, 
100; and Butler, 1984, 266-7.  Steggle notes that ‘in recent years King Lear has increasingly come to 
be seen as an articulation of insecurities to do with national sovereignty and the division of the 
kingdoms’, and argues that the echoes of Shakespeare’s play here ‘enters, in effect, into a form of 
intertextual dialogue with King Lear, addressing the same concerns about the borders of the nation 
but from a different perspective’. He also notes that the parade of Saxon kings who appear to 
Anthynus, reminiscent of Macbeth, are in this play actually ‘guarantees of continuity with the past, 
not of changes in the future’.  Whilst Steggle argues that this denotes a ‘distinctly separatist agenda’, 
it also suggests the continuity of the Saxon legacy of law and custom left by Bertha’s father (2004, 
56). 
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courtiers, but creates an unmistakeable parallel between Segebert’s home and the 
court.   
 
In a sinister parallel of Osriik’s pursuit of Mildred, Offa also indulges an 
uncontrolled and unnatural desire for his sister.  In order to clear his path to her and 
to the inheritance of his father’s estate, Offa employs outlaws to murder his father 
and his brother.  Although these attempts are unsuccessful, this domestic disorder 
and disregard for law (moral, natural and positive) demonstrates the chaos which 
could potentially occur in the public political sphere if established law is supplanted 
by the rule of will only.  Like Bertha’s insistence on her will, and Osriik’s pursuit of 
his, Offa’s language and manner is threatening and arbitrary: 
 
Thy cries shall be as fruitless as thy life 
If thou offend’st me with ’em; hear but this 
Impertinently peevish maid, and tremble 
But to conceive a disobedient thought 
Against my will. (Queenes Exchange, sig. F2r) 
 
Interrupted in his assault on Mildred by the arrival of Osriik claiming to be a 
Northumbrian gentleman wishing to see her, he assumes Osriik is Anthynus in 
disguise and summarily orders his death for the murder of their father.  His servant 
Arnold prevents this claiming the action is ‘too rash’.  Whilst Offa tries to assert his 
authority, Arnold emphasises law and process over arbitrary action: 
 
 Off[a]: Are you 
  Become my master, you old Ruffian? 
 
 Arn[old]: No 
  Your Servant Sir, but subject to the Law; 
  The Law that must determine this mans cause, 
  Nor you, nor we, what ever he deserves. 
  And till he shall be censur’d by that law 
  We’l find a Prison for him. (Queenes Exchange, sig. F2v) 
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The emphatic repetition of ‘law’ here suggests that Offa, like Arnold and despite 
being his master, must subordinate his will to the law.  Importantly, the law under 
which Osriik is to be tried, and to which Offa’s will is subject, is identified as the 
law of Bertha’s Saxon kingdom (Queenes Exchange, sig. F4v).  
  
Whilst Anthynus’ loyalty to his father is rewarded at the end of the play with 
marriage to Bertha, Offa is punished with madness, maintaining the association of 
madness with submission to passion and arbitrary judgement.
40
  In this respect it is 
particularly interesting to note that Offa’s madness is closely associated with 
attempts to corrupt justice: 
 
 Offa: Whither do you hurry me? 
  If I must answer’t, give me yet some time, 
  To make provision of befitting Presents, 
  To supply the hard hands of my stern Judges, 
  Into a tender feeling of my causes. 
  I know what Eacus loves, what Minos likes, 
  And what will make Radamanthus run.  
 
 Anthynus:  He is distracted. (Queenes Exchange, sig. G1r) 
 
Minos, Rhadamanthys and Aecus were made judges of the souls of the dead in the 
classical underworld because, when alive, they were renowned for their wisdom and 
justice as lawgivers (March, 1998, 258).  Offa, in his distraction, believes his judges 
will be these classical judges and asks time to prepare bribes for them; his madness 
leads to an attempt to corrupt even the most fair of justices.
41
  Significantly, it is 
Anthynus, the subject whom the Queen will marry and therefore preserve the 
                                                
40
 Elizabeth Shaw (1980, 97) and Jackson Cope (1973, 138-9) also comment on the theme of 
madness in this play, but do not relate this to law or authority. Shaw associates madness here with a 
psychological morality, and Cope with the ‘return to reasoning as an individual means of control 
over one’s journey toward desired ends’ (Shaw, 1980, 99; Cope, 1973, 139). 
41
 Rhadamanthys had such a reputation for justice that the people of the islands in the southern 
Aegean voluntarily put themselves under his control (March, 1998, 344). 
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Saxon’s customary laws, who notes and comments on Offa’s judicial distraction 
here.  Untempered desire and madness are contrasted throughout this play with 
reason, justice and customary law. 
 
  Although no lasting damage is done to Osriik’s kingdom through his pursuit 
of will, it does cost him his possible marriage to Bertha.  Anthynus, who looks 
almost identical to Osriik, arrives in his kingdom and some of the courtiers take him 
to the palace thinking he is the king.  Osriik takes this opportunity to leave the 
country unnoticed and pursue Mildred, leaving the kingdom in the hands of 
Ethelswick and Edelbert.  However, the rest of his council dismiss these men, 
believing they are responsible for the King’s madness, and they bring forward his 
wedding to Bertha, thinking this will cure him.  Anthynus is then married to Bertha 
in Osriik’s place in the literal exchange of the play’s title.  Martin Butler argues that 
in dismissing these men, the council take rule ‘into their own hands in the name of 
the national good’ and that Osriik later ‘applauds his subjects for having opposed 
him for his own good’ (1984, 266).
42
  However, the council did not know they were 
opposing the king; they were acting against his advisers, believed Anthynus was 
Osriik, and that they were bringing forward a marriage the king desired.  Even when 
Anthynus lashes out at them, Theodwald claims that ‘if your Majesty / Will tread 
our due allegiance into dust, / We are prepared to suffer’ (Queenes Exchange, sig. 
F1r).  As evidence for his argument, Butler quotes the following passage: 
 
 Thy trespasse is thine honour… 
 And I must thank your care my Lords, as it deserves, 
 Your over-reaching care to give my Dignity 
 As much as in you lay unto another. 
                                                
42
 Ira Clark gives a similar reading, stating that Osriik, ‘who has been awakened to responsible 
monarchy, praises the allegiance and care of his country’s lords, who counteracted his commands’ 
(1992, 162).  
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However, Butler’s editing misrepresents the action of the play.  When placed in its 
immediate context and quoted in full, this passage has a very different meaning: 
 
 Theodr[ick]: O let me wash your feet Sir with my tears. 
 
 Osr[iik]: Thy trespasse is thine honour my Theodrick 
  And I must thank your care my Lords, as it deserves, 
  Your over-reaching care to give my Dignity 
  As much as in you lay unto another. 
  And for your Letters counterfeit in my name 
  By which the Queen is mock’d into a marriage. 
 
 Theod[wald]: That was your policy, your wit, my Lord. 
 
 Eauf[ride]: A shame on’t.  Would I were hanged, that I 
  Might hear no more on’t. (Queenes Exchange, sig. G1r) 
 
If the first line of Osriik’s obvious praise is given where it is meant – to the 
erstwhile banished favourite – and the following lines directed towards Theodwald 
and Eaufride, it is clear that the King’s tone is one of displeasure (‘over-reaching’ 
‘mock’d’), not applause, and his offer to thank their care ‘as it deserves’ becomes 
threatening.  Theodwald’s immediate attempt to shift responsibility to Eaufride is 
not the action of a courtier being praised.  There is not, then, in Osriik, the 
promising change of heart in government which Butler allows him.  Indeed, it is 
clear that little will change at Osriik’s court:  Theodrick will remain as Osriik’s 
favourite (Queenes Exchange, sig., G1v), and despite his acknowledgement that he 
may be justly punished for pursuing his desires (‘yet I must confesse, / In all that I 
am like to suffer, heaven is just’ (Queenes Exchange, sig. F4r)) Osriik’s will is 
upheld in that he is to marry Mildred.  In the same way that the spectre of 
Severino’s unpunished, arbitrary acts of violence haunt the end of The Guardian, 
nothing appears set to change in Osriik’s kingdom. 
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For Bertha, however, the case is different.  Through the literal exchange of 
future husbands, Bertha also exchanges one form of government for another.  In 
happily accepting her marriage to Anthynus, and in her joyful pardon and 
acceptance of Segebert and Alberto (both had been banished for questioning their 
monarch’s will, Alberto under Bertha’s father) Bertha is seen to accept Segebert’s 
values.  She comments on her marriage: 
 
 I take it as the providence of Heaven; 
 And from the Son of that most injur’d Father, 
 Whom now in my joys strength I could shed tears for. 
 I yield you are my head, and I your handmaid. 
  (She sets him down, and kneels; he takes her up). 
     (Queenes Exchange, sig. G1r). 
 
The image seen on stage is not merely one of monarchical acceptance of the law, 
but of her submission to it; it is a presentation of the contemporary lawyers’ 
arguments that the monarch should be subject to law.  Monarchical will is brought 
under the control of the ‘reason’ of law, as Anthynus is the son of the representative 
of reason at Bertha’s court.  Bertha makes this submission happily and this is the 
best decision for the good of her people, the play suggests, as the marriage is 
brought about by providence. 
  
However, this reading of the scene is complicated by the ruler’s gender. 
Because the monarch in question is female, the image is one of traditional wifely 
obedience, and this potentially undermines any radical implications of Bertha’s 
kneeling to Anthynus, as the audience see female wilfulness submitting to male 
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reason.
43
 The relationship between women and wilfulness was commonly 
understood in the period and is spelled out in Massinger’s The Very Woman (1634): 
 
Pedro: One reason for this would do well. 
 
Almira:   My will 
Shall now stand for a thousand; shall I lose 
The priviledge of my sex, which is my Will 
To yield a Reason like a man? (The Very Woman, sig. O1v) 
 
In kneeling to Anthynus, Bertha submits her female wilfulness to the control of 
masculine reason.  However, in this conservative image is a covert suggestion that 
any monarch behaving wilfully is behaving in a less than masculine fashion.  This 
connection between irrational womanly wilfulness and arbitrary absolutism is 
emphasised in Massinger’s play in the lines following those quoted above: 
 
Or [shall] you 
Deny your Sister that which all true women 
Claim as their first prerogative, which Nature 
Gave to them for a law? and should I break it 
I were no more a woman.  (A Very Woman, sigs. O1v-O2r). 
 
This privilege to act wilfully, Almira asserts, is the only law that a woman need 
follow.  A man, the passage suggests, should not act in the same way; reason is the 
law a man should follow. Her claim to be allowed, by nature, to act wilfully because 
she is a woman is couched in the language of prerogative and privilege, connecting 
her with absolutist claims for the unlimited exercise of the royal prerogative.
44
  In 
The Queenes Exchange such claims are set against a discourse of common law 
                                                
43
 In terms of her position as monarch her gender is irrelevant. This is emphasised in Jeffrey’s bawdy 
joke when he is told that the King’s future bride is ‘the bravest Woman’: 
 
 Take heed o’that, woman did you say? Take heed, I 
 Give you warning. No man must know she is a woman 
 But the King himself.  But a brave Queen she is they say. (Queenes Exchange, sig. C2v) 
44 The Very Woman was performed by the King’s Men at the Blackfriars theatre. As The Queenes 
Exchange was also a King’s Men play it is possible that both plays were performed at Blackfriars, 
and along with Brome’s The Queen and Concubine, suggest a sustained engagement with ideas of 
reason, masculinity and wilful behaviour in the audiences for which the King’s Men performed at 
that theatre.   
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which claims that the common law is ‘nothing else but reason’.
45
  Bertha’s kneeling 
to Anthynus is much more than an enforcement of gender roles and stereotypes: it 
emphasises the rational nature of customary law and suggests that will and 
prerogative should be subject to this kind of reason. 
 
It is, however, made clear in Anthynus’ physical raising of the Queen that 
rule by the established customs and law of the kingdom will not diminish her status, 
rather it will maintain her position, if not raise her higher.  It is perhaps significant 
in this respect that Anthynus and Osriik look almost identical: there is, to the 
uninformed observer, no apparent difference in Bertha’s position in marrying one or 
the other man, adopting one or the other position regarding law; her status looks the 
same.  The dramatic motif of mistaken identity allows the adoption of the common 
law as the best method of government without suggesting a decrease in the 
monarch’s powerful image.  That Bertha and Osriik’s pardons are necessary for all 
those who acted against their will, or without their authority, in order to bring about 
a satisfactory resolution to the play, also emphasises that the Queen remains 
sovereign in her country, despite her acceptance of custom and law.  There is not a 
radical change in the ways Bertha governs; the marriage of the Queen to her subject 
(and her country’s law) maintains the ancient constitution of the Saxon kingdom. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
45
 Coke, 1629, 97b; Finch, 1627, 75. See also Davies, 1615, 4; Doddridge, 1631, 194; and Noy, 
1642, sig. B1r. 
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Inverting law and authority: The Antipodes  
 
 Whilst The Queenes Exchange pays sustained attention to contemporary 
arguments for the superiority of common law in the ancient constitution, and 
suggests the union, if not a complete submission, of the monarch to the law, 
Brome’s The Antipodes deals more obliquely, but no less critically, with the notions 
of conquest, custom, reason and madness in relation to legal authority explored in 
that play.  The play presents a young man, Peregrine, who has been taken to London 
by his family to see Doctor Hughball because his overwhelming desire to travel has 
made him mad. Hughball and Letoy stage a play in which the doctor pretends to 
take Peregrine to Anti-London, where all things are supposedly opposite to London 
in order to cure him.  However, the ‘fantasy of travel is in the end a means of 
reinterpreting one’s own place and space’ (Sanders, 1999b, 142), and Anti-London 
provides a means to explore issues connected with contemporary London, and it is 
primarily on this play-within-the-play that this section will focus. Through the 
theatrical device of the play-within-the-play the notions of custom, reason, and law 
already established are explored simultaneously in familial and political, domestic 
and foreign spheres, with the on stage audience being at once part of and 
commentators on this exploration.   
 
 Although Joyless attributes his son’s madness to reading too many travel 
narratives and an intemperate desire to travel, it is not only this which has sent 
Peregrine mad; it is because his desire to travel has been frustrated by his father’s 
seemingly arbitrary decision not to let him go: 
 
 When he grew up towards twenty, 
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 His minde was all on fire to be abroad; 
 Nothing but travaile was all his aime; 
 […]  His mother and 
 My selfe oppos’d him still in all, and strongly  
Against his will, still held him in; and wonne 
 Him into marriage; hoping that would call  
In his extravagant thoughts, but all prevail’d not, 
Nor stayd him (though at home) from travailing 
So farre beyond himselfe, that now too late, 
I wish he had gone abroad to meet his fate. (Antipodes, sig. B3r) 
 
This attempt to cure Peregrine of his sickness through marriage recalls the 
Northumbrian adviser’s attempts to cure Osriik in bringing forward his marriage to 
Bertha.  In this case, though, the effect of the marriage is not to facilitate an 
unwitting but satisfactory end in marrying the monarch to the law, but to bring 
about madness in Peregrine’s wife, Martha:  
 
 Joy[less]: He takes no joy in her; and she no comfort  
In him: for though they have bin three yeeres wed, 
  They are yet ignorant of the marriage bed. 
 
 Doct[or]: I shall finde her the madder of the two of then. 
 
 Joy.: Indeed she’s full of passion, which she utters 
  By the effects, as diversly, as severall 
  Objects reflect upon her wandering fancy. (Antipodes, sig.B3v) 
 
The arbitrary will of the father encourages madness in the son, and in turn the 
madness of the husband provokes madness in the wife.
46
  Analogically, as in 
Osriik’s Northumbria, the sickness at the head of the body politic also affects the 
subjects.   
 
The family are brought to the house of Letoy, a gentleman for whom ‘Stage-
playes, and Masques, are nightly […] pastimes’ (Antipodes, sig. C2r), to witness an 
elaborate play-within-the-play engineered by Letoy and the Doctor, performed by 
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 Joyless himself suffers from the same horn-madness (fear of cuckoldry) that Blaze identifies in his 
neighbours, whom Hughball has also cured. Joyless’s jealousy is later cured when he witnesses the 
attempted seduction (which is later revealed to have been staged too) of his young wife Diana. 
168 
Letoy’s own troop of actors.  Letoy’s fondness for plays leads Hughball to assert, 
‘O y’are the Lord of fancy’.  Whilst this may be an indication of his skill in 
inventing the play, (‘Your fancy and my cure shall be cry’d up / Miraculous’) 
(Antipodes, sig. D2r), ‘fancy’ also connects him with Martha’s ‘wandering fancy’, 
and with arbitrariness and caprice, the latter confirmed at the end of the play when it 
is revealed that his unfounded mistrust of his wife led him to disown his daughter, 
Diana.
47
  Letoy’s response, ‘I’m not ambitious of that title Sir, / No, the Letoy’s are 
of Antiquity, / Ages before the fancyes were begot’ (Antipodes, sig. D2r) can then 
be read as a denial of arbitrariness, claiming that his long lineage precludes any 
possibility of irrationality (one of the arguments for the rationality of common law) 
and as asserting his high social status through his genealogy, as tracing his family 
name back to the Norman Conquest would legitimize his privileged status as part of 
an ancient family in the contemporary socio-political order.
48
  That he has actively 
sought out his claim to this status is clear from an earlier conversation with Blaze 
over Letoy’s ‘Armes and Pedegree’: 
 
Let.:   But has he gone to the root, has he deriv’d me, 
 Ex origine, ab antiquo? Has he fetched me 
 Farre enough Blaze? 
 
Bla.:  Full foure descents beyond 
 The conquest my good Lord, and findes that one 
 Of your French ancestry came in with the conqueror. 
 
Let.: Jefrey Letoy, twas he, from whom the English 
 Letoy’s have our descent; and here have tooke  
Such footing, that we’ll never out while France 
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 OED, ‘fancy’, 4a, 5a, 6 and 7. 
48
 When glossing these lines, Anthony Parr notes that in The Compleat Gentleman (1622, 142), 
Henry Peacham explains that ‘the ancients of our Nobility for the greater part, acknowledge 
themselves to bee descended out of Normandy, and to have come in with the Conquerour, many 
retaining their French names’ (I.ii. notes to lines 7-9).  Letoy’s desire to trace his ancestry may also 
be an appeal to the interests of the gentry in the audience, as Lisa Hopkins notes that ‘the study of 
genealogy, along with that of heraldry, was one of the great crazes of the Jacobean and Caroline 
periods’ (1994, 56). 
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  Is France, and England England, 
  And the Sea passable to transport a fashion. (Antipodes, sig. C1r-v) 
 
Whilst his concern for his heraldry is trivialised by the emphasis on his family 
importing fashion from France, particularly as Letoy himself dresses ‘more like a 
pedlar, / Then like a Lord’ (Antipodes, sig. C1v), this may be a comment on the 
importation of French fashions at the Caroline court because of the Queen’s 
influence.  There is, potentially, an underlying concern here that France may not be 
as separate from England in fashion or governance as ‘France / Is France, and 
England England’ ought to suggest. 
 
 It is in this context of madness, conquest and antiquity that the play-within-
the-play is produced.  In order to cure Peregrine’s travel madness, Hughball 
pretends to have taken him to the Antipodes where: 
 
The people through the whole world of Antipodes, 
In outward feature, language, and religion, 
Resemble those to whom they are supposite. 
They under Spaine appeare like Spaniards, 
 Under France French-men, under England English 
To the exterior shew: but in their manners, 
Their carriage, and condition of life 
Extreamly contrary.  (Antipodes, sig.C4r) 
 
During Peregrine’s travels in Anti-London, he and the on stage audience are told of, 
and witness, many of these contrary practices, most of which concern issues of law, 
authority and governance:  sergeants running away from a gentleman who wants to 
be arrested, wives ruling their husbands, servants governing their masters/mistresses 
and children instructing their parents.  The interjections of Peregrine’s observing 
family, particularly Diana, commenting on the differences between anti-London and 
its English counterpart serve, in part, to highlight the points of similarity as well as 
the differences (Butler, 1984, 215).   
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The first thing Hughball tells him about the Antipodes is that although in 
London ‘the Magistrates / Governe the people: there the people rule / The 
Magistrates’ (Antipodes, sig. C4r), suggesting that the focus of this play-within-the 
play will be issues of governance.  In a domestic version of such issues, Peregrine 
witnesses a conversation between the gentleman, his wife and her serving-woman, 
in which the Lady, endorsing Antipodean practices, instructs her husband that he 
must sleep with the merchant’s wife: 
 
La[dy]:  You know your charge, obey it. 
 
[…] 
 
Wom[an]:  What is his charge? or whom must he obey? 
 Good madam with your wilde authority;  
You are his wife, tis true, and therein may 
According to our law, rule, and controwle him. 
But you must know withall, I am your servant, 
And bound by the same law to governe you, 
And be a stay to you in declining age, 
To curbe and qualifie your head-strong will, 
Which otherwise would ruine you[…] 
 
 La.:  Insooth she speaks but reason.  (Antipodes, sig. E3v) 
 
Despite the Lady’s assertion that her instruction is unproblematically clear, the 
servant’s response suggests otherwise.  Associating the Lady’s legitimate authority 
with her ‘head-strong will’ implies an arbitrariness in her commands which 
undermines this authority by making it ‘wilde’, thus leaving her husband in doubt of 
exactly what he is supposed to do.  As ‘The Antipodes presents an anti-London 
which is at once an inverted image of London and an accurate representation of it’ 
(Steggle, 2004, 111), the play here contains a warning about the consequences of 
Charles’ manipulation of law and arbitrary authority (for example, in projectors and 
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the award of monopolies, which are also shown to be Antipodean practices).
49
  If 
law and its representatives are inconsistent or arbitrary, the play suggests here, 
subjects will be left with no clear law to follow.
50
  Moreover, this wilfulness not 
only leads to confusion but to the potential ‘ruine’ of the ruler.  To prevent this, the 
law places the Lady under the influence of her servant, who is bound to ‘curbe and 
qualifie’ her wilfulness.  If this is Anti-London, then London has no check on the 
ruler’s authority and the audience is left to question, given the already suggested 
outcomes of arbitrary action, whether this really should be the case.  That the 
mistress’s ‘head-strong will’ is contrasted with her servant’s ‘reason’ suggests a 
tempering influence over Charles in the common law itself, but there is also the 
possibility that the servants who should be called to stabilise the king’s ‘wilde 
authority’ are members of Parliament, servants of the king in being his subjects, and 
representatives of the law in proposing and debating statutes.   
 
During his visit to the Antipodes, however, Peregrine does not merely watch 
the action, he participates in it, much to the consternation of one of the actors: ‘he 
puts me out, my part is now / To bribe the Constable (Antipodes, sig. H3r).  Finding 
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 Although monopolies had been made illegal by statute in 1624, Charles I and his Attorney General 
had found ways around the legislation in order to raise more money for the King’s coffers, ‘in clear 
violation of the spirit of the law’ (Orgel and Strong, 1973, 64), although particular projects were 
excluded from the condemnation of the 1624 Statute; monopolies held by corporations, and for 
limited periods, inventions were legal (Butler, 1987, 30).  In including monopolies and projectors in 
his vision of anti-London, Brome perhaps illustrates ‘the unfitness and ridiculousness of these 
Projects against the Law’ that Bulstrode Whitelocke noted in the projectors of James Shirley’s 1634 
masque, The Triumph of Peace (Whitelocke quoted in Orgel and Strong, 1973, I, 65).  The 
controversial nature of monopolies under Charles is emphasised by their frequent and often 
ridiculous representation in drama of the period.  Richard Brome’s The Court Begger (licensed 1632) 
presents several projectors and focuses specifically upon one man trying to make his fortune in 
projects.  In Act IV, scene I of Shirley’s The Bird in a Cage, the idea of monopolies is made to look 
ridiculous when Grutti comments that it is a shame Morello cannot have a patent for his new clothes 
(he is punished for his attempts to visit the Princess in the tower by being made to wear his disguise 
of a petticoat for a Month at court). Projectors also come in for criticism under the good rule of 
Pulcheria in Massinger’s The Emperor of the East (see Chapter 2, pp. 104-5). 
50
 The consequences of the separation of royal authority and law, and the confusion over what the 
law actually demands is explored in greater detail in Brome’s The Queen and Concubine. See below. 
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his way into Letoy’s actors’ tiring house, he attacks the stage properties and 
proclaims himself king by conquest: 
 
on the suddaine, with thrice knightly force, 
 And thrice, thrice, puissant arme he snatcheth downe 
 The sword and shield that I playd Bevis with, 
 Rusheth amongst the foresaid properties, 
 Kils Monster, after Monster; takes the Puppets 
 Prisoners, knocks downe the Cyclops, tumbles all 
 Our jigambobs and trinckets to the wall. 
 Spying at last the Crowne and royall Robes 
 Ith upper wardrobe, next to which by chance, 
 The divells visors hung, and their flame painted 
 Skin coates; those he remov’d with greater fury, 
 And having cut the infernall ugly faces, 
 All into mamocks) with a reverend hand, 
 He takes the imperiall diadem and crownes 
 Himselfe King of the Antipodes, and beleeves 
 He has justly gaind the Kingdome by his conquest. (Antipodes, sig. G1v). 
 
Despite the doctor’s previous explanation that the Antipodes is not full of monsters 
and exotic creatures, but of people with contrary customs and manners, Peregrine’s 
‘Mandevile madnesse’ (Antipodes, I4v) leads him to believe that he does really see a 
Cyclops, and his desire to take possession of the ‘imperiall diadem’ emphasises his 
desire to explore and conquer foreign lands prefigured in his talk of Drake, 
‘Candish’ [Cavendish], Hawkins and Frobisher (Antipodes, sig. C3r).
51
  However, 
in light of Letoy’s concerns to assert his name’s pre-Norman Conquest antiquity 
over fancy, and the concern the play-within-the-play has with law and authority, it 
is significant that Peregrine claims kingship through conquest, and in his madness, 
thinks this is just.  Letoy’s comment on this, ‘Let him injoy his fancy’ (G2r), further 
undermines the idea of right to absolute rule through conquest which the 
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 Julie Sanders reads Peregrine’s conquest of the tiring room as a rite of passage in freeing himself 
from his father’s influence: ‘The infantilising prohibitions of his family are swept away in the 
assertive role he assumes as a romance hero in his attack on the stage properties of the actors’ tiring 
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ridiculousness of taking a country through conquest over an army of stage 
properties already calls into question. 
 
Nevertheless, in what his rights and conquest suggest to be an inverted echo 
of The Queenes Exchange, Peregrine sets about ‘to governe / With purpose to 
reduce the manners / Of this country to his owne’ (Antipodes, sig. G2r) through 
imposing his absolute authority on the people of the Antipodes.  His knighting of a 
judge who presides over a trial where only the judge is satisfied by the verdict, 
exclaiming ‘Most admirable Justice’ (Antipodes, sig. G4v) suggests that this is not 
the bringing back of unreasonable government to one of reason and custom which 
would have been promised if Bertha had reduced Osriik’s government to hers.
52
  
The doctor encourages king Peregrine to ‘make discovery of passages / Among the 
people’ in disguise, so he can ‘perceive / What to approve, and what to correct 
among ’hem’ (Antipodes, sig. H1v), and it is during this time that Peregrine begins 
to come to his senses.  Watching the arrest of a gentleman because a woman 
assaulted him, Peregrine intervenes: 
 
Per. Call you this justice? 
 
Doct.  In th’ Antipodes. 
 
Per. Here’s much to be reform’d.  (Antipodes, sig. H3r) 
 
Peregrine’s acknowledgement that this is not justice marks a step in his recovery 
from madness. He frees the gentleman, and begins to order that the lady is taken to 
prison, until the Doctor reminds him, ‘At first shew mercy’ (Antipodes, sig. H3r).  
Hughball’s role as king Peregrine’s chief Officer in the play-within-the-play, and as 
physician for Peregrine’s madness, places him in a position to educate the king in a 
                                                
52 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of this trial. 
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more temperate method of government and the husband in a more temperate way of 
living.   
 
On recognising how much there is to be ‘reform’d’ in the Antipodes, 
Peregrine considers sending for advice:  ‘What if I crav’d a Counsell from New 
England / The old will spare me none’ (Antipodes, sig. I1v).  There may be here a 
direct reference to the absence of parliament from real London (Butler, 1984, 218).  
Old England either cannot spare a ‘Counsell’ for Peregrine because Charles is 
currently ruling without a parliament, or because were one to be called it would be 
needed there. Doctor Hughball’s response, ‘Is this man mad?’ (Antipodes, sig. I1v), 
suggests that his wish to call a parliament is a step towards his recovery from 
arbitrary madness.  His movement away from madness and immediate imposition of 
his absolute power by Conquest is indicated when Peregrine ruefully claims ‘’Twill 
aske long time and study to reduce / Their manners to our government’ (Antipodes, 
sig. H4r) on seeing a man-scold on a ducking stool.  Unlike the earlier suggestion 
that reducing their manners to his own may involve the imposition of his own 
madness on the country, here he not only refers to the extent of the contrary 
behaviour in the country, but calls to mind the long study which Coke claims is 
necessary for a true familiarity with the common law (Coke, 1629, Institutes I, 97b).  
This change will not be a rapid imposition of the will of an arbitrary monarch by 
conquest, but a careful introduction of reason into the activities of the Antipodes. 
 
 The final straw for the new king of the Antipodes, and the indication of 
Peregrine’s return to rationality, comes when he fully understands the arbitrary 
nature of justice and law in his kingdom: 
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 Doe you provide whips, brands; and ordaine death, 
 For men that suffer under fire, or shipwracke, 
 The losse of all their honest gotten wealth: 
 And finde reliefe for Cheaters, Bawdes, and Thieves? 
 I’ll hang ye all. (Antipodes, sig. I3r). 
 
The Antipodeans’ response is given in terms of custom and law: 
 
 Let not our ignorance suffer in your wrath, 
 Before we understand your highnesse Lawes, 
 We went by custome, and the warrant, which  
We had in your late Predecessor’s raigne; 
But let us know your pleasure, you shall finde 
The State and Common-wealth in all obedient, 
To alter Custome, Law, Religion, all, 
To be conformable to your commands. (Antipodes, sig. I3r)  
 
This vocabulary for debating legal positions is now familiar, but here the terms are 
used unexpectedly.  In an inversion of the assertion of the supremacy of customary 
law presented in The Queenes Exchange and contemporary legal tracts, here the 
ridiculousness of the Antipodean’s customs and their willingness to conform to 
Peregrine’s commands invites the audience to accept the imposition of monarchical 
law. That Byplay claims Peregrine’s predecessor had allowed the customs, also jars 
with notions of customary common law existing independently of the monarch.
53
  It 
may be that this too is the Antipodean reverse of how things are in London; 
however, what is significant about Peregrine’s attempt to change the laws in the 
Antipodes is that his laws, in contrast with those of the Antipodeans, will be laws of 
reason, not arbitrary judgements.  His outburst against the irrational customs of the 
Antipodes marks his return to reason from madness. 
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 Parr’s gloss to this line suggests that this is a ‘clear allusion to the reign of James I, when the court 
was a place of licence and excess and was perceived to set a bad example to the country’ (note to 
IV.iv.737-4). 
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 At the end of his journey through the Antipodes, Peregrine is introduced to 
the Antipodean princess, played by the (still mad) Martha, who has been bequeathed 
to him by the late sovereign.  Although he momentarily ‘falls backe againe to 
Mandevile madness’, concerned over marrying the princess in case she is a 
Gadlibrien, Byplay advises him, ‘For the safety of your Kingdome, you must do it’ 
(Antipodes, sig. I4v).  It is possible that this advice makes reference to the idea that 
marriage to the legitimate heir of the kingdom would make his claim to the throne 
less questionable, or that marriage and the production of heirs was necessary to 
maintain political stability.  However, in the domestic and political analogy in 
which Peregrine’s kingly madness affects his subject/wife, his (re)marriage to 
Martha will also cure her of her madness, returning his (English) household to 
correct order.  Peregrine states that he cannot marry the princess because he already 
has a wife at home, and ‘A Crowne secures not an unlawfull marriage’ (Antipodes, 
sig. I4r).  Significantly, Peregrine’s new embrace of reasoned law brings him to 
recognise the limits to his kingly power.  Although Hughball removes this problem 
by claiming that Martha is dead and her spirit now ‘animates this Princesse’ 
(Antipodes, sig. I4r), Peregrine’s objection positions the king, by his own admission, 
as undoubtedly subject to law.  Lawful, productive marriage is not the solution to 
the problem of law and prerogative in this play as it was in The Queenes Exchange; 
rather, it is symbolic of a well-ordered household (political or domestic) where all 
concerned hold their proper place: subject to established rational law. 
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Destabilising legal authority: The Queen and Concubine  
 
Although The Antipodes glances towards the potential for legal confusion 
when authority is not rational, and advocates a return to reasoned government 
subject to law, this play, like The Queenes Exchange, does not explore the 
consequences of irrational rule in any detail beyond the suggestion that 
illness/madness at its head will cause illness in the body politic.  It is with these 
consequences that The Queen and Concubine is concerned.  Developing the 
theatrical representation of absolutism as madness established in The Queenes 
Exchange and presented in The Antipodes, and the image of a choice between a 
representative of law/reason and absolutism/passion as marital partner for the 
monarch, The Queen and Concubine explores the corruption, disharmony and 
confusion which potentially occurs when reason and law are rejected in favour of 
passion and will. 
 
 It is clear almost from the beginning of the play that Gonzago is prone to act 
irrationally and arbitrarily.  His strangely and rapidly conceived jealousy of his 
wife’s commendations of Sforza, a general in his army who has given the king good 
military service, and his consequent change of heart towards Petruccio, a banished 
courtier, leads Horatio to comment on Petruccio’s return to court that: ‘It must be 
so, this is one of his un-to-be-examin’d hastie Humours, one of his starts: these and 
a devillish gift He has in Venerie, are all his faults’ (Queen and Concubine. 
sig.B4r).  Although Horatio makes light of these as Gonzago’s only faults, as the 
play progresses it becomes clear that it is these faults in the king which bring about 
a crisis in government and potential chaos on the country.  This mention of his 
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‘devillish gift in Venerie’ in relation to his rapidly changing humours paves the way 
for his pursuit of Alinda.   
 
 To Lodovico’s questioning of the King’s ‘dotage’ on Alinda, Horatio 
replies: ‘Come, think upon Law and Regal Authoritie. The king’s Power Warrants 
his Acts’ (Queen and Concubine,  sig. C6v).  For Gonzago and Horatio, the king’s 
will is law, enforceable by his power.  Although he makes a show of ruling in 
accordance with legal procedures (Eulalia is tried in a court, albeit a corrupt one) 
and governs in conjunction with a parliament, it is clear that Gonzago exercises an 
absolute authority.  Unlike The Queenes Exchange’s Bertha, of whom we can 
initially think more generously in calling her Lords as council, Gonzago calls his 
parliament to approve his divorce and remarriage only for the sake of appearance: 
 
King: Now to this Censure, for due Orders sake. 
  And for which end this Parliament was call’d;  
  Your Voyces are requir’d: do ye all approve it? 
 
Omnes:  We do. 
 
Lodovico:  We must. 
 
King: What say you, Lodovico? 
 
Lodovico:  We do; Heaven knows against my heart. 
 
Eulalia:  My thanks unto you all, that do obey 
 So well with one consent your Soveraign Lord.  
(Queen and Concubine, sigs. C4r-C4v) 
 
 Gonzago’s assertion that parliament was called for ‘due Orders sake’ suggests 
something of his own aversion to sharing any judicial power; however, it also serves 
to highlight Gonzago’s undermining of order even whilst he claims to uphold it.  
This is an early indication that arbitrary royal action undermines the stability of 
legal authority, an idea which becomes increasingly evident later in the play.  That 
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Lodovico feels compelled to condemn Eulalia here, however reluctantly, is clear 
from his ‘we must’ set against the easy ‘we do’ of the other courtiers.  One of the 
reasons he must condemn her is that she has been found guilty of adultery in a court 
of law, albeit through perjured witnesses and falsified evidence engineered by 
Flavello and Alinda, once again suggesting the manipulation and undermining of 
legal processes by arbitrary rule.  Flavello describes the trial to Alinda before it is 
shown on stage, and the theatre audience (who now know about their bribing of 
witnesses) watches it only in dumb show, emphasising that in this trial justice is 
only seen to be done; what is said and what is true is irrelevant.    For this 
parliament, too, what is true means very little.  Whatever the lords may think, it is 
clear from Gonzago’s speech regarding his new Queen that Lodovico has no safe 
choice other than to give his assent:    
 
    I your King 
 Am Subject to this all-deserving Lady, 
 And do require you not alone to hear 
 What I can say, but without all denial 
 That you approve, confirm what I will say. 
 … 
 I hope none rates our will or his own life 
 So meanly, as to give least contradiction. (Queen and Concubine, sig. C5r) 
 
The parliament must be seen to approve of the King’s marriage to Alinda, and of 
her coronation.  Gonzago’s vocabulary is commanding (‘I… do require you’), and 
his threat of execution for dissent is apparent.  The emphasis throughout the 
parliament scene is on obedience to, and ratification of, Gonzago’s kingly will.  
However, there is a strange contradiction in his claims to be both able to command 
their obedience and yet be subject to Alinda himself.  This signals his complete 
submission to will and with this, the play suggests, comes a reduction of kingly 
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authority.  Alinda herself describes his ‘raging dotage’ on her as ‘the weakness of 
the King’ (Queen and Concubine, sig.C2r).  
 
 It is not only Gonzago’s complete submission to his passion for Alinda that 
represents arbitrary authority in this play, however; Alinda comes to embody this 
absolute power.  It is Alinda who explicitly asserts the independence of royal 
power, telling her father in response to his objection to her relationship with the 
king that ‘Soveraignty you know, admits no Parentage’ (Queen and Concubine, sig. 
B8r).  Her own ambition, exacerbated by Flavello’s administration of ‘Pills that 
puff’d her up / To an high longing, till she saw the hopes / She had to grow by’ 
(Queen and Concubine, sig. B6v) grows to such an extent that she attempts to bring 
about the realisation of this statement, asking Gonzago to have her father killed 
(‘’twas she that sought his Head’ (sig. H4v)).  This arbitrary cruelty is continued 
when she persuades the king to banish his son, and sends assassins to attempt 
Eulalia’s life in her exile.  That her natural ambition is accelerated by an ‘unnatural’ 
drug also suggests something of the unnaturalness of Alinda’s arbitrariness.  Her 
demands become increasingly cruel and arbitrary, provoking even Horatio, the 
courtier who loves and hates just as the king does (Queen and Concubine, sig. B5v) 
to state, ‘She’s mad beyond all cure’ (H1r) and the king to observe: 
 
 What wild Affections do in women raign! 
 But this is a Passion past all President. 
 O ’tis meer Madness, mix’d with Divellish cunning, 
 To hurl me upon more and endless mischiefes.  
(Queen and Concubine, sig. H1v) 
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This combines the theatrical presentation of wilfulness as being womanly, and of 
arbitrary absolutism with madness.
54
  This madness is beyond even any precedent 
the arbitrary Gonzago has seen, and his reference to ‘Divellish cunning’ emphasises 
the unnaturalness of her behaviour.  In her madness Alinda tried to explain her 
actions, saying, ‘she thought, that being now a Queen, / She might by her 
Prerogative take Heads, / Whose and as many as she listed’, a comment which 
expands on Horatio’s earlier comment that ‘the Kings Power Warrants his Acts 
(Queen and Concubine, sigs. H4v and C6v). As Alinda here, punished by a real 
madness, seeks pardon from what she believes is her father’s ghost, it is clear that 
both statements of unlimited power and prerogative ought to be revised. 
 
 In contrast with Alinda’s unreasonable exercise of prerogative power, 
Eulalia is presented as an idealised image of restraint:  
 
  you know too well the King, 
 How apt his Nature is to fell oppression. 
 The burden of whose crueltie long since, 
 If by the virtuous Clemencie of his Wife 
 It had not been alay’d and mitigated, 
 Had been a general subversion. 
 And now that Peerless Princesse being depos’d, 
 Whose vertue made her famous, and us happy; 
 And he re-married to this shame of women, 
 Whose vileness breeds her envie and our mischief, 
 What can we look for but destruction? (Queen and Concubine, sig. C7v) 
 
The description of Eulalia’s clemency mitigating Gonzago’s cruelty is reminiscent 
of the arguments discussed in Chapter 2 for the need for law to moderate the 
passionate acts of a fallible, human king.  However, a link is also made here 
between Eulalia and established law in the use of the word ‘Clemencie’, which has 
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 Eulalia too is associated with female wilfulness, but her ‘wilfulness’ is in a steadfast obedience to 
Gonzago’s decree despite it being against her. Andrea’s comment ‘but for this wilfulness in her, I 
should not think her a woman’ (Queen and Concubine, sig. E1v) rather than suggesting an 
arbitrariness in her, instead emphasises her more-than-human patience and obedience. 
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been used once before in the play to describe the laws of Sicily which ‘are so well 
rebated / With Clemencie, and mercie’ that they prevent Eulalia’s execution for 
alleged adultery.
55
  However, Eulalia’s clemency has not only prevented Gonzago’s 
cruelty, but also averted a ‘general subversion’, the word associated in The Queenes 
Exchange with the replacement of established customary law with the rule of an 
absolute monarch (Queenes Exchange, sig. B1v).  Here, Eulalia’s compassion, as 
well as her maintenance of due order emphasised later in the play, has prevented 
chaos and potential rebellion against the King.  In sharp contrast with Eulalia’s 
maintenance of order, however, Alinda will prove to be the ‘destruction’ of the 
state.  That Lodovico and Horatio propose the only way to prevent this subversion 
and destruction is Alinda’s death suggests an urgent need to curtail arbitrary 
prerogative rule for the good of the government and the country. 
 
 Eulalia herself, like the Saxon laws of Bertha’s kingdom, and the reason 
restored to Peregrine, is also associated with the health of the body politic.  The 
province of Palermo, which ‘Kings have customarily laid out / For their Queens 
Dowry’ and where lawyers and doctors were never previously needed has been 
struck by ‘foul Infection, Pain and Sorrow’ (Queen and Concubine, sigs. E2v, E2r) 
since the King banished Eulalia.  Although Pedro suggests that this is a punishment 
for them as the people of her province in lieu of the king’s execution of Eulalia, the 
queen herself provides an alternative: ‘Might you not judge as well, it was th’ 
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 Clemency is used again later in the play, also regarding Eulalia’s attitudes to legal judgement:  
 
 Our Shool Mistris doats upon 
 Clemencie, it is fit that we run mad upon crueltie 
 So meeting her in the midst, we shall jump into the Sadle of Justice.  
 
Again, madness is associated with arbitrariness and cruelty.   Somewhere between cruelty and 
clemency, this suggests, lies justice.  However, the scene emphasises Eulalia’s clemency over 
Andrea’s ‘cruelty’, as Poggio worries, comically, that ‘if the Candle of her mercy be not put out, / 
We shall shortly, see more honest men then Knaves among us’ (Queen and Concubine, sig. I2v). 
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injustice and the wrongs the innocent Queen hath suffer’d , that has brought sense 
of her injuries upon her Province?’ (Queen and Concubine, sig. E3v).  With the gift 
of healing that a genius gave her to help sustain her, Eulalia sets about curing the 
illnesses of her people, because, as Lodovico claims, ‘perfect health I think dwells 
only where  / Good Eulalia remains’. Andrea’s repeated complaint ‘I am out of 
joynt… Out a joynt, out a joynt, I am all out a joynt’ (Queen and Concubine, sigs. 
E4r-v) is representative of the state of the country when there is a divorce between 
the king and the law. 
 
 The introduction of Alinda as initially possessing ‘simple Countrey 
Innocence’, Sforza’s concern that the ‘the air of court’ had already ‘infected’ her 
(Q&C., sigs. B4v, B7r) despite her relatively short stay there, and her rapid descent 
into arbitrary madness suggests that this play will present a juxtaposition of court 
and country values, an idea further suggested in Eulalia’s choice to stay in Palermo 
amongst the country rustics and her comparison of her simple life there in 
comparison with that at court (Queen and Concubine, sigs. D6v-D7r).
56
  However, 
the parallel scenes in Sicily and Palermo demonstrate that it is the cause of these 
events and their resolution which are the concerns of the play rather than a 
contrasting ideology of court and country.  
 
 The ‘pettie parliament’ of Palermo provides both a contrast to and a comic 
echo of Gonzago’s pretended parliament to banish the Queen and recognise Alinda: 
 
 Do not I understand the purpose of our meeting 
 Here in our pettie Parliament, if I may so call it? 
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 Butler reads the play’s movement from court to country as a ‘shift to more popular forms of 
government’ and the play’s final country festival as representing a nostalgia for an ‘Elizabethan idea 
of an organic community in which the members participate fully’ (1984, 40 and 39). 
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 Is it nor for a Reformation, to pull down  
The Queens mercy, and set up our Justice? 
For the prevention of a superabundance of Treason 
Dayly practiced against her? (Queen and Concubine, sig. I2v) 
 
The language of ‘reformation’ and justice in this passage also associates the 
‘justice’ of the king and Palermo’s rustics with contemporary affairs at the Caroline 
court, where Charles’ attempts to introduce legal reforms caused some 
controversy.
57
  The parliament is ‘pettie’ in being a less important (that is less 
official) version of Gonzago’s parliament, constituted by men of lesser rank, and in 
being largely ineffective as its decisions are all overturned by the Queen in a 
restoration of order which is juxtaposed with Gonzago’s destruction of it in forcing 
his parliament to assent to the banishment of Eulalia and accept Alinda.
 58
  It seems 
from this speech that their concerns are far from trivial in their care for the safety of 
the Queen, but the express purpose of their meeting – to pull down the Queen’s 
mercy and set up their own justice – is a baldly stated version of what Gonzago 
achieved with his parliament in banishing the Queen and her ‘clemencie’ and 
instituting his and Alinda’s arbitrary judgement.
59
  In a similar way, the ‘pettie 
Parliament’ wish to impose summary execution, without trial or processes of law, 
upon those who attempt Eulalia’s life.  Eulalia makes clear, however, that such an 
action would make the rustics no better, and certainly no less guilty, than her 
attackers; her concern is always for the upkeep of the law: ‘you transgresse / As 
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 In arguing the need to introduce summary justice to prevent treason, the ‘pettie Parliament’ also 
echoes one of the reasons given for Charles’s resort to arbitrary imprisonment without showing 
cause, presented in this play in the imprisonment of Sforza who is told only that he is imprisoned 
because ‘’Tis the Kings pleasure’ (Queen and Concubine, sig. D2r), and reminiscent of the royal 
argument that the knights of the Five Knight’s Case were imprisoned per speciale mandatum domini 
regis (‘by his majesty’s special command’) (See Chapter 1, p.30).  The possibility for abuse of this 
practice is evident in Petruccio’s concern that Sforza’s life may be forfeit to the King’s fury rather 
than his law (Queen and Concubine, sig. D3r). 
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 OED, ‘petty’ adj. and n, 1a and b, 2a. 
59 OED, ‘petty’ adj and n, 2b. 
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much his Laws in spilling of their blood, / As they had done in mine’ (Queen and 
Concubine, sig. F8v).
60
 
 
 In his divorce from Eulalia and his marriage to Alinda, Gonzago moves 
further away from the forms and procedures of established law.  The imprisonment 
and death of Sforza are commanded at the King’s (and Alinda’s) whim, not through 
any legal channels, and the various attempts on Eulalia’s life engineered by Alinda 
and Flavello provide clear examples of the disrespect for law and order at 
Gonzago’s court.  As the play progresses, this divorce of royal authority and law 
destabilises both law and authority.  The king himself comes under threat as the 
soldiers, revolting against Petruccio for the death of Sforza, come to the palace: 
 
  in the late Execution 
 Of Death-doom’d Sforza, which the Souldier 
 (Not looking on [the King’s] justice, but the Feud 
 That was betwixt Petruccio and him) 
 Resents as if it were Petruccio’s Act, 
 Not yours, that cut him off.  (Queen and Concubine, sig. H2v) 
 
The soldiers believe Petruccio’s life should be forfeit for the murder of Sforza, 
despite his royal warrant.  However, when he claims that he disobeyed the king’s 
order, the soldiers accuse him of lying and maintain their claim to his blood, but 
simultaneously offer him to the king’s punishment for disobedience: 
 
 We dare to kill the Hangman of our General, 
 And think it fits our Office best: though you 
 Have Law enough to wave our care and pain,  
 And hang him up your self: for he affirms 
 That he let Sforza live ’gainst your command; 
 And that’s the lie we treat of.  (Queen and Concubine, sig. H3v) 
                                                
60 In this ‘pettie Parliament’ Brome does not necessarily advocate the form of popular government 
suggested by Butler (1984, 40); indeed, in the potential lynching attempted by these countrymen, 
away from Eulalia’s influence and contrary to the law and the King’s command, the play seems to 
condemn, not endorse, popular government without a figure of legitimate authority. 
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The claims of the King, law and justice have been separated and thus undermined to 
such an extent that there is no possibility of justice for Petruccio whether he did or 
did not carry out the king’s command; innocence in a world of arbitrary justice is 
insignificant.  Although the soldiers do not believe his claims of innocence, his 
admission of disobedience gives the king ‘Law enough’, that is, sufficient evidence 
whatever the truth of the matter, to punish him for his action.  The confusion that 
accompanies the soldiers’ demands is indicative of the potential chaos of a State 
without due legal process.  The only way to defuse the situation is for Sforza to 
return, unharmed, to the King’s favour.  This can be achieved in the play because 
Petruccio has deceived Gonzago in Sforza’s death; significantly, this method of 
restoring order requires the reversal of all of the king’s arbitrary judgements on 
Sforza. 
 
 The difficulty of Petruccio’s position and scene of confusion caused by 
arbitrary action is echoed in the concerns of the country rustics that in rescuing 
Eulalia from those Alinda sent to kill her they have fallen foul of an edict ordering 
that no one is to aid the former queen in her banishment:  
 
Poggio:  How?  what have we done?  In relieving her from killing, we are all  
become Traytors. 
 
Lollio: That’s an idle fear: we knew her not, 
Which now we do, we may again reliver her 
  Into their hands, for them to kill her yet: 
  And then there’s no harm done. 
 
Poggio:  So let us give them their swords again; and when they have done  
their work, to make all sure, we’ll hang them for their pains, and so 
keep the Law in our own hands while we have it.  
(Queen and Concubine, sigs. E6r-E6v) 
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The ridiculousness of this situation masks its more serious undertones.  This is one 
of several similar incidents in the play, all of which suggest that the uncertainty 
caused by arbitrary actions leaves subjects in doubt over what is and is not legal.  
That the rustics can logically claim that if they hand the queen over to her killers 
‘then there’s no harm done’, though couched in comedy, is a shocking realisation of 
the chaos that the will of Gonzago and Alinda can bring about, and the need to take 
law into their own hands in order to keep on the right side of it allows the possibility 
that subjects as well as kings can disregard established law.  The comedy of the 
situation, which remains comedy only because Eulalia’s insistence on the due 
process of law prevents a lynching, hides the chaos which would result from the 
countrymen’s arbitrary ‘legal’ decisions.  The ‘destruction’ (Queen and Concubine, 
sig. C7v) Lodovico feared for the court when Eulalia was banished is only kept in 
check in Palermo by her presence.   
 
 It is not only that Eulalia has influence over the rustics, however; more than 
this, they acknowledge her as Queen, a legal authority separate from that of the 
king: 
 
 Alphonso:  Your selves are Traytors 
  In succouring ’gainst the Law, a dissolute woman 
  Whom I command you, in the Kings high name 
  To yield into my hands: 
 
Lollio, Poggio, Andrea: You shall be hang’d first. 
 
Alphonso:  By whose Authority? 
 
Lollio:     By the said womans Sir. 
 She is our Queen and her Authority is in our hands.  
(Queen and Concubine, sig. I3v) 
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Despite the King’s decree that Eulalia should not be aided and that she is no longer 
Queen, she has become, to the rustics of Palermo, the figurehead of an independent 
legal authority, and this authority is held in higher regard than the King’s.  Eulalia 
herself, however, is always obedient to the King and refuses their title of Queen 
(Queen and Concubine, sigs. G3v-G4r), emphasising that it is Gonzago, not Eulalia, 
who is responsible for the rustic’s institution of a separate legal authority through 
his misuse of law, and his embrace (literal and figurative) of arbitrary absolutism in 
Alinda.
61
  Eulalia’s unquestioning and submissive obedience to Gonzago’s will 
throughout the play problematises the division of law and prerogative I am making 
here.  However, her obedience maintains order, and it is this orderliness and her 
associated virtue (set against Alinda’s mad ambition and disorder) which finally 
bring Gonzago to realise his error in divorcing the rightful queen.
62
 
  
 The potential radicalism of the people’s institution of their own legal 
authority is, however, diffused in the audience’s knowledge that Gonzago has 
already (privately) rejected Alinda because of her cruel demands and reinstated 
Eulalia as his Queen.  Unlike the happy resolution of The Queenes Exchange 
brought about by the marriage of the monarch and the common law, and the 
restoration of reason in the reunion of Peregrine and Martha, the reacceptance of 
Eulalia as Queen, and thus the remarriage of royal and legal authority, is not 
sufficient in The Queen and Concubine to bring about a satisfactory resolution.  
Alinda is quite literally brought to her senses and recognises her folly, begging 
                                                
61
 I have taken the image of embracing arbitrary rule in Alinda from Butler (1984, 36). 
62
 Catherine Shaw argues that the play’s main concern is the exploration of virtue, contrasting 
Alinda’s corruption with Eulalia’s ‘inviolate’ virtue. Like Butler, she suggests the movement from 
court to country is restorative: ‘The action moves from the court world dominated by fortune and the 
desire for material growth and social advancement to a green world dominated by nature and the 
desire for spiritual growth and moral advancement’ (1980, 102, 100), but this fails to take into 
account the dubious legal manoeuvrings of the ‘pettie parliament’ discussed above. 
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pardon from her father, the King, the Queen and the Prince before asking to be 
allowed to retire to a convent ‘To spend this life in Tears for [her] amiss’ (Queen 
and Concubine, sig. K1r).  Importantly, Gonzago, too, having recognised his errors, 
is to leave the political arena and retire to a monastery, leaving the kingdom to the 
Prince’s government:   
 
King: So haste we to Nicosia, where (my Son) 
  In lieu of former wrongs, Ile yield thee up my Crown and  
Kingdom. 
  Your vertuous mother (whom may you for ever 
  Honour for her pietie) with these true 
  Statesmen, will enable you to govern well. 
 
Horatio:  Who makes a doubt of that?  (Queen and Concubine, sig. K1r) 
 
Arbitrary rule must not only be recognised as inappropriate, and even dangerous to 
the stability of the state, it must be entirely removed from the political sphere.  That 
Gonzago emphasises to his son that ruling in conjunction with his mother will 
enable him ‘to govern well’ highlights the importance of law and order for good 
governance, and implies that his government with Alinda, and without Eulalia, has 
not been good.  Horatio’s comment here on the future good government of Sicily is 
consistent with his characteristic agreement with the king; throughout the play he 
has, in a ridiculous caricature of the sycophantic courtiers of Bertha’s court, done 
the King ‘that service, just to love / Or hate as the King does’ (Queen and 
Concubine, sig. B5v).  Nevertheless, this statement reinforces Gonzago’s 
acknowledgement of the need for rule by established law and due order, suggested 
in his praise of Eulalia’s piety.  However, Horatio’s rhetorical question also invites 
the audience to pass judgement on the legal politics which have been presented to 
them in the course of the play.  There is very little basis for disagreement.  
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Conclusion 
 
The recurrent motif of the royal marriage in these dramatised debates over 
prerogative and law, places significant emphasis upon the necessary union of both 
forms of legal authority if stable, harmonious government and a sense of justice is 
to be maintained.  However, this unity is fragile, and easily undermined.  The 
resolution of The Queenes Exchange, like The Guardian discussed in the previous 
chapter, is haunted by the possibility of Osriik’s continued arbitrary government, 
and Bertha’s sovereign authority will remain dominant, despite her acceptance of 
common law in her marriage to Anthynus.  Peregrine’s (re-)marriage to Martha (and 
Joyless’s acceptance of his chaste wife) marks the return of both the ruler and the 
ruled to reason, and the royal Peregrine’s acknowledgement that his position does 
not allow him to act above the law suggests that for health to be restored to the body 
politic, monarchy must be subject to law.  This is advocated, too, in The Queen and 
Concubine in the hopeful image of the future government of Sicily, in which the 
Prince will replace his father, and remain subject to the guidance of his mother, 
Eulalia; monarchical will is subject to an established, independent legal authority. 
 
The movement towards the subjection of monarchical authority to law is set 
alongside the disintegration of reason into madness, which is representative of, and 
brought on by, the unrestrained exercise of prerogative powers. Attempts to 
manipulate the law are shown to be acts of madness, literally in Offa and Alinda, 
fictionally in the Antipodes, but also metaphorically, as such actions destabilise the 
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State, threatening both the monarch and the commonwealth.  This association of 
intemperate monarchical will with madness in the theatre coincides with an 
increased emphasis in the contemporary politico-legal arena upon the reason of the 
law, both inherent in law itself and in the cumulative wisdom of the lawyers, set 
against the potentially arbitrary judgements of absolute monarchy.   The wise and 
reasonable thing for a king to do, these plays suggest, is to uphold the ordering 
power of established law above the prerogative.  Whilst the dramatic confines of the 
theatre, and the generic boundaries of tragi-comedy and comedy, allow the 
exploration of the destabilising effects of absolutism without real consequences, the 
political arena does not.  The only means to maintain a stable, just government is to 
subordinate royal authority to the power of an independent established law.   
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Chapter 4 
 
Decentralising Legal Authority:  
From the centre to the provinces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positions of legal authority in the localities fell to men from a variety of 
social strata, from the local petty constable (often a man of humble background) to 
the Justices of Peace (local landowners or gentry) to the Lords Lieutenant (usually 
titled men).
1
  Such figures were responsible for the enforcement of central law and 
policy in their area, and were officially the representatives of central authority in 
delivering justice.  The responsibilities of local authority figures were wide-ranging, 
and will be summarised, along with the structures and hierarchies of authority that 
led from the centre to the provinces, in the first section of this chapter.  Justices of 
Peace: 
 
be called Justices (of the peace) because they be Judges of Record; and 
withal to put them in minde (by their name) that they are to doe justice 
(which is, to yeeld to every man in his owne by even portions, and according 
to the Lawes, Customes, and Statutes of this Realme,) without respect of 
person. 
                                                
1
 Indeed, Keith Wrightson suggests that petty constables, at least, were often poor men pressed to 
take the position because villagers were notoriously reluctant to accept the responsibility (Wrightson, 
1980, 26).  For a detailed discussion of the selection, responsibilities and activities of village 
constables, see Joan Kent (1986); Thomas Cogswell (1998) provides a discussion of the position and 
activities of the Earl of Huntingdon, Lord Lieutenant of Leicestershire.  For a more general 
discussion of the power and position of Lords Lieutenant, and their relationship with local sheriffs 
and justices, see Victor Stater (1994, especially the introduction and chapters 1 and 2). 
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They are named also Commissioners (of the peace) because they 
have their authority by the Kings Commission (Dalton, 1635, 7). 
 
Appointed by the king through the Privy Council, Justices were the main 
representatives of central authority in the localities, and, I will argue in a reading of 
Brome’s The Weeding of Covent Garden (1632), on the Caroline stage.  However, 
figures of local authority were also involved much more in the negotiation and 
mediation of central law, than in its direct enforcement; Justices of Peace and, 
particularly, constables walked a precarious line between following their 
instructions from higher authorities, and maintaining peace and their place in local 
society.  As Keith Wrightson argues: 
 
The order of the village community could survive occasional drunkenness, 
erratic church attendance, profane language, neglect of the licensing and 
apprenticeship laws.  It was more likely to be disturbed by the enforcement 
of the host of penal laws which might excite new conflicts and drain, in 
fines, its resources. What really mattered was the maintenance of specific, 
local, personal relationships, not conformity to impersonal law (Wrightson, 
1980, 25). 
 
The division of central legislation and local government into two separate concepts 
of order that this implies suggests a negotiation of law enforcement in the localities 
which took into account not only the relationship of the ‘offender’ to the law, but 
also of the official to the law and to the community.  Such complexities of local 
authority will be explored here with regard to Ben Jonson’s A Tale of a Tub (1633).  
Finally, it will argue that increased attempts to centralise legal authority in the 
provinces, in parallel with Charles I’s exercise of prerogative rule at the centre, 
emphasised the divisions between concepts of central and local legal governance, 
and brought about, Brome’s A Joviall Crew (1641) suggests, a fragmentation of 
law, government and society.   
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From the Centre to the Provinces 
 
 Aside from the Lord Lieutenants whose main responsibility was military 
(although they occasionally, as a figure of high local standing, attempted to resolve 
disputes amongst their neighbours), the Justice of the Peace was the most prominent 
figure of permanent judicial authority in many regions in the Caroline period.
2
  
Justices were appointed by the Privy Council, served indefinitely, and could only be 
removed from office at the King’s will.  They reported their activities to the Judges 
of Assize, who in turn reported to the Privy Council on the Justices. However, this 
system of monitoring was not all one way; the local justices, Kevin Sharpe notes, 
were also encouraged to report back to the Council on the activities of the Judges 
whilst in their area (Sharpe, 1992, 435).   The hierarchy of justice figures was not 
for monitoring purposes only, however; it also acted as a chain of communication: 
the King gave his address in Star Chamber to the Assize Judges, who then passed on 
new (or emphasised) issues of policy to the local justices on their circuit.     
 
 The Justices of Peace in each county met every three months for the quarter 
sessions, the main forum for local justice.
3
  Some justices, however, chose to meet 
more often in ‘petty sessions’ in order to deal with pressing county business, or to 
reduce the workload for the quarter sessions.  These petty sessions were initially set 
up on an informal basis but the Book of Orders of 1631, which sought to increase 
                                                
2
 Stater suggests that the responsibilities of the Lords Lieutenant increased throughout the early 
Stuart period, and that this was a reflection of the ad hoc nature of early Stuart government (Stater, 
1994, 26).  J. A. Sharpe notes that ‘arbitration through friends, respected members of the community, 
the local clergyman, or even through the intercession of justices of the peace, must have kept many 
disputes and differences from entering the courts’ (Sharpe, 1980, 112). 
3 Much of this paragraph is based upon Sharpe, 1992, 430-438.  See also Fletcher, 1986, passim.  
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officials’ co-operation and impose a greater order upon local governance, ordered 
the institution of regular monthly petty sessions: 
 
 Orders 1. 
That the Justices of Peace of every Shire within the Realme doe divide 
themselves, and allot amongst themselves what Justices of the peace, and 
what Hundreds [a division of land in the county] shall attend monethly at 
some certain places of the Shire.  And at this day and place, the High 
Constables, petty Constables, and Churchwardens, and Overseers for the 
poore of those Hundreds, shall attend the said Justices. And there inquirie 
shall be made, and Information taken by the Justices, how every of these 
Officers in their severall places have done their duties in Execution of the 
Lawes mentioned in the Commission annexed, and what persons have 
offended against any of the said Lawes. (Charles I, 1630, sigs. E4r-E4v) 
 
Those officers who had neglected their duties were to be punished, and note taken 
of this, along with any fines levied and how these had been spent.  Details were then 
to be sent quarterly in a written report to the High Sheriff of the County, for him to 
report back to the Privy Council. The extent to which this order was carried out 
varied from county to county.
4
 
   
 Despite the importance of their position in law enforcement, local 
governance and county welfare, Justices of the Peace received no formal training.  
However, there were some ‘handbooks’ for Justices, which laid out their 
responsibilities and the statutes for their enforcement.  William Lambarde’s 
Eirenarcha (first published in 1581) and Michael Dalton’s The Countrey Justice 
(first published 1618) presented the statutes pertinent to their office, and justices’ 
jurisdiction with respect to felony, larceny, theft, and the raising of hue and cry.  
Apart from their expected judicial responsibilities, however, The Countrey Justice 
showed that justices were also responsible for determining paternity, poor relief and 
                                                
4
 A J Fletcher argues that the implementation of any central authority directives in the counties 
varied from place to place and official to official (1986, passim). 
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road maintenance.  The popularity of such manuals is attested by the fact that by 
1620, Eirenarcha had reached its twelfth edition (Sharpe, 1992, 431n.217), and The 
Countrey Justice was reprinted for the fifth time in 1635.  The anonymous The 
Complete Justice A Compendium of the particulars incident to Justices of the 
Peace, either in Sessions or out of Sessions (1637), containing not only information 
from the statutes, resolutions of judges and approved authorities, but also references 
to the relevant passages of Dalton’s and Lambarde’s works, suggests the authority 
these volumes carried.   
 
Primarily, Dalton stated, the justices were commissioned by the King to 
keep his peace: 
 
The conservation of this peace (and therein the care of the Justice of Peace) 
consisteth in three things, viz. 
1. In preventing the breach of the Peace, (wisely foreseeing and 
repressing the beginnings thereof) by taking surety for the keeping of it, or 
for the good behaviour of the offenders, as the case shall require. 
2.  In pacifying such as are in breaking of the peace[…] 
3. In punishing (according to Law) such as have broken the peace. 
But of the three, the first, the preventing Justice, is most worthy to be 
commended to the care of the Justices of Peace. (Dalton, 1635, 10) 
 
Before stating the Justices’ responsibilities, however, Dalton also notes that: 
 
Justice may be perverted in many wayes, (if [the justices] shall not arme 
themselves with the feare of God, the love of Truth and Justice, and with the 
authority and knowledge of the Lawes and Statutes of this Realme).  
       (Dalton, 1635, 7) 
 
These are, he says: fear of ‘the power or countenance of another’; attempts to favour 
friends or family; hatred of one party or another; expectation of a gift, fee or reward; 
‘Perturbation of minde; as anger, or such like passion’; ignorance of knowing what 
should be done; ‘presumption’ (when a justice acts on their own will without law or 
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warrant); ‘Delay; which in effect is a denying of justice’, and ‘precipitation’ (rash 
actions without due examination) (Dalton, 1637, 7). 
 
 Justices of Peace, however, were not the only law enforcement officials.  
Amongst their responsibilities was that of appointing High Constables (two in each 
Hundred), who were assisted by Petty Constables.  Of the local officials, the High 
and Petty Constables were most integrated into the society they served, and were 
mostly yeomanry / farmers and ordinary men like husbandmen or shopkeepers 
respectively.  They were more engaged in the everyday life of their local 
community, and as such faced a more complex negotiation between their 
responsibilities and life in their community than the justices, and indeed are the 
primary focus of Wrightson’s essay ‘Two Concepts of Order’ quoted above.  They 
were responsible for effecting hue and cry (rousing the local people to search for 
criminals), collecting taxes / loans, making presentments to the assembled justices 
at petty and quarter sessions, and escorting those who were summoned to appear 
before the sessions.  In this way, it was they, not the justices, who were directly 
responsible for reporting their friends, family and neighbours’ misdemeanours.  
Unlike Justices, they were not protected by a high social status, nor were they 
appointed by the king’s Privy Council.  Constables usually held their position only 
for twelve months, after which they had to go back to their everyday lives in the 
same community, facing any repercussions from their neighbours, without what 
little protection their post had previously offered.
5
  That they had to live in the 
community, and thus with the consequences of their actions, must have held 
substantial influence over the decisions made by all local officials, but this does not 
                                                
5
 For a detailed discussion of position of constables, see Wrightson, 1980; Sharpe, 1980, and Kent, 
1986.  The same problems arose for ship money sheriffs (Lake, 1981, 57). 
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necessarily imply widespread corruption (although figures such as the constables 
and clerks of Brome’s The Northern Lasse and Thomas Nabbes’ Covent Garden 
suggest a perceived undercurrent of dishonesty amongst local lawmen).  The 
increased demands upon constables brought about by the Book of Orders and ship 
money collection in the 1630s exacerbated the constables’ problems, making 
recruitment to the post more difficult.  Justices were forced to appoint men from a 
broader base of lower status men and new families (Sharpe, 1992, 439), and these 
men would inevitably carry less natural authority than those of locally established 
families or men of higher status. 
 
The collection of the forced loan (1626) and ship money (during the 1630s) 
not only tested the constables and those above them in the chain of local 
governance, but also highlighted the tensions between the priorities of local and 
central authorities.
6
  Charles’ attempts to raise these extra parliamentary monies 
were met with some resistance, in part because of their dubious legality (extra 
parliamentary taxation was illegal) – there were those who refused to collect or pay 
their allotted amount for this reason – and in part because those commissioned to 
collect the money chose to do what was best for the financial well-being of their 
local community.
7
   Ship money sheriffs with responsibility only for the collection 
of such funds were appointed in the localities, and although this ‘constituted a 
decision to bypass the usual hierarchies of county government’ (Lake, 1981, 59), it 
                                                
6 For a detailed discussion of the introduction, enforcement and implications of the Forced Loan, see 
Richard Cust’s The Forced Loan and English Politics 1626-1628 (1987, passim).  For more detail on 
ship money, see Sharpe, 1992, 567-598; Peter Lake’s discussion of Cheshire ship money provides a 
close focus upon the different methods of the individuals involved in its collection, and of their 
communication with the Privy Council (1981, passim). 
7
 Lords Lieutenant who displeased the King over the forced loan temporarily lost their position 
(Stater, 1994, 17), and Fletcher states that some country justices were also dismissed for opposition 
to ship money (Fletcher, 1986, 10). Sharpe, however, argues that there is little evidence to support 
this statement (Sharpe, 1992, 436). 
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did not sidestep the clash of local and national interests present in local officials: 
some managed to assert the rights and concerns of their community with regard to 
ship money assessments, whilst also appearing loyal to the King and Privy Council.
8
  
The Privy Council, too, exploited the dual loyalties (and personal concerns) of the 
ship money sheriffs, who were financially responsible for any shortfall in the 
collection in their year of office: 
 
[T]hey were not only playing on his sense of obligation to the King’s service 
(and his fear of the practical consequences of any failure on his part) but 
were also exploiting his sense of obligation towards his own county.  Left 
with no choice but to administer the writ the sheriff could be relied on to 
minimize its effects in the local context.  After all he had to live there after 
his year in office (Lake, 1981, 57). 
 
The localism that could be detrimental to central authority’s will here was turned to 
its advantage.    
 
The disadvantage of bypassing the usual county hierarchy in such a way, 
however, was that it allowed the direct questioning of the royal prerogative, in the 
authority given by the king to the sheriffs.  Unlike the Justices of Peace, who were 
given authority by the king to uphold and provide justice within common and 
statute law, ship money sheriffs acted only with the authority of the King’s 
prerogative, making them ‘a direct link[…] through which the unalloyed power of 
the King’s prerogative was to be brought to the locality’ (Lake, 1981, 59).
9
  The 
extent of the King’s prerogative was, in this case, not a matter for debate amongst 
lawyers, parliament and the king in the way that passing the Petition of Right had 
                                                
8
 See Peter Lake’s discussion of the sheriffs involved in the collection of ship money in Cheshire 
(1981, passim, especially 45-50). 
9
 By contrast with the sheriffs, Richard Cust and Peter Lake argue that the institutions of local 
government were seen primarily as representatives of parliamentary authority in the localities in their 
discussion of the ideals and ideologies espoused by Sir Richard Grosvenor, chief justice of the peace 
in Cheshire (Cust and Lake, 1981, 45). 
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been, but a matter that affected all subjects in the localities directly and financially.  
Their reaction to the sheriffs’ authority could then be seen as a reaction to the 
prerogative, and thus Peter Lake argues, ‘it was not possible to react against ship 
money without also raising a whole series of questions about the nature and limits 
of the King’s authority’ (Lake, 1981, 61).  If people were unco-operative with the 
sheriff, they were disobedient to the King.  In attempting to bypass the chain of 
local authority in the provinces, ship money and its sheriffs created a fissure in the 
presentation of royal authority by subjecting it to the mediation of individuals’ 
capabilities and influence.  
 
The enforcement of law and royal policy, then, depended upon the influence, 
charisma and efficiency of the local authority figure(s), and upon the co-operation 
of the local people.  Although Caroline local officials were not always 
representatives of the king’s prerogative (as in the case of the ship money sheriffs) 
they were always representatives of the king’s judicial authority.  The next section 
will discuss this representation of central authority in The Weeding of Covent 
Garden. 
 
 
Central authority: The Weeding of Covent Garden 
 
 Brome’s The Weeding of Covent Garden presents several figures of 
authority: the local Justice (Cockbrayne), two fathers (Croswill and Rooksbill) and 
the Captain of a band of youths called the Philoblathici (Driblow).  The parallel 
positions these men hold might suggest a proliferation of authorities in the play; 
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indeed, Butler has argued that ‘Brome’s Covent Garden is full of law of all 
varieties, but order and authority there is none’ (Butler, 1984, 157).  In what follows 
I would like to argue that, whilst the play does present a variety of potential 
authorities, ultimately, the legal authority in this play resides in the single figure of 
the Justice of the Peace, suggesting a single, unified focus of legitimate legal 
authority. 
  
 Cockbrayne is a particularly proactive local official, who takes his 
responsibilities very seriously, reminding himself of his duties regarding bawdy 
houses and prostitutes (‘I guess what she is, what ere I have said. O Justice look to 
thine office’ (The Weeding of the Covent-Garden, sig. B5r)), and actively seeking 
out wrong doers to punish in order to rid Covent Garden of its ‘weeds’, suggesting a   
concern that the newly built houses are filled by appropriate people.
10
  Cockbrayne 
compliments Rooksbill, a developer of Covent Garden, on the state of the building, 
saying ‘All, all as’t should be!’.  Rooksbill’s response, ‘If all were as well tenanted 
and inhabited by worthy persons’, leads the justice to a lengthy discussion of the 
progress of all new developments: 
 
Cockbrayne: Phew; that will follow.  What new Plantation was ever peopled 
with the better sort at first; nay commonly the lewdest blades, and naughty-
packs are either necessitated to ’hem, or else do prove the most forward 
venturers[…]  And do not weeds creep up first in all Gardens? and why not 
then in this? [...] And for the weeds in it, let me alone for the weeding of 
them out. And so as my Reverend Ancestor Justice Adam Overdoe, was 
wont to say, In Heavens name and the Kings, and for the good of the 
Common-wealth I will go about it. 
 
Rooksbill: I would a few more of the Worshipful here-abouts (whether they 
be in Commission or not) were as well minded that way as you are Sir; we 
should then have all sweet and clean, and that quickly too. (Weeding, sigs. 
B1v-B2r) 
                                                
10 Hereafter The Weeding of Covent Garden will be abbreviated in references to Weeding.   
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Here, Cockbrayne’s declaration that he acts in heaven’s name, and the king’s and 
for the good of the common wealth justifies his actions through all possible 
authorities from the highest seat of justice (heaven), through the king to the people, 
and his earlier decision to actively seek out criminals suggests something of the 
demands of central authority in the Book of Orders for an increased efficiency in its 
local officials.  In this statement, he also claims heritage in Jonson’s Jacobean 
justice, Adam Overdo (Bartholomew Fayre) and like Overdo, his officiousness will 
do him little good.  This heritage also hints towards the way Cockbrayne intends to 
weed Covent Garden: in disguise.  His comparison between the development of 
Covent Garden and colonial expansion (‘new Plantation’) is significant as a 
comment upon the expansion of London into greenfield areas on its outskirts.
11
 At 
the time, there were royal proclamations against further building around London, 
except for on existing foundations (Sanders, 1999a, 51), and the Earl of Bedford had 
to petition the king in order to build at Covent Garden. In January 1630/31 the king 
instructed the Attorney General to prepare a licence for Bedford, and a pardon for 
any offence committed against royal proclamations against building (Brett-James, 
1935, 169).  However, if central authority was against any further expansion of 
London, this does not fully explain the colonial analogy.  The explanation lies, I 
suggest, in the intended market for the houses, to which Rooksbill hints in his wish 
for ‘worthy persons’ and Cockbrayne refers in his compliments on the building:  ‘I 
Marry Sir! This is something like!  These appear like Buildings! Here’s 
Architecture exprest indeed!  It is a most sightly scituation, and fit for Gentry and 
                                                
11
 Matthew Steggle notes that until the earl of Bedford commissioned its redevelopment for housing 
in 1631, Covent Garden had been a greenfield area (2004, 47).  Julia Merritt discusses the layout of 
the Covent Garden development, suggesting it was designed to exclude the undesireable poor ‘by 
eliminating the types of areas in which the poor traditionally congregated’ (2005, 196-199, quotation 
at 197).  For early seventeenth century testimony regarding the movement of undesirables to colonies 
before more respectable gentlemen, see Miller (1990, 357). 
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Nobility’ (Weeding, sig. B1r).  Martin Butler states that ‘[t]he square was designed 
deliberately as an area of fashionable housing’ and ‘Covent Garden[…] was the 
newest and most prominent example of the gentry’s foothold in London’ (Butler, 
1984,147).  The country gentry, then, are ‘colonising’ London.  Charles sought to 
deal with this with the proclamation of 1632, ‘Commaunding the gentry to keep 
their Residence at the Mansions in the Country, and forbidding them to make their 
Habitations in London and places adjoining’.  The Weeding of Covent Garden’s 
Crosswill, however, has contrary ideas: ‘He has had an aime these dozen years to 
live in town here but never was fully bent on’t until the Proclamation of restraint 
spurr’d him up’ (Weeding, sig. C2r).  He has, however, found a way to circumvent 
the proclamation; he has ‘sold all [his] land to live upon [his] money in Town here, 
out of danger of the Statute’ (Weeding, sig. F5v).  His deliberate crossing of the 
proclamation is representative of Crosswill’s intentionally contradictory attitude.   
 
 Crosswill sees his authority as the ability to act utterly arbitrarily and 
embodies the extreme of untempered will.  The dramatic convention and the 
patriarchal political theory which equates fathers with kings, suggests that he should 
be seen as a representation of the king’s authority.
12
  Julie Sanders makes this point 
particularly succinctly, arguing that in The Weeding of Covent Garden and other 
such plays: ‘the space of the family is used as a means for exploring the wider 
problems of the monarch-father’s relationship with his children-subjects in the body 
politic or wider commonweath’ (Sanders, 1999a, 68).  Crosswill arrives in Covent 
Garden as a potential tenant for Rooksbill’s properties, and when he first appears, 
he is complaining of his children’s behaviour.  Although they behave in ways that 
                                                
12  For a discussion of patriarchalism, see chapter 2, especially pp.76-79.  
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‘other fathers would rejoice at’ (Weeding, sig. B2v), it is not enough that they speak 
of obedience ‘Or that [they] are obedient.  But I will be obeyed in my own way’ 
(Weeding, sig. B2r).  For his daughter, this is choosing her own husband: 
 
But she has a humour, forsooth, since we put your son by her, to make me a 
match-broker, her marriage-Maker; when I tell you friend, there has been so 
many untoward matches of Parents making, that I had sworn she shall make 
her own choice, though it be of one I hate.  Make me her match-maker! 
Must I obey her, or she me, ha? (Weeding, sig. B3v). 
 
Katherine’s refusal to make her own choice is a response to Crosswill and 
Cockbrayne’s sudden and irrational decision to call off her marriage with 
Cockbrayne’s son Anthony.  Crosswill believes his fatherly authority gives him the 
power to do whatever he pleases and exercises this power at every opportunity, and 
in this way embodies the fears of arbitrary action by the king raised by the 
imposition of Charles’ personal rule. Often his arbitrary decisions are merely a test 
of his children’s obedience; yet this backfires, as Crosswill’s arbitrariness raises in 
his children a spirit of opposition and deviousness that would not necessarily have 
arisen if he did not attempt to thwart their plans at every turn:  
 
thou know’st ’tis his custome to crosse me, and the rest of his children in all 
we do, to try and urge his obedience; ’tis an odde way: therefore to help my 
self I seem to covet the things that I hate, and he pulls them from me; and 
make shew of loathing the things I covet, and he hurles them doubly at me, 
as now in this money. (Weeding, sigs. C6r- C6v) 
 
After a long soliloquy on his actions and their response, Crosswill himself 
acknowledges his fault in creating his children’s behaviour, saying ‘I could beat my 
selfe for getting such children’ (Weeding, sig. F7v).  (A parallel for this can be 
found in the play’s Captain Driblow, who actively encourages disorder in his 
followers).
13
  In the same way as Mihil tricks money from his father, Katherine 
                                                
13 cf. Butler 1984, 156. 
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pretends to want to leave Rooksbill’s house to trick her father, who had decided to 
leave, into staying.  This deliberately contrary behaviour in his children and his own 
repentance for creating it serves as a warning to Charles about the dangers of 
imposing arbitrary rule.  Wilfulness in the ruler provokes wilfulness in the subjects. 
 
More significant than his daughter’s behaviour in this respect are the 
‘disobediences’ of his sons: Gabriel has changed from ‘imitating a soldier’ 
(Weeding, sig. E2r)  to behaving like a Puritan, and Mihil has, Crosswill believes, 
become a student of law at the Inns of Court.  Puritans and lawyers were both 
groups with whom Charles I wrangled on occasion, the former objecting to the 
potential catholicising of the English church, and the latter for Charles’s prerogative 
infringements upon common and statute law.  Gabriel admits at the end of the play, 
when Dorcas’s honour is restored though marriage with Nicholas, that he was 
merely acting the Puritan to displease his father in return for being sent away earlier 
(a decision which unintentionally allowed Nicholas to seduce and leave Dorcas).  
His choice of words here, however, is significant, as he ‘acknowledg[es] [his] 
formal habit was more of stubbornnesse then true devotion’ (Weeding, sig. G7v,  
my emphasis).  This suggests a certain contrariness in all Caroline Puritans, 
emphasised by Katherine and Lucie’s earlier interchange: 
 
Kat: […] I think verily he does it but to crosse my father, for sending him 
out of the way when the mischief was done. 
 
Luc: I will not then beleeve ’tis Religion in any of the gang of ’em, but mere 
wilful affectation. (Weeding, sig. E3r) 
 
Gabriel’s ‘affectation’ however, not only displeased his father, but gave him a 
religious vocabulary which suggests heavenly retribution for Nicholas, but also 
allows personal violence:  
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It had been good to have humbled him, though into the knowledge of his 
Transgression.  And of himself for his soules good, either by course of Law, 
or else in case of necessity, where the Law promiseth no releese, by your 
own right hand you might have smote him, smote him with great force, yea, 
smote him unto the earth, until he had prayed that the evil might be taken 
from him. (Weeding, sig. E8r) 
 
The comic repetition of ‘smote’ both emphasises Gabriel’s anger with Nicholas and 
ridicules the zealous fervour of seventeenth-century puritans.  It should be noted, 
though, that this violence becomes an option only ‘where the Law promiseth no 
releese’.  Submission to appropriate authority is still important to Gabriel.
14
 
 
 Mihil’s ostensible study of the law also infuriates his father.  Although 
Crosswill himself placed Mihil as a student in London, his disappointment to find 
his son studying law rather than reading romances plays on the knowledge that the 
Inns of Court were as much a ‘college’ for young gentlemen who wished to enjoy 
London society and advance themselves at court as places to study the law.
15
  
Mihil’s demonstration of his legal knowledge, put on as a show to his father using 
borrowed books and gowns, and other pretend students (the shoemaker and tailor to 
whom he owes money), leads Crosswill himself to admit as much: 
 
Did I leave thee here to learn fashion and manners, that thou mightst carry 
thy self like a Gentleman, and dost thou wast thy brains in learning a 
language that I understand not a word of? ha! I had been as good have 
brought thee up amongst the wild Irish (Weeding, sig. C4v). 
 
The reference to the Irish perhaps continues the colonisation analogy, but more 
significant is Crosswill’s objection to Mihil’s legal learning: he does not understand 
it.  I do not wish to argue that Brome is suggesting Charles I is ignorant of the law, 
                                                
14 In fact neither ‘smiting’ nor law catches up with Nicholas who is, instead, persuaded by his friends 
to marry Dorcas without official intervention.  This circumvention of the legal authority by the 
philoblathici perhaps gestures towards the community negotiation of law I suggested in the 
introduction to this chapter. 
15 See Introduction, pp.4-5. 
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but this may suggest a (deliberate?) misunderstanding of the law on the King’s part.
 
The terms that Crosswill uses to prevent Mihil continuing his study too are 
significant: ‘Away with books. Away with Law. Away with madnesse.  I, God 
blesse thee, and make thee his servant, and defend thee from Law, I say’ (Weeding, 
sig. C4r), and again later, an interchange between Crosswill and Mihil confirms this 
association of studying law and madness: 
 
Mi: They are Gentlemen of my standing, Sir, that have a little over-studied 
themselves, and are somewhat --- 
 
Cros: Mad; are they not? And so will you be shortly, if you follow these 
courses.  Mooting do they call it? you shall moote not mute here no longer. 
      (Weeding, sig. C5r) 
 
This is, of course, an inversion of the law/reason, madness/arbitrary rule equations 
evident in Caroline drama as discussed in Chapter 3.  The explanation for this may 
lie in Crosswill’s deliberately contrary nature, and thus it might be expected that he 
should reverse the convention.  His prayer that Mihil be defended from law could be 
taken as a slight upon crooked lawyers and legal practices, but in terms of Crosswill 
as a representative of Charles I, his wish that heaven may defend him and his sons 
from law evokes the divine right of kings in protection of royal prerogative 
(Crosswill’s arbitrary authority) against the claims of law.
16
  As this is Crosswill’s 
prayer though, it can be understood as a perverse wish.   
 
Mihil’s apparent studiousness, however, is a cover for his real ‘occupation’ 
in town as a member of the Philoblathici, the ‘brothers of the blade and battoon’ led 
by Captain Driblow (a further figure of authority), who swear to protect each other 
                                                
16
 Mihil’s exposition of ‘remitter’ to his pretend students is taken from Coke’s Institutes, fol.347b- 
348a, and is close to direct quotation.  The choice to quote from Coke is also significant in this 
presentation of the clash between law and kingly authority, as Coke was one of the main proponents 
of rule by common law against prerogative (see Chapter 3). 
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and their companions, be disrespectful to all but their brotherhood unless they can 
gain from them (‘let no man take wall of you, but such as you suppose will either 
beat you or lend you money’), and to undermine the law: 
 
That you be ever at deadly defiance with all such people, as Protections are 
directed to in Parliament, and that you watch all occasions to prevent or 
rescue Gentlemen from the gripes of the Law brissons.  That you may 
thereby endear your selfe into noble society, and drink the juice of the 
Varlets labours for your officious intrusions (Weeding, sig. D3v). 
 
Protections were warrants for safe conduct or immunity from arrest usually issued 
by the king to those in his service.  That the protections here are offered by 
parliament suggests an intention to undermine all forms of authority.
17
  In this 
respect, it is interesting that Nicholas draws a comparison between his Philoblathici 
brothers and Gabriel’s puritan brothers: 
 
But we are brethren, sir, and as factsous [sic] as you, though we differ in the 
Grounds, for you, sir, defie Orders, and so do we, you of the Church, we of 
the Civil Magistrate; many of us speak i’th’nose, as you do; you out of 
humility of spirit, we by the wantonnesse of the flesh; now in devotion we 
go beyoud [sic] you, for you will not kneel to a ghostly father, and we do to 
a carnal Mystresse (Weeding, sig. F4v). 
 
This comparison of Mihil, Nicholas and Gabriel’s positions suggests that puritans, 
like the philoblathici, deliberately set out to flout authority.   
 
That the brothers of the blade can so easily ‘convert’ Gabriel from his 
Puritan ways to drunkenness may, like the revelation of his pretence, also be a 
comment on the sincerity of puritans.  His transformation from Puritan to Militia 
Captain threatening to ‘do Martial Justice on you all’ (Weeding, sig. G4v) is not too 
far in violence from his previous desire to ‘smite’ his enemies, but presents him as 
                                                
17
 Matthew Steggle argues, alternatively, that the reference to the parliamentary protections is a 
topical reference relating to the revival of the play in 1641, as parliamentary protections were a 
contentious issue at that point (2001, paragraph 20). 
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more acceptable to his father (and thus Caroline central authorities) but also as an 
embodiment of several contentious issues of the period.  His complaint that his 
‘troops’ are ill-trained and equipped (Weeding, sigs. G4v-G5r) was a real problem 
for the Caroline militia, and his threats of martial law reflect fears of its imposition 
in towns with military garrisons which had been had been argued against in the 
Petition of Right.
18
  This opens the question as to what forms of behaviour are 
acceptable to both the Caroline populace and the king.  Gabriel’s threat to enforce 
such law changes the threat to order he embodies from one of disobedience to 
Church authority to a threat to local authority, as commissions of martial law 
undermined the authority of Justices of the Peace.
19
  
 
Cockbrayne’s attempts to ‘tread out the spark of impiety, whilest it is yet a 
spark and not a flame; and break the egge of a mischief, whilest it is yet an egge and 
not a Cockatrice’ (Weeding, sig. B2r), and thus weed Covent Garden, involve 
infiltrating the philoblathici.  His attempts result in his first being soundly beaten by 
the brothers, then left to pay their inn bill with Clotpoll, and then being beaten by 
two prostitutes, Bettie and Francisca (Frank).  His determined statement, ‘I will not 
yet desist; but suffer private affliction with a Romane resolution for the publicke 
welfare’ (Weeding, sig. D6r) is admirable and suggests a genuine concern for the 
common good.  However, his letter to Crosswill explaining his absence suggests 
ulterior motives: 
 
He is upon the point of discovery in a most excellent project for the weeding 
of this Garden? What Garden? What project? A project he says here for the 
good of the Republike, Repudding… He is ambitious to be call’d into 
                                                
18
 Cogswell’s discussion of Huntingdon’s efforts in training and equipping the local militia is 
particularly informative regarding these problems (1998, passim). See Lockyer (1999, 272) and 
Chapter 1, pp.33, 47-8 for the concerns over the imposition of martial law in the Petition of Right. 
19 See Russell, 1979, 359, and Lockyer, 1999, 272.  Also, Chapter 1, p. 33. 
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authority by notice taken of some special service he is able to do the state 
aforehand (Weeding, sig. F7r). 
 
Crosswill’s easy dismissal of any concern for the common good (‘Republicke, 
Repudding’) is unsurprising given his cross-will and arbitrary nature, and perhaps 
suggests a lack of concern for this in Charles’s arbitrary government.  Cockbrayne’s 
motives here, too, are less than altruistic in wishing to advance his own position in 
weeding Covent Garden.  In seeking to advance himself through his enforcement of 
the law rather than in acting for the common good despite his earlier claims that he 
would do so, Cockbrayne can be seen to represent Charles I’s dubious use of law for 
his own gain.
20
   
 
The misapplication and abuse of law by figures of authority is a recurring 
theme in much of Caroline drama, from Justice Squelch’s manipulation of the law 
and his authority to keep Holdup as his mistress in The Northern Lasse (1629) to 
Constable Busie in Glapthorne’s Wit in a Constable (1636-8) who uses his position 
as a trusted and respected mediator in the community as a means to engineer good 
marriages for his daughters, outsmarting the gallants and alderman Covet: 
 
Covet: Dare you doe this sirrah? 
 
Busie: Yes, and answer’t too sir. 
 Y’ave met a Constable that has the wit 
 To know the power of’s office. (Wit in a Constable, sig. H4v) 
 
Throughout the play, Busie’s focus is on proving that there can be wit in a 
constable; it is only at this point that he reveals that this wit is in knowing what his 
position allows him to do.  This abuse of law, position and authority is also given 
                                                
20 Butler argues similarly (1984, 153). 
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sustained treatment in Tale of a Tub, which will be discussed in the following 
section.   
 
Cockbrayne’s scheme advances him very little.  His infiltration of the 
philoblathici and storming of the tavern result in confusion as he finds respectable 
community members amongst the carousers who agree to stand as surety for each 
other and their relatives in the philoblathici.  Cockbrayne finds that he cannot arrest 
Crosswill and his children, or Rooksbill and his, and discovers that another of the 
Philoblathici is his own son: ‘Why I know not whom to commit now’, he says 
(Weeding, sig.G8v).  In this confusion, Brome nods towards the ties of friendship 
and community which Wrightson argues complicated the activities of local officials.  
However, this confusion merely facilitates a satisfactory resolution to the play; it is 
not the dominating issue.  Rather, the proper exercise of authority and obedience is 
brought to the fore.   The parallel positions of Cockbrayne, Crosswill, Rooksbill and 
Driblow, along with Gabriel’s puritan authorities, have led critics to argue that the 
proliferation of authority figures in this play suggests a complete lack of authority in 
Covent Garden.  Matthew Steggle has associated this lack of authority closely with 
the play’s setting, as Covent Garden had strong puritan links, and it did not become 
a parish in its own right until fourteen years after the play was written and therefore 
did not have its own local authority figures (Steggle, 2004, 47-8).
21
  Butler argues 
that there is a more general confusion over legitimate legal authority:   
 
Brome simply [sets] these various sorts of authority at war with one another, 
the point being that no one figure can claim any more ‘authority’ than the 
next, since the actions of each arise from a narrow personal (and often 
contradictory) idea of what constitutes law (Butler, 1984, 154-5). 
                                                
21
 Steggle explains the spread of tavern activities in the play in this way, as lacking their own local 
officials would inevitably interfere with tavern licensing (Steggle, 2004, 48-9). 
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However, I would argue that despite their parallel positions as authority figures, 
Cockbrayne, Crosswill, Rooksbill and Driblow are not really competing authorities 
(unlike, for example, The Queen and Concubine’s King and Eulalia’s council).  
Indeed, a satisfactory resolution to this play is ultimately brought about through the 
intervention of and submission to, the appropriate officials: 
 
Vintner: There’s no escaping forth.  And Gentlemen, It will but breed more 
scandal on my house, and the whole plantation here, if now you make 
rebellious uproar. Yield your weapons, and welcome Justice but like 
subjects new, and peace will follow. 
 
… 
 
Mihil: They shall yield up their weapons. So do you. 
 
Capt: Yes yes ’tis best. 
 
Clot: Shall we, sir, shall we? 
 
Mih: Yes sir, you shall. (Weeding, sig. G6v). 
 
Mihil’s insistence that the Philoblathici give up their swords to the local authority 
figure, and Crosswill and Rooksbill’s legitimate desire to bail their relatives rather 
than stand unofficially in the way of their arrest, imply deference to the constable 
and Justice Cockbrayne.  Although there are other authority figures in the play, they 
do not hold higher power than Cockbrayne, and they know this.  Even Captain 
Driblow who potentially fights against Cockbrayne’s authority, acknowledges this 
in his interchange with Clotpoll before the justice’s arrival: 
 
 Clot:  If our sight offend you,  
Know we are men that dare forbear the place. 
 
 Capt:  I son, let’s go, our stay is dangerous. 
  They look like Peace-maintainers, we’ll fall off. (Weeding, sig. G6v) 
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The harmonious ending to the play is brought about by acknowledgement of the 
legitimate authority of the justice, and Covent Garden is eventually weeded when 
those who have not been submitting to the relevant authorities do so.
22
  That 
Cockbrayne chooses not to enact his powers of arrest suggests the necessary 
mediation of strict laws to bring about a satisfactory resolution.  Nevertheless, this 
does not cause a dilemma for Cockbrayne; the authority to enforce or mitigate the 
law is his alone.  There is no divided authority in this play. 
 
 
Divided loyalties: A Tale of a Tub   
 
 Although The Weeding of Covent Garden nods towards the conflicting 
loyalties experienced by local officials, its primary concern is with the appropriate 
imposition of, and obedience to, judicial authority.  As a representative of kingly 
judicial power, Cockbrayne ultimately holds the highest authority in the locality of 
Covent Garden.  Matthew Steggle’s comment that Covent Garden had to rely on the 
services of officials shared with neighbouring areas (Steggle, 2004, 48) may go 
some way to explaining this lack of personal conflict, although Cockbrayne’s ties of 
friendship and family are not entirely irrelevant to the resolution of the play.  
Instead, I would like to argue that there is little conflict in Covent Garden because 
there is only one legitimate authority figure here (however dubious his motives and 
activities may be); there is no hierarchy.  The conflict for figures of local authority 
comes with the need to reconcile the demands of higher authorities with those of the 
                                                
22
 A similar argument is made in Heywood and Brome’s The Late Lancashire Witches:  ‘Sir, I have 
heard, that Witches apprehended under hands of lawfull authority, doe loose their power; And all 
their spels are instantly dissolv’d’ (Late Lancashire Witches, sig. L1v).  Order is indeed restored in 
the betwitched household when the witch is taken into custody by the local constable. 
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community. In this section, I will explore this distinction with regard to the detailed 
depiction of local authority hierarchies in Jonson’s A Tale of a Tub. 
 
 Throughout the personal rule, Charles I sought to impose a greater sense of 
order upon what central government saw as the often haphazard enforcement of law 
in the provinces.  Thus he issued the Book of Orders (Orders and Directions) in 
1631: 
 
Whereas divers good Lawes and Statutes, most necessary for these times, 
have […] been with great wisedome, pietie, and policie, made and enacted in 
Parliament[…]  And whereas we are informed that the defect of the 
execution of the said good and politique Lawes and Constitutions in that 
behalfe made, proceedeth espicially from the neglect of duetie in some of 
Our Iustices of the Peace and other Officers, Magistrates, and Ministers of 
the Peace, within the severall Counties, Cities and townes. (Charles I, 1630, 
sigs. B3r-B4r). 
 
Accordingly, the Book of Orders attempted to institute regular meetings of Justices 
of Peace within each county to monitor the activities of all local officials and punish 
those who were lax in law enforcement (Orders and Directions, sigs. E4v-F3r). 
This attempt to impose central control over the localities was met with differing 
levels of enthusiasm; ‘the Book of Orders […] failed not so much because it was 
openly resisted as because it was not properly enforced’ (Fletcher, 1986, 57).  The 
criticism of officials in Orders and Directions assumes an easy choice between the 
neglect of duty and enforcement of law, failing to take account of local 
circumstances: 
 
[T]he Book presupposed a common pattern of priorities, a national agenda 
for magisterial effort. Justices of Peace, however, believed they knew their 
own counties, the needs of their countrymen and the most glaring 
deficiencies of their subordinates better than anyone in London. (Fletcher, 
1986, 57) 
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The local law enforcers acted in what they saw as the best interests of their county, 
and, as with the collection of the forced loan and ship money, problems arose when 
this conflicted with central government’s policies and directions. For example, the 
forced acceptance of apprentices ordered in 1618 and 1627, and restated in Orders 
and Directions, proved difficult in the 1630s; ‘[t]he matter had been allowed to 
lapse for so long that in some areas it was not easy all of a sudden to find enough 
suitable masters for large numbers of boys and girls’ (Fletcher, 1986, 216).  The 
disruption caused by attempts to enforce apprenticeship would cause greater 
disorder than the unemployed youth. 
 
Justices’ flexibility regarding the opening and licensing of alehouses too 
paid attention to the sustained peace of the province rather than the strict 
enforcement of central legislation.  On one hand, justices had to acknowledge the 
interests of local suppliers and brewers, the wishes of their clerks who received fees 
for awarding licenses, and the demands of local inhabitants for a place to drink and 
socialise (Fletcher, 1986, 247); on the other, was the tightening of alehouse 
regulation determined by central government (to whom the Justice was ultimately, if 
haphazardly answerable).  This particular balance of interests can be seen in 
Thomas Nabbes’ justice, Sir Generous Worthy, in Covent Garden, as he arrives at 
an alehouse: 
 
 Sir Gen.:  Ha! My sonne here; and Mr Ierker!   
I came i’th’ person of authoritie, 
  Invited by your noise.  But put that off, 
  Out of my love borne to the generall good, 
  I doe advise you to be temperate: 
  That the faire hope conceiv’d of growing virtues 
  Might not be lost. (Covent Garden, sig. H1v) 
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Sir Generous sees no need to be heavy handed with his judicial authority in this 
case, but nevertheless, the mention of it suggests a warning to those present that 
they are in breech of regulations.   His reasoning, ‘Out of my love borne to the 
generall good’, could relate to the previous phrase (he has put off his authority 
because of his love for the general good), or to that following (out of concern for 
their good, he advises temperance).  Either way, his concern for the local 
community overrides the strict enforcement of law.  It is also worth pausing here to 
discuss the drinkers’ response: 
 
 Ierk:   Sir, we are Gentlemen; and by that priviledge 
  Though we submit to politique Government 
  In publique things may be our owne law-makers 
  In morall life.  If we offend the law 
  The law may punish us; which onely strives  
  To take away excess, not the necessity 
  Or use of what’s indifferent, and is made 
  Or good or bad by’ts use (Covent Garden, sig. H1v). 
 
Jerker takes the interference as an affront to his gentlemanly honour and privilege to 
regulate his own moral behaviour.   Perhaps, then, Nabbes suggests that alcohol 
consumption should not be a matter for law, particularly amongst gentlemen.  Butler 
places emphasis on the drinkers’ gentlemanly status, suggesting that the play 
presents gentleman as being capable of governing themselves, especially in their 
personal lives, arguing that in ‘Nabbes’s Covent Garden, an independently minded 
gentry indignantly criticise the rigours of a repressive authority’ (Butler, 1984, 151).  
Whilst this is true, to an extent, it fails to take account of Sir Generous’s mediation 
of these stricter laws, and indeed, the fact that Sir Generous is also a gentleman.  
His decision not to press his authority at the alehouse is not specifically related to 
the drinkers’ gentlemanly status, or to the fact that one of them is his son, but rather 
for the ‘generall good’.   It is important to note that Jerker does not claim a 
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‘privilege’ for gentlemen above the law in its appropriate jurisdiction (‘If we offend 
the law / The law may punish us’).  This does, of course, raise questions as to what 
the law should regulate and who should make these decisions, which are not 
resolved in the play. The scene ends with Sir Generous buying wine from the 
vintner, admonishing him to ‘keepe good orders’ (Covent Garden, sig. H3r), and 
inviting all of the gentlemen to his house for dinner in a demonstration of ideal 
gentlemanly hospitality, a significant part of the establishment and maintenance of 
good order.
23
   This complex set of relations between centre and locality, officer and 
local community forms the background, and even, I would argue, the subject, of 
Jonson’s A Tale of a Tub. 
  
The setting of A Tale of a Tub is Valentine’s Day in Finsbury Hundred.  The 
Marian or Elizabethan period setting of the play suggests a deliberate nostalgia, but 
the problems of law and order presented are, as Julie Sanders suggests, those of a 
1630s Caroline community (1997, 456).
24
  The action of the play takes place in 
Finsbury and other specifically named places which are not quite in London, but not 
quite far enough away to be essentially provincial.  Sanders argues that Finsbury 
Hundred is in an ‘uncomfortable proximity to London’, and this contributes to the 
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 See also Brome and Heywood’s  Late Lancashire Witches (1634) where the hospitality of the local 
gentleman is the only stable factor in the disorder caused by the witches, and Shirley’s Lady of 
Pleasure in which the balance between privilege and hospitality suggested in Nabbes’s scene 
between the alehouse gallants and Sir Generous is given a more direct contrast in the positions of 
Bornwell, who used to be renowned for his hospitality in the country, and his wife who now claims 
privilege in the city.   Butler argues that Charles I’s commanding the gentry back to their country 
estates sought in part to reinstate this kind of order-keeping, whilst maintaining better 
communication between Whitehall and the provinces during the personal rule (Butler, 1992b, 181-2).  
My analysis of A Joviall Crew below will discuss in more detail the position of gentry versus local 
Justices. 
24 Butler’s argument that this pre-Stuart setting provides a rebuke to the Caroline subjects ‘whose 
response to social change was to create a divisive ideology of discipline’, not their king, and the 
nostalgia is for a time ‘that has yet to hear the name puritan’  (Butler, 1990, 24).  The play’s primary 
concern, however, is the working and hierarchies of local authority.  For a discussion of the potential 
explanations of the pre-Stuart setting, see Butler, 1990, 5, 26; 1992b, 180, 183-4. 
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undercurrent of political tension in the play (1997, 459).
25
  Whilst I do not wish to 
disagree with her argument, I believe the play’s geography – being not quite inside 
London, and not quite outside it – also emphasises the ‘in between’ central and 
provincial status of local law officers which I have already established, and 
encourages such a reading of the play’s High Constable Toby Turf.   
 
Turf has arranged the marriage of his daughter Audrey to John Clay, through 
the traditional Valentine’s Day marriage lottery during which Turf and his wife 
were married thirty years before.  The choice of husband seems to have involved the 
whole community as ‘All the wise o’th’ hundred’ (all local officials: the petty 
constable, headborough, and thirdborough) are met at Turf’s house ‘to conclude in 
Counsell, / A Husband, or a Make for Mrs Awdrey’ (Tale of a Tub, sigs. J3r-v).
26
   
Thus the spirit of community and neighbourliness of the hundred under Turf’s 
authority is illustrated by the festive gathering of Audrey’s wedding.  However, the 
wedding is consistently delayed, and the festivities postponed, whilst Turf goes 
about the business required of him by his position. Leah Marcus argues that 
Audrey’s marriage to Pol-Martin at the end of the play presents the triumph of 
festival (evident in the Valentine’s Day ritual) which local officials and dignitaries 
seek to suppress through imposition of various forms of law, suggesting that what is 
at stake in the play is festival versus law, making the play a celebration of Charles 
I’s reissue of the Book of Sports in 1633 (Marcus, 1986, 133, 107).   However, the 
interferences with the wedding are not planned, ultimately, to prevent the festivities 
taking place, but to allow a change of groom.  The wedding is, rather, the 
                                                
25
 Sanders associates this with the radicalism of Essex in the period discussed by Keith Wrightson in 
‘Two Concepts of Order’, and the autonomous stance near-London communities adopted on political 
issues (Sanders, 1997, 459). 
26 A Tale of a Tub will be abbreviated to Tub in subsequent references. 
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demonstration of a peaceful neighbourliness which is disturbed by the intervention 
of authorities from outwith the community for their own gain.  What disturbs the 
peace of this village is, as Martin Butler argues, the ‘interference of the external 
world of law into the communal peace of the hundred’ (Butler, 1990, 21).  
 
 The first demand on Turf is created by a dispute between Hannibal (Ball) 
Puppy (Turf’s man) and Basket Hilts (Squire Tub’s Governor) who has come, sent 
by Squire Tub, to disrupt the festivities.  Turf intervenes, asserting the origin of his 
authority: 
 
 Turf: I charge you in the Queenes name, keepe the peace. 
  
 Hilts:  Tell me o’ no Queene, or Keysar: I must have  
  A legge, or a hanch of him, ere I goe.   
 
 Medlay:     But zir, 
  You must obey the Queenes high Officers. 
 
 Hilts:  Why must I, Good-man Must?  
 
 Medlay:     You must, an’ you wull.  
(Tub, sig. K4v) 
 
The necessity of obedience to local officials and the authorities they represent is 
thus asserted as the first plot to delay the wedding begins. There is an equation of 
the Queen’s power with the constable’s, and there is no immediate conflict in these 
authorities.  Hilts’s reference to ‘Keysar’ here, however, draws attention to an 
almost incidental tale of a Roman constable that Scriben, Medlay and Turf later 
discuss: 
 
 Scriben:    I can tell you 
  A thousand, of great Pompei, Caesar, Trajan, 
  All the high Constables there. 
 
 Turf:      That was their place: 
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  There were no more. 
 
 Scriben:    Dictator, and high Constable 
  Were both the same. 
 
 Medlay:    High constable was more, tho’! 
  He laid Dick: Tator by the heeles. 
 
 Pan:       Dick: Tator! 
  H’ was one o’ the Waights o’ the Citie. I ha’ read o’ hun. 
      (Tub, sig. M4v) 
 
On the surface, this comic interchange highlights the rustic simplicity of the 
provincial officials Medlay and To-Pan, who believe Dick Tator was a real person.  
However, Scriben and Turf’s comments have a more serious political undertone.  In 
suggesting that the constable and the dictator were the same in ancient Rome, 
Scriben elevates the lowly constable to the status of imperial power, leading 
Sanders to infer an oblique criticism of Charles’s government: 
 
[W]as it so far a leap of the imagination to consider that in 1633 there was a 
real person who used the title of Caesar in order to aggrandize his position 
rhetorically, and that very possibly his attempt to rule without Parliament 
came close to constituting a form of dictatorship?  (Sanders, 1997, 459) 
 
However, Scriben’s constable does not merely assume imperial status in their 
conversation, but goes beyond it, placing ‘Dick Tator’ in the stocks (laying Dick 
Taytor ‘by the heels’).  In the provincial Hundreds, the High Constable is the 
highest local authority; kingly dictation will receive little favour.  It is perhaps 
worth noting at this point that Turf is also capable of discoursing ‘of the great 
Charty’ (Magna Charta) to his subordinates (Tub, sig. I4v).  Thus divisions begin to 
appear in the implied unity of local and central authority that was suggested in 
Turf’s command to keep the peace in the ‘Queenes name’.  That the discussion 
about Dick Tator comes shortly after Turf’s claim that he will ‘triumph over this 
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Justice, as becomes a Constable’(that is, foil Preamble’s plans to marry Audrey) 
suggests that these divisions affect all levels of the local authority judicial hierarchy.  
 
 Turf does eventually manage to impose order on the near-brawling Puppy 
and Hilts, pledging his own authority as promise of punishment for the offender 
(Puppy): ‘For him, / On my authority, he shall lie by the heeles’. Puppy appeals to 
Turf’s clerk (Clench) to intercede so that he will not have to miss the wedding, but 
Turf is adamant that ‘If he lye not by the heeles, / Ile lie there for ’hun’ implying an 
absolute determination to see justice done (Tub, sig. K4v).  The demands of justice 
and the wedding festivities can both be met as Hilts drops his charge, and Turf 
insists that Puppy will make amends.  As soon as this potential obstacle to the 
festivities is overcome though, Hilts presents a further problem for Turf, charging 
him to raise hue and cry to find robbers who allegedly attacked him and his captain 
(in fact this is a ruse to delay the wedding so that Squire Tub can steal Audrey 
away). Turf is immediately torn between community life epitomised in the wedding 
plans and doing his duty: 
 
 Turf:  As Fortune mend me, now, or any office 
  Of a thousand pound, if I know what to zay, 
  Would I were dead, or vaire hang’d up at Tiburne 
  If I doe know what course to take, or how 
  To turne my selfe, just at this time too, now, 
  My Daughter is to be married: Ile but goe  
  To Pancridge Church, hard by, and returne instantly, 
  And all my Neighbour-hood shall goe about it. 
 
 Hilts:  Tut, Pancridge me no Pancridge, if you let it  
Slip, you will answer it, and your Cap be of wooll; 
Therefore take heed, you’ll feele the smart else, Constable. 
     (Tub, sigs. L1r-L1v) 
 
 Hilts’ assertion that the constable will have to answer if the hue and cry is not 
raised immediately is no empty threat; village constables were often held 
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responsible for the value of stolen items, or indeed for the ship money they were 
commissioned to collect on behalf of the sheriff.  Turf himself acknowledges this:  
‘shud we leave the zearch / I am in danger, to reburse as much / As he was rob’d on; 
I and pay his hurts’ (Tub, sig. M1v). 
 
In an example of the ways in which local government hierarchy was 
supposed to function (in accordance with the Book of Orders) Turf is later brought 
before Justice Preamble to answer both dropping the hue and cry and hiding Clay, 
who is accused of the robbery.  However, this hearing illustrates how open the 
system is to corruption, as Preamble uses it extort money from Turf.  Preamble’s 
choice of language at this meeting contributes to the interplay of law, order and 
community in the play: 
 
 Pre: I cannot choose but grieve a Soldiers losse: 
  And I am sory too for your neglect, 
  Being my neighbour; this is all I object. 
 
 Hug:  This is not all; I can alledge far more 
  […] 
    Let not neighbour-hood 
  Make him secure, or stand on priviledge.    
      (Tub, sig. N3r). 
 
Preamble’s seeming concern that his neighbour should be so remiss plays on Turf’s 
own understanding of his position in society, but is, in fact merely a cover for 
Preamble’s plot against Turf, to keep him away from the church and his daughter.  
He uses the same feigned rhetoric of neighbourliness during his engineered ‘arrest’ 
of Squire Tub (Tub, sig.L4r).  Preamble’s obsequious response to Captain Thums’s 
(Chanon Hugh) concern, ‘Sir, I dare use no partiality’ (Tub, sig.N3r), contrasts 
starkly with Turf’s sincere determination justifying his arrest of his intended son-in-
law:  ‘I will doe mine office, / An’ he were my owne begotten a thousand times’ 
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(Tub, sig. L2r).  Preamble again uses this language of community to pretend a 
favour to Turf, asking Captain Thums, ‘then Ile pray you, ’cause he is my 
neighbour, / To take a hundred pound, and give him day’ (Tub, sig. N4r).  As an 
abuse of the discourse of neighbourliness which maintained peace in the provinces, 
this could be seen as representative of the Crown’s (mis)use of the local and 
national loyalties of its officers to make central policy seem less incompatible with 
the wishes of the community.
27
  That Preamble intends to take this money himself is 
further evidence of the exploitation of provincial officers for the personal gain of 
higher authorities. 
  
 Preamble’s plans to disrupt Audrey’s wedding to Squire Tub involve the 
introduction of a third layer of authority into the province.  He arranges for his 
Clerk, Miles Metaphor, to dress as a pursuivant to arrest Tub: 
 
 Pre:  Ha you acquaintance with him [a pursuivant] 
  To borrow his coat an houre? 
 
 Hugh:     Or but his badge, 
  ’Twill serve: A little thing he weares on his brest. 
 
 Pre:  His coat, I say, is of more authority: 
  Borrow his coat for an houre.  I doe love 
  To doe all things compleately, Chanon Hugh; 
  Borrow his coat, Miles Metaphor, or nothing. 
      (Tub, sig. K2r) 
 
Butler suggests that, throughout, the play dwells on the way authority lies in the 
signs of office rather than the person of the office holder, arguing that this presents a 
failure of local authority (Butler, 1990, 23).  However, here it is the agent of central 
authority who needs to command respect through his dress. The badge of their 
office means less, according to Justice Preamble, than the clothes central officials 
                                                
27 See Lake, 1981, 57. 
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wear which demonstrate their higher status.  Turf, on the other hand, seems to be 
highly respected in the community, at least by his inferiors (‘A right good man!’ 
(Tub, sig. K4r)), and his clothing is not mentioned.  If this does suggest a failure of 
authority in the provinces then, it lies, more subversively, with the central 
authorities not the local.     Metaphor’s pursuivant adds a higher authority to which 
the Justice must defer: 
 
 Pre:   It is a warrant, 
  In speciall from the Councell, and commands 
  Your personall appearance. Sir, your weapon 
  I must require: And then deliver you 
  A Prisoner to this officer, Squire Tub. 
     (Tub, sig. L4r) 
 
Personally making Tub’s arrest ‘I’ the Queenes Majesties name, and all the 
Councels’ (Tub, sig. L4r), the pursuivant provides a direct link between Whitehall 
and the province, and as Butler argues, presents the direct incursion of the ‘arm of 
princely government’ into the locality (Butler, 1992b, 181).  Once again the 
interference of authority and imposition of law from outside the Hundred causes 
delay to Audrey’s wedding, and she is snatched away by Justice Preamble. 
  
Although Preamble’s claims of neighbourhood and community are bogus, 
the other local officials attempt more carefully to balance upholding the law with 
causing as little disruption to the community as possible. During the officers’ search 
for criminals, Medlay voices concerns: ‘Masters, take heed, let’s not vind too many: 
/One’s enough to stay the Hang-mans stomack’ (Tub, sig. M1r).  The occasional 
prosecution is enough to show central authority their willingness to enforce law 
without being over-officious.  Turf himself genuinely struggles to negotiate the 
demands of the community (Audrey’s wedding) and the demands of his position: 
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Turf:  Were never honest Varmers thus perplext. 
… 
Turf: Hath Justice Bramble got my daughter Awdrey? 
 A little while, shall he enjoy her, zure. 
 But O the Huy and Cry! That hinders me: 
 I must prusue that, or neglect my journey: 
 Ile ene leave all: and the patient Asse, 
 The over-laden Asse, throw off my burden, 
 And cast mine office[…] 
 […] Ile no more High Constables. 
     (Tub, sig. M2v) 
 
On discovering Preamble’s plot, Turf can no longer negotiate his divided loyalties, 
and chooses to abandon his post to salvage the wedding.  His plaintive comment 
about ‘honest Varmers’ reminds the audience that High Constables were not 
professional officials; rather, they were local yeoman farmers, who took on the post 
in addition to their usual occupation.  Whilst his references to the overburdened ass 
indicate the pressure Turf is under, to the theatre audience who know that the 
robbery is a ruse, the repetition of ‘asse’ also hints that the High Constable’s 
superiors are using their legal authority ‘to make and ass out of him’.  Turf’s 
problem of pursuing Hue and Cry or preventing Preamble’s seduction of Audrey is 
not resolved, but dissolved: Squire Tub tells Turf that the robbery was a trick 
concocted by Preamble to seize Audrey.  Although Tub’s explanation is not quite 
the truth (Clay’s guilt was his plot) it does allow Turf to resume his post, ‘I take my 
office back: and my authority/ […] Neighbours, I am / High Constable againe’ 
(Tub, sig. M3r). Turf’s distinction between his office and authority acknowledges 
that the office itself does not necessarily give authority, but it also emphasises 
Turf’s own authority in his community.  It seems, however, that Tub’s revelations 
are not sufficient to dispel Turf’s concerns: 
 
 The Huy, and Cry, was merely counterfeit: 
 The rather may you judge it to be such, 
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 Because the Bride-groome, was describ’d to be 
 One of the theeves, first I’the velonie. 
 Which, how farre ’tis from him, your selves may guesse. 
      (Tub, sigs. M2v-M3r). 
 
Tub uses the High Constable’s knowledge of members of the local community to 
convince him to drop the hue and cry and prevent the wedding.  This, of course, is 
in his own interests, not for Turf, and once again plays on the constable’s loyalty to, 
and knowledge of, the community for personal gain. 
  
Finally, Turf’s conflicts of loyalty in this situation are resolved as Audrey 
marries Pol-Marten, Lady Tub’s usher.  Marcus reads this as evidence that ‘the 
irrepressible energies of festival operate outside even its own mechanisms for 
containment – but no harm is done’ (Marcus, 1986, 133).  However, the happy 
ending is, as Sanders argues, only a veneer (Sanders, 1997, 443).  The tension 
between the strict enforcement of law and the community activities is only dispelled 
because all responsibility is taken from Turf.  Audrey’s marriage takes place 
without the knowledge of any of the local officials, and none of the demands on him 
as High Constable are legitimate: the robbery was indeed a ruse, cancelling any 
need to prosecute Clay, or lose his own money in restitution.  The fragility of this 
veneer is easily seen: 
 
Medlay: What of Iohn Clay, Ball Puppy? 
 
Puppy:     He hath lost –  
 
Medlay: His life for velonie? 
 
Puppy:    No, his wife by villanie. 
     (Tub, sig. M2v). 
 
The urgency of Medlay’s questioning and potential severity of the reply is dissolved 
in the comic juxtaposition of the punishment for crime and the trickery of his rivals. 
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But that these outcomes are interchangeable, emphasised by the close similarity of 
‘life’/ ‘wife’ and ‘velonie’/ ‘villanie’, presents the serious implications of the misuse 
of law.   
 
 Unusually, the play provides regular summaries of the action.  Metaphor, 
Turf and Audrey (Tub, sigs. L4v-M1r, M1r and M4v respectively) all give 
summaries of the plot so far, which explain the changes of the groom for Audrey, 
and thus emphasise the contrast between the good of the community and the 
attempted personal gain of the Justice and Squire.  The most detailed of these, 
however, is Medlay’s masque commissioned by Squire Tub which concludes the 
play.  The masque shifts the focus from an examination of the local to the central.  
Lady Tub’s welcome to her ‘neighbours’, ‘Now doth Totten-Hall / Shew like a 
Court’ (Tub, sig. Q1r), aligns the Tubs firmly with the royal court rather than the 
local men. Their position as owners of a Saltpetre mine confirms this association, 
and is a further example of the ways in which the centre is seen to exploit the 
provinces.
 28
  The representation of the planning and performance of the masque 
might go some way to explain why the play was not liked at court as Medlay is a 
sharply satiric caricature of Inigo Jones (Butler, 1992b, 179).  However, what the 
masque repeats from the play is the self-interest of those representative of central 
government (the Tubs and Preamble) and their abuse of legal mechanisms and 
authority by which Charles sought to reform law enforcement in provinces, that is, 
presentments to Justices and active local gentry.   
 
                                                
28
 Saltpetre (used in gunpowder) was a contentious issue in the 1630s, as searches which were often 
destructive were conducted to collect hidden stores from the provinces. Central government gained at 
the expense of the localities (Sanders, 1997, 461-2). 
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The implications of corruption amongst the local justices and the 
presentation of the imposition of central law in the provinces as unpopular and 
disruptive would be enough to create some discomfort at the court which sought to 
tighten control over localities, and this possibly explains why the play was not liked 
at court. The problems caused by the interference of central authority in the 
provinces cannot be masked (masqued?) by celebratory performances (particularly, 
Jonson might suggest, if they lack his invention over Jones’ designs), nor are they, 
as Butler suggests they are, ‘marginalized, diffused or transcended’ (Butler, 1990, 
24) in the play.  The manipulation of law and legal authority for personal ends in A 
Tale of a Tub critiques the Caroline court’s self-interested interventions in the 
provinces (such as ship money and Saltpetre).  Importantly, it is these abuses of law 
and authority by those in positions higher and more central than his own that cause 
the divided loyalties of the High Constable, and make his task of keeping order in 
the provinces impossible.  Whilst the play does what its prologue denies, in 
pretending ‘State affairs’, these do indeed ‘shew what different things / The Cotes 
of Clownes, are from the Courts of Kings’ (Tub, sig. I2v), and emphasises that these 
entities are not, and should not be the same. 
 
 
Fragmented authority:  A Joviall Crew  
 
 A Tale of a Tub examines the position of the local constable and the 
pressures that attempts to centralise local government, particularly though central 
abuse of law, places upon him in the maintenance of order.  The problems 
presented, however, are specific to the High Constable; there is little exploration of 
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the wider picture, that is, the effect on the people and the country.  Richard Brome’s 
A Joviall Crew continues to advocate the mediation of the strict imposition of 
central law in the provinces but in doing this, this section will argue, illustrates a 
fragmentation of authority in the polarisation of the royal court and the landowning 
gentry, and further, what causes, and is at stake through, this division. 
 
 The countryside authority in this play is embodied in the figure of Oldrents, 
who at the beginning of the play is the epitome of the benevolent gentleman 
landlord. His companion Hearty observes: 
 
 What justice can there be for such a curse 
 To fall upon your Heirs?  Do you not live 
 Free, out of Law, or grieving any man? 
 Are you not th’onely rich man lives un-envied? 
 Have you not all the praises of the Rich, 
 And prayers of the Poor? Did ever any 
 Servant, or Hireling, Neighbour, Kindred curse you, 
 Or with one minute shorten’d of your life? 
 Have you one grudging Tenant? will they not all 
 Fight for you? Do they not teach their Children 
 And make’em too, pray for you morn and evening, 
 And in their Graces too, as duly as 
 For King and Realme? The innocent things would think 
 They ought not eat else. (Joviall Crew, sig. B2r-B2v) 
 
That Oldrents can be seen as a provincial governor is suggested in the comparison 
made here between Oldrents and the King.  As his name suggests, Oldrents 
represents the traditional landowning gentry, helping his tenants and exercising 
gentlemanly hospitality.
29
  His hospitality extends to friends and strangers as well as 
the crew of beggars he accommodates in his barn, and in contrast with those men 
raised to a higher status through the purchase of titles or kingly favour, his wealth 
and status too are traditional, as Randall later explains that Oldrents’s ancestors 
                                                
29
 Sanders notes that charging old rents would indeed be kind to his tenants, as rental costs for 
farmlands increased threefold between 1600 and 1688 (Sanders, 2002a, 4 n.12). 
230 
have held that house for over three hundred years (Joviall Crew, sig. I4r).  
Throughout the play, Oldrents’s servants also give testimony to their happiness and 
his generosity.  The butler claims that ‘my Master, for his Hospitality to Gentlemen, 
his Charity to the Poor, and his bounty to his Servants, has not his Peer in the 
Kingdom’ and Randall, the bailiff, comments that ‘we, his Servants, live as merrily 
under him; and all do thrive […] And I have now, without boast, 40l. in my Purse’ 
(Joviall Crew, sig. K2r, K1r).  Steggle notes a discrepancy here in the amount 
Randall has been able to save from his salary over the lifetime he has spent in his 
employ, and the ‘hundred a yeer, at least’ (Joviall Crew, sig. I4v) that Oldrents 
spends on accommodating beggars, thus undermining the beggars’ claim to live cost 
free and contrasting the world of the beggars with that of loyal servants (Steggle, 
2004, 170). 
 
 Oldrents’s generosity and hospitality is not enjoyed by all those it affects, 
however; his daughters feel they suffer, rather than enjoy it, claiming that the 
beggars are: ‘Happier than we I’m sure, that are pent up and tied by the nose to the 
continual steam of hot Hospitality, here in our Father’s house, when they have their 
Aire at pleasure in all variety’ (Joviall Crew, sig. D2r).  This leads to a discussion of 
liberty between the ladies and their beaux:  
 
 Hilliard: Why Ladies, you have liberty enough; or may take what you  
please. 
 
Meriel: Yes, in our Father’s Rule and Government, or by his allowance. 
What’s that to absolute freedom such as the very Beggars have; to feast and 
revel here today, and yonder to morrow […] ther’s Liberty! (Joviall Crew, 
sig. D2r) 
 
The reference to ‘Rule and Government’ reinforces Oldrents’s position as a local 
governor, and invites comparison with the King, particularly as the vocabulary of 
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‘absolutism’ is introduced.  However, it is clear that Oldrents’s government is not 
absolute – he allows Springlove to make his own choice whether he goes begging:  
‘My love shall give thy will preheminence; / And leave th’effect to Time and 
Providence’ (Joviall Crew, sig. C1r) – and that his government is offered, as 
Sanders argues, in contrast with Charles’s personal rule (Sanders, 2002a, 5). 
 
   This implied contrast is confirmed by the other figure of authority in the 
play, Justice Clack, who embodies absolute authority.   Unlike Oldrents’s 
daughters’ relative freedom to choose their husbands, Clack has arranged a marriage 
for his ward Amie, from which she is running when she meets the crew of beggars.  
In this Amie chose, Clack complains, ‘rather to disobey me, than to displease her 
self. Wherein (altho’ she did not altogether transgresse the Law) she did both offend 
and prejudice me, an Instrument; nay I may say, a Pillar thereof’ (Joviall Crew, sig. 
M3r).  This identification of himself with the law suggests an analogy with Charles’ 
prerogative rule, emphasised when Clack asserts that he is ‘a Justice of the Kings’  
rather than the usual Justice of the Peace (in fact, this comes immediately after 
Clack tells Martin to ‘Hold [his] own peace’) (Joviall Crew, sig. M3v, my 
emphases).  In respect of royal prerogative, it is also significant that Amie is Clack’s 
Ward, not his daughter, as wardship provided a significant amount of extra-
parliamentary (prerogative) funding for the King.
30
  Thus royal absolutism once 
again finds its way into the provinces. That Clack’s son Oliver has travelled from 
London to Amie’s wedding (Joviall Crew, sig. H1v) cements his links with central 
authority.   
                                                
30 At the end of James’s reign, wardship was worth approximately £40,000 a year to the crown, by 
1637 this was worth £62,000 and by 1640, £76,000.  It was also a significant source of tension 
between the king and the landowners, whose wealth suffered because of it (Lockyer, 1999, 236, 38). 
Amie’s complaint that in their ‘inforc’d Matches’ wards are often ‘sold into Captivitie’ (Joviall 
Crew, sig. I3r) is then not merely a comment on forced marriage, but also on the value of wardships. 
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Clack and Oldrents are also compared in terms of their hospitality.  Whilst 
Oldrents’s hospitality, as I have already illustrated, is emphasised throughout the 
play, Clack is shown to be particularly lacking in this respect, as Randall comments: 
 
Sir, my Master sends you word, and plainly, that without your Company, 
your Entertainment stinks. He has commanded me saddle his Nags, and 
away to night. If you come not at once, twice, thrice, he’s gone presently, 
before Supper; He’ll finde an Host at an Inne worth a hundred o’ you.  
(Joviall Crew, sigs. N1r-N1v). 
 
Oldrents’s complaining cannot merely be explained by his desire for an excess of 
joviality, entered upon when his daughters ran away to join the beggars; Clack 
himself admits that his guests are ‘scarce welcome’, and drinks all of his good wine 
himself to avoid sharing it with his visitors (Joviall Crew, sigs. N1r, N3v).  There is, 
then an emphatic selfishness to absolute, prerogative rule. 
 
Clack’s dealings with Martin, the clerk who helped Amie flee her wedding, 
emphasise the arbitrariness of his absolutism: ‘Have I not born with thee, to speak 
all thou pleasest in thy defence? Have I not broke mine own Rule, which is to 
punish before I examine; and so have the Law the surer o’my side?’ (Joviall Crew, 
sig. M3v).  The notion of acting without law in order to stay on the right side of it 
should now be familiar from Brome’s The Queen and Concubine; it is a recurring 
idea in Caroline drama.
31
  Constable Busie’s advice to the watch in Wit in a 
Constable also centres on this: 
 
You shall be sure to keep the peace; that is, 
 If any quarrell, be ith’ streets, sit still, and keepe 
 Your rusty Bills from blood-shed; and as’t began 
 So let it end […] 
                                                
31 See Chapter 3, pp.186-187 
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 […] 
 
 Next, if a thiefe chance to passe through your watch, 
 Let him depart in peace; for should you stay him, 
 To purchase his redemption he’le impart 
 Some of his stolne goods, and you’re apt to take them, 
 Which makes you accessory to his theft, 
 And so fit food for Tiburne (Wit in a Constable, sigs. G4v-H1r). 
 
Whereas in The Queen and Concubine, this idea was used to highlight the dangers 
of kingly disregard for law, and here in Wit in a Constable to suggest local law 
officers’ susceptibility to corruption (and perhaps Busie’s desire to avoid extra 
work, as the Watch would have to present their prisoners to him), what is presented 
in A Joviall Crew’s use of this idea is a deliberate neglect of law and procedure in 
order to satisfy Clack’s desire to punish.
32
  Access to fair and reasonable local 
justice has been denied through the separation of local landowning gentry and the 
administrators of central justice. Clack, then, comes to embody the summation of 
the fears of arbitrary rule, the misapplication of law and abuse of authority. 
 
Clack’s self-seeking, arbitrary ‘justice’ is confirmed in his refusal to let 
Sentwell tell him of the beggars’ arrest: 
 
I can inform my self, Sir, by your looks. I have taken a hundred 
Examinations i’ my daies of Fellons, and other Offendors, out of their very 
Countenances; and wrote ’em down verbatim, to what they would have said. 
I am sure it has serv’d to hang some of ’em, and whip the rest. (Joviall 
Crew, sigs. M3v-M4r)  
 
This inclination to judge before examination, and punish without reason is far from 
the ideal local Justice described in Dalton’s The Countrey Justice.
33
  This 
                                                
32 This may be a covert reference to the punishment without proper hearing of those who refused to 
pay ship money, in case the examination of the case proved that ship money was an illegal extra-
parliamentary tax. 
33
 Clack is guilty of ‘Presumption’ (‘when without Law (or other sufficient rule or warrant) they 
(presuming of their owne wits) proceed according to their owne wills and affections’) and 
234 
indiscriminate hanging and whipping also harks back to the strict imposition of 
central law in the provinces through the Book of Orders, regardless of the 
circumstances of the locality or the offender.  Indeed, it is over the possible 
punishment of beggars that Clack and Oldrents most obviously disagree.  Hearty’s 
comment ‘Pray let ’em play their Play: the Justice will not hinder ’em, you see; he’s 
asleep’ (Joviall Crew, sig.O1v) is a further acknowledgment of the different forms 
of order (provincial and central) whereby the activities of the village community 
can, under the eyes of Oldrents, continue whilst central law ‘sleeps’.  It should be 
noted that under the law, travelling players were classed as vagrants, and 
theoretically should be punished as such; they would be, as we are told twice in the 
play, ‘well whipt and set to work, if [they] were duly and truly serv’d’ for their 
vagrancy (Joviall Crew, sig. G4r), and Justice Clack is itching to ‘put ’em in Stocks, 
and set ’em up to the Whipping-post’ (Joviall Crew, sig. M4v). Clack agrees, 
however, to allow them to put on their play to entertain his visitors, on the 
understanding that: ‘They are upon Purgation. If they can present any thing to 
please you [Oldrents], they may escape the Law; that is (a hay) If not, to morrow, 
Gentlemen, shall be acted, Abuses stript and whipt, among ’em’ (Joviall Crew, sig. 
N3v).  To prevent this, Oldrents is determined ‘rather than they shall suffer, I will 
be pleas’d, let ’em Play their worst’ (Joviall Crew, sig. N4v).  That Hearty must 
remind his friend of this on several occasions during the performance, suggests a 
deliberate (if well-meaning) stubbornness on Oldrents’s part to thwart Clack’s 
plans.   
 
                                                                                                                                    
‘Precipitation, or too much rashnesse; (when they proceed hastily without due examination and 
consideration of the fact’), both of which are listed as ways justice can be perverted by local officers 
(Dalton, 1635, 7). 
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 If it is the beggar crew that highlights the differences between Clack and 
Oldrents, it is important to understand what they represent. The children from both 
houses come to the beggars for their apparent liberty from absolutism (benevolent 
or arbitrary).  They quickly come to realise that this ‘freedom’ is not as idyllic as 
they had supposed, as they have to find food and shelter, and are always potentially 
subject to punishment or assault by those of higher status: Vincent and Hilliard are 
whipped, and Rachel and Meriel are in danger of rape by Oliver, the latter being a 
further instance of the abuse of authority and exploitation of the provinces by the 
centre as was noted in A Tale of a Tub.  Whether these liberties are what the 
children expected, however, is irrelevant to the idea that Clack and Oldrents 
disagree on the treatment of liberties of the subject.  Aside from the realistic 
representation of a beggar’s life, then, which does indeed cause conflict between 
Oldrents and Clack as representatives of different kinds of order, the ‘Beggars 
Commonwealth’ (Joviall Crew, sig. E3r) presents an alternative society free from 
absolute rule.
34
  Thus, whilst presenting the cause of contention, however, the 
beggars also present a possible solution. They are: 
 
 The onely Freemen of a Common-wealth 
 Free above Scot-Free; that observe no Law, 
 Obey no Governour, use no Religion, 
 But what they draw from their own ancient custom, 
 Or constitute themselves, yet are no Rebels. (Joviall Crew, sig. E1r) 
 
Although the beggars acknowledge Springlove as their king, they are free of the 
impositions of an absolute monarch, whether benevolvent (Oldrents) or arbitrary 
(Clack), as the commonwealth of beggars is ruled by customary or parliamentary 
laws (those they ‘constitute themselves’). Insisting that the beggars are not rebels 
                                                
34
 For a discussion of A Joviall Crew as one of several plays of this time presenting an alternative 
society, see Sanders (2002a, passim). 
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despite living in this way, the play suggests a position between the extremes of 
deliberately obstructive county gentry and the absolutist monarch, whereby liberty 
can be maintained under a monarch with the rule of common law through 
parliament.  The date of the play, after the failed short parliament of 1640 and the 
calling of the long parliament later that year, emphasises the need for such a 
conciliatory position. 
 
 As interlopers into the beggars’ kingdom, Vincent, Hilliard, Meriel and 
Rachel are well placed to compare the beggars’ liberties with political subjection, 
and their concerns are particular to Charles’s reign: 
 
 Vincent: With them there is no Grievance or Perplexity; 
  No fear of war, or State Disturbances. 
  No Alteration in a Common-wealth, 
  Or Innovation shakes a Thought of theirs. 
 
 […] 
 
 Hilliard: We have no fear of lessening our Estates; 
  Nor any grudge with us (without Taxation) 
  To lend or give upon command, the whole 
  Strength of our Wealth for the publick Benefit: 
  While some, that are held rich in their Abundance, 
  (Which is their great Misery, indeed) will see 
  Rather a generall ruine upon all, 
  Then give a Scruple to prevent the Fall. (Joviall Crew, sigs. L3r-L3v) 
 
Vincent’s observations describe a settled, peaceful state, without fear of war or 
rebellion or religious upheaval (‘innovation’). The recent Scottish wars, personal 
rule and dissolved parliaments suggest these are all fears relevant to a Caroline 
gentleman, and Hilliard’s description of the beggars’ financial freedoms also picks 
up this theme. The reference to lending or giving on command evokes the collection 
of the Forced Loan and ship money, and Hilliard’s parenthetical ‘without taxation’ 
highlights the potential illegitimacy of such Crown demands.  Nevertheless, he says, 
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the beggars are unconcerned about them, whereas the wealthy are unprepared to 
contribute, regardless of the political consequences. Once again the position of the 
King and his wealthier subjects are set in opposition.  In a political debate which 
essentially involves the legal rights of subjects over their own property versus the 
rights of the King, the beggars are free from the fears caused by these commands 
because they have no estate to lose.  Nevertheless, whilst acknowledging the fears 
of those affected by Charles’s laws, Hilliard’s comment also notes the necessity of 
compliance to prevent ‘general ruine’, and suggests a stubbornness rather than 
inability in those unwilling to do so who allow a ‘scruple’ to prevent them.  Thus, 
the debate is brought to centre upon the good of the commonwealth, not the rights 
of the individual subject and king.  Polarising the prerogative position of the king 
(‘without taxation’) and the objections of the landowners (‘scruple’) will bring 
about this ruin.  Only by creating compromise will the situation be rectified. 
 
Although Hilliard leaves his listeners to speculate what the threatened 
‘general ruine’ is, (the beggar-poet) Scribble’s masque for the wedding of the two 
old beggars almost immediately ends this speculation: 
 
Poet: I would have the Country, the City, and the Court, be at great variance 
for Superiority. Then would I have Divinity and Law stretch their wide 
throats to appease and reconcile them: Then would I have the Souldier 
cudgel them all together, and overtop them all. (Joviall Crew, sig. M1v) 
 
This is a very bleak outlook for the future; the fragmentation of the country in the 
division of court, city and country will become irreparable without immediate 
compromise.  The future is not so bleak for the beggars in this masque, however, 
who will ‘at last, overcome the Souldier; and bring them all to Beggars-Hall’ 
(Joviall Crew, sig.M1v).  At this point the beggars resume their position as an 
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idealised, free, apolitical entity.  Only those who have not been involved in the 
political wrangling for ‘superiority’ will emerge from it undamaged.   
 
In disagreeing over their approach to the legal status and potential 
punishment of ‘Statute Beggars’ (Joviall Crew, sig. E1r), Clack and Oldrents 
represent a fragmentation of authority, caused by a split between the centre and the 
provinces in the dissolution of parliament.  This fragmentation can only begin to be 
repaired by attention to the type of political society the same beggars represent.  
This compromise (monarchy ruling with parliament and in accordance with 
common law suggested in Springlove’s beggar society) facilitates a happy ending to 
the play, bringing the Justice and landlord to a greater accommodation between their 
previously polarised positions.  Oldrent’s moral/legal superiority is undermined 
through the Patrico’s disclosure that he has an illegitimate son (Springlove) by a 
beggar woman, and the revelation of Oldrents’s ancestor’s own illegitimate legal 
manoeuvrings to establish his position in society goes some way to levelling him 
with Clack’s manoeuvrings. Clack too is brought to relax his hold over county 
governance, providing entertainment for his guests and ‘sleeping’ whilst the beggars 
put on their play: ‘Law and Justice shall sleep, and Mirth and good Fellowship ride 
a Circuit here to night’ (Joviall Crew, sig.N3r).  Neither position in itself is 
particularly satisfactory: the landowner is no longer ideal, and Clack only permits 
this license because he is drunk.  The end of the play is not unreserved in its hope 
for the future. However through the marriage of Springlove and Amie (Oldrents’s 
and Clack’s children) who meet at the beggars’ commonwealth which is physically 
(and metaphorically) in the space between Oldrents’s and Clack’s estates, a 
reconciliation of these polarised positions is initiated.   
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Conclusion. 
 
 On the Caroline stage, the Justice of the Peace (as a figure appointed by the 
Crown) is often used to illustrate the spread of central authority in the imposition of 
impersonal and prerogative law in the provinces, and its implications for local 
governance.  The conflicts of interest between a usually self-seeking Justice and 
other figures of authority suggest that Charles I’s attempts to centralise the 
government of the localities were not always in their best interests and created an 
almost impossible predicament for those who attempted to maintain order – if not 
strictly law – in their area.  The Weeding of Covent Garden’s Cockbrayne is able to 
restore order in Covent Garden through the assertion of his authority (when this is 
for the general good, and recognised by those he governs) because as the only figure 
of judicial authority he faces no conflicting interest and little challenge.  However, A 
Tale of a Tub highlights the difficulties faced by local officials in negotiating 
community and law, but provides no solution to the problem.  As the period 
progresses, this divide between the demands of central law (increasingly identified 
with royal prerogative) and provincial life, and between the kingly authorities and 
local officials, widens on the Caroline stage.  Attempts to maintain communication 
between the centre and the provinces through local landlords is, A Joviall Crew 
suggests, a somewhat doubtful enterprise, and unless a compromise is reached 
between the centre and the provinces there will be ‘generall ruine’ (Joviall Crew, 
sig. L3v).    In the same way that Charles’s attempts to impose a more absolutist 
regime upon the country brought about a competing authority in the common law, 
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his attempts to centralise the government of the counties, rather than merely 
highlighting an existing but unthreatening discrepancy in the attitudes to law of 
central and local officials, created a fracture in the chain of government from the 
centre to the localities.  This fracture potentially leads to a complete break between 
the centre and the provinces, and the fragmentation not only of law and government, 
but society as whole. 
241 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Theatre of the Courtroom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The trial and subsequent execution of Thomas Wentworth, earl of Strafford, 
constitutes one of the great set-piece dramas of English history: an intensely 
theatrical confrontation of one of Charles I’s ministers with some of his most 
determined critics, as well as a curtain-raiser for the confrontations of the 
Civil War. (Kilburn and Milton, 1996, 230) 
 
 
 
There is an inevitable connection between the theatre and the courtroom; 
trials are inherently dramatic.  The Earl of Strafford’s trial was conducted, Terence 
Kilburn and Anthony Milton argue, in a public arena through printed reports of the 
prosecution and response (1996, passim), as well as in the court of Parliament.  
However, their opening statement focuses not on the trial itself, or indeed upon the 
publications surrounding it; rather, they highlight the political context of the trial 
and the theatricality of the occasion, describing it in explicitly theatrical terms (‘set-
piece drama’, ‘theatrical confrontation’ and ‘curtain raiser’).  The interconnection of 
politics, courtroom and theatre, exemplified in Wentworth’s trial, is the focus of this 
chapter.  Trials, real and fictional, are the place of the practical imposition of the 
directives of the legitimate legal authorities discussed in the previous chapters.  
Here, I will discuss the different kinds of court, perceptions of them in drama, and 
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the courts’ relationship with the king, before examining the use of trial scenes in 
Massinger’s The Roman Actor (1625), Ford’s The Ladies Triall (1638), Brome’s 
The Antipodes (1638) and Shirley’s The Traitor (1631), suggesting that these scenes 
not only provide an opportunity for the staged presentation of the workings of the 
law and legal authority – or their perceived workings – but also that these scenes, 
and the theatre, provide a forum for the trial of issues of social, cultural and political 
importance, including the legitimacy of legal authority itself. 
 
 
Jurisdictions 
 
Although the King held ultimate judicial power, in practice his role as judge 
was shared amongst his appointed Judges who carried the commands of the 
monarch to the localities, and executed the King’s justice on his behalf.
1
  There 
were several different law courts during the early Stuart period, from the 
ecclesiastical courts to the courts of common law (including the Courts of Common 
Pleas, King’s Bench and Assizes), courts of equity (Chancery) and the Conciliar or 
prerogative courts (Star Chamber, High Court of Admiralty, the Council in the 
North Parts, and the Council in the Principality and the Marches of Wales), and 
finally the High Court of Parliament. This section will give a brief overview of the 
position and jurisdiction of these courts.
2
 
 
                                                
1
 See Chapter 4 for discussion of the relationship between central and local authority. 
2
 Unless otherwise indicated, the descriptions of the courts which follow are based upon Baker, 2002, 
chapters 2, 3, 6 and 7, and information on the Assize courts is based upon Cockburn, 1972, 1-10, 
219-236.  I will not be discussing the activities of the ecclesiastical courts, the Court of Admiralty, or 
the Councils of the North and Marches here. For a discussion of ecclesiastical courts’ jurisdiction 
and practices, see Baker, 2002, 126-134; for Admiralty and the Councils, see Baker, 2002, 121-24, 
and Sharpe, 1992, 448-56.  
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The Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction solely over cases concerning 
commoners, that is, cases of property and land disputes, and therefore not 
concerning the Crown.  Felonies were reserved for the King’s Bench and the local 
Courts of Assize.  Although initially an itinerant court following the monarch, the 
Court of King’s Bench finally settled in the early fifteenth century at Westminster 
Hall.3  Technically, it only held jurisdiction over Middlesex, but appellants 
elsewhere could, with permission from the Court of Chancery, move their case to 
King’s Bench if they felt their case would benefit from a less local hearing.  The 
Court of King’s Bench held session in the South-East corner of Westminster Hall, 
with no inner walls separating it from the Court of Chancery in the South-West 
corner, or from the general activities of ‘shopkeepers, cutpurses and sightseers’ 
(Baker, 2002, 37) in the main body of the Hall. Their positions in Westminster Hall 
made trials at these courts very public events; although public attendance at trials 
was not always so large, the authorities expected such a large audience for the trial 
of the second Earl of Castlehaven in 1631 that a gallery was built in Westminster 
Hall to raise the official proceeding above the general public, and scaffolds for 
observers were also constructed (Herrup, 1999, 50).
4
  The theatrical nature of the 
Castlehaven trial is confirmed in Charles I’s order for a full dress rehearsal of the 
ceremony of the trial, although this was cancelled when there was found to be no 
precedent for such a rehearsal (Herrup, 1999, 51).  This blending of the social and 
the legal, of courtroom, theatre and everyday life, is, I will argue, repeated and 
developed in drama of the period.   
 
                                                
3 For a detailed description of the development of King’s Bench up to the fifteenth century, see also 
Sayles, 1959, passim. 
4
 Herrup notes that ‘[a]dded construction was standard practice in important trials; so many observers 
had crowded into the Hall in 1616 during the trial of the Earl of Somerset that a scaffold had 
collapsed’ (1999, 50). 
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All courts were open to the public, and the Courts of Assize made sure that 
the forms and processes of the common law courtroom were known all over the 
country.  Assizes took place regularly in the localities, conducted by Judges from 
the Bench Courts of Common Pleas and King’s Bench.  This allowed for gaol 
delivery and the resolution of cases outside the capabilities of the local Justices of 
the Peace, as well as providing the opportunity for the dissemination of the policies 
of central government in the localities. It was this, Cockburn argues, that made the 
judiciary indistinguishable from the government whose policies they sought to 
uphold (Cockburn, 1972, 236).  That the judges were appointed by the King also 
contributed to this perception. More recently, however, Kevin Sharpe has argued 
that ‘[a]s a bench […] the judges were far less the willing agents in royal 
programmes than they are often presented’ (Sharpe, 1992, 663), and indeed, a 
number of dismissals for failure to comply with or enforce royal policy under James 
VI and I and Charles I supports this argument. 
 
Other courts lay outside the ordinary remit of the common law courts.  The 
Court of Chancery, for example, was a court of equity.  It was more concerned with 
individual cases and fair results than with general rules and the rigid implementation 
of law, and as it was not a court of record, Chancery judges (usually the Chancellor 
himself) need not be concerned about setting precedent with their judgements.
5
  As 
it was concerned primarily with issues irresolvable at common law, there was 
initially no conflict between this court and King’s Bench and the other common law 
courts.  However, there were times when Chancery clashed with the common law 
                                                
5
 For a more detailed discussion of courts of equity, see Baker, 2002, 105-11, and a shorter definition 
with a brief history of the Court of Chancery see ODL,  ‘equity n.’   
Courts of record are courts whose acts and judicial proceeding are permanently maintained and 
recorded. See ODL ‘court of record’.  
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courts; Lord Chancellor Ellesmere (1596-1617), for example, heard suits in 
Chancery which had already been concluded at common law, thus interfering with 
the jurisdiction of the common law courts and causing conflict between Egerton and 
the Judges in 1613-1616.  The events which followed led to the downfall of Edward 
Coke as Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, and a royal decree which allowed the 
Chancellor to hear cases in Chancery after judgement had been passed at common 
law.
6
  Indeed, the practice of moving cases from court to court was not unusual and 
finds its way into Caroline drama, as the lawyer in The Antipodes tells his client:  
‘Your case is cleare; I understand it fully, / And need no more instructions, this shall 
serve, / To firke your Adversary from Court to Court’ (Antipodes, sig. F1r).  Mihil 
in Brome’s The Weeding of Covent Garden also threatens to move the Shoemaker 
and Taylor through several courts if they try to force him to pay them, making 
specific reference to Chancery court: 
 
Mihil: You clap a Sergeant o’ my back. I put in bail, remove it, and carry it 
up into the upper Court, with habeas Corpus; bring it down again into the 
lower Court with procedendo; then take it from thence, and bring it into the 
Chancery with a Certiorari; I, and if you look not to’t, bring it out of the 
Chancery again, and thus will I keep you from your money till your suite 
and your boots be worne out before you recover penny of me. (Weeding of 
Covent Garden, sig. C4r) 
 
The deferral of judgement brought about by the unclear limitations of each court’s 
authority here is indicative of the wider problem of destabilised legal authority 
when the limits of law and prerogative are under question. 
 
 The Court of Star Chamber is the clearest example of the problematic 
combination of court and politico-legal authority.  Like Chancery, the conciliar 
                                                
6
 Baker summarises the chain of events which succeeded, during which Coke, as Chief Justice of the 
Kings Bench, entered a legal battle with Ellesmere leading finally to Coke’s dismissal (Baker, 2002, 
108-9).   
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Court of Star Chamber was also initially a court of equity, but developed its 
criminal jurisdiction more clearly than Chancery.  Jonson’s The New Inn makes 
positive reference to the court for finding truth and bringing about justice: 
 
 There is a royall Court o’the Star-chamber 
 Will scatter all these mists, disperse these vapours, 
 And cleare the truth. Let beggers match with beggers. 
 That shall decide it, I will try it there. (New Inn, sig. G5r) 
 
There is no reason to suppose that Beaufort’s professed faith in the justice of this 
court is ironic or untrue.  However, Star Chamber later became the most 
controversial of the extraordinary courts when it was closely associated with the 
enforcement of Charles I’s policies.  This may have been due to its shared personnel 
with the Privy Council (Jones, 1971, 18), or with the rise in the number of cases at 
Star Chamber regarding matters of prerogative.
7
  Cheyney argues that there was, 
under Charles, a marked increase in the number of cases brought before the court 
concerning the punishment of those who opposed or were disrespectful to officials 
or the sovereign, and that its procedure ‘savored far more of the Roman than of the 
common law’ (Cheyney, 1913: 747, 737), contributing to suspicions regarding its 
association with absolutist policies and practices. The Star Chamber also developed 
a reputation for secrecy which was not entirely undeserved, despite the fact that, as 
with the common law courts, it was open to the public.
8
  Although it had no 
authority to sentence to death (this had to be done under common law as the 
defendant had to be found guilty by a jury of his peers), the gruesome punishments 
Star Chamber was able to authorise, such as ear cropping and nose slitting, also 
helped establish a reputation as an instrument of autocratic government.  Despite 
                                                
7 Baker notes that the main difference between Star Chamber and the Privy Council meeting was that 
the Chief Justices of the two benches sat at the Star Chamber meetings, but they did not attend the 
Privy Council (Baker, 2002, 118, n.4). 
8
 Witnesses were examined in secret and their testimonies were not made available to cross-
examining counsel until all parties had completed their examination (Barnes, 1962, 228-9). 
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this, T. G. Barnes argues that Star Chamber did not uphold the King’s prerogative 
any more than the established common law courts, and that defendants were more 
likely to have their say there than in other courts (Barnes, 1961, 4, 9).  Nevertheless, 
as the Caroline period progressed, Star Chamber did gain a reputation as an 
instrument of royal policy, acting in the King’s interest rather than the people’s.  
Such a perception contributed to its abolition by Parliament in 1641, as it was 
‘cleerly and absolutely dissolved’ because ‘the proceedings, censures, and Decrees 
of that Court, have by experience been found to be an intolerable burthen to the 
subject, and the meanes to introduce an Arbitrary power and Government’ (England 
and Wales, ‘Two acts of Parliament’ 1640, B2v).
9
 
  
 It is not possible to distinguish which of the courts outlined above is 
represented in the trial scenes to be discussed in the following sections, and 
attempting to identify particular courts, judges and trials represented in these plays 
is not the aim of this chapter; as Subha Mukherji has argued, ‘instances in which the 
relation between dramatic fiction and real events is direct and intended are rare’ 
(Mukherji, 2006b, 14).  It is, instead, concerned with the ways in which courts and 
judges were perceived to function.  What is at stake in trial scenes on the Caroline 
stage is not the guilt or innocence of the defendant; rather, they present a critique of 
social, cultural and legal issues of the period including: moral criticism of the 
theatre in The Roman Actor; social assumptions over gender and transgression in 
The Ladies Triall, and perceived practices of judges and prosecutors in The 
Antipodes and The Traytor.  I will argue that ultimately what is at stake in the trials 
                                                
9
 This was not the only complaint against the Star Chamber.  The anonymous The Star Chamber 
epitomized also suggests that the clerks and lawyers associated with the Court were perceived to 
impose unreasonably high prices for their services (Anon, 1641, passim). 
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of these issues on the Caroline stage is a greater trial of legitimate judicial and legal 
authority. 
 
 
Absolute judicial power: The Roman Actor  
 
 In the early action of Massinger’s The Roman Actor Paris, the leading actor, 
is summoned to appear before the Senate on charges of treason.  As he is taken to 
trial, he encourages his colleagues not to fear the outcome: 
 
 Nay droope not fellowes, innocence should be bould 
 We that have personated in the Sceane 
 The ancient Heroes, and the falles of Princes 
 With loud applause, being to act our selves, 
 Must doe it with undaunted confidence. 
 What ere our sentence be think `tis in sport. 
And though condemn’d lets heare it without sorrow 
As if we were to live againe to morrow. (Roman Actor, sig. B1v-B2r) 
 
The exhortation makes an explicit connection between the stage and his trial, 
exemplifying the theatre of the courtroom with which this chapter began.  That Paris 
sees the actors’ appearance at court as acting ‘our selves’, suggests he views the 
trial, and the world, as a theatrical production in which all people act a part.  This is 
a recurrent theme in The Roman Actor, in which there are several plays within the 
play, and where the emperor Domitian himself is often the stage manager.
10
  The 
confidence Paris appeals for in his colleagues is evident in his own actions at trial, 
as Aretinus asks ‘Are you on the Stage / You talke so boldly?’ (Roman Actor, sig. 
C1v), confirming the court/stage analogy.  However, it is clear that his confidence 
lies in the theatrical possibility made available by this analogy that a protagonist 
                                                
10
 For discussions of the theatricality of The Roman Actor and the importance of Domitian as stage-
manager, see Goldberg, 1989, 203-209, and Hartley, 2001, passim.  Hartley also discusses in this 
article the importance of performing obedience to Domitian’s power in the play. 
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condemned to death will live again in the next day’s performance.  Here the analogy 
falls short: should the actors be sentenced to death, whatever role they play, they 
will not live again tomorrow.  Indeed, Paris’s security even in theatrical resurrection 
also proves to be misplaced, as he is really killed in Domitian’s later production of 
‘The False Servant’ in an enactment of the emperor’s arbitrary justice.
11
 
 
 The trial itself collapses not only the court and the stage, but also the social, 
political and theatrical worlds of the play:  
 
 Aret[inus]:  In thee, as being chiefe of thy profession, 
  I doe accuse the qualitie of treason, 
  As libellers against the state and Caesar. 
 
Par[is]: Meere accusations are not proofes my Lord, 
 In what are we delinquents? 
 
Aret.:  You are they 
 That search into the secrets of the time, 
 And vnder fain’d names on the Stage present 
 Actions not to be toucht at; and traduce 
 Persons of rancke, and qualitie of both Sexes, 
 And with Satiricall, and bitter jests 
 Make even the Senators ridiculous 
 To the Plebeans.  (Roman Actor, sigs. C1r-C1v) 
 
In The Roman Actor’s world of informers, emperor’s spies (of whom Aretinus is 
one (B1v)) and imperial summary judgements, Paris’s statement that ‘accusations 
are not proofes’ is an important distinction.  However, it also feeds into Paris’s 
defence against the libel charges, in which accusations do become proof, not of the 
guilt of the actors, but of the guilt of the accuser of the acts presented on stage: 
 
  And for traducing such  
 That are above us, publishing to the world 
  Their secret crimes we are as innocent 
                                                
11 See Chapter 2, pp.86-101 for a discussion of the legitimacy of Domitian’s arbitrary authority. 
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 As such as are borne dumbe.  When we present 
  An heyre, that does conspire against the life 
 Of his deare parent, numbring every houre 
  He lives as tedious to him, if there be 
 Among the auditors one whose conscience tells him, 
  He is of the same mould we cannot helpe it. 
 Or bringing on the stage a loose adultresse 
  […] 
 […] if a Matron 
  However great in fortune, birth or titles, 
 Guilty of such a foule unnaturall sinne, 
 Crie out tis writ by me, we cannot help it. 
  […] 
  If any in this reverend assemblie, 
Nay e’ne your selfe my Lord, that are the image 
Of absent Caesar feele something in your bosome 
That puts you in remembrance of things past, 
Or things intended tis not in us to helpe it.   
(Roman Actor, sigs. C2r-C2v) 
 
This defence is part of a broad ranging debate over the ‘application’ of characters 
and stories on stage to contemporary people and events.  Although here Paris is 
accused only of personal satire, Andrew Gurr argues that a ‘substantial change that 
had taken place by 1620 was the use of plays for a larger scale of political comment 
than is evident earlier’ and that this ‘made the post of Master of the Revels as censor 
of plays a much hotter seat than it had been’ (1996, 133-4).  Massinger himself was 
no stranger to censorship over political issues.
12
   Paris’s defence claims that if a 
                                                
12
 Massinger and Fletchers’s Sir John Van Olden Barnavelt was subject to censorship in 1619 
(Reinheimer, 1998, 319). Bentley makes only brief mention of this censorship (JCS, III. 416).  
Reinheimer also suggests that The Bondman (1623) ‘flirted’ with censorship, but Bentley’s entry for 
this play (JCS, IV, 765-770) gives no such suggestion.  Massinger’s Believe as You List was 
censored and rewritten with the characters’ names changed so as not to reflect so closely recent 
political occurrences in the Palatinate. Herbert noted on 11th January 1630/1:  ‘I did refuse to allow 
of a play of Messinger’s because itt did contain dangerous matter, as the deposing of Sebastian king 
of Portugal, by Philip the [Second,] and ther being a peace sworen twixte the kings of England and 
Spayne’ (JCS, IV, 762).  S.R. Gardiner gives a detailed analysis of the ways in which Believe as You 
List reflects Frederick’s loss of the Palatinate in James VI and I’s reign and can be seen to resemble 
closely Caroline negotiations with Spain regarding the Palatinate (Gardiner, 1876, 499-503).  Allen 
Gross, however, questions whether Massinger would have sufficient knowledge of contemporary 
court manoeuvring to give so close an analogy of Anglo-Spanish negotiations as Gardiner suggests, 
but admits that he cannot disagree with Gardiner’s general parallel between Antiochus and Frederick 
(Gross, 1966, passim, especially 283 and 288).  Massinger’s The King and Subject (1638) was 
heavily censored at the King’s command for an explicit comment on prerogative taxation, spoken by 
a Spanish King to his subjects: 
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person or play does catch the conscience of someone in the audience, this does not 
prove the actors intended it, but it does suggest a guilty conscience in the accuser, or 
a malicious intent in the applier.
13
   
 
Paris’s argument is, then, a wider defence of all players from such 
allegations.  That Paris is representative of all actors – Roman and Caroline – is also 
evident in the other argument of his defence.  He is not only concerned with 
political and personal application, but with a moral defence of playing:  
 
 But ’tis urg’d 
 That we corrupt youth, and traduce superiours: 
 When doe we bring a vice upon the Stage, 
 That does goe off unpunish’d? doe we teach 
 By the successe of wicked undertakings, 
 Others to tread, in their forbidden steps? 
We show no arts of Lidian Pandarisme, 
Corinthian poisons, Persian flatteries 
But mulcted so in the conclusion that 
Even those spectators that were so inclin’d, 
Go home chang’d men. (Roman Actor, sig. C2r) 
 
In answering more than he was charged with (the charge against him makes no 
reference to corrupting youth), Paris emphasises that his trial is a trial of the theatre, 
not of the actor himself, and thus the platform of the stage(d) trial allows Massinger 
                                                                                                                                    
 Monys? Wee’le rayse supplies what ways we please, 
 And force you to subscribe to blanks, in which 
 We’le mulct you as wee shall thinke fitt.  The Caesars 
 In Rome were wise, acknowledginge no lawes 
 But what their swords did ratifye, the wives 
 And daughters of the senators bowinge to 
 Their wills, as deities. 
 
According to Herbert, who noted the passage as ‘for ever to bee remembered by my son and those 
that cast their eyes on it, in honour of Kinge Charles, my master’, who himself read the play and 
marked this passage as  ‘too insolent, and to bee changed’ (Dutton, 1991, 91).  Ironically, this is the 
only passage of the play that now remains.  This passage and Charles’s comments, read in the light 
of Paris’s argument that the playwright and actors cannot help it if a person sees themselves in a 
play’s character could produce interesting speculation about Charles’ own understanding of his 
prerogative taxation practices. 
13
 ‘Part of the reason why the Chamberlain’s Men got away with staging Richard II for the Essex 
conspirators was because it had been the conspirators’ choice, not the players’ to ‘apply’ the play’s 
story to Elizabeth and Essex’ (Gurr, 1996, 133).  
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the opportunity to respond to contemporary anti-theatrical tracts, such as Alexander 
Leighton’s ‘A Short treatise Against Stage-Playes’ published in 1625.
 14
  This 
treatise was dedicated to ‘the High and Honourable House of Parliament Assembled 
May xxiii 1625’ and David Reinheimer suggests that the anti-theatrical element of 
Parliament must have taken its arguments to heart as their first act prevented the 
performance of plays on Sundays (1998, 318).  It cannot be coincidence under these 
contemporary theatrical circumstances that it is the Senate, in the absence of the 
Emperor (who is Paris’s patron), which brings Paris to trial.  Reinheimer suggests 
that the scene invites this allegorical reading: 
  
In Rome, Paris should be judged by Domitian, not the Senate, just as the 
Caroline stage should be under the aegis of Charles’s Master of the Revels.  
But Aretinus drags the actor before the Senate while Domitian is still out on 
campaign, trying a political end run.  Massinger sees Parliament’s legislation 
as the same kind of political machination, a ploy that tries to take advantage 
of a newly crowned king. (Reinheimer, 1998, 330) 
 
Aretinus’s decision to ‘reserve to [Domitian] / The Censure of this cause’ (Roman 
Actor, sig. C3r) shakes the certainty of Reinheimer’s analogy a little, but perhaps 
also suggests that in such matters Parliament should defer to the king’s judgement. 
 
 Although Jonathan Goldberg claims that at the end of the scene, the emperor 
exonerates Paris and the actors (Goldberg, 1989, 204), this is not entirely true: the 
Senate abandons the matter at the return of the victorious emperor and the case is 
not mentioned again.  We can assume that the players are acquitted as Paris returns 
to acting, but this is not seen on stage, and the implicit acquittal allows the theatre 
audience themselves to condemn or acquit the actors.  The interpretive power of the 
audience is confirmed by the closing of Paris’ defence: ‘I have said, my Lord, and 
                                                
14
 For a detailed discussion of the relationship between The Roman Actor and this anti-theatrical tract 
see Reinheimer, 1998, passim.  
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now as you find cause / Or censure us, or free us with applause’ (Roman Actor, sig. 
C2v).  This is, if one were necessary, a further iteration of the courtroom / theatre 
analogy in echoing the epilogue of several early Stuart plays but, more significantly, 
it places the responsibility for theatrical guilt on the (on and off stage) audiences’ 
interpretation.
15
 Whatever their decision, however, it is the emperor / king’s 
decision which is the most important.  The deferral of the Senate to Domitian 
demonstrates that in this play, the absolute power of the emperor both supersedes 
(in their deferral to him) and precludes the judgement of the Senate.   
 
After Paris’s Senate appearance there are no trials, but instead summary 
imperial judgements upon Philargus, Lamia, Sura, Rusticus and, finally, Paris. 
Domitian’s judgement of Paris for his acquiescence in Domitia’s desire for him 
confirms the personal and absolute nature of the emperor’s judicial authority: 
 
 Caes[ar]:  O that thy fault had bin 
  But such as I might pardon; if thou hadst 
  In wantonnesse (like Nero) fir’d proud Rome 
  Betraide an armie, butcherd the whole Senate, 
  Committed Sacriledge, or any crime 
  The justice of our Roman lawes cals death, 
  I had prevented any intercession 
  And freely sign’d thy pardon. 
 
 Par[is]:  But for this 
  Alas you cannot, nay you must not Sir 
  Nor let it to posteritie be recorded 
  That Caesar unreveng’d sufferd a wrong, 
  Which if a private man should sit downe with it 
  Cowards would baffell him.  (Roman Actor, sig.H4r) 
 
That Domitian would rather pardon offences against Rome than against himself is 
further evidence of his arbitrary judgement, and suggests that his acts toward Paris 
                                                
15
 Goldberg notes that the end of Paris’s speech is reminiscent of the epilogue to The Tempest (1989, 
204). 
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will be of personal revenge unauthorised by Roman law.
16
  This time, the trial by 
the Senate must be bypassed rather than voluntarily passed over because Paris’s 
crime is not capital according to law.  His willingness to accept Domitian’s sentence 
without offering a defence to prevent his death (‘To hope for life, or pleade in the 
defence / Of my ingratitude were againe to wrong you’ (H4r)) after his previous 
lengthy defence before the Senate emphasises the personal power and authority of 
the emperor.
17
  Domitian’s subjects should not question his authority, and those who 
do act against him, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, will be punished by his successor. 
 
 
Domesticating judicial authority: The Ladies Triall  
 
 John Ford’s The Ladies Triall places the personal judicial power of the 
emperor of The Roman Actor into a domestic setting.  The plot of the play centres 
on the relationship between Auria and his wife Spinella.  Auria goes to war, returns 
successful, and as a reward the Duke appoints him governor of Corsica. At his 
                                                
16 The King in James Shirley’s The Cardinal is also more concerned with the affront to him of 
Columbo’s murder of Alvarez than with the murder itself: 
 
 And if I should forgive 
 His timeless death, I cannot the offence, 
 That with such boldness struck at me. Has my 
 Indulgence to your merits which are great 
 Made me so cheap, your rage could meet no time 
 Nor place for your revenge, but where my eys 
 Must be affrighted, and affronted with  
 The bloody execution? This contempt  
 Of Majesty transcends my power to pardon, 
 And you shall feel my anger Sir. (The Cardinal, sig. D2r) 
 
The repeated calls for justice in this play, along with this preference of Majesty over law demonstrate 
a corruption of legal authority away from the focus of justice to a manipulation by favourites to 
further personal interest. 
17
 Paris does offer something in mitigation of his crime, so that Caesar may pardon him when he is 
dead, giving his ‘frailtie, / Her will, and the temptation of that beautie / Which you could not resist’ 
(Roman Actor, sig. H4r) as his defence.   The emperor’s poor example explains, although does 
excuse, a similar action in one of his subjects. 
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return, his friend Aurelio finds Spinella alone with Adurni and accuses them of 
adultery.  Auria acts as judge at her trial. It is through his position of dual authority 
that the play questions the judicial power and legal position of the monarch: Auria is 
representative of political authority in his position as governor of Corsica, and by 
the husband / king analogy of patriarchalist theory and theatrical convention.  Auria 
himself refers to his domestic kingdom in his initially happy marriage to Spinella: 
 
I had a kingdome once, but am depos’d 
From all that royaltie of blest content, 
by a confederacie twixt love and frailtie. (Ladies Triall, sig. F3v) 
 
Whilst it might, in a play which conducts a trial of Spinella’s virtue, be assumed 
that the ‘frailtie’ referred to here is hers, as the play progresses the social 
assumptions and judgements of sexual behaviour suggesting this interpretation are 
brought into question, and the ‘frailtie’ of male faith becomes a possibility. The play 
explores several meanings of the ‘trial’ in its title:  the audience will see a trial (test) 
of Spinella’s virtue, her trial (hearing) for her supposed offence, and a trial 
(questioning) of the contemporary social assumptions regarding gender which led to 
Spinella’s alleged guilt.  This is not merely the ‘Lady’s trial’, but also potentially, 
the ‘Ladies’ Trial’.  It is through these different kinds of trial, I will argue, that the 
play also presents, less obviously, a trial of legitimate legal authority.  
 
Throughout the play, the use of legal terms maintains a close association 
between the domestic and politico-legal world.  From the moment Aurelio finds 
Adurni and Spinella together, their argument over her guilt or innocence of adultery 
is not made in moral terms but in legal ones.  Adurni comments, ‘Rich conquest, / 
To triumph on a Ladies injur’d fame, / Without a proofe or warrant’ (Ladies Triall, 
sig. E3r), and Spinella herself picks up on this legal register, saying: 
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I must beg 
 Your charities; sweet sister, yours to leave me, 
 I need no fellowes now: let me appeare, 
 Or mine owne lawyer, or in open court 
 (Like some forsaken client) in my suit 
 Be cast for want of honest plea – – oh misery. (Ladies Triall, sig. E3v) 
 
Spinella invites a courtroom trial of her honour during which she will represent 
herself either as a lawyer for her defence, or appear in court without a lawyer to 
defend herself under presumption of her guilt (‘for want of honest plea’).  This 
refers to the legal practice that if a defendant refuses to enter a plea, the court 
proceeds ‘pro confesso’ (as if the accused had pleaded guilty).
18
  The idea of 
Spinella going on trial to defend her virtue is continued in her sister Castanna’s 
concern that Spinella should not be followed: 
 
Ad[urni]:  Her resolution’s violent, quickly follow, 
 
Cast[anna] By no means (sir) y’aue followed her already, 
 I feare with too much ill successe in triall, 
 Of unbecoming courtesies. (Ladies Triall, sig. E3v) 
 
The word order here allows the possibility that Spinella’s trial for her supposed 
infidelity will meet with ‘ill successe’ for her, before it becomes clear that Castanna 
is referring to the trial of Spinella’s chastity in Adurni’s attempt to seduce her. 
 
                                                
18
 At the trial of Bastwick, Burton, and Prynne in Star Chamber in 1637, the gentlemen were 
‘injoyned to put in their answers to the Information by Munday next came sennight, by the advice of 
their counsell, and under their hands, or else the matters of the Information should be taken against 
them pro confesso’ (Prynne, 1641, 20-21).  Despite attempting to enter pleas they wrote and signed 
themselves, Bastwick and Prynne were tried pro confesso because these were not entered on their 
behalf and signed by their lawyers (Prynne, 1641, 21-33).  Spinella’s reference to a ‘forsaken client’ 
may make reference to this trial, as Bastwick and Prynne both claimed they were unable to give 
answer through their lawyers because they refused act for them (Prynne, 1641, 27, 29-30). Charles 
I’s refusal to plead at his trial created much discussion amongst the judges as to whether they should 
proceed, as they would in a less unusual trial, pro confesso, and instructions to this effect were 
incorporated into the ordinance passed by the Commons on 1st January 1649. This was, according to 
Sean Kelsey, to limit the King’s options when he came to trial.  Nevertheless, the King was given 
between nine and twelve more opportunities to enter a plea after the usual time to do so was past 
(2004, 4, paragraph 9; 8, paragraph 21).  This suggests a reluctance to assume the King’s guilt, as 
this meant execution became almost inevitable.   
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 It is not clear that Spinella and Adurni’s ‘trial’ takes place in a courtroom. 
Indeed, in The Ladies Triall, the trial scenes are little more than a discussion 
between Spinella, Adurni, Aurelio, and Auria, as accused pair, accuser and judge 
respectively: 
 
 Adur[ni]:  Stand Aurelio, 
  And justifie thine accusation boldly, 
  Spare me the needlesse use of my confession, 
  And having told no more, then what thy jealousie 
  Possest thee with againe before my face, 
  Urge to thy friend the breach of hospitalitie 
  Adurni trespast in, and thou conceavst  
  Against Spinella; why proofes grow faint, 
  If barely not suppos’d, Ile answere guilty. 
 
Aure[lio]:  You come not here to brave us. 
 
Adur.: No Aurelio 
 But to reply upon that brittle evidence, 
 To which thy cunning never shall rejoyne. 
 I make my Judge my Jurie, be accountant 
 Whither withall the eagernesse of spleene 
 Of a suspitious rage can plead, thou hast 
 Enforc’d the likelihood of scandall. (Ladies Triall, sig. I1r)  
 
Although the play gives no stage directions for scenery to indicate a court, their 
language (‘confession’, ‘proofes’, ‘guilty’, ‘evidence’) invites comparison with 
legal proceedings and presents Auria, whose new position as governor of Corsica 
makes him the obvious choice, as Judge.  In his answer to Aurelio’s accusation, 
Adurni acknowledges his fault in an intention to seduce Spinella, but denies that 
Aurelio has sufficient evidence other than suspicion to make a formal charge of 
adultery.  His response becomes an accusation before his own judge and jury 
(Auria) that it is Aurelio, not Adurni, who has brought potential scandal to Auria’s 
house. The collapse of Judge and Jury in one man suggests absolute authority, as 
Mukherji notes that these roles were kept scrupulously apart in common law 
258 
(2006a, 228).
19
  Auria himself says little during Adurni’s trial, only intervening to 
ask Adurni to say more when he hears of Spinella’s virtue (‘On sir and doe not 
stop.’ (Ladies Triall, sig. I2r)).  The emphasis on ‘proofes’ and ‘evidence’ 
highlights the fact that Aurelio’s accusation is based upon nothing more than 
circumstance, and brings into question the social and cultural assumption (the 
inevitable infidelity of unmonitored young wives) upon which his judgement is 
based.
20
 
 
  Spinella’s language when she appears continues the movement between the 
trial and the domestic sphere: 
 
 Spi[nella]: Tho prove what judge you will, till I can purge 
  Objections which require beliefe and conscience, 
  I have no kindred sister, husband, friend, 
  Or pittie for my plea. (Ladies Triall, sig. K1r) 
 
Whereas Adurni admits the intention to commit his crime but denies carrying out 
the action, Spinella, guilty in neither act nor intention, asks her family who are now 
the impersonal non-familial court and judge, to assume her guilt (have ‘no pittie for 
my plea’).  This draws attention to the fact that Aurelio has already done exactly 
that in his accusation, and highlights that the same assumption has been made of 
Levidolche by both Malfato and Martino during the play.
21
  Spinella’s next 
                                                
19
 Mukherji makes this observation in relation to Francis Bacon’s position as Inquisitor for the Privy 
Council and Star Chamber, which involved examination and torture of witnesses and defendants 
(2006a, 228). 
20 For an exploration of ideas of proof , rhetoric and evidence in relation to common law and 
Aristotelian notions of artificial and inartificial proof in this play, see Mukherji, 2006a, passim. 
21
 Dorothy Farr argues that Spinella’s trial highlights the wrong conclusions Aurelio comes to about 
her (based upon his views on marriage for love and young brides) and Malfato’s misjudgements of 
Levidolche’s attentions to him as a response to Adurni’s abandonment of her.  Thus the trial makes 
both men question the social codes by which they came to these conclusions (Farr, 1979, 134-149, 
especially 143).  Lisa Hopkins argues that Spinella’s success at her trial re-writes plays such as 
Othello, in which innocence is not an effective defence and law cannot protect the female characters 
(1999a, 59-63).  
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statement continues this determination to stand alone, but implicitly transfers the 
guilt to those who have distrusted and accused her on such slim evidence: 
 
  I disclaime all benefit 
 Of mercie from a charitable thought, 
 If one or all the subtilties of malice, 
 If any engine of faithlesse discord, 
 If supposition for pretence in folly, 
 Can poynt out, without injurie to goodnesse, 
 A likelihood of guilt in my behaviour, 
 Which may declare neglect in every dutie, 
 Requir’d fit, or exacted. (Ladies Triall, sig. K1r) 
 
The three conditional clauses here convey Spinella’s confidence in her innocence, 
allowing three possibilities to find evidence against her.  These possibilities, 
however, all involve underhand machinations of ‘malice’, ‘faithlesse discord’ and 
‘pretence in folly’, setting her honesty against the dishonesty of those who might 
accuse her.  Indeed, it is this confidence that Auria notices in Spinella’s defence, 
saying, ‘High and peremptory, / The confidence is masculine’ (Ladies Triall, sig. 
K1r).  For him, her innocence is confirmed in her movement away from womanly 
behaviour.  Although Spinella later acknowledges that in this she has ‘assum’d a 
courage / Above [her] force’, she does, as Auria requires of her, ‘Keepe faire, and 
stand the triall’ (Ladies Triall, sig. K2v, K1r).   
 
Assumptions about gender roles also play an important part in Spinella’s 
defence against Auria’s assertion that infidelity is unpardonable in their marriage 
which was for love, not money or status. She replies: 
 
 My thoughts in that respect are as resolute as yours, 
 The same, yet herein evidence of frailtie 
 Deserv’d not more a separation, 
 Then doth charge of disloyaltie objected 
 Without or ground or witnesse, womans faults 
 Subject to punishments, and mens applauded, 
260 
 Prescribe no lawes in force. (Ladies Triall, sig. K2r) 
 
Her alleged ‘frailtie’, she claims, was no worse than Auria’s willingness to believe 
it without proper evidence. This suggests a kind of frailty in him, which could also 
be understood in Auria’s own reference to a ‘confederacie twixt love and frailtie’ 
(Ladies Triall, sig. F3v) noted earlier.  Spinella’s argument, again blending the 
domestic and legal worlds, claims that men should set a good example: 
patriarchally-devised behavioural norms in relationships (‘lawes’) cannot be 
enforced if men are applauded for their faults and do not set a good example.  This 
perhaps provides the clearest link between the main plot and the sub-plot of the 
fallen Levidolche who attempts to regain respectability having been used and 
abandoned by Adurni and rejected by Malfato.  Spinella’s comment upon obeying 
one’s own laws, following closely upon Adurni’s reference to the ‘power’ and 
‘soveraignty’ of Spinella’s virtue to set ‘bounds to rebell bloods’ (Ladies Triall, sig. 
I1v) and Malfato’s criticism of Auria’s ‘waste kinde of antique soveraigntie’ 
(Ladies Triall, sig. I4v) when he pretends not to recognise his wife as she kneels to 
him, can also be seen as a domestically disguised reference to the necessity for the 
sovereign himself to set a good example in adhering to established laws.
22
 
 
Throughout the process of accusation and trial, Spinella’s ‘masculine’ 
confidence and reasonable argument are contrasted with Aurelio’s earlier 
unreasonable reaction when finding her with Adurni: 
 
 Spi[nella]: What rests behind for me, out with it. 
 
 Aure[lio]:  Horror, 
  Becomming such a forfeit of obedience, 
                                                
22
 See Chapter 2, footnote 14.  See also Chapter 3 for a discussion of the consequences of 
monarchical disregard for law in The Queen and Concubine, pp.185-88. 
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  Hope not that any falsity in friendship 
  Can palliate a broken faith, it dares not 
  Leave in thy prayers (fair vow-breaking wanton) 
  To dresse thy soule new, whose purer whitenesse 
Is sullyd by thy change, from truth to folly. 
  A feareful storme is hovering, it will fall, 
  No shelter can avoyd it, let the guilty 
  Sink under their owne ruine. 
 
Spin: How unmanly 
 His anger threatens mischiefe! (Ladies Triall, sig. E3r-E3v) 
 
In describing his unsubstantiated, angry accusation as ‘unmanly’, the play makes 
explicit a connection between this unmanliness and tyranny, as Castanna challenges 
Aurelio to ‘Use your tyranny’ (Ladies Triall, sig. E3r) immediately before this 
exchange.  Thus the play participates in the theatrical convention which presents 
absolutism, tyranny and submission to will as less than manly.
23
  Spinella’s 
questioning of patriarchal authority in calling Aurelio’s outburst unmanly, and of 
Auria’s position in undermining his charges by reminding him of his duty to her not 
to accept unsubstantiated accusations against her, presents the kind of questioning 
of legal authority by a subject which was not countenanced in Paris’s willing 
submission to Domitian’s tyranny in The Roman Actor ten years earlier. 
 
Although tyranny is associated with Aurelio rather than the governor of 
Corsica himself, Auria’s actions too are questioned and questionable.  His part in 
Spinella’s trial makes him at once ‘judge of both law and fact, and converts the 
judge’s role from that of impartial referee to that of active inquisitor’ (Mukherji, 
2006a, 228-229).   Again he is in the legally problematic position of being both 
judge and jury, and his purpose in trying Spinella is not entirely clear. At times he 
seems convinced of her innocence, even before her defence: 
                                                
23 See Chapter 2 pp.101-117 and Chapter 3, pp.163-65 for more detailed discussions of this idea. 
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Revenge! for what? (uncharitable friend) 
On whom? Lets speak a little pray with reason, 
You found Spinella in Adurnies house, 
Tis like a’ gave her welcome very likely, 
Her sister and another with her, so 
Invited, nobly done; but he with her 
Privatly chamberd, he deserves no wife 
Of worthy qualitie, who dares not trust 
Her virtue in the proofes of any danger. (Ladies Triall, sig. F3v) 
 
His appeals to reason dissociate him, through legal and political discourse of the 
period discussed in Chapter 3, from Aurelio’s tyranny.  But his belief in her virtue 
suggests that the trial he forces her to undergo is a cruelly unnecessary testing of her 
loyalty to him which savours of arbitrary absolutism.  For Auria, it is not enough 
that his wife is chaste; she must prove it through semi-public argument at law.
24
  
 
Having declared at the end of the trial that he finds Spinella’s ‘vertues as 
[he] left them, perfect / Pure, and unflaw’d’ (Ladies Triall, sig. K2v), Auria then, 
with his accepted patriarchal authority, offers her sister Castanna to Adurni in 
marriage.   Significantly, it is made clear that Auria does not impose his authority 
on Castanna; rather she has chosen him as guardian of her ‘faith’. Nevertheless, 
there is an uncomfortable convenience to this marriage.  It seems it has been 
planned by Auria, and ‘is not sudden, / But welcom’d & forethought’ to Adurni 
(whose attempted seduction of Spinella, not Castanna, initiated the trial) but it has 
not been indicated to Castanna or the audience before this point.  Ford draws 
attention to the contrivance, as Spinella comments ‘The courtship’s somewhat 
                                                
24
 Mukherji links his desire for such proof to rhetorical hierarchies understood in the period in the 
‘value-laden distinction in rhetoric between the superiority of artificial proof or ‘invention’ 
constructed by the art of the orator, and the inferiority of external, material signs which the orator 
merely uses’. She argues that in testing Spinella in this way Auria ‘sets himself up as a superior user 
of method in the project of discovery than both Aurelio, who convicts on external, circumstantial 
proof, and the common lookers-on, who might ‘construe’ and ‘presume’ guilt erroneously (I.i.)’ 
(2006a, 229-30). 
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quick’, but Spinella and Castanna then explain this suddenness respectively as ‘the 
use of fate’ and the ‘will of heaven’ (Ladies Triall, sig. K2v).  It becomes clear 
though, that this is not the will of heaven so much as the will of Auria when he 
claims that this was his intention throughout: 
 
 Make no scruple 
(Castanna) of the choice, tis firme and reall, 
Why else have I so long with tamenesse nourisht 
Reports of wrongs, but that I fixt on issue 
Of my desires, Italians use not dalliance 
But execution; herein I degenerated 
From custome of our nation. (Ladies Triall, sig. K3r) 
 
Auria’s wording here is significant in the terms of politico-legal theatrical debate 
identified in this thesis.  He has tested Spinella only to bring about the satisfaction 
of his will (desire), and in doing so has ‘degenerated’ from the custom of his nation, 
suggesting his absolutist leanings. ‘Degenerated’ is a particularly loaded word here: 
whilst it can mean ‘to become altered in nature or character (without implying 
debasement)’, more commonly degeneration implies deficiency or ‘a fall away from 
ancestral virtue or excellence’.
25
  In acting to satisfy his own desires, the ruler who 
does not follow established customary law is in some way declining from a 
previously superior form of legal authority.  This reading is complicated by the 
understanding that in not following the custom of his country, Auria has brought 
about a peaceful resolution rather than challenging Aurelio to a duel for slandering 
his wife. However, the emotional cost to Spinella of the unnecessary trial, evident in 
Castanna’s observation ‘She faints’ (Ladies Triall, sig. K2v), suggests that the 
governor’s attempts to confirm his authority by testing subjects’ loyalty and his 
focus on the ‘issue of [his] desires’ rather than the welfare of his subjects is an 
inappropriate and potentially ‘degenerate’ form of government.    
                                                
25 OED ‘degenerate, v.’ 3 and 1. 
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Judicial practices: The Antipodes  
 
 Whilst The Roman Actor and The Ladies Triall use trials to subject the 
judicial and legal authority of the monarch-as-judge to scrutiny in terms of the 
ultimate monarchical authority to judge, testing subjects’ loyalty, and adhering to 
ones own laws, the position and practices of Judges themselves are not examined.  
The trial scene in Brome’s The Antipodes moves the focus away from the King’s 
judicial power and position, presenting instead a comic but critical comment on not 
only the perceived practices but also the position of lower ranking and local 
Justices.  Unlike the trials already discussed in this chapter, the trial in The 
Antipodes is not real: it is one of the many plays-within-the-play in which events 
contrary to conventional activities take place, designed by Doctor Hughball with the 
help of Letoy to bring Peregrine back to his senses.
26
   
 
Having declared himself King of the Antipodes, Peregrine is witness to, and 
comments on, a trial conducted by Byplay as ‘City Governor’ (Antipodes, sig. G2v).  
The opening of the trial brings court practices and arbitrary judgement into 
question: 
 
 Byp[lay]:  Call the defendant, and the Plaintiffe in. 
 
 Sword[-bearer]: Their counsell and their witnesses. 
 
                                                
26 Although Mukherji refers to Spinella’s trial as a ‘false trial’ (2006a, passim), and it is not 
necessarily carried out in a real court, it is a real trial in that there are real consequences for the 
accused, whatever the outcome.  The trials in The Antipodes and The Traytor (which I will discuss 
shortly) are knowingly pretended trials, acted out within the play for a purpose other than judging the 
accused. 
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 Byp: How now! 
  How long ha you beene free oth Poyntmakers, 
  Good master hilt and scaberd carrier; 
  (Which is in my hands now) do you give order 
  For counsell and for witnesses in a cause 
  Fit for my hearing, or for me to judge, haw? 
  I must be rul’d and circumscrib’d by Lawyers must I, 
  And witnesses, haw? no you shall know 
  I can give judgement, be it right or wrong, 
  Without their needlesse proving and defending: 
  So bid the Lawyers goe and shake their eares, 
  If they have any, and the witnesses, 
  Preserve their breath to prophesie of dry summers.  
(Antipodes, sig. G2v) 
 
Byplay’s immediate reaction to the Swordcarrier’s calling of counsel and witnesses 
is an attempt to maintain control: the hilt and scabbard (symbols of justice) are in 
his hands once the trial has begun, and this hearing is for him alone to judge.  This 
determination to proceed with the trial in his own way is continued in his objection 
to being ‘rul’d and circumscrib’d by Lawyers’ which, echoing Domitian (Roman 
Actor, sig. D3r), hints towards a kind of absolutism in the governor of Anti-London 
which disregards the law when judicial expedience requires it.  That this desire to be 
without the rule of lawyers is a practice of Anti-London, which is ‘contrary in 
Manners’ (Antipodes, sig. E1v) to London, suggests that it should not be the 
practice of the Caroline legal proceedings, thus making a critical comment on the 
legal manoeuvrings of Charles I and his Judges which common lawyers did attempt 
to circumscribe.  Byplay’s assertion of his ability to give a judgement ‘right or 
wrong’ without proving or defending is reminiscent of the arbitrary justice of A 
Jovial Crew’s Justice Clack who can inform himself of guilt or innocence by the 
defendants’ countenances alone (Joviall Crew, sigsM3v-M4r).
27
  Martin Butler 
suggests that Byplay’s ‘self-opinionated judge’ comes from a long tradition of such 
figures descending from Jonson’s Justice Clement and including Clack, but that his 
                                                
27 See Chapter 4, p.232.   
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comment on ‘needlesse proving and defending’ may also make reference to ‘the 
drawn-out arguments and delayed judgement of the Ship Money case’ (Butler, 
1987, 216), a particularly controversial issue of prerogative rule.  The brief 
comment about lawyers’ missing ears could snipe at William Prynne, grounding this 
Antipodean court in contemporary London courts, specifically the Star Chamber, 
which had begun to gain a reputation for arbitrary royal judgement.
28
  Although 
these practices (acting without lawyers or witnesses) are those of Antipodean Anti-
London, in many cases in Caroline London, particularly those heard in Star 
Chamber, witnesses did not appear in court, their testimony having been given in 
writing before the defendant appeared in front of the Judge (Barnes, 1962, 229), and 
trials for felony in the common law courts proceeded, as Byplay will have it here, 
without the benefit of a lawyer for the defence.
29
  In presenting these as Anti-
London, contrary practices, Brome passes comment on the (im)propriety of their 
inclusion in London’s legal proceedings. 
 
 The association of the Antipodean court with Star Chamber is continued in 
Peregrine’s comment on the ‘equity’ of Byplay’s procedure: 
 
 Byp: Bring me the plaintiffe, and defendant only. 
  But the defendant first, I will not heare 
  Any complaint before I understand 
  What the defendant can say for himselfe. 
 
 Per[egrine]: I have not known such down right equity, 
  If he proceeds as he begins, ile grace him. –  
(Antipodes, sigs. G2v-G3r) 
 
                                                
28
 See above, pp. 245-47.  Steggle’s suggestion of a date of 1636 for this play (2004, 105-109) would 
not disallow this allusion, as Prynne’s ears were cropped twice, once in 1633 and once in 1637. 
29
 Defendants in trials for treason or felony were not allowed to consult lawyers for points of fact, but 
they were usually allowed for difficult points in law (Herrup, 1999, 55). 
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Peregrine’s reference to ‘equity’ does at least suggest a fairness in allowing the 
defendant to explain himself before passing judgement – something the arbitrary 
Justice Clack, for example, would not do – but there is, of course, something absurd 
about his hearing the defence before the complaint, and Peregrine’s praise of this as 
the correct way to proceed in trial is also symptomatic of the madness, associated 
with arbitrary absolutism and intemperate desire, that the doctor is trying to cure in 
him.
 30 
 Perhaps Star Chamber’s judgements, this suggests, are not as equitable as 
the Court’s designation as a court of equity might imply. 
 
 Byplay hears the case: a merchant has brought a gentleman to court for 
refusing to sleep with his (the merchant’s) wife in payment for the cloth he has 
provided.  Although the gentleman offers to pay him twice its monetary value, the 
merchant will not accept this because it will not satisfy his wife.  Byplay’s 
judgement that he himself will take the cloth and satisfy the tradesman’s wife is an 
appropriate Antipodean solution to the triviality of the case, but before examining 
the implications of the sentence it is worth considering the judge’s stated reasoning: 
 
Peace, I should  
 Now give my sentence, and for your contempt, 
(which is a great one, such as if let pass 
Unpunished, may spread forth a dangerous 
Example to the breach of City custome, 
By gentlemens neglect of Tradesmens wives) 
I should say for this contempt commit you 
Prisoner from the sight of any other woman 
Untill you give this mans wife satisfaction, 
And she release you; justice so would have it. (Antipodes, sig. G4r) 
 
The comic suggestion that it would be disastrous to the city customs in Anti-London 
if Byplay were to set an example allowing gentlemen not to sleep with tradesmen’s 
                                                
30
 See Chapter 3, pp.166-176 for a discussion of the relationship between madness and absolutism, 
reason and law in this play. 
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wives suggests a wish to prevent this becoming common in London.  More 
significantly, however, the comedy of this comment and the triviality of its cause 
disguise a more serious point: early modern common law legal practice (indicated 
again by ‘custome’) placed a great deal of importance on precedent, so when 
pronouncing difficult or controversial judgements in the common law courts of 
record, the judges not only had to weigh the evidence but take into consideration the 
implications of the precedent it would set. 
 
The hierarchy established in having both Peregrine (the ‘king’) and Byplay 
(the ‘City Governor’) of the Antipodes on stage simultaneously, encourages the 
audience to see Byplay as a lower ranking Judge than Peregrine, Domitian, the 
Roman Senators or Auria, and it is with the position of the local justice with which 
the sentence of the Antipodean trial scene is concerned.   Although Byplay has 
stated that he knows how justice ‘would have it’, he chooses to adopt an alternative 
solution: 
 
But as I am a Citizen by nature, 
(For education made it so) ile use 
Urbanity in your behalfe towards you; 
And as I am a gentleman by calling, 
(For so my place must have it) ile performe 
For you the office of a gentleman 
Towards his wife, I therefore order thus: 
That you bring me the wares here into Court, 
(I have a chest shall hold ’hem, as mine owne) 
And you send me your wife, ile satisfie her 
My selfe. Ile do’t, and set all streight and right. (Antipodes, sig. G4r-v) 
 
His comments upon a gentleman’s position and a citizen’s education is an obvious 
satire upon the behaviour of city traders and gentlemen, but more seriously it 
suggests the difficult position judges held in trying to negotiate between their 
position as gentlemen and local authority figures and the citizens for whom they 
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administered justice, and upon whom they were to press, for example, Charles’ 
potentially illegal extra-parliamentary taxation.
31
  Unable to be entirely a citizen 
because of his position as Judge, and constrained not to be a gentleman by his 
education, Byplay’s solution at first appears to answer both sides of the dispute:  the 
gentleman does not receive the goods for which he has not ‘paid’, and the citizen’s 
wife is satisfied.  However, it is clear that the only person really satisfied here is the 
Judge himself, who gains free cloth and unquestioned access to the citizen’s wife, 
and Byplay’s knowing comment immediately following the sentence, ‘Justice is 
blinde, but Judges have their sight’ (Antipodes, sig. G4r-v), implies judicial 
corruption.  Yet the fact that this comment is placed immediately after Byplay’s 
explanation that, given his liminal position, this is the only sentence he can pass, 
raises the question as to whether this judgement is a result of the judge’s innate 
corruption or of his taking advantage of the impossible situation in which he finds 
himself. Peregrine, the self-proclaimed King of the Antipodes who at this point is 
still mad, expresses satisfaction with the verdict exclaiming, ‘Most admirable 
Justice’ (Antipodes, sig.G4v), suggesting that only arbitrary monarchy would 
approve of either the self-serving action or the situation in which the Justice is 
placed.  Peregrine’s subsequent recovery and reformation of the laws of the 
Antipodes confirms that Antipodean practice is, or should be, an inversion of the 
organisation of the English courts.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
31 See Chapter 4, pp. 198-200. 
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The process of prosecution: The Traytor  
 
The comedy of Brome’s courtroom and the easy slippage between inverting 
and displaying English judicial practices highlights some of the failings of the 
Caroline judicial system.  The lack of legal counsel hinted at in Byplay’s comments, 
and the dramatic, adversarial aspects of trial procedure are explored in more detail 
in Depazzi’s trial in James Shirley’s The Traytor.  Like that in The Antipodes, this is 
an imagined trial.  In a similar vein to the interview between Prince Harry and King 
Henry in Act II of Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, acted out by Harry and Falstaff 
(who each take a turn at being Prince and the King) so that Harry can prepare what 
he will say to explain his dissolute actions to his father, Depazzi, a conspirator to 
treason, asks his servant Rogero to act as prosecutor in a preparatory ‘trial’ so that 
he can practise his defence.
32
 
 
Despite Depazzi’s threat of ‘I will beate you, if you wonot imagine at my 
bidding’, Rogero is reluctant to participate, claiming ‘Good my Lord it will not 
become me, being your humble servant’ (Traytor, sig, E2v).  This concern for 
propriety is notably absent in the similar inversion of servant-master/mistress 
relations in Pru’s position as judge for the days sports in Jonson’s The New Inn, and 
suggests the extent of the verbal assault which Rogero associates with treason trials, 
and which Depazzi expects if he is caught.
33
  In response to Rogero’s concern for 
his humble status, Depazzi states:   
 
                                                
32
 The interview acted by Harry and Falstaff is only a prefiguring of this sort of pretended trial, as 
neither of them actually offers a defence of Hal’s actions; rather, as ‘King’ they take the opportunity 
either to compliment (Falstaff) or criticise (Harry) Falstaff as a companion for the prince. 
33 See Chapter 1 pp. 33-51 for a discussion of The New Inn. 
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Humble Coxcombe, is’t not for my good?  I say, accuse me, bring it home, 
jerke me soundly to the quicke Rogero, tickle me as thou lovst thy Lord; I 
doe defie thee, spare me not, and the divell take thee if thou bee’st not 
malicious. (The Traytor, sigs. E2v-E3r) 
 
The series of violent and uncomfortable metaphors for this interrogation suggest the 
virulence of questioning Depazzi expects and perhaps the versatility his response 
will require, and in insisting that Rogero be ‘malicious’, Depazzi anticipates the 
worst that will confront him if his plotted treason with Lorenzo is discovered.  This 
staged trial, with permission for the prosecutor to ‘spare […] not’ the defendant, 
allows the presentation on stage not only of an exaggerated version of Depazzi’s 
possible trial, but also of an example of how real treason trials could be perceived 
by the Caroline theatrical and law-court audiences.       
 
Rogero soon warms to his role, and accuses his master, without evidence, of 
several attempts upon the Duke’s life: 
 
Do not interrupt mee varlet I will proove it, his hunting saddle, and woe 
shall be unto thy breech therefore, and finding this serpentive treason broken 
in the shell, doe but lend your reverend eares to his next designes I will cut 
em off presently.  This irreligious nay Atheistical Traitor, did with his owne 
hands poison the Dukes prayer booke, oh impiety!  
[…] 
hee hath for this fortnight or three weekes before his apprehension, walk’d 
up and downe the Court with a case of pistols charg’d, wherewith, as he 
partly confessed, hee intended to send the Duke to heaven with a powder.  
               (Traytor, sig.  E3v) 
 
‘[C]ut em off’ has particular resonance in relation to perceived Caroline law court 
activities; although in the sense of the sentence, this is said in relation to 
expounding Depazzi’s further crimes, coming so close to the reference to ‘eares’ it 
refers to sentence of ear cropping, reminding the theatre audience of the physical 
punishments meted out by contemporary courts.  Methods of prosecution are 
questioned here too in the mention of Depazzi’s possible atheism.  As Cynthia 
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Herrup argues in her discussion of the trial of the second Earl of Castlehaven in 
1631:  
 
adversarial law is as much about style as it is about fact […] Trials are 
confrontations, rhetorical swordplay within set rules.  Like the swordplay of 
the theater, trials are constructed to persuade their audiences […]  
Regardless of fact and even law, the best performance is the most 
convincing one.  And the most convincing one is usually the one most 
strategically attuned to the fears and ideals of the judge and jury. (Herrup, 
1999, 55) 
 
Thus in stating that Depazzi is not only a traitor, but an ‘atheistical’ traitor, the ‘ex 
tempore’ (Traytor, sig. E2v) prosecutor brings his moral character into question, 
playing upon contemporary fears regarding non-belief, irrespective of his crime and 
adding a charge of atheism to the alleged treason.
34
   
 
In response to the accusations laid against him, Depazzi asks for evidence of 
his guilt: 
 
 Dep:  Will you justifie this?  Did I any of these things you tadpole? 
 
Ro:  Hold your selfe contented my Lord, he that is brought t[o] the barre in 
case of treason, must looke to have more objected then hee can answere, or 
any man is able to justifie. (Traytor, sig. E3v) 
 
Depazzi and Rogero here seem to step out of character from the acted trial and 
converse again as master and servant.  However, Rogero’s reply is more than a 
defence to his master of his insolence, also providing a comment upon the 
perception of State treason trials: once arrested for treason, a man becomes subject 
to a barrage of accusations which cannot be justified or defended, and in a trial for 
                                                
34 Being a Catholic and possibly an atheist were accusations incorporated into the trial of the Earl of 
Castlehaven for rape and sodomy in 1631, shortly before the play was written (Herrup, 1999, 3).  
Castlehaven’s trial was such a public event that it is possible it had some influence in Shirley’s play.  
For a discussion of the the Castlehaven trial in relation to John Ford’s Perkin Warbeck, see Hopkins, 
1999b, passim. 
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felony, defendants had no right to warning of the evidence against them (Herrup, 
1999, 55).    
 
It is not merely the subject of the accusations, however, which become 
impossible for Depazzi to answer, but the nature of the questioning, as his defence 
is turned against him: 
 
Ro:  That that my Lord hath overthrowne him, he saieth hee never sought 
the princes life, ergo he sought his death, besides he hath heard of treason, 
now he that heareth and discovereth not is equally guilty in fact: for in 
offences of this nature there are not accessories, ergo hee is a principall, and 
beeing a principal Traitor, hee deserveth condemnation. (Traytor, sig. E3v-
E4r) 
 
In knowing about the plot, Depazzi is automatically implicated.
35
  His inadvertent 
admission of guilt demonstrates the dangers for the accused of ore tenus (oral 
questioning) carried out by the Attorney General in the Star Chamber rather than the 
more usual submission of all complaints and answers in writing: 
 
There was much objection to the ore tenus procedure even then, and various 
safeguards were thrown around it. It is not hard to see that it was likely to 
lead to abuses[...]  A man suddenly arrested and privately and skilfully 
examined, overwrought, and perhaps entrapped into an unintentional and 
injudicious confession, then retained in the custody of a pursuivant until he 
was brought, without counsel, into the presence of the most dignified 
persons of the kingdom, was but ill provided with even such poor protection 
as the practice of the common-law courts then gave to a culprit’. (Cheyney, 
1913, 740-41) 
 
The kind of word play Rogero indulges in returns to the idea of swordplay that 
Herrup associates with both the theatre and the courtroom (1999, 55), once again 
explicitly connecting these two forums for debate.  Moreover, Depazzi’s confession 
                                                
35
 In the same way that the earlier accusation of atheism was reminiscent of the Castlehaven trial, so 
here is the impossibility of being an accessory to particular crimes:  all parties were tried as 
principals in cases of rape and sodomy (Herrup, 1999, 26). 
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that he knew of treason not only confirms that he is guilty, but gives the prosecutor 
the opportunity to prevent him giving any further defence: 
 
 Dep: Shall I not speake? 
  
Ro:  No, traitors must not be sufferd to speake, for when they have leave, 
they have liberty, and hee that is a Traitor deserveth to bee close Prisoner. 
 
 […] 
 Ro:  I defie al the world that wil heare a Traitor speak, for himselfe, tis  
against the Law which provids that no man shal defend treason, and he that 
speakes for him being a Traitor, doth defend his treason, thou art a Capitall 
obstreperous malefactor.  (Traytor, sig. E4r) 
 
Although traitors were usually allowed to speak for themselves at trial – C. G. L. Du 
Cann suggests that Wentworth’s ‘stubborn fight and his final great speech in his 
own defence’ might have saved him by a vote of his peers (1964, 141) – Rogero’s 
comment reflects upon a common contemporary argument: those accused of treason 
(and other felonies) were thought to have no defence, and so were not allowed  to 
consult lawyers for their defence in point of fact, although lawyers were usually 
allowed for difficult points in law (Herrup, 1999, 55).   
 
 The adversarial nature of Depazzi’s acted trial is highlighted when compared 
with the treason trial in Shirley’s The Doubtful Heir (1640).  This is not an imagined 
trial; Ferdinand is on trial for his life having invaded the kingdom claiming to be the 
rightful king.  Ferdinand is allowed to defend himself at trial, although it is made 
clear that this is a favour bestowed by the Queen not a right: 
 
 Although the Queen in her own Royal power, 
 And without violating Sacred Justice, where 
Treason comes to invade her, and her Crown 
With open war, need not insist upon  
The Forms, and Circumstance of Law, but use 
Her sword in present execution; 
Yet such is the sweet temper of her blood, 
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And calmness of her Nature, though provok’d 
Ino [sic] a storm, unto the great’st offender 
She shuts up no defence, willing to give 
A satisfaction to the world how much 
She doth delight in mercy. (The Doubtful Heir, sig. C3r) 
 
Whilst Ferdinand’s crime is mentioned here, the emphasis is placed upon the 
Queen’s goodness (‘sweet temper’, ‘calmness’, ‘mercy’) and her acceptance of the 
forms and processes of law despite having no compulsion to do so.  It is in fact a 
demonstration of her mercy that she allows Ferdinand to speak.  Later, as if to 
confirm this image of her justice, Olivia prevents her counsellors from interrupting 
his defence: 
 
 Ferd[inand]:  I am Ferdinand, 
  And you the fair Olivia, brothers children. 
 
 Leon[ario]: What insolence is this? 
  
Qu[een]:  Oh my Lord, let him 
  Be free to plead; for if it be no dream, 
  His cause wil want an Orator:  By my blood, 
  He does talk bravely. (Doubtful Heir, sig. C3v) 
 
In this, and the earlier emphasis placed upon her goodness, Shirley presents an 
idealised image of a just ruler who is prepared to hear arguments on both sides, 
despite the attack Ferdinand makes on her throne.  Her decision to pardon him after 
hearing him speak, despite her courtiers’ ‘officious’ attempts to have him executed 
(Doubtful Heir, sig. C5r), could be seen as Providential preservation of the rightful 
monarch, as Ferdinand is in fact the true king, not a pretender to the throne. 
 
 Shirley can, therefore, allow the ‘traitor’ of The Doubtful Heir to be 
pardoned; he has committed no offence.  Depazzi, however, who has really 
conspired to commit treason, escapes execution at this point only because he pleads 
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to an imagined judge, against a performing prosecutor, and thus can easily bring his 
trial to an end: 
 
Ro: Hold, hold good my Lord, I am sensible, I ha done, imagine, I ha done, I 
but obeyd your Lordship, whose batoone I finde stronger then my 
imagination, my Lord you will answer this to stricke i’th Court thus? 
 
 Dep: I Am as wearie ---- harke Rogero    Knockes 
one knocks, see, see thers to make thee amends see good Rogero, and say 
nothing pray heaven it be no pursevant. (Traytor, sig. E4r) 
 
Rogero’s effortless list of possible criminal activities, and the comedy of his almost 
plaintiff admission that the ‘batoone’ is stronger than his imagination, draws the 
audience’s attention away from the potentially serious prosecution Depazzi could 
face. The beating Depazzi administers to end the trial echoes that which he 
threatened if Rogero did not ‘imagine at [his] bidding’ (Traytor, sig. E2v), and this, 
with the emphasis on imagination in Rogero’s asking him to stop, highlights that 
this is only a pretend trial.  Rogero’s question, ‘will you answer this to stricke i’th 
Court thus’, reminds the audience that such an end to the trial – beating the 
prosecutor – would be impossible were he really indicted for treason against the 
Duke, just as Depazzi’s fear of the imminent appearance of a pursuivant and his 
need to bribe Rogero to silence illustrates the seriousness of his crime and the trial 
and execution which would await him.
36
 
 
 Unusually for trial scenes, there is no character on stage for Depazzi’s trial 
playing a Judge. Without interjections from a ‘judge’ the theatre audience are, 
                                                
36
 The possibility that this fake trial will be interrupted by the appearance of a pursuivant is made 
more likely in the theatrical heritage of the scene: Harry and Falstaff’s interview in Act II of Henry 
IV Part 1 is interrupted by a sheriff who wants to arrest Falstaff for stealing gold.  For Falstaff this 
threat of the law is avoided because Harry first lies for him to send the Sheriff away, and then returns 
the gold to its rightful owner; Depazzi recants his treachery in fear for his life and pays Lorenzo half 
the price again of the office he had bought, hoping by doing so to ‘induce your Lordship to dismisse 
mee’ and ‘have my Lordships good will’ (Traytor, sig. H1v).   
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perhaps, given more freedom to give their own comment on the activities and 
procedures of the trial, but the absence of a justice figure may suggest that this trial 
scene, unlike the trials of Paris, Spinella and the gentleman / merchant, does not 
comment on the judicial authority.  However, Depazzi does make sure that Judges 
are at least represented in his staged trial: ‘conceive I prithee, that these chaires were 
Judges most grave and venerable beards and faces at my arraignement’ (Traytor, 
sig. E2v).  The vague description of ‘venerable beards and faces’ suggests that not 
only are the Judges potentially indistinguishable one from another, but that there is 
little substance behind their venerable appearance, something confirmed by the fact 
that the accused and prosecutor in this trial make their addresses to empty chairs.  
Rogero’s deference to ‘the most understanding seates of Justice: most wise, most 
honourable, and most incorrupt Judges’ (Traytor, sig. E3r) is not only comic – they 
are quite literally ‘seates’ and no more – but also potentially critical: the only wise, 
honourable and incorrupt seats of justice in a play so full of plotting, deception, and 
corruption are the empty ones. 
 
 
Absent Judges and Legal Authority 
 
The empty seats of justice in The Traytor’s trial scene is the most obvious 
representation of the destabilisation of legal authority explored in all of the trial 
scenes examined in this chapter. Although the absolute authority of Domitian as 
Emperor is maintained despite the Senate’s attempt to convict his favourite in his 
absence (suggesting an already divided authority), from this point, figures of 
legitimate judicial authority come to be divided, undermined, questioned and, 
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ultimately, absent in the trial scenes of Caroline drama.  Auria’s authority is brought 
into question by his unnecessary exercise of it, and the absolutism of patriarchal law 
is undermined by Aurelio’s rash assumptions about Spinella’s virtue; Byplay’s 
judgement is questioned as potentially corrupt but also illustrates the divided 
loyalties and impossible position of those who are at once an independent legal 
authority and subject to the King; Olivia’s trial of Frederick undermines legitimate 
authority as it is he, not she, who is the real monarch, and Depazzi’s incorrupt, 
venerable judges are completely absent in the corrupt royal court in which the Duke 
or Prince’s word is enforceable law.  In place of these absent figures of legal 
authority, the theatre audience is invited to be judge not only of the plays and the 
social and cultural topics debated in them, but also, in the exploration of the use and 
abuse of authority each play presents, to consider the foundation and legitimate 
exercise of legal authority itself.
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In 1634, The Triumph of Peace was presented at court.  Although it is a 
masque, and not a play of the commercial theatre, it would be a significant omission 
in a thesis concerned with the theatrical representations of legal authority under 
Charles I if this masque did not receive some consideration.  Written by James 
Shirley, writer for the Queen’s acting company at the Cockpit, The Triumph of 
Peace was unusual in being presented not by the King to the Queen or the Queen to 
the King, but by the gentlemen of all four Inns of Court. The men learned in the law 
were addressing the king on the topic of law and prerogative.
1
   The lawyers staged 
a public procession through from Holbourne to Whitehall, enacting the Triumph of 
the masque’s title.  The use of triumphal iconography is not unusual for the period; 
                                                
1 There is some debate over the reasons for the presentation of the masque. The records of the Middle 
Temple in October 1633 suggest that the original pretext for the masque was the birth of the Duke of 
York; those of the Inner Temple claim it is because there has been ‘no representation of any mask or 
show before the King’s Majesty by the four Inns of Court or any of them sithens his Highness’ 
access unto the Crown’ (JCS, V.1155).  However, the most commonly understood reason for 
producing the masque is the need for a declaration of loyalty by the Inns of Court after the 
publication of William Prynne’s Histriomastix, which condemned all plays and revels as inherently 
sinful (passim) and described women actors as ‘notorious whores’ in its Index.  Prynne was a 
member of Lincoln’s Inn at the time of the publication, and had dedicated the book to the ‘masters of 
the bench’ at Lincoln’s Inn, and to the students of all four Inns of Court.  The royal court took great 
offence; dramatic entertainment played a large part in court life and the Queen frequently acted in 
court theatricals, and Histriomastix was understood to be directly critical of royal activities. 
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indeed, it borrows the imperial, triumphal iconography of Charles’ court.  Charles 
himself had previously danced as a conquering King in Aurelian Townshend’s 
Albion’s Triumph (1632) in which a Roman Triumph was recreated at Whitehall.  
This association between Charles and Imperial iconography, and his peaceful reign, 
allows the understanding that the ‘Peace’ of the title refers to Charles’ personal 
rule.
2
  However, as is clear from Shirley’s description of the masque, it was not 
Charles who rode in triumph through London, nor was it the masquer representing 
Irene (Peace), but rather the lawyers of the Inns of Court.  Already, then, tension is 
presented between the King’s prerogative law and the lawyers as representatives of 
established law.
3
  After a series of antimasques presenting the ‘effects / Of peace’ 
(Triumph of Peace, sig. B3r) which include Projectors, tavern activities, and 
beggars who drop their crutches and dance once they have been given money by a 
gentleman, Irene (Peace) descends, chasing away the disorderly figures, who 
significantly are connected with aspects of prerogative rule, and the main masque, 
which presents a more harmonious relationship between the king and the law 
proceeds. 
 
Irene wonders at the delay of her sisters’ arrival, and appeals for Eunomia 
(Law) to arrive because: ‘I’m lost with them / That know not how to order me’.
4
  
                                                
2 Orgel and Strong argue that as the personal rule had been underway for several years, the peace 
may be recognised as the King’s peace.  The architecture of the backdrop to the first scene of the 
masque too, they suggest, is, to its designer Inigo Jones, representative of the King’s Peace (1973, 
pp. 65 and 39) 
3 In Chapman’s Memorable Masque, another masque which processed through London, Eunomia 
appears as the ‘virgin priest of the Goddess Honour’ (Memorable Masque l. 76).  Eunomia as Law, 
in this Jacobean masque, is important in moderating access to honour, ‘since none should dare access 
to Honour, but by Virtue; of which Law being the rule, must needs be a chief’ (Memorable Masque 
ll.170-171), but law does not have the same independent status as it is allowed in The Triumph of 
Peace. 
4
 Contrary to Venuti’s argument (1986, .202-3), there is no reason to see Eunomia as symbolic of 
parliamentary rule in this masque.  It is clear, in both the antimasques and the main masque, that The 
Triumph of Peace is concerned with issues of law and prerogative rather than parliamentary 
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Eunomia descends, claiming she could not have been absent for this night, but 
compliments Irene for her gentleness in inviting her sister, Law, to join her 
(Triumph, sig. C3r).  This presents an ideal relationship between the King’s peace in 
which, despite the fact the law should accompany prerogative, the courtesy of the 
invitation highlights the King’s graciousness.  This ideal is emphasised as Eunomia 
and Irene proceed to compliment one another, each trying to give the other 
precedence: 
 
 Irene:  Thou dost beautifie increase, 
  And chain security with peace. 
 
 Eunomia: Irene fair, and first divine, 
  All my blessings spring from thine. 
 
 Irene: I am but wilde without thee. (Triumph, sig. C3v). 
 
It is clear that peace can only be secure with the help of law, but the blessings of law 
cannot flourish without peace.  Eunomia’s reference to Irene being ‘first divine’ 
may also be a compliment to Charles, commenting upon the divine status of 
kingship.  Eunomia and Irene end this discussion with an announcement of their 
perfect harmony: 
 
 The world shall give prerogative to neyther. 
 Wee cannot flourish but together. 
     (Triumph, sig. C3v). 
 
The use of the language of the personal rule to allow equal importance to Peace and 
Law does not deny Charles the possibility of prerogative; it does, however, 
                                                                                                                                    
government.  Eunomia does appear as Parliamentary rule in the Anonymous Tragedy of the Cruell 
Warre, which is modelled closely on The Triumph of Peace.  This pamphlet is an appeal for 
cooperation between the King and Parliament in order to bring an end to the Civil War.  This re-
telling of The Triumph of Peace foregrounds the emphasis placed on harmony in this masque. 
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emphasise that prerogative must work in harmony with law if peace is to produce, 
as it should, a ‘golden harvest’ (Triumph, sig. C3v ).
5
   
 
Significantly, it is not until Irene and Eunomia have agreed upon this 
harmonious union that Dice, Justice, can descend.  In this way, the masque instructs 
Charles that his reign, however peaceful, can only be just if his prerogative exists in 
a harmonious relationship with law.  Kevin Sharpe argues that this part of the 
masque reveals that there can be no peace without law and justice (Sharpe, 1990, 
219).  However, the order of the goddesses’ appearances and the association of 
Peace with Charles’ personal rule suggest a movement in the masque towards a 
greater sense of justice, rather that specifically towards a more stable peace.  For 
this reason, it is significant that Dice addresses her sister as ‘chast Eunomia’ (sig. 
C4r).  If law is to be just, she must be no one’s mistress. 
 
 During her descent, Dice comments that her sisters have ‘forsaken Heaven’s 
bright gate, / To attend another state / Of gods below’ (Triumph, sig C4r), giving 
overt praise to Charles and Henrietta Maria, whom the sisters recognise as Jove and 
Themis, parents of the Hours and the figures of Divine Power and Divine Law. In 
these roles, the union of the royal couple represents the union of prerogative and 
law (Butler, 1987, 132) and once again the emphasis is upon their ‘chaste’ union 
(Triumph, C4v), suggesting that prerogative power, although divine, must be joined 
harmoniously with law if there is to be justice.
6
   For a moment, the King and Queen 
                                                
5
 In his dedicatory epistle to Queen Elizabeth in The Elements of the Common Lawes of England, 
Francis Bacon also comments on the necessary union of peace and law, claiming that the Queen is 
the  ‘life of our lawes… because you are the life of our peace, without which lawes are put to 
silence’ (Bacon, 1630, sig. A2r). 
6
 Cf. Butler, 1987, 132.  Coelum Brittanicum, to which gentlemen of the Inns were invited in 
gratitude for the performance of The Triumph of Peace, refers to the image of Charles and Henrietta 
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become central to the masque’s action, as the Genius draws their attention to the 
masquers from the Inns of Court, and comments that their attention animates the 
‘sons of Peace, Law and Justice’ (Triumph, sig, D1r): 
 
 No forraigne persons I make knowne 
 But here present you with your owne, 
 The Children of your Raign, not blood; 
 […] 
 O smile on what your selves have made, 
 There have no forme, no sunne, no shade, 
 But what your vertue doth create, 
 […] 
 That very looke into each eye 
 Hath shot a soul, I saw it fly. (Triumph, sig D1v) 
 
In describing the lawyers as the children of Charles’ reign, Shirley again presents an 
idealised relationship between the King and the law; the lawyers should not be 
‘forraigne’ to Charles’ rule.   The invitation to the monarch to look and smile on the 
lawyers allows Charles to participate in the masque in animating their dance, but 
also realises the notion that the king must acknowledge the law and lawyers to 
create the harmonious union of the court and Inns which follows later in the revels.  
Significantly, the king’s recognition of the lawyers makes the Hours (Peace, Law 
and Justice) happy (Triumph, sig. D1v-D2r). 
 
 This renewed harmony between the court and law is, however, disrupted by 
a strange sound behind the scenes as ‘ a cracke is heard in the workes, as if there 
were some danger by some piece of the Machines falling’ (Triumph, sig D2r); the 
                                                                                                                                    
Maria’s chaste marriage as an ideal which the gods are emulating in the heavens in their reforms 
begun in order to match the virtue of Charles’ court.  It is particularly noteworthy that Carew too 
uses this image in reference to law, claiming that as Jupiter is not only commanding chastity and 
marital fidelity, but maintaining this himself, ‘there is no doubt of an universal obedience, where the 
Lawgiver himself in his own person observes his decrees so punctually’ (Coelum Brittanicum, ll. 
243-245).  In claiming that the gods are imitating Charles’ court, thus praising the King through 
idealising his actions, Carew also comments on an ideal situation in which the King does follow his 
own laws.  A King who expects his subject to be obedient to law needs to obey it himself. 
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illusory world of the masque, for a moment, seems as if it will literally come 
crashing down. This is, however, followed by the ungainly and comic appearance of 
a group of craftsmen and their wives who, having participated in creating the 
masque, now insist on being able to watch it: 
 
Painter:  I, come, be resolute, we know the worst, and let us challenge a  
privelledge, those stairs were of my painting. 
 
 Carpenter:  And that Timber I set up: some body is my witness. 
       (Triumph, sig. D3r) 
 
The language of their complaint is significant as it is the language of prerogative.  
Their contribution to the creation of the masque gives them a right (‘privelledge’) to 
be present at the performance, but their unexpected presence also challenges the 
privileged exclusivity of the invited audience, their (mis)use of the language of 
privilege also suggests a challenge to the King’s prerogative over law.  The point at 
which this disruption occurs is also significant as it reminds the audience that, 
although in the world of the masque the relationship between the King and lawyers 
has been idealised and as such has made Peace, Law and Justice happy, the masque 
is only a performance, engineered through machinery and costume.  In the practical 
world outside the masque, this ideal relationship must also be realised and practised.  
Understanding that the masque will not continue while they remain in the hall, the 
craftsmen and their wives decide to ‘dance a figary’ themselves so that the audience 
will think they are another antimasque, and they can avoid punishment for their 
intrusion (‘we may else kisse the Porter’s lodge for ’t’) (Triumph, D3r).    Order 
then is restored and the masquers of the Inns are encouraged to take the ladies of the 
court to dance.  The contrast in grace and order between the craftsmen’s ‘figary’ and 
the courtly dancing highlights the difference between a country ordered by law and 
one in which the language of ‘privilege’ is misused.  
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 In accordance with the order promulgated by the masque, the revels come to 
an end with the arrival of the morning in the figure of Amphiluche.  Sharpe suggests 
that this indicates that the invasion of her ‘unwelcome light’ (Triumph, sig. D3v) 
brings about the realisation that ‘reality, the outside world, must dawn’ (Sharpe, 
1990, 220).  Thus Amphiluche continues the negotiation between real and ideal 
instigated by the craftsmen’s intrusion.  However, her appearance also presents the 
lawyers’ hope that the real and ideal may now begin to coincide; Amphiluche is 
‘that glimpse of the light which is seen when the night is past, and the day is not yet 
appearing’ (Triumph, sig. D3v).  As much as The Triumph of Peace comments upon 
the problems with Charles’ personal rule in relation to law by presenting an 
idealised relationship between Peace and Law, the monarch and the masquers, it 
also anticipates a more constructive relationship between the lawyers and the king 
in the future.  
 
 
* * * 
 
 
 The harmony presented, however tentatively, between the monarch and the 
lawyers, the prerogative and the law in The Triumph of Peace is increasingly absent 
from drama of the commercial theatre.   Charles I’s attempts to gain greater and 
tighter control over the laws of the kingdom, asserting himself as the highest legal 
authority, led to an increased emphasis on the legitimacy of the common law as an 
alternative  to the king’s will as law.  Such assertions, drama of the period suggests, 
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bring about conflict between the king, the law, and local governors which 
culminates in the destabilisation, fragmentation and potentially, the disintegration of 
any legitimate legal authority.   
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Appendix  
 
 
 
 
 
The Dating of The Love-sick Court c.1626-1640 
 
 
The date of Richard Brome’s The Love-sick Court has been the most heavily 
debated of all the plays discussed in this thesis.  Most recent criticism agrees that 
the play was probably composed in the 1630s.   
 
However, Elizabeth Cook posits an early date of 1626, suggesting it was possibly 
the play licensed as The Brothers on 4 November 1626 and wrongly ascribed to 
Shirley (1947, 286). C. E. Andrews gives 1629 as a possible date based on Fleay’s 
dating (Andrews, 1981, 35). Gerald Bentley, however, suggests that Fleay’s 
decision to date the play to 1629 is based on nothing more than the similarity of its 
title to another of Brome’s plays, The Love-sick Maid, licensed in February 1628/9. 
Bentley himself gives the wide range of dates 1632-1640 (JCS. III.77).   Although 
Andrews’ argument that a potential source for the play (John Barclay’s Argenis) 
was printed in English in 1629 lends support to a date of circa 1629, Argenis was 
also printed in English in 1625, 1628 and 1636, so this source potentially provides 
evidence for all of the possible dates I discuss here.  The currently accepted view of 
the play is that it is a parody of courtly drama of the 1630s.  Martin Butler suggests 
it was written in the mid 1630s, because The Love-sick Court parodies a strain of 
tragicomedy being exploited in the mid decade by Davenant, Montagu and Carlell 
(Butler, 1984, 268).  For similar reasons, Catherine Shaw suggests a date of 1638 
310 
(Shaw, 1980, 29, 118-9), and Matthew Steggle suggests a date between 1637 and 
1639 (Steggle, 2004, 11, 137-141).   I would also suggest that the play’s reference 
to Tempe points towards a date of, or after, 1632 when the masque Tempe Restored 
was performed at court.  Dating the play in the early-mid 1630s would not negate 
my reading of the play in relation to the Petition of Right, as the issues of 
prerogative it involved were still current, and the political resonance of the Petition 
itself continued throughout the period.  For example, L. J. Reeve notes that the 
Petition was often cited in John Hampden’s case in the Exchequer Chamber in 1637 
and 1638 regarding his obligation to pay ship money (Reeve, 1986, 261). 
 
 
